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This dissertation examines the processes and outcomes of welfare regimes reforms in eleven 
Latin American countries, between 1980 and 2010. It theorizes the reforms by comparing 
pensions, health care, and social assistance policies.  In so doing, it confronts three theoretical 
goals. First, it provides an explanation of recent transformations of welfare regimes as resulting 
from the combined effects of gradual institutional change and exogenous socioeconomic 
transformations. Second, it explores the potentialities and limitations of historical 
institutionalism. Third, it identifies emerging patterns of governance.  
Mismatches between institutions and social problems trigger reforms, but do not determine the 
options that policy makers finally choose. Frictions caused by emerging social risks interact with 
difficulties of established welfare regimes to cope with old risks to facilitate access to public 
agendas for reformist projects. Ultimately, however, reforms depend on the construction of pro-
and anti-reform coalitions, shaped by two main forces: 1) lines of discrimination in the 
distribution of benefits by existing welfare regimes; 2) strategies of parties, interest groups, and 
bureaucracies, competing to activate those cleavages according to their interests. 
Socioeconomic change, fiscal strain, and transnational factors, interact to make the expansion of 
social protection contingent upon redistributions of burdens and benefits guaranteed to trigger 
resistance from groups privileged by existing schemes. The strategic challenge for reformist 
politicians is the crafting of formulas aimed at simultaneously neutralizing potential veto 
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coalitions and mobilizing unprotected populations. This requires combining strategies of blame-
avoidance and credit-claiming that variably mix persuasion, exclusion, and division targeting 
potential opposition. Selective pay-offs to appease privileged groups constitute the most direct 
determinants of the architecture of reforms.  
In explaining the reforms, I discuss endogenous institutional change and how this results in 
fragmented social protection policies. However, exogenous shocks may facilitate changes away 
from expected paths.  Certain institutional configurations are also found to block the 
consolidation of structural reforms entailing drastic institutional discontinuity, leading to 
situations of chronic instability and serial institutional replacement. 
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PREFACE 
 
The defense of this dissertation somehow closed what probably has been the most intense ten 
years of my life. Throughout the decade that I took to complete my PhD, many incredibly happy 
experiences combined with a comparable number of extremely painful ones, to form a 
contradictory sequence of emotional oscillations in which ups and downs not only abruptly 
alternated, but also frequently overlapped. Although only few of the episodes forming that 
bittersweet chain were directly related to my academic activities, many complicated them to a 
significant extent. I am convinced that obtaining a PhD is less a matter of intelligence than of 
developing survival skills. At least in my case, however, credit is also owed to a long list of 
generous people that I have been lucky enough to cross paths with. 
I have neither the time, nor the space, to mention here everyone I feel obliged to, but 
some cases deserve a special mention, even at the risk of being unfair. It is simply impossible to 
enumerate all I owe to Scott Morgenstern: I will simply summarize it by saying that without his 
support I would have not graduated. His academic reputation is deservedly solid; more 
importantly, I can certify that two attributes that in my country we call sensatez and, especially, 
don de gentes also distinguish him. I really treasure the gift of his generous friendship. 
The intellectual reputation of the other members of my dissertation committee is well 
known too. I believe I can safely say that, throughout these ten years, I may have very rarely left 
 xix 
an encounter with any of them without having learned something. Each one of them contributed 
with his own very personal intellectual style to what ended being a superb collective adviser. 
“You need to form a committee that can help you go through the process,” Guy Peters said to me 
when I was beginning to think about my dissertation. It took me a while to fully understand the 
sense of that apparently trivial advice. My deepest gratitude to Guy, Barry Ames, and John 
Markoff. 
Anybody having circulated academic environments for a while knows that there is no 
necessary connection between purely academic value and don de gentes; there are only too many 
brilliant colleagues out there who are simply not willing to invest their best effort in helping their 
students. Part of my luck has been that, already past an age where one is not so easily 
impressionable any longer, I met not one, but quite a few valuable role models. To the ones just 
mentioned, I would like to add George Reid Andrews, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, and Michael 
Goodhart. Last but not least, I have to mention the privilege of two years of work as an assistant 
to Carmelo Mesa-Lago: his encyclopedic knowledge of Latin American social security and 
healthcare systems and his generosity to share that treasure can hardly be exaggerated, neither 
can his deeply human commitment to the improvement of those systems in the direction of 
universalism, solidarity and equality.  
The survival of the full-time graduate student has, as that of most human beings, some 
very urgent and prosaic dimensions –it is very difficult to think clearly with an empty stomach. 
My survival owns a lot to the generosity of the Center for Latin American Studies at the 
University of Pittsburgh. However, if I have developed a deep affective commitment to the 
CLAS, it is not merely because of the multiple field research grants from which this dissertation 
has benefitted –not negligible nevertheless. It is first of all because of the amazing gang that 
 xx 
make it a great place to work. Julian Asenjo, Luis Bravo, John Frecchione, Karen Goldman, Luz 
Amanda Hank, Diana Shemenski, and Devon Tagliaferro, make the daily arrival to the office a 
pleasant experience. And it was only the patience and support of seu Luis that made a job 
compatible with finishing my dissertation –once again, obrigadinho. 
Something that will never cease to mesmerize me is people’s widely extended disposition 
to mistake for intelligence what is just cultural capital that owners’ have done nothing to deserve. 
There are very few ideas in this dissertation that I could not somehow relate to some 
conversation with Germán D’Elía or Andrés Vázquez-Romero –two men who were somehow 
capable of combining life-time dedication to the development of social rights in general and 
universal education in particular, with both intellectual production and the multiple activities that 
the need to feed their families frequently imposes on scholars in underdeveloped countries.  In 
the case of the former, a marvelous capacity to always being able to somehow make the time 
demanded by Loquillo should be added –if I some day manage to make a good granddad, the 
explanation will be parsimoniously mono-causal: I learned from the best. He and my father also 
made available two personal libraries that no public institution could facilitate in late twentieth 
century-Uruguay –especially during the years of the dictatorship under which my intellectual 
awakening took place. They also provided examples of principled commitment to the struggle 
for democracy that still make me smile each time I read some of the rational choice-based 
science fiction that too many of my colleagues cultivate these days. Most importantly, they 
showed me the amazing capacity of some human beings to build happy lives even under the 
direct every-day threat of state terrorism. 
As exciting as it is, the decision to leave one’s country to initiate a career in a strange 
land well into the fourth decade of one’s life is not an easy one. Many people played important 
 xxi 
roles making both my take-off from Uruguay and my landing in Pittsburgh way smoother than it 
could have otherwise been. I would not have landed in Pittsburgh without the support of Gaston 
Labadie and Mitchell Seligson. But this smoothing task is fundamentally a family business. Until 
her unexpected and too-early death, my mother provided unconditional support, as did my 
siblings Isabel and Antonio. My niece Malena had to face the challenge of developing a long-
distance relationship with tío Loquillo for most of her life: I cannot be but thankful for the results 
of the patience and love applied by la Pulguita at such task. Survival in the United States would 
have been far more difficult without the generosity and warmth of my cousins Elisa and Keith. 
Nancy and Pat, my parents-in-law, also deserve my gratitude. 
Family is just a matter of luck; friends are one of the few things we are truly allowed to 
choose in this life. I consider myself privileged for having Guillermo Acevedo, Elías Adler, 
David Bajada, Bruno Gili, Luis Giménez, Carlos Lesino, Germán Lodola, Sebastián Saiegh, and 
Álvaro Sánchez in mine. Special mentions are deserved by Jorge Papadópulos and Paul 
Morrison. Besides a generous sort of adoptive older brother, the former has been confessor, 
mentor, intellectual partner-in-crime, and, last but not least, creative gourmet. Few things I miss 
from Uruguay more than the opportunity of regularly sharing a cup of coffee or a glass of wine 
with him. Paul’s equally unexpected late arrival at and too-early departure from my life 
somehow summarize the intense bittersweetness of the last few years. A man from the 
Renaissance lost in the twenty-first century, he allowed me to share the warmth of his friendship, 
his subtly intelligent sense of humor, and the multiple fruits of his infinite curiosity and 
knowledge of literature, painting, music… and quantum physics. Very few days go by without 
me missing the hours of conversation from which his death deprived me too soon. I know “Uncle 
Paul” would have liked this dissertation. 
 xxii 
As is usually the case, those who provide what truly makes the difference at the end of 
the day come last. I do not exaggerate at all by saying that this degree is Candy’s, partner in love 
and life, as much as it is mine. I can simply not find good enough words to thank her for the life 
we have managed to jointly build and enjoy -under often very challenging circumstances. I 
would immediately sign anything guaranteeing the time to grow old together. Neither can I 
adequately express my gratitude to Andrés, Colton, and Isabel, for so much love and fun, and for 
their patience with a dad who was too busy too often. More than on any other person in my life, 
these ten years have entailed important sacrifices for my enano, which he always absorbed with 
loving generosity and patience. If any regrets were to be mentioned here, the ones from missing 
too much of his process of becoming both un hombre cabal and a guitar virtuoso would be at the 
top of my list. I simply wish I could have had him by my side more often.  Chimpie has been less 
willing to honor the restrictions imposed on his time with Daddyman by that thing called 
dissertation, and I believe that has been in the end a healthy thing for which I thank him. As for 
my atorranta, the little hurricane of cheerfulness and joy that has been sweeping our lives for the 
last two years, my survival to the combined challenges of her energy and a dissertation suggest 
that I may have actually developed some skills, now that I think about it. In any case, it has been 
a wonderful challenge. My deepest gratitude, niña Isabel. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW 
This dissertation has three main goals. First, it is an attempt to explain through comparison 
recent transformations of Latin American welfare regimes as the result of a combination of 
gradual institutional change and exogenous impacts from their socioeconomic environments. 
Second, at a theoretical level, it is an exploration of the potentialities and limitations of historical 
institutionalism to explain institutional change. Third, at a more substantive level it ultimately 
has more general concerns about emerging patterns of democratic governance, which it intends 
to identify taking the study of welfare reform as a vantage point. The general assumption that 
keeps those three components together is not just that they are connected by important 
relationships of interdependence, but also that full accomplishment of any of them would be very 
difficult if sight of the other two were lost. Processes and outcomes of welfare regimes reforms 
are the variable to be explained. However, I will successively conceptualize and consider the 
very same object from three different perspectives. First, I will analyze the substantive content of 
those changes. Next, I will treat them as examples of general patterns of institutional 
transformation. Finally, I will explore them as a public policy that reveals the operation of 
certain patterns of governance and interaction between state and society. 
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Research will be organized around three groups of questions: The first one refers to the 
models of social protection that have emerged throughout Latin America during the cycle of 
reforms initiated by the exhaustion of import-substitution industrialization. I find in the first 
place the need to enquire about the extent to which it is accurate to speak of “models,” and if so, 
how many and defined by which attributes. In the terms of a classic of the field, the question 
would be How many “worlds of welfare capitalism” can we identify in Latin America at the 
beginning of the current century? The construction of a typology leads to an attempt to explain 
diversity: What is at the root of the cross-national variation of post-reform welfare regimes in 
the region? What are the main specific institutions that explain changes in welfare regimes from 
this perspective? Could we establish a parallel typology of political dynamics of reform 
systematically associated with the different types of regime? Next, there is a more general 
theoretical interrogation about the possibilities and limits of historical institutionalism in general 
and the possibilities of its integration with socioeconomic explanations. To what extent and how 
do political institutions shape the political articulation of cleavages and their impact on public 
policies? What are the determinants associated with the different general types of institutional 
change?  
Introducing a piece of social science research on Latin America by recalling that the 
region remains the most unequal in the work has become pretty much a common place, and 
still… What results more puzzling than the persistence of that attribute in itself is the fact that it 
has survived three decades of feverish policy reform. 
Indeed, Latin American political elites may be accused of incapacity to reverse the 
declining levels of social integration and solidarity that affect their societies, but not of inactivity 
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in the field. Jointly considered, the experience of the eleven countries included in this study1 
amounts to 159 attempts to reform diverse areas of their social protection systems during the last 
three decades. True, many of those attempts were frustrated –but that is in itself an important part 
of the story-, and many resulted in relatively marginal parametric adjustments aiming to alleviate 
pension systems dangerously close to financial collapse. However, there has been no shortage of 
more ambitious change: the number of reforms that changed in depth the central institutions and 
principles structuring the provision of social security is 21.  
This intense reformist activity runs against what could be expected based on the 
mainstream theories developed around the experience of developed countries. It is no accident 
that the “politics of the welfare state” have been among the central areas of development and 
testing of historical-institutionalist approaches focused on the phenomenon of institutional 
resilience and path-dependent change. Within the OECD universe, welfare states have 
constituted, to quote an influential political scientist, “immovable objects” capable of enduring 
“irresistible forces” of change. It is true that an important stream of recent scholarship has 
recently begun to challenge with good arguments and solid evidence that extreme diagnostic. 
Still, the alternative suggested is a more nuanced, rather than an opposite, one: what is notable 
about welfare states, the new story suggests, is not their inertia, but their resilience. In other 
words, welfare regimes show an important capacity of institutional adaptation to a changing 
environment, but also go through those changes without losing their most distinctive attributes –
in other words, preserving a high degree of institutional continuity. 
In Latin America, on the other hand, social protection has since the 1980s been one of the 
policy domains showing more experimentation and innovation. Not only do we find episodes of 
                                                 
1 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
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structural reform that entailed the displacement and replacement of complex institutions. We can 
also discover, within a space of three decades –a brief period, if considered in terms of 
institutional temporality-, successive cycles of structural reform moving the social protection 
system of the same country in opposite directions. Thus, many institutions of social insurance 
within the area have been not only far from “immovable,” but also hardly resilient. However, it 
is not that the phenomenon of institutional resilience –even inertia- is completely absent from 
this universe. Some of the pension and health care systems of the region have in fact followed 
paths of steady and gradual institutional change involving significant turning points, but not 
abrupt discontinuity. 
This puzzling and diverse mosaic offers a great opportunity for comparative exploration. 
Most of the countries here considered participated of the same “first wave” that put the 
foundations of European welfare states –some actually pioneered it; others followed blueprints 
provided by the North-Atlantic world. Without being completely alien to their experience, they 
can contribute to see it in a different light. They provide an interesting vantage point to explore 
the boundaries, limitations, and possibilities of more comprehensive development, of current 
theories of institutional change in general, and of the politics of welfare state reform in 
particular. 
Research on Latin American social policy has grown considerably during the last decade 
–and it is precisely that growth that makes the type of exercise I am proposing feasible. 
However, with a few exceptions, it has remained fragmented in more than one sense. We can 
count on an important body of exhaustive evaluations of specific social programs, some excellent 
detailed case studies comprehensively covering national systems of social protection, and a few 
small-N comparative studies. But the integration of those streams of literature is still very 
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limited. Moreover, in some cases, fragmentation is accentuated by a de facto division of labor 
among professional tribes and regionally-based scholar communities among whom dialogue 
remains very limited, globalization notwithstanding.  
Integration is, in the first place, a matter of language and concepts. While debates about 
social protection in industrialized democracies have been mostly framed by Gosta Esping-
Andersen’s comprehensive theory of welfare regimes, systematic application of this approach to 
Latin America has only very recently begun to expand. Besides, the main part of this pioneering 
literature is still predominantly descriptive, or oriented to the evaluation of policy impact on 
inequality and poverty, rather than explanatory of the transformation of welfare regimes. 
What I present here is in the first place an exercise in integration through comprehensive 
qualitative comparison of welfare regimes, covering a medium-N (11) sample of countries, and 
focusing on the dynamics of “the new politics of the welfare state” in Latin America. This 
approach offers multiple potential gains. First, it contributes to integrate research on Latin 
American social policy with more general debates on the comparative study of welfare regimes 
and the dynamics of institutional change. This not only favors a more productive integration of 
multiple disperse bodies of empirical knowledge and data through the introduction of a 
comprehensive theoretical framework, but also contributes to correct and eventually further 
develop the theory by diversifying its empirical basis. Second, while its coverage expands the 
usual range of qualitative cross-national comparison, the use of process-tracing allows doing so 
without sacrificing the benefits of in-depth historical analysis of policy change as more 
comprehensive statistical studies on the region usually do. Third, it proposes to simultaneously 
see reforms to social protection in terms of their substantive policy contents, and as exercises in 
statecraft and political mobilization.  
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The last aspect extends the relevance of the study beyond the boundaries of 
institutionalist theory and social policy studies. It considers social policy reform not in its 
substantive contents, but as a window to explore the dynamics of democratic governance and the 
relations between state and society in more general terms. Social policy is not just another public 
policy domain. It constitutes one of the main points of friction between the dynamics of 
socioeconomic fragmentation and exclusion through unequal distribution of social risks, and the 
political dynamics that aim to reverse those effects through the expansion of social rights. If 
democracy is a “moving target,” the displacement of the boundaries of social citizenship is a 
critical direction for its dynamic possibilities. 
Finally, it provides additional input to currently very lively debates –both within and 
outside academia- on the existence of a “post-neoliberal” critical juncture marked by a “left turn” 
of Latin American politics. Arguments on those issues are only too frequently presented, that rest 
on the analysis of political discourses, public opinion, and electoral results, without digging on 
the effective dynamics of policy-making and its products. 
1.2 THE ARGUMENT 
The explanation of public policy and institutional change requires simultaneous consideration of 
socioeconomic change, institutions, and political actors. Long-term demographic changes, 
transformations in productive structures, and changes social relations, changes in social 
structures, create mismatches and frictions between institutions and their environments that 
constitute a powerful force of political transformation. Particularly relevant in the case of welfare 
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regimes, is the emergence of new social risks and the redistribution of power and vulnerability 
among social categories. 
However, the translation of those disjunctures into institutional change is never 
automatic. Institutions change through the conflictive political activation of cleavages, and the 
formation of coalitions of interests. In turn, political conflict requires political actors. The 
formation of those actors is never a closed process. On the one hand, actors’ strategic 
possibilities are modified by changes in social structure; on the other hand, those strategies are 
always shaped by institutions that distribute power unevenly and partially define the terms of 
political conflict. Actors are never frozen entities; they define and redefine themselves 
relationally through conflict and cooperation. By setting the terms of those relationships, 
institutions do more than establishing “rules of the game” for fully constituted actors; they 
contribute to the formation and transformation of actors themselves. 
Public policies in general tend to generate and consolidate through time their 
constituencies. Welfare regimes are particularly powerful in this sense. By distributing highly 
valued resources –like health, security, or employment opportunities- they have a strong impact 
on individuals’ developmental opportunities and vital trajectories. Depending on the case, they 
may consolidate lines of stratification, favor social mobility, or reinforce intergenerational 
dependence. They thus favor their own reproduction by defining the boundaries of risk 
categories and distributing diverse forms of protection that solidify interests around their 
permanence, and often provide institutional resources that facilitate collective mobilization of 
those interests. Thus, if social change provides the essential stimuli for the transformation of 
welfare regimes, established welfare regimes themselves always stage and limit the possibilities 
of their own transformations. 
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Specifically, the architecture of welfare regimes determines two main lines of potential 
cleavages. First, the one that separates insiders granted social protection by the existing system, 
from outsiders either lacking access to existing protection, or exposed to social risks for which 
no protection is provided. Second, the one that discriminates among categories of insiders by a 
selective distribution of benefits and services. The context of “permanent austerity” defined by 
the combined effects of actuarial imbalances, rising costs, the debt crisis, the priorities of 
economic stabilization and adjustment, and the oscillations of economic growth, determine a 
number of trade-offs that narrow the options for reform. In particular, they make particularly 
difficult the financial re-equilibration and expansion of social protection without tightening the 
criteria of eligibility and the benefits enjoyed by privileged categories of insiders.  
I will not systematically explore the institutional channels facilitating the circulation of 
ideas, formation of epistemic communities, and processes of policy learning that determine the 
circulation of policy paradigms and other raw materials for the elaboration of projects for reform. 
My goal is the explanation of the processes that determine the frustration or success of different 
types of reform. Based on the combination of two dimensions –orientation and depth-, I classify 
reforms in four categories: parametric retrenchment, structural retrenchment, parametric 
expansion, and structural expansion. 
As I said, social policies are very popular, and their established constituencies very solid. 
In consequence, politicians will avoid taking the risk of the electoral costs of retrenchment as 
much as possible. Welfare reforms will tend thus to be protracted, and evolve through 
trajectories that begin pushing parametric adjustment to the very limits of the financial 
sustainability of the system. Eventually, that problem dovetails with the emergence of new social 
risks and the expansion of populations not protected from the old ones. The usually very limited 
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contributive and organizational capacities of new risk populations favor governments’ preference 
for handling the situations of insiders and outsiders separately –the latter usually through social 
assistance and other forms of parametric expansion. 
At the edge of bankruptcy, the possibilities are either the abandonment of the 
contributory principle for tax-based funding (for reasons that I discuss extensively, a very 
unlikely solution), or its radicalization through the reduction of risk-pooling and the privatization 
of insurance. Structural retrenchment –that is, a comprehensive privatization that completely 
displaces existing institutions- are extremely rare. Institutional path-dependence determined by 
the built-in mechanisms of welfare regimes are unlikely to be broken in the absence of powerful 
endogenous shocks. I test the hypothesis that, in the case of pensions, it requires the 
simultaneous presence of an authoritarian concentration of executive power and a generalized 
financial crisis associated with hyperinflation as a necessary condition. 
Absent those conditions, segmented retrenchment constitutes the most likely solution. 
This entails the purchase of insiders’ quiescence by protecting their privileges through a selective 
application of reform. The conditions under which this becomes politically viable, and the 
concrete terms in which it takes place depend on three aspects of the legacies of the 
incorporation period: systems of interest intermediation, party systems, and the distribution of 
the electoral benefits of the initial development of social protection. The articulation, 
mobilization, and aggregation of interests is in the end contingent on the availability of organized 
collective actors whose interests only imperfectly overlap with the ones of risk categories. The 
effective magnitude of insiders’ veto power is contingent on the channels that provide them 
access and influence on policy-making, and on their value as electoral assets, defined by the 
situation of inter-party competition. In any case, the outcome implies an important degree of 
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institutional continuity, in which innovations are implemented through the addition of 
institutional layers.  
Structural expansion is an outcome demanding more complex political conditions, since 
they depend on the articulation of coalitions of insiders and outsiders. Once again, legacies 
determining interest groups’ access to policy making and partisan strategies are again crucial. 
Additionally, outsiders’ collective actions problems tend to put them in disadvantage vis-á-vis 
insiders. That being the case, partisan technical teams and specialized bureaucracies capable of 
operating as political brokers become especially relevant, as well as institutions eventually 
leveling the distribution of effective access to policy-makers between insiders and outsiders. 
Absent those conditions, the outcome to expect is the consolidation of dual structures of social 
protection. These are the result of a split between schemes of social insurance whose coverage is 
truncated at some point of middle social strata, and expanding schemes of social assistance for 
those at the bottom of social stratification.  
Summarizing the argument in the thickest lines: the emergence of new social risks and 
the maturation of established welfare regimes constitute the most powerful triggers for the 
installation of welfare reforms in the public agenda. However, I contend, the concrete contents 
and political viability of reforms is in the end determined by mosaics of institutions that put risk 
categories, interest groups, political parties, and specialized bureaucracies in reciprocal 
dependence. Those institutions define spaces of viable strategies that, at least in the short-term, 
actors need to consider as given. 
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1.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
To the extent that the distinction between theory-development and theory-testing is valid for 
analytical purposes, this research strategy is designed aiming at the latter goal rather than the former 
–thus allowing to set aside the thorny question of the methodological legitimacy of lacking two 
separate sets of cases for the respective purposes of developing and testing. 
It is important to remark a basic underlying assumption in terms of the ontology of 
causation: causal effects are not attributed to “variables” –that is, variables are not per se 
assumed to “make things happen.” Causal effects are expected to be the –intentional or 
unintentional- result of political agency –that is, of the interactions of political agents (in this 
case, mainly, parties, interest groups and bureaucracies) that interact strategically within “fields 
of forces” defined by combinations of socioeconomic and institutional variables. It follows that it 
is at the level of those interactions that explanatory connections need to be hypothesized and 
verified. It also follows that both the distribution of agents’ capabilities and power and their 
understanding of their respective interests need to be defined in relational terms –that is, neither 
power, nor interests constitute absolute attributes, but are always constructed in relational –thus 
context-dependent- terms. That being the case, a final implication is that they can only be 
observed in movement –that is, as they develop diachronically as political processes. 
The chain of assumptions synthesized in the previous paragraph justifies the main 
methodological tools chosen –namely, descriptive typology, set-theoretic analysis based on 
Boolean logic, and process-tracing. Their application is expected to solve what I find to be the 
project’s three central methodological challenges: 1) measurement of welfare regime change; 2) 
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testing of hypothesis about the co-variation of causal configurations and reform processes; 3) 
explanation of variation of patterns of reform. 
The first aspect is solved through the inductive reduction of the existing systems of social 
protection to an inductively constructed classificatory typology. The core of the second challenge 
is the avoidance of reduction to linearity of what are hypothesized to be “network-like” causal 
processes. The chosen instrument for that is the production of set-theoretic arguments that place 
individual institutions in broader systemic contexts emerging from structured historical 
processes.  
The analysis of causal configurations proceeds through the qualitative comparative 
analysis of crisp sets (csQCA), based on the use of Boolean Algebra. This technique has two 
basic advantages: on the one hand, it makes it possible for the researcher to go from individual 
causes to more complex relationships constituting causal configurations to establish necessary 
and sufficient conditions; on the other hand, the identification of multi-variable configurations 
helps to solve the “too many variables problem.” 
According to Benoit Rihoux, “[…] QCA techniques, as such, only enable one to identify 
the core ingredients (the core combinations of conditions), not the recipe as such.” In other 
words, strictly speaking, explanation only can emerge from the “unpacking” of causal inference 
through the exploration of causal mechanisms. The technique chosen for the identification of 
those mechanisms is micro-level process-tracing of specific trajectories of reform. 
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1.4 ORGANIZATION 
What follows is divided in seven chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 develop the theoretical framework and 
explain the research design. I propose a model that explains the transformation of welfare regimes 
through the relations of conflict and cooperation established between three main types of actors –
political parties, interest groups, and specialized governmental bureaucracies. My central argument 
aims to explain reformist strategies and contents through mechanisms of institutional path-
dependence. I contend that the alignments of interests, the composition of feasible coalitions, and 
the projects around which they clustered, are shaped by institutional legacies from the conjuncture 
of initial configuration of systems of social protection. Those institutional legacies constitute causal 
configurations that include the original architecture of welfare regimes, the articulation between 
political parties and interest groups, the configuration of party systems, and the political 
embeddedness of expert bureaucracies administrating social protection. The institutional 
architecture of welfare regimes determine the relative size and composition of potential coalitions of 
insiders and outsiders. Institutional structures of interest intermediation linking interests groups, 
political parties, and bureaucracies determine the former’s influence on policy-making processes 
They also impose on the parties involved, specific equations of means and constraints vis-á-vis 
organized categories of insiders. The configuration of inter-party competition, in turn, determines 
the viability, for different parties, of different strategies of blame-avoidance, blame-sharing, and 
credit-claiming, oriented to diverse constituencies of insiders and outsiders. Specialized sectorial 
bureaucracies may, under certain circumstances, facilitate or block different paths of formulas for 
reform. My central prediction is the predominance of processes of reform through gradual 
institutional change, endogenously determined by the hypothesized configurations. However, my 
theory also suggests two types of exogenous shocks that, by means of facilitating the fracture of 
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mechanisms of path-dependence, may make possible the introduction of reforms involving 
institutional discontinuity. I also identify certain conditions under which structural reforms would 
fail to reach a stable institutional crystallization, which would lead to repetitive processes of chronic 
instability and serial institutional replacement. 
Chapter IV presents a brief narrative to justify the proposed classification of the 
processes of popular incorporation experienced by the three cases in this study that were not part 
of the typology provided by Ruth and David Collier –namely, those of Bolivia, Costa Rica and 
Ecuador. The analysis I offer is, for obvious reasons, far from the exhaustiveness and refinement 
of the ones provided by the Colliers –I do not intend to add a second volume to theirs. The goal 
is just to briefly synthesize the development of the institutional legacies that I hypothesize 
partially determine the reforms I intend to explain. I will contend that Costa Rica should be 
included, with Colombia and Uruguay, as a case of incorporation through electoral mobilization 
by democratized oligarchic parties; the inclusion of the other two cases requires an extension of 
the original typology by adding a fifth category –that of frustrated processes of incorporation.  
 Chapters 5 to 8 constitute the empirical core of the dissertation. Chapter 5 is 
descriptive. Its goal is the measurement of the changes to be subsequently explained. For each 
country, I consider and classify the configurations of  the respective welfare regime at the 
beginning and end of the period under study, then I compare both types. I show that both 
classifications differ, showing important degrees of regime transformation, but I do not find 
evidence of regional convergence towards a unique model –which underscores the importance of 
domestic factors. I also find that, neither around 1980 nor circa 2010, the clustering of countries 
according to their welfare regimes mirrors the one determined by their processes of labor 
incorporation. This supports the idea that, even when institutional legacies from that critical 
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juncture contribute to explain changes in welfare regimes, additional factors need to be 
introduced. 
Chapter 6 uses crisp sets qualitative comparative analysis to identify correspondences 
between the hypothesized configurations of causal factors and the variations in welfare regimes 
measured in chapter 4. Evidence is organized in truth tables and assessed in terms of necessity 
and sufficiency.  
Chapter 7 has two goals. First, the identification of causal mechanisms eventually 
explaining the associations that resulted from the QCA practiced in chapter 5. Second, the 
exploration of possible explanatory factors or mechanisms not considered by the initial 
hypotheses. I analyze in depth pension reforms in Argentina and Mexico, using the cases of 
Brazil, Costa Rica, and Uruguay as ancillary cases. Then I unpack the processes of and 
healthcare reforms in Brazil, Costa Rica, and Uruguay. I present narratives structured around two 
analytical points. First, the ways in which policy legacies shape the constellations of actors 
opposing reform and their power resources, thus setting parameters for viable reformist 
strategies, second, the articulation between interest groups, political parties, and bureaucratic 
teams.  
The narratives included in Chapter 8 have a more clearly exploratory intention. They go 
through the development of social assistance programs in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Venezuela. I do not intend to explain the emergence of such programs, which has been universal 
across the region. Instead, my goals are two. First, I show how differences in terms of 
organization and mobilizational strategies among political forces in government may explain 
cross-national variation in the design of those programs. Second, to suggest some clues about the 
factors underlying some patterns of recurrent institutional instability identified in chapter 5. I 
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also develop some hypotheses about how the use of social assistance for purposes of political 
mobilization may have important consequences in terms of mechanisms of governance and 
relations between state and society. They may also contribute to explain, I contend, the pattern of 
chronic institutional instability identified in chapter 5.  
A final chapter summarizes the conclusions and suggests an agenda for further research.
 17 
2.0  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework for the subsequent empirical exploration. Its goal 
is to provide a series of hypothesis explaining variation among processes of reform of welfare 
regimes.2 It rests on the basic assumption that any theory aiming to explain changes in public 
policy and institutions must ultimately show their emergence from interactions among political 
actors. In the end, the central question is the one presented by Häusermann as the synthesis of 
                                                 
2 The concept of welfare regime will be extensively discussed in the first second of this chapter. However, I find 
convenient the introduction of a preliminary basic delimitation with respect with a series of concepts that will be 
repeatedly used and partially overlap. Gosta Esping-Andersen introduced the concept in 1990, as the axial piece of a 
theory of the emergence and development of what was by then generically alluded as welfare states. Although the concept 
of welfare state is still widely used in the field, it has retained an important degree of ambiguity, and I will avoid its 
systematic use. The concept of welfare regime is part of a specific theoretical approach for the analysis and classification 
of the empirical realities that we imprecisely designate as welfare states. According Esping-Andersen, welfare regimes 
constitute different formulas for the collective management of social risk, and what differentiates them is “the ways in 
which welfare production is allocated between state, market, and households (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999).” Welfare 
regimes thus constitute institutional formulae through which societies implement social protection. Social protection can be 
defined as “public actions taken in response to levels of vulnerability, risk and deprivation, which are deemed 
unacceptable within a given polity and society (Barrientos and Santibáñez 2009).” Systems of social protection are 
typically formed by three components that run across diverse policy domains: social insurance, social assistance, and 
labor market regulations. Social insurance designates a series of programs that provide protection against life course and 
employment hazards, and are financed with variable combinations of contributions from employers, workers and 
governments. In most developed systems it covers occupational risks; healthcare and cash benefits for maternity and 
non-work accidents and diseases; old age, disability and survivors pensions; family allowances; and unemployment. 
There is also a number of additional benefits that are frequently included under the umbrella of social insurance systems 
–i.e. funeral aid, personal and mortgage loans, and day care centers (Mesa-Lago 1989). Social assistance, instead, is financed 
by the government out of general revenue, and includes those programs oriented to support populations in situation of 
poverty (for example, means-tested noncontributory health care and pension programs). Labor market regulations aim to 
protect the right to voice and representation of workers, in first place by providing guarantees against unfair dismissal.  
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her book on pension reform in continental Europe: “By whom and for whose needs and interests 
was the regime created (Häusermann 2010)?” 
 
The model I propose explains the transformation of welfare regimes through the relations 
of conflict and cooperation established between three main types of actors –political parties, 
interest groups, and specialized governmental bureaucracies. The identification of hypothetical 
agents of change is only the beginning of the story. I do not ignore that the notorious statement 
according to which men make their own history in circumstances they do not get to choose has 
already been quoted ad nauseam. Still, I confess myself incapable of coming up with a more 
concise formula.  
The relevant circumstances are made of two types of factors –socioeconomic structures 
and institutions. The former defines the emergence of the social risks whose management is the 
goal of welfare regimes, and a geometry of potential lines of fracture for the definition, 
alignment, and political activation of interests. The translation of socioeconomic fractures into 
political cleavages is never automatic, though. Both the terms in which social risks are 
conceptualized as such and included in the political agenda, and the activation of cleavages as 
effective axis of political conflict are the result of political entrepreneurship.  
Competition among political entrepreneurs is always staged in specific institutional 
settings. Institutions decisively shape the terms under which actors compete and cooperate, not 
only by defining rules for the game, but also by distributing power resources –moreover, actors 
themselves are to some extent configured as such by existing institutions. I hypothesize that the 
actors and strategies involved in the reform of welfare regimes result from institutional 
configurations including the following interrelated components: 
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1) existing welfare regimes; 
2) regimes of interest intermediation articulating labor unions, political parties, and 
sectorial bureaucracies;  
3) systemic configurations of competition among political parties. 
Although connections operating in both directions exist between all the components of 
such institutional complexes, welfare regimes can be seen as constituting nodal points. On the 
one hand, they define risk categories that structure the articulation of interests, constituencies and 
resources for the mobilization of political support, and organizational patterns of sectorial 
bureaucracies. On the other hand, they decisively mediate the operation of structural 
socioeconomic transformations as triggers for reforms. Indeed, all the processes I aim to explain 
have at their root some disjuncture between a new equation of social risks emerging from 
changes in the social structure, and the respective existing structure of social protection. 
As a result, welfare regimes not only appear at both extremes of my theoretical argument, 
but also play a dual role. First, defining the dependent variable –what I intend to explain is the 
difference between their pre- and post-reform configurations, and the political processes 
mediating between them. Second, pre-reform welfare institutions are part of the hypothesized 
explanatory causal configurations.   
It is also important to underline that, although the processes of policy change leading to 
the transformation of welfare regimes constitute, a single empirical object of analysis throughout 
the whole dissertation, they will be conceptualized and studied from two different perspectives. 
First, as welfare regimes, understood as conglomerates of institutions and policies designed for 
the collective management of social risks. Second, as expressions of more general modes of 
institutional change and configuration. While the first conceptualization builds on substantive 
 20 
policy contents and finds its place in a middle-range theory of welfare regime change, the second 
one considers the formal attributes of the institutions in which reforms crystallized, aiming at a 
more general theory of institutional change. 
In very general terms, the argument can be summarized as follows. Frictions and gaps 
caused by the emergence of new social risks and/or by a diminishing capacity of established 
welfare regimes to cope with old ones, result in pressures for the inclusion of reforms in the 
public agenda. Those mismatches between institutions and social problems limit the spectrum of 
feasible reforms, but do not determine the specific content and design of the options finally 
chosen. The concrete substance of attempted reforms is the result of political processes of 
construction of pro-and anti-reform coalitions of interests. I hypothesize those coalitions to be 
determined by two types of forces. On the one hand, the potential cleavages defined by the 
coverage and benefits guaranteed by existing welfare regimes. On the other hand, the political 
agency of parties, interest groups, and sectorial bureaucracies, competing for the activation of 
those cleavages that may favor the formation of coalitions supportive of their respective 
proposals for reform. 
What makes the task of political forces advocating for reform particularly challenging is 
the simultaneous existence of several constraints pushing them in contradictory directions. First, 
a series of long-term socioeconomic transformations, combined with the limitations of existing 
systems of social protection, have expanded the populations in situation of social risk that require 
the expansion of those systems. Second, the financial insolvency of systems of social insurance 
already in place combines with more encompassing situations of fiscal strain and pressures from 
the international economic environment, creates the type of context that Paul Pierson has defined 
as “permanent austerity.” In such circumstances, any expansion that is financially sustainable in 
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the long term is necessarily contingent upon drastic revisions of current schemes of social risk 
pooling. In other words, any more inclusive reorganization of social protection demands 
redistributions of burdens and benefits between categories of insiders and outsiders that are 
guaranteed to be resisted by the former.  
In those conditions, the strategic challenge for pro-reform political entrepreneurs is the 
implementation of formulas to simultaneously neutralize potential veto coalitions of insiders and 
politically mobilize the support of outsiders. Such formulas are expected to include some 
combination of strategies of blame-avoidance and credit-claiming, as well as attempts to manage 
the opposition through variable mixes of persuasion, exclusion, and division. The specific 
strategies applied in each case –especially measures to compensate groups of insiders through 
the selective distribution of pay-offs-, have direct implications in terms of the concrete design of 
reforms.  
My central argument aims to explain reformist strategies and contents through 
mechanisms of institutional path-dependence. I contend that the alignments of interests, the 
composition of feasible coalitions, and the projects around which they clustered, are shaped by 
institutional legacies from the conjuncture of initial configuration of systems of social protection. 
Those institutional legacies constitute causal configurations that include the original architecture 
of welfare regimes, the articulation between political parties and interest groups, the 
configuration of party systems, and the political embeddedness of expert bureaucracies 
administrating social protection. The institutional architecture of welfare regimes determines the 
relative size and composition of potential coalitions of insiders and outsiders. Institutional 
structures of interest intermediation linking interests groups, political parties, and bureaucracies 
determine the former’s influence on policy-making processes. They also impose on the parties 
 22 
involved, specific equations of means and constraints vis-á-vis organized categories of insiders. 
The configuration of inter-party competition, in turn, determines the viability, for different 
parties, of different strategies of blame-avoidance, blame-sharing, and credit-claiming, oriented 
to diverse constituencies of insiders and outsiders. Specialized sectorial bureaucracies may, 
under certain circumstances, facilitate or block different paths of formulas for reform. 
One of my central predictions is the predominance of processes of reform through 
gradual institutional change, endogenously determined by the hypothesized configurations. 
However, my theory also suggests two types of exogenous shocks that, by means of facilitating 
the fracture of mechanisms of path-dependence, may make possible the introduction of reforms 
involving institutional discontinuity. I also identify certain conditions under which structural 
reforms would fail to reach a stable institutional crystallization, which would lead to repetitive 
processes of chronic instability and serial institutional replacement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Causal model 
Socioeconomic 
change 
Pre-reform 
welfare regime 
Disjuncture Reform Political 
Parties 
Pressure 
groups 
Specialized 
bureaucracy 
Post- 
reform 
welfare 
regime 
 23 
The chapter is structured in four sections. First, I develop the theoretical instruments for 
the analysis and classification of welfare regimes, and discuss the main points of friction 
resulting from the mismatch between welfare regimes and their socioeconomic environments. 
The second section introduces the criteria for the analysis and classification of patterns of 
welfare regime change. In the third section, I present the causal configurations hypothesized to 
lead to different patterns of reform, and explain the mechanisms through which they are expected 
to operate. Finally, I summarize my hypotheses. 
 
2.2 DEFINING AND COMPARING WELFARE REGIMES 
2.2.1 Introducing the concept of welfare regime 
Since the path-breaking work of Esping-Andersen3, a relatively solid consensus has emerged 
among researchers of social policies and welfare states, around the notion that comparisons 
based on the measurement of levels of “social spending” usually mask important differences in 
the distribution of burdens and benefits among social classes, status groups, risk categories, sexes 
and generations. The main goal behind the development of analyses in terms of welfare regimes 
has been, precisely, to provide a multidimensional instrument of measurement of qualitative 
variation among systems of social protection. 
                                                 
3 The concept was initially introduced in The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Esping-Andersen 1990). Although all the 
essential elements are already present in what has become its “classical” formulation, during the following two decades 
its author kept refining and clarifying his formulation in response to diverse criticisms (Esping-Andersen 1999, 2009). 
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Although at first glance it can be seen as constituting something like “a nation’s social 
policy repertoire (Arts and Gelissen 2002),” however, the concept aims beyond a sum of discrete 
programs. Rather than reflecting linear variations along a single cumulative dimension, different 
welfare regimes are qualitatively discontinuous configurations hypothesized to express 
distinctive sets of “embedded principles (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999).” In other words, a 
central assumption is that each regime shows internal coherence between a core of basic 
principles and a characteristic combination of policies and institutional arrangements. Esping-
Andersen’s most powerful contribution was the demonstration that such consistency results in 
distinctive “political economies of the welfare state  (Esping-Andersen 1989).” 
Welfare regimes constitute distinctive formulas to define and address social risks.4 The 
concept can be unpacked in three components –namely, welfare mix, outcomes, and 
stratification. The welfare mix is defined by the specific articulation of state, market and family 
through which social risks are managed under different regimes. Depending on the mix, each 
welfare regime is expected to deliver a characteristic set of welfare outcomes, in terms of how 
risks are dealt with. One of Esping-Andersen’s most innovative suggestions is the 
conceptualization of outcomes in terms of two dimensions –decommodification and 
defamilialism. The former describes the extent to which individuals' and households’ welfare are 
detached from their labor market status. The latter refers to the extent to which individuals’ 
welfare is independent from their family status.5  
                                                 
4 What follows is extensively based on (Barrientos 2009, Gough 1999, 2004, Powell and Barrientos 2004). 
5 In the author’s own words, “[decommodification is] the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially 
acceptable standard of living independently of market participation (Esping-Andersen 1990).” “[Defamilialization is 
meant] to capture policies that lessen individuals’ reliance on the family; that maximize individuals’ command of 
economic resources independently of familial or conjugal reciprocities (Esping-Andersen 1999).” Thus, for example, the 
creation of unemployment insurance introduces per se a powerful element of decommodification. However, the degree 
of decommodification is different under a regime that provides a flat-rate benefit based on the condition of citizen, than 
under one that makes access to benefits dependent upon beneficiaries’ previous contributions, and pays differential rates 
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The concepts underlying such awkward terms present two main analytical advantages. 
First, when considering welfare regimes as a dependent variable, they provide a common metric 
for the comparison of outcomes across policy domains and regimes, based on the study of 
qualifying conditions and levels and types of benefits. Second, they constitute the link between 
the welfare mix and the stratifying effects of welfare regimes, which is in turn the key for the use 
of the type of welfare regime as an independent variable in the analysis of the political economy 
of reforms.  
The degrees of decommodification and defamilialization define the extent to which a 
welfare regime replicates, corrects, or magnifies, the lines of stratification produced by the 
dynamics of the market and the predominant type of family structure.6 There are two 
mechanisms through which this in turn has a decisive impact on the long-term dynamics of the 
regime. First, the lines of stratification emerging from differences in terms of entitlements, 
qualifying conditions, access and levels of benefits, create potential lines of cleavage that may be 
politically activated by initiatives of reform entailing redistribution of resources and privileges 
                                                                                                                                                             
based on the amount contributed. As for defamilialization, it is minimal under those regimes that assume a typical 
household with a single male breadwinner, making access to benefits for women and children contingent upon their 
relationship to the former. On the other extreme, welfare regimes providing access to public childcare services have a 
strong impact in terms of defamilialization, by increasing the opportunities for women to make maternity and 
professional careers compatible. For a penetrating analysis of this last aspect, see especially (Esping-Andersen 2009). 
6 Consider, for the sake of illustration, the following concrete examples. 1) Regarding decommodification: A regime that 
universally provides publicly funded health care including high-cost medical treatments, has a corrective effect on some 
stratifying effects of differentials of income. That is the case to a considerably lesser extent in the case of a welfare 
regime that only guarantees universal access to basic treatments, forcing the population to individually contract high-cost 
medical care with private providers. But income-based stratification is even accentuated when the social insurance 
system is fragmented in “special regimes” guaranteeing special benefits –for example, access to better infrastructure and 
medical technology- for some privileged professional categories. 2) Regarding defamilialization: A welfare regime 
providing universal long-term care for the elderly tends to reduce differences between the conditions under which 
women and men participate in the labor market –given that, in low-income households, those care responsibilities tend 
to disproportionally burden women. But the effects of that first level of gender-based stratification would be further 
accentuated by a pension regime that based benefits on contributions and imposed the same proportionality between 
contributions and benefits for men and women –thus replicating the inequalities of a job market already biased against 
the latter. 
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across different risk categories. Second, patterns of stratification close a circle that, connecting 
outcomes back to the welfare mix, reinforces the latter’s effect by favoring its reproduction.7  
2.2.2 Classifying welfare regimes 
2.2.2.1 Esping-Andersen’s OECD-based typology  
When confronted with the empirical reality of systems of social protection, the theoretical 
approach in terms of welfare regimes leads into a typology. Esping-Andersen applied it to a 
universe of 18 OECD countries for which the data required for a comparative analysis were 
available. Cases were compared along three typological dimensions –namely, the way in which 
the production of welfare is distributed between state, market, and family; the granting of 
decommodifying social rights; and the impact of decommodifying effects on stratification. Once 
measured along those dimensions, the cases considered tended to cluster in three groups with a 
high degree of consistency. The analysis of the common denominators across cases in the same 
clusters resulted in a tripartite typological classification. Table 1 reproduces the one created by 
Esping-Andersen to summarize the attributes differentiating the three types.  
Esping-Andersen labeled his types liberal, social-democratic, and conservative. The 
liberal welfare regime finds its paradigmatic cases in the United States, Australia, and New 
Zealand. It is characterized by a mix predominantly resting on the market and private provision. 
Participation of the state is to a great extent residual, limited to the alleviation of poverty through 
provision for basic needs, largely based on means-tested criteria. Benefits are for the most part 
tax-financed and tend to be low –as public social spending in general. The result of this moderate 
                                                 
7 These points are further elaborated below (section I.3).  
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interference with market dynamics is a low level of decommodification that makes this regime 
the one with the highest effects in terms of stratification. It tends to reinforce sharp demarcations 
separating the situations of the poor and extremely vulnerable relying on social assistance, 
middle classes benefitting from earnings-related social insurance, and a privileged minority with 
full access to private services. 
Table 1: Summary overview of welfare regimes' distinctive attributes 
 
 Liberal Social-democratic Conservative 
Role of:    
Family Marginal Marginal Central 
Market Central Marginal Marginal 
State Marginal Central Subsidiarity 
    
Welfare State: 
Dominant mode of solidarity 
Individual Universal Kinship 
Corporatism 
Etatism 
Family 
    
Dominant locus of solidarity Market State Family 
Degree of decommodification Minimal Maximum High (for 
breadwinners) 
    
Modal examples US Sweden Germany, Italy 
         Source: (Esping-Andersen 1999). 
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The social-democratic welfare regime sits at the opposite extreme of the typology, 
finding its most representative cases among Scandinavian countries in general and Sweden in 
particular. It is the type with highest levels of decommodification and lowest stratification. These 
effects result from a welfare mix with maximum state participation in order to alter the 
stratifying effects of market and family dynamics.8 The system has the strongest orientation 
towards universal coverage, based on granting benefits and access to services largely as a matter 
of citizenship rights. This is the most expensive welfare stated, leading to high levels of 
predominantly tax-based public social spending. 
Germany is the representative par excellence of the conservative welfare regime. Based 
on the principle of subsidiarity and the predominance of social insurance schemes financed 
through payroll contributions, this type has a mix with an important level of state participation 
and assigns an in multiple distinct important role to families. As opposed  to both to liberal and 
social-democratic regimes –where access respectively depends on demonstrable need and 
citizenship-, the conservative type “stresses that social rights are earned on the basis of one’s 
economic contribution to society (employment), or one’s social function in the family 
(predominantly housewife. Hence […] those who have no job, especially women in their role as 
mothers, are entitled to benefits via their relationship with an employed person (husband, father, 
or other family member) (Van Keersbergen and Vis 2014).” Since both eligibility and level of 
benefits are tightly linked to former earnings-based contributions to social security funds, the 
social protection system not only reinforces the differences between men and women, and types 
of families, but also contributes to the reproduction of market-based stratification of occupational 
                                                 
8 The title of Esping-Andersen’s first book, on the political dynamics underlying the development social-democratic 
hegemony in Scandinavia, condenses the central guiding principle: Politics Against Markets (Esping-Andersen 1985). 
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groups. This last aspect is further accentuated by the internal fragmentation of social insurance in 
multiple particularistic schemes granting differential benefits for some occupational and 
professional categories. 
2.2.2.2 Main critiques to Esping-Andersen’s typology 
This typology has been intensely debated and criticized. Apart from measurement issues –not 
negligible but temporarily left aside for the purposes of this section- the vast majority of 
criticisms revolved for some time around three issues: the number of types, the classification of 
some of the cases originally considered by Esping-Andersen, and his exclusion of the gender 
dimension from the analysis of stratification. In spite of the numerous criticisms, however, the 
original tri-partite scheme has remained the base of almost all the subsequent expanded ones. 
A second and more specific wave of discussions, that has been gaining importance and 
audience during the last decade, is more relevant to the purpose of this dissertation. It has 
emerged from attempts to extend the analysis in terms of welfare regimes to the social policies in 
Asian industrial societies and underdeveloped countries. In this case, debates have revolved 
around two connected problems. The first is a typical “conceptual stretching” one –namely, the 
extent to which Esping-Andersen’s original types “travel” well to the realities beyond the OECD 
universe.9 Second, subsequent efforts to produce new ideal types, that registered the main 
attributes of the new cases being considered with more accuracy, led to a revision of the 
dimensions included in the original construction of the typology –that is, the list of relevant 
variables to analyze in order to identify welfare regimes in non-OECD countries.10 
                                                 
9 See (Barba 2005, Barrientos 2004, Filgueira 199, 2008, Gough 1999, 2004, Mares and Carnes 2009, Martínez Franzoni 
2008b, c, Rudra 2007, 2008, Segura-Ubiergo 2007). 
10 See, for example, (Barrientos 2004, Gough 2004, 2008, Martínez Franzoni 2008c)  
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The expansion of the typology has brought two kinds of new variables under 
consideration. Some of them are of institutional nature, since they are associated with the 
inclusion of a wider range of public policies considered to define welfare regimes11. Some 
others, however, result from the need to account for the very centrality that the informal 
economy and community-based services have in the production of welfare in those societies.  
This is ultimately consistent with Esping-Andersen’s characterization of regimes as different 
ways of articulating state, market, and family. My current purpose, however, is not an evaluation 
of the effective impact on the social structures, but to analyze variations in their institutional 
architecture.  
With that purpose in mind, I will confine my analysis to the formal design of the 
institutions12 and public policies through which welfare regimes are implemented.13 This 
decision does not imply denying the relevance that informal components may have for the 
assessment of the effective production of welfare –something beyond the limits of the present 
study. 
I also intend to be restrictive regarding the policy areas covered by the study. It will focus 
on what has historically been –and remains- the central concern underlying the development of 
welfare regimes –namely, protection from risks caused by the intersections of the contingencies 
                                                 
11 For example, educational policies and training programs oriented to assist the adaptation of the workforce to changes 
in the job market produced by technological and managerial innovation –typically a central component of South-East 
Asian “productivist” regimes-; long-term care policies; and services aiming to cope with diverse consequence of 
changing family structures and the feminization of the workforce. 
12 I agree with the limits set by Margaret Levi to the use of the concept of institution: according to her, they “have a 
legalistic aspect and rely on a relative clear structure of enforcement,”  constituting “formal arrangements for aggregating 
individuals and regulating their behavior through the use of explicit rules and decision processes enforced by an actor or 
set of actors formally recognized as possessing  such power (Levi 1990) (pp.404-405).” 
13 A restriction that is also consistent with the general notion of “regime” that is clearly predominant in the field of 
political analysis.  
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of individuals’ life cycles and the dynamics of markets under capitalism.14 That does not imply 
ignoring several significant developments very likely expand the boundaries of welfare regimes 
considerably beyond the boundaries of social security as traditionally understood.15 However, 
social protection still constitutes –around the world in general and in Latin America in particular- 
the financial and functional core of welfare regimes, the source of their politically most 
significant tensions, and the target of most reforms –both successful and failed. The last 
consideration, however, brings to the table a problem that has received only scant attention in 
explicit theoretical terms16 –namely, that of the degree of internal coherence that can be 
reasonably expected from regimes aggregating across so many dissimilar policy domains.17 I will 
not revisit that discussion here, but want to point to the fact that the concept is often used as if 
the internal consistency of welfare regimes could be taken for granted18. This project has been 
initially designed based on the hypothesis that Esping-Andersen’s typology provides a powerful 
tool for a preliminary comparative analysis of the universe of Latin American welfare regimes. 
                                                 
14 This is the main reason behind the exclusion of the Cuban case, which otherwise could have increased significantly the 
variation of the phenomena under study. Such a decision does not result from considering communist societies to be 
risk-free, neither  
15 Neither do I consider irrelevant the multiple points of intersection between welfare regimes and the institutional 
complexes identified by the literature on “varieties of capitalism” as defining  
16 But see the important reflections in  (Bannick and Hoogenboom 2007, Kasza 2002, Mätzke 2009) ; see also (Ashford 
1977, 1986a) on the problems of aggregation faced by structural analyses of public policy in general. 
17 The problem presents specific modulations for welfare regimes, but is ultimately a manifestation of a more general 
issue –that of finding the right “metrics” for a structural analysis of the state based on the analysis of public policies. If 
one thinks, as I do, that “public policy is the most promising way of watching states in action (Katzenstein 2005),” the 
big challenge is how to reconstruct a systemic logic scaling up from policy-specific logics. 
18 Usually, the use of made of the concept betrays one or more of the –frequently implicit- assumptions about  the 
factors guaranteeing that internal consistency: 1)  a unified and coherent foundational project developed by the 
continuous  action of an ideologically homogeneous political agent; 2) strong mechanisms of path dependence operating 
across policy areas; 3) an extended societal consensus around a coherent constellation of values that can be univocally 
translated into specific policy designs; 4) what Swenson calls “the equivalence premise”, that is, the existence of solid and 
steady coalitions of interests that can be automatically and unequivocally related to concrete policy preferences. The last 
assumption in turn presupposes not only stable chains of correspondence linking actors to interests and interests to 
policy options, but also that the perception of those chains as fully homogeneous and transparent for all the relevant 
agents.  
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However, I do not assume that internal consistency.  For several reasons that I will develop 
throughout the empirical analysis,19 I am inclined to expect variable degrees of friction between 
the constitutive programs and institutions that constitute welfare regimes. 
2.2.3 The endogenous dynamics of welfare regimes 
The initial development of a research program around the transformations of welfare regimes was 
heavily influenced by the experiences of welfare reform in OECD countries up to the early 1990s. A 
direct consequence was a strong emphasis on the mechanisms that, by guaranteeing the 
reproduction of regimes, explained their resilience.  That bias, which already marked Esping-
Andersen’s points of views, fed and was in turn reinforced, by the predominance of historical 
                                                 
19 Some of the reasons to have such expectations have to do with pervasive attributes of political life in general. 
Institutional change occurs by means of patch-work (Skowronek 1982) and piecemeal transformation far more 
frequently than through “big bangs” of radical innovation. Even when the latter occur, it is even more rarely, if at 
all, by fiat of a unified projective political will. That being the case, its processing is commonly messy, contingent 
upon recurrent negotiations and compromises that erode the global coherence of the final decision. The debate 
alternatives seldom takes place at the level of generality and abstraction that the implementation of a fully consistent 
welfare regime would require. Policy-specific coalitions have become more heterogeneous and less stable. The 
technical complexity of most social policies makes the understanding of the options vague and even inaccurate not 
only for the common citizen, but for political leaders themselves. All the previous statements are particularly 
applicable to social security systems, which in most cases have developed throughout cycles starting between the 
late 19th and early 20th century, through waves involving diverse actors. Even in the rare occasions in which 
“institutional big bangs” led by unified agents happen, there is always a subsequent process of exploration of 
boundaries and discovery of loopholes and unintended consequences of policy design (Pierson 2000). The already 
mentioned technical complexities have also widened the gap between general laws and their concretion through 
multiple decisions and regulations of specialized bureaucracies. Summing up, no matter whether we conceive the 
coherence of regimes and “trickling-down” from comprehensive ideological paradigms and technical rationality, or 
“percolating up” from additive gradual innovation, it will be always imperfect. Moreover, several of the alluded 
factors are magnified, in the case of Latin America, by a more basic institutional weakness emerging from variable 
combinations of fragmented societies, states still penetrated by patrimonial dynamics and lacking internal 
coordination, poorly professionalized bureaucracies, highly volatile parties, and party systems in flux (Levitsky and 
Murillo 2012, O'Donnell 1996, 1999). In that kind of context, the problem is not merely that policy-making may 
become especially erratic and unpredictable and policies unstable and incoherent, but we cannot even take for 
granted governability itself. (Ashford 1986b, Baldwin 1990, Hacker 2002, Hicks 1999, Malloy 1979, 1991, 
Martínez-Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea 2012, McGuire 2010, Papadópulos 1992, Rosenberg 1983, Castiglioni 
2005, Pribble 2013) 
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institutionalism among students of welfare states in general and welfare regimes in particular.20 In 
this sense, Paul Pierson’s seminal work on the “new politics of the welfare state” had a decisive 
influence. A particularly relevant outcome was the frequent conflation of two arguments that, 
although analytically distinct and not necessarily connected, frequently were assumed to be inherent 
to the welfare regimes approach. The first one states that each type of welfare regime tends to 
generate a distinctive political economy; the other one contends that those different types of political 
economy are inherently conservative and tend to “freeze” the respective regimes.  
Pierson’s model essentially specifies the political dynamics of a phenomenon already 
presented, as we have seen, by Esping-Andersen –namely that the patterns of stratification 
produced by specific welfare mixes tend to retro-aliment the respective mixes, thus guaranteeing 
the reproduction of the regime. The mechanism that operates is actually a very extended one –
each policy tends to perpetuate itself through the generation of its own constituency. In the case 
of most developed welfare systems, constituencies became massive thanks to the expansion of 
coverage during the “golden decades” of economic growth that followed World War II, turning 
reforms an extremely  “electorally risky business (Pierson 2001).” 
Throughout the 2000s, however, evidence began to accumulate that lead to more nuanced 
formulations, by showing that, if welfare regimes were certainly resilient, they were by no means 
immobile.21 In other words, although the replacement of welfare regimes by alternative 
paradigms remained virtually inexistent,22 at the same time even those regimes identified as most 
resistant had been accumulating piecemeal reforms that jointly amounted to significant 
                                                 
20 See (Pierson 1994, 1998, 2001, 2011); two penetrating discussions of the influence of Pierson’s theses can be found in 
(Emerijck 2011, Van Keersbergen and Vis 2014). 
21 This distinction is translated in more general terms by the equivalent one between institutional resilience and 
institutional inertia (Häusermann 2010). 
22 Although, as we will see, only within the boundaries of the developed world. 
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transformations within the limits of persistent paradigms.23 The most pervasive effect was a 
reorientation of the historical-institutionalist literature towards the explanation of gradual 
endogenous institutional change, which will be discussed in detail in section… Here I will 
specifically indicate some endogenous factors of potential transformation that result from the 
welfare regimes’ structures and internal dynamics. 
First, we have the double-edged nature of the very same lines of stratification originally 
hypothesized to operate exclusively in the direction of reproduction. They are at the same time 
boundaries marking the distribution of some either privileged or stigma-carrying status –in other 
words, they simultaneously circumscribe policy constituencies and operate as lines of exclusion. 
As any line of exclusion, they have at the same time the potential to reinforce the cohesion of 
insiders and to feed the conflict between insiders and outsiders. The critical point is that the final 
balance in the materialization of those contradictory potentials depends on their activation as 
effective cleavages by political actors.  
A priori, it is possible to identify four potential lines of cleavage, that I enumerate 
proceeding from the periphery to the core of systems of social protection: a) the one that results 
from what is known as “truncation” –that is, the external limits of any system of social protection 
short of universal coverage, that may define a conflict between insiders and outsiders lacking any 
sort of protection; b) a first line of stratification cutting across insiders separates those with 
access to social insurance from the ones forced to rely on social assistance –and to carry the 
stigma that frequently comes with means-tested benefits; c) a second division operating “at the 
top” of the universe of insiders and separating those with the means to contract social insurance 
                                                 
23 See (Armingeon and Bonoli 2006, Bonoli and Natali 2012, Emerijck 2013, Emmenegger et al. 2012, Hacker 2005, 
Häusermann 2010, 2012, Van Keersbergen and Vis 2014, Palier 2010) 
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in the private sector; d) finally, we have the divisions produced by the eventual existence of 
privileged “special regimes” that grant more or higher benefits for the members of specific 
occupational and professional categories. 
Notice that the relative potential of different types of divisions for political activation is 
contingent not only upon the competition among political entrepreneurs contending for the 
activation of different cleavages, but also on the type of welfare regime and the specific content 
of reforms.24  
Second, we find endogenous pressures for transformation related to critical elements of 
the financial sustainability of social protection systems that almost universally tend to deteriorate 
with the latter’s maturation.25  Especially critical are: a) the expansion, with the passing of time, 
of the proportion of the population benefiting from old-age pensions; b) the steadily increasing 
costs of health care services –particularly medical technology; c) actuarial imbalances produced 
by cross-subsidization among different programs in the system.  
A third source of pressure for change comes from systems of social protection made 
increasingly dysfunctional by their operation in dynamic socioeconomic environments. Four 
long-term trends –connected by a complex web of reciprocal interactions- are especially 
consequential in terms of institutional mismatches:26 a) the demographic transition to a 
“developed” pattern combining low fertility and longer life expectancy, which reduces the 
                                                 
24 Thus, for example, the possibilities of activation of the first cleavage in order to mobilize the support of outsiders for 
an inclusive reform dependent on reducing insiders’ benefits should be higher under residual systems with limited 
coverage. In turn, the different sub-categories of insiders of a fragmented system are more likely to coalesce against a 
project of encompassing homogeneous reduction of benefits, than against a reform aiming to eliminate privileged 
regimes in order to preserve the financial viability of the system as a whole. 
25 On this, see (Mesa-Lago 1989, Mesa-Lago and Bertranou 1998). 
 
26 On this, see in general (Esping-Andersen 1999, 2009); specifically on the manifestation of these trends in 
contemporary Latin American societies and their impact on social protection, see . 
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dependency ratio among age groups and elevates the cost of old-age pensions; b) the transition 
to a post-industrial economy, usually associated with long-term, structural unemployment, and 
an expansion of informal employment, tends to narrow the fiscal base of social protection; c) the 
generalization of new patterns of family organization, other than the traditional one based on a 
single (male) breadwinner, that makes conservative regimes particularly dysfunctional; d) the 
accelerated feminization of the labor force, especially through its association with the raising 
number of monoparental households with a female breadwinner, amplifies the impact of gender-
based stratification. 
2.3 ANALYZING AND CLASSIFYING WELFARE REGIME CHANGE 
My central purpose is the development of a theory that can explain the variation across processes 
and outcomes of reforms affecting welfare regimes. In other words, the variable to be explained 
combines two dimensions tightly connected, yet analytically distinguishable dimensions –
process and outcome. The latter will be conceptualized in terms of their policy contents; the 
former, considering the modes of institutional change through which they crystallize.  
2.3.1 Conceptualizing outcomes of welfare regime reforms 
The main challenge in this sense, is the development of analytical categories that allow the 
comparison of outcomes across policy areas that are not only dissimilar, but also internally 
complex. Both pension and health care systems have multiple dimensions that may be 
simultaneously reformed to different degrees and through qualitatively different combinations. 
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Besides, the equivalence of changes across both policy domains is not always obvious or 
unambiguous.  
 The solution I have chosen is the classification of contents of reform in a small number of 
relatively general categories with a relatively straightforward connection with the defining 
dimensions of welfare regimes. The four categories I intend to use result from crossing two 
dimensions to be measured dichotomously –namely, intensity and direction.  
Intensity taps the qualitative reach of a given reform. The goal here is the discrimination 
between two types of reform. On the one hand, the ones that introduce quantitative adjustments 
in the parameters of a pension or healthcare system without touching the core principles that 
define its qualitative profile; on the other hand, those that redefine the system’s basic nature 
through a reformulation of those principles.  I will respectively use the labels parametric and 
structural for those categories. Parametric reforms typically involve adjustments aiming to 
increase the efficiency and financial viability of the system, alter the quality or volume of its 
services, or modify the size of the populations with effective access to benefits.27 Structural 
reforms typically involve changes affecting entitlements, criteria of eligibility for benefits, types 
of risks covered, and funding mechanisms. As a general rule, we could say that structural 
                                                 
27 As more concrete examples we could mention, for pension systems, changes affecting replacement ratios, the 
proportionality between contributions and benefits, minimum age for retirement, or differences between special regimes. 
In the case of health care systems, decentralization in the provision of services, modifications in the amount of 
copayments, changes in lists of catastrophic illnesses and medical treatments with guaranteed coverage, or adjustments in 
the maximum age up to which individuals may be protected through their parents’ insurance. In both types of systems, 
managerial reforms aiming to reduce administrative costs and improve efficiency and quality of service. 
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reforms introduce a new balance between state, market, and family, in the production of welfare, 
having their center of gravity in the public/private mix.28 
The direction of reform taps the orientation of its effects in terms of the horizontal and 
vertical expansion or contraction of decommodification –along this axis, reform outcomes are 
classified as either retrenchment or expansion. The reforms involving retrenchment are those 
that reduce either the coverage or the levels of decommodification provided by the system of 
social protection; reforms entailing expansion suppose analogous changes, but in the opposite 
direction. By crossing both dimensions, we obtain four categories –parametric retrenchment, 
parametric expansion, structural retrenchment, and structural expansion. 
2.3.2 Conceptualizing welfare regime change as modes of institutional transformation 
Research on diverse processes of welfare reform in the developed world has provided abundant 
evidence supportive of the idea that the institutional forms adopted by reforms may have long-
term consequences in terms of their subsequent stability and future possibilities of change. The 
resilience of welfare regimes, and the difficulties to form stable and relatively homogeneous 
reformist coalitions, frequently force reformers to put together multidimensional reform 
“packages” combining very heterogeneous interests and goals in order to make ad hoc minimum 
winning coalitions possible. The unavoidable bargaining and muddling-through required by this 
                                                 
28 Examples of structural reforms would be: a) switches between demonstrable need, contribution, and citizenship as 
basis for access to social protection; b) transitions between pay-as-you-go pension systems with intergenerational risk 
pooling and defined benefits, and retirement systems based on individual savings accounts with defined contributions; c) 
transitions between a type of  health care system based on mandatory universal insurance subsidized through tax-based 
public resources, and one based on optional contracting of private, non-subsidized insurance; d) switches between social 
protection consisting on earnings-related benefits funded by payroll contributions, and a regime establishing a flat-rate 
universal benefit funded through general revenue.  
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type of strategy, frequently end leading to the dilution of the initial reformist project, with loss of 
internal coherence. This results in processes of institutional “hybridization” and/or “dualization” 
with a frequency noticed by several recent studies.29 The resulting institutional structures may 
not only face serious coordination problems, but also present levels of internal complexity and 
heterogeneity with important implications for their long-term stability. 
 It seems thus important to pay consideration to welfare reforms under this light. 
Some recent developments in the theory of institutional change seem relevant and potentially 
useful for such purpose. I have already called attention on the recent reorientation of the 
theoretical mainstream of historical institutionalism –particularly when applied to the study of 
welfare states-, from a concentration on the possible sources of institutional inertia, to a focus on 
possible explanations for a particular type of change. 
 The new privileged object of attention was institutional change without ruptures –
in the case of welfare regimes, the persistence of institutional configurations that certainly 
maintained very resilient distinctive profiles, but not necessarily or predominantly against 
change, but through it. In other words, the phenomenon of resilience still needed to be explained, 
but more and more frequently began to be seen as a product of adaptation, rather than rigidity.  
Historical institutionalism was poorly equipped for such purpose. It is not that it completely 
lacked a theory of institutional change, but its “distinctive emphasis on stability and 
predictability” (Peters and Pierre 1998) had led to privilege a model of punctuated equilibrium, 
                                                 
29 See the studies included in (Bonoli and Natali 2012, Emmenegger et al. 2012, Palier 2010). 
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combining long periods of institutional inertia and punctual episodes of drastic and abrupt 
discontinuity with long-term effects (critical junctures).30  
The result of efforts to go beyond the limitations of the punctuated equilibrium model 
was a somewhat paradoxical rediscovery of the importance of time and its  (Pierson 2004, 
Streeck 2009) materialization both through institutional aging and through changing 
environments of institutional development. This in turn suggested the need to develop different 
terms of consideration for formative periods and for subsequent stages of institutional 
maturation, and triggered a series of theoretical explorations towards an alternative model of 
gradual endogenous institutional change.31  
The most critical aspect for the development of such a model seems to be the 
identification and theorization of the mechanisms through which gradual institutional change 
takes place, and of the conditions that explain them. So far, the most articulated developments in 
that direction share a basic limitation: what they actually provide is a typology of outcomes of 
institutional change and some suggestions regarding types of transformative agents associated 
with each one of them. However, they offer only limited insight into what it is that triggers the 
underlying transformative mechanisms (Anderson and Immergut 2008). My investigation 
includes a component of exploration in that direction. Its point of departure is a re-classification 
of the reforms under study based on the typology suggested by Mahoney & Thelen (2010).  
Mahoney and Thelen (2010) suggest four “modal types” of institutional change. 
Displacement takes place when “existing rules are replaced by new ones”, usually supported by 
emerging actors, or by those who were “losers” under the old set of rules. Layering occurs when 
                                                 
30 See (Peters and Pierre 1998, Pierson 2004). 
31 See (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, Mahoney and Thelen 2010, Peters and Pierre 1998, Peters, Pierre, and King 
2005, Streeck 2009, Streeck and Thelen 2005, Thelen 2003) 
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the new rules are attached to the existing ones, in a process that, strictly speaking, “does not 
introduce wholly new institutions…, but rather involves amendments, revisions, or additions”. 
Still, it can nevertheless “bring substantial change if amendments alter the logic of the institution 
or compromise the stable reproduction of the original ‘core’”. Drift results when the effects of 
rules that remain formally the same experience change as a result of transformations in their 
environment. Finally, conversion occurs when “actors who actively exploit the inherent 
ambiguities of the institutions” manage to impose new interpretations or enactments for rules 
that remain the same from a formal point of view.  
This typology has recently been enriched by Levitsky and Murillo, who noticed that 
Mahoney and Thelen’s theorization assumes a background of general strong institutionalization 
(Levitsky and Murillo 2009, 2012). The conditions prevailing in several Latin American polities, 
they observe, create very different environments, signed by pervasive institutional weakness. A 
“weak institutional environment” is defined by these authors as “a context in which (1) 
enforcement of the rules is low, or there exists broad de facto discretion with respect to their 
application; and (2) institutional durability is low, in that formal rules change repeatedly, rarely 
surviving fluctuations in power and preference distributions (Levitsky and Murillo 2012).” Such 
circumstances, they suggest, favor the emergence of a fifth distinct pattern of institutional change 
–serial replacement- in which change is both radical and recurrent.  Although Levitsky and 
Murillo’s theorization of the specific mechanisms and dynamics leading to this type of 
institutional precariousness is still insufficient, and the analytical separation of the treatment of 
institutional weakness as causal factor and as effect is not always precise, the concept of serial 
replacement taps what I find to be a significant modal variation, which makes its addition as a 
fifth modal pattern to Mahoney and Thelen’s typology potentially rewarding. 
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2.4 EXPLAINING PATTERNS OF WELFARE REGIME CHANGE 
In this section, I present the causal configurations hypothesized to lead to different patterns of 
reform, and explain the mechanisms through which I expect them to operate.  
Welfare regimes emerged as a direct response to processes of capitalist modernization 
that created a series of new social risks and destroyed traditional systems of social risk-
management. They were a chapter of the “double movement” (Polanyi 1985) through which 
western societies coped with the disruptive effects of the subordination of an increasing number 
of dimensions of social life to market dynamics. The sources of disruption had to do with more 
than the substitution of “mechanic” for “organic” forms of solidarity (Castel 2003). The anxieties 
and tensions caused by the new risks were intertwined with the demands for political inclusion 
that would end with oligarchic regimes of restricted participation.  Under that light, welfare 
regimes clearly appear as components of more encompassing exercises in statecraft oriented to 
the “regulation of the poor” (Piven and Cloward 1993) –and of the middle classes. The 
neutralization, or moderation, of some of the potential effects of the democratization and 
massification of politics, counted among the goals underlying their development.  
Based on the considerations of the previous paragraph, I make three assumptions that are 
at the root of my hypotheses. First, that an accurate understanding of the dynamics of 
transformation of welfare regimes should require consideration of their articulation with other 
institutional instruments of those attempts of political activation, controlled mobilization, and 
integration of hitherto excluded social forces. Second, that three among those institutions are 
particularly relevant: regimes of interest intermediation, political parties, and specialized state 
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bureaucracies. Third, that timing and sequencing of development of those components is an 
essential determinant of their combined dynamics. 
This is an exercise in theory development. Since my hypotheses were for the most part 
inductively developed to explain already known outcomes, I find it convenient, for the sake of 
clarity, to organize their exposition around the specific outcomes –patterns of reform- to explain.  
The “trajectories of reform” (Palier 2010) that I anticipate as more frequent involve some 
combination of three types of solutions. First, marginal parametric adjustments (Pierson 1994, 
2001) of the conditions of eligibility and benefits for those already covered by the system 
(“insiders”). Second, structural reforms involving the creation or encouragement of mechanisms 
of individual private aiming to eliminate or significantly restrict risk-pooling. Private models 
may substitute public ones, operate in parallel, or be combined in some mixed formula. Any of 
those situations  may incorporate some transitional formula to preserve the situation of “insiders” 
with acquired rights (Mesa-Lago and Bertranou 1998). Third, “dualization”, resulting from the 
development of some residual, non-contributory means-tested type of assistance for those 
“outsiders” in situation of poverty and some high-risk populations like elderly, children, or single 
mothers.  
2.4.1 Parametric retrenchment 
I have repeatedly remarked the multidimensional complexity of the reforms here analyzed, and 
the multiplicity of outcomes that we can expect. Final diversity notwithstanding, I will postulate 
the existence of a virtually universal starting pattern defined by a few common basic attributes. 
First, punctual, relatively unitary episodes of reform of social protection are extremely rare. Even 
if with important variation in terms of length and number of stages, we tend to find them chained 
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in frequently very protracted “trajectories of reform” (Palier 2010) that may cover entire decades. 
Second, those trajectories entail important processes of policy learning by trial and error, the 
obvious implication being that frustrated reforms are a relatively common occurrence in this 
policy domain. Third, the early stages consist, without exception, on cycles of frustrated 
structural reforms and parametric adjustments.  
Actually, Paul Pierson’s model of a “new politics of the welfare state” marked by 
strategies of blame-avoidance in a context of “permanent austerity,” while failing to explain the 
most advanced stages of those trajectories, fits the early ones pretty well. I have presented the 
reasons that make policy domain entailing high electoral risks for reformers acting under 
conditions of financial duress. Without exception, the systems of social protection of the 
countries here considered entered the period under study under such conditions –even if not in all 
cases in situations of strict emergency.32 That was the combined effect of long-term processes of 
financial deterioration due to the combined effects of financial mismanagement, demographic 
change, narrow contributory bases, and fiscal fragility (Mesa-Lago 1989). Without exception, 
problems were dramatically exacerbated in the 1980s by the debt crisis. 
My hypothesis is thus that the irruption of social security reform in the public agenda, 
and the resulting universal “first wave” of parametric adjustments is without exception explained 
by the combination of the objective problems of increasingly dysfunctional systems and a 
context of deep economic crisis. In such circumstances, parametric reforms constituted the “path 
of less resistance (Bonoli 2012).” The configurations analyzed in the following sections are 
hypothesized to explain the timing, feasibility and content of diverse types of structural reform in 
                                                 
32 In the countries with the oldest and most developed systems (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay), however, the cycle of 
failed reforms and endless parametric adjustments had already begun by the early 1970s (Mesa-Lago 1978, 1989). 
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a subsequent stage, but neither the initial emergence of the issue as a public problem, nor the 
initial cycle of parametric retrenchment. 
2.4.2 Structural retrenchment through institutional displacement 
An important degree of institutional continuity is the predominant common denominator among 
the majority of welfare reforms registered in Latin America. My theory and consequently a clear 
focus on the exploration of the mechanisms underlying gradual “change within the continuity.” 
However, Latin America shows an important number of cases of structural transformation through 
institutional rupture, involving a comprehensive displacement of existing institutions.  This is the 
type of reform that fits a model of punctuated, discontinuous institutional change requiring the 
intervention of exogenous factors to break mechanisms of path dependence. In this section I 
suggest two potential external sources of change expected to increase the pressure on institutions to 
the point of making radical discontinuity more likely.  
Retrenchment by substitution, I contend, requires, as a necessary condition, the joint 
presence of two exogenous impacts: authoritarian interregna introducing strong institutional 
discontinuities, and deep debt crises associated with hyperinflationary processes. Those 
exogenous shocks combine negative impacts on the relative strength and veto capacity of 
distributional coalitions that benefit from ISI and support the continuity of welfare regimes as 
originally designed.  
2.4.2.1 Authoritarian interregna 
It is convenient to clarify what my hypothesis in this regard is not going to be: neither that any 
political regime change can be a sufficient cause of subsequent welfare regime transformations, 
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nor that it can per se determine the specific content of such transformations, when they occur. 
The argument is that authoritarian governments may have the capacity to concentrate enough 
power in the hands of executive authorities to, based on some combination of exclusionary 
policy-making and repression, break or bypass some players’ capacity to veto radical reforms 
(Malloy 1977b, 1979, Silva 1996). 
2.4.2.2 Financial crises 
Institutional configurations are crystallizations of specific distributions of power among 
coalitions of interests and political actors.33 I thus expect drastic changes in that distribution to 
create situations of “institutional misfit.” Such situations are in turn likely to stimulate attempts 
at radical institutional re-design in order to adjust the distribution of benefits favored by the 
institutional design to the new distribution of power. Although such displacements are relatively 
rare, deep economic crises can have such an effect. The Great Depression of 1929 is almost 
universally cited as the trigger of a chain of deep socioeconomic transformations at the root of 
the cycle of political crises that more or less abruptly ended the era of oligarchic regimes 
throughout Latin America. Many authors assign the financial debacles produced by the debt 
crises of the early eighties a comparably significant impact on the viability of the ISI model and 
the institutional arrangements that supported it.34 
As in the case of regime changes, however, I will not assign to debt crises sufficient 
causal powers. I only suggest that their impact may, depending on specific domestic institutional 
configurations, favor redistributions of economic and political power that could facilitate the 
                                                 
33 Cfr. (Knight 1992, Moe 2006, Offe 2008, Streeck 2009). 
 
34 See, for example, (Cavarozzi 1992, 1997, 2007, González 2012, Mahon 1996, Roberts 2007a). 
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adoption of radical welfare reforms. I will suggest four mechanisms through which that kind of 
redistribution might happen. First, the growth of unemployment and the expansion of the 
informal economy, by narrowing the contributory basis of social security systems, should be 
expected accentuate their financial urgencies. Second, those very same factors would at the same 
time weaken the position of labor unions, and strengthen the blackmailing power of international 
financial institutions (IFIs) favorable to radical transformations of welfare regimes in general and 
pensions systems in particular. Third, in those political systems whose institutional legacies 
included corporatist forms of interest intermediation and strong populist parties with organic 
connections to labor movements, governments’ margins for maneuvering in the management of 
the crisis should be expected to be severely restricted. This would increase the probability of 
hyperinflationary spirals, with the final paradoxical effect of making radical reforms more 
acceptable among former components of the coalitions of interests hitherto benefited by the ISI 
model. Fourth, financial crises tend to increase the economic power and political leverage of 
some sections of economic elites whose wealth is predominantly consistent on assets with high 
liquidity and mobility. Due to the historical configuration of Latin American economic elites, 
those displacements would operate in the benefit of specific entrepreneurial conglomerates or 
components internal to them, rather than entire economic sectors.35 Such a situation, associated 
with the general absence of encompassing centralized entrepreneurial pressure groups could 
accentuate the likelihood of successful strategies of capture, giving those economic agents direct 
access to policymaking processes.  
It is important to note that these four mechanisms are specified exclusively for the sake of 
intelligibility of the hypothesized effects of financial crises. Identifying the specific combinations 
                                                 
35 See (Schneider 2004, 2005, 2013). 
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of the ones at work in each national crisis is beyond the scope of this project. I will limit myself 
to test the correlation between crisis and radical reform.  
2.4.3 Blockage and segmentation of structural retrenchment 
Quite a few corpses can be found along many of the trajectories that ended leading to structural 
retrenchment in Latin America. Frustrated –sometimes not even formally discussed- initiatives of 
radical structural retrenchment followed by the success of more moderate alternatives, form a 
relative common sequence in the region. The outcome is a pattern of segmented reform, in which 
limits are set for the scope of retrenchment in order to preserve the interests with veto capacity 
from its effects and purchase, if not their support, at least their acquiescence. Limits may be 
implemented either by the establishment of a parallel system, or by the creation of a mixed one. 
In both cases, an important degree of institutional continuity becomes part of the price. The 
mode of institutional change is not displacement, but layering. This is a direct reflection of the 
capacity of coalitions of insiders to block or inhibit initiatives of radical retrenchment –meaning 
full privatization and closure of the existing system- under democratic regimes. Such capacity 
also not only explains the limitation in scope and institutional discontinuity, but also who the 
political agent(s) of the reform needs to be. 
The type of process of labor incorporation and its legacies explain the inter-partisan 
dynamics leading to the reform. The relevant aspect of the process is whether it involved a 
subsisting legacy of corporatist structures of interest intermediation. Those legacies are 
associated with the existence of a hegemonic partisan agent of incorporation, that tends to 
monopolize the electoral returns of the initial expansion of the system of social protection. With 
relatively developed systems of social protection, insiders become the core constituency of this 
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type of historical populist party. The obvious consequence is that, if the party is in the 
opposition, supporting any governmental initiative of radical structural retrenchment entails non-
affordable electoral costs. The first hypothesis, then, is that a necessary effect of a corporatist 
legacy is the frustration of any attempt at structural retrenchment if the partisan agent of 
incorporation is in the opposition. (Or, expressed in terms of sufficiency, that the presence of 
such party in the opposition is a sufficient condition for the frustration of radical retrenchment.)  
That electoral dependence on a core constituencies of insiders provides incentives for a 
type of opposition behavior with paradoxical consequences. On the one hand, it encourages 
systematic opposition to any type of adjustment, thus contributing to further deterioration of the 
situation. The most likely consequence will be a return to power, but to administrate an 
emergency situation. In that type of context, corporatist structures operate as a double edged 
sword. On the one hand, they enable insiders to present very solid obstacles to attempts of radical 
retrenchment; on the other hand, they provide the party with an instrument of control and co-
optation. The consequence is a mixed outcome. The party in power manages to buy, by 
combining carrots like the segmentation of the effects of reform and the distribution of 
compensatory pay-offs, with some sticks provided by control of government, the support of 
insiders for a mixed reform. The hypothesis, then -assuming a context of financial crisis of the 
system of social protection- is that the necessary outcome of a populist party in government will 
be a partial structural reform that creates either a mixed or a parallel system through institutional 
layering. 
Corporatist structures are absent from the legacy of incorporation in those cases in which 
the expansion of political participation takes place through the democratization of oligarchic 
parties. Under those circumstances, the process is considerably less disruptive, and allows for an 
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important degree of continuity. The party establishment is not challenged from the outside by a 
new populist party, but absorbs the demands of expanded participation by recycling actors 
already in place. One of the implications is the absence of monopoly of the electoral returns of 
the expansion of social protection. The refurbished traditional parties tend to develop formulas of 
co-participation in the  
When the responsibility and benefits of incorporation and the initial development of the 
welfare regime are shared by two parties, the identity of the one in power becomes irrelevant, 
since both parties count insiders among their constituencies.  Taking full blame for regressive 
reforms would entail severe losses for any of them, and a cycle of failed reforms, frustrated by a 
zero-sum game of blame-avoidance is likely to develop. The switch to a strategy of 
“cartelization” in order to shame blame and minimize costs is unlikely in the absence of a 
challenge entailing potential higher costs –like the accelerated electoral growth of a third party. 
My hypothesis is that this would force traditional parties to converge around a strategy to 
moderate the costs of a shared reform as much as possible. The predicted necessary outcome is a 
partial structural reform through layering in this case too. 
2.4.4 Structural expansion 
This section hypothesizes set of requisites for the success of structural reforms aiming to 
accentuate a system’s inclusiveness by expanding coverage and introducing more egalitarian 
distributions of benefits and burdens –resulting in increased decommodification and reduced 
stratification. It is my hypothesis that these reforms, depend on the combined effects of systems 
of interest intermediation, type of party in government, and the articulation of sectorial 
specialized bureaucracies with the political system. I hypothesize the following necessary 
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conditions, that can be combined in alternative paths: a) the presence either of strong labor 
unions connected with ruling parties without subordination or of institutionalized mechanisms of 
concertation guaranteed by the state; b) a labor mobilizing-party in government that is capable of 
articulating a comprehensive coalition of insiders and outsiders; c) an autonomous specialized 
technical bureaucracy. 
What makes such a complicated combination of factors necessary is the equation of 
potential obstacles and bottlenecks that this type of reform needs to simultaneously overcome. 
First, the potential opposition of insiders. Second, the problems of collective action affecting the 
mobilization of outsiders. Third, the neutralization of potential opposition from within the 
government of the upper bureaucratic cadres of the system in place. Fourth, the propensity of 
partisan experts to rely on a technocratic, exclusionary style of policy-making. Let us see how 
each of the necessary conditions is hypothesized to contribute to the removal or neutralization of 
those potential obstacles. 
 Any significant expansion of social protection having to build upon the legacy of welfare 
regimes as segmented as the Latin American ones, in the general macroeconomic contexts that 
characterized the last three decades, is to some degree in conflict with the interests of fractions of 
the already covered population. This is because fiscal constraints make its sustainability partially 
contingent upon the suppression –or at least significant moderation- of the special benefits 
enjoyed by certain privileged categories among the insured –crucially, in most cases, civil 
servants. At the same time, these reforms are highly unlikely against a coalition of insiders. Such 
restrictions require some type of governing party that can credibly offer insiders a degree of 
reassurance sufficient to preclude their opposition, but without being too unilaterally dependent 
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on their support. In other words, a party for which organized labor and white collar-unions 
constitute a core constituency, but not a hegemonic one. 
Party organization and the type of linkage between party and pressure group play a 
central role in that equation. Parties with what Pribble calls a professional-electoral 
organizational profile do not grant unions guarantees of effective influence in the definition of 
programmatic priorities and in policy decisions (Pribble 2013). Neither do parties providing 
stable organic connections at the cost of unions’ autonomy. Organic-mobilizational partisan 
structures, Pribble argues, provide organized interests within the partisan coalition with the 
means to exercise more control on partisan policy-making teams.  In that case, the possibility of 
overcoming pressures for the protection of privileges will depend on the existence of other 
organized constituencies that would benefit from the equalization of benefits.36 
Unions and organized outsiders controlling some significant quota of intra-party 
influence may become also decisive for the definition of a different type of conflict. Teams of 
partisan experts operating on the domain of social policy frequently find the expansive reforms 
they support compromised by vetoes from their peers in economic teams. In these type of 
conflict, economic experts from governmental teams tend to get the upper hand more often than 
not. That being the case, constituencies with significant muscle within party structures may 
represent the only possible effective counterweight. 
                                                 
36 This is a pattern of party-union articulation that can only be provided by what we may label second generation labor-
mobilizing parties –that is, parties that captured the stable support of organized labor only after the latter’s incorporation 
had been completed by other parties. They are creatures of one of two types of alternative sequences. First, cases in 
which an authoritarian interregnum destroyed the corporatist structures left by an incorporation through controlled 
mobilization by an authoritarian populist party. Second, processes of incorporation through the modernization of 
oligarchic parties that limited themselves to a type of purely electoral mobilization, without developing organic linkages 
with subordinated unions. 
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In the absence of the “right” type of governing party, a different type of structure may 
provide a sort of functional equivalent, securing effective access to stages of policy design for 
labor unions, social movements, and other forms of organized interests, by other means. That 
would be the case of formally established avenues of consultation and participation, supported or 
even mandated by governmental authority, and operating under consensual rules. I have in mind 
three types of situation: 1) neocorporatist regimes of interest intermediation; 2) inclusive 
processes of constitutional reform; 3) ad-hoc schemes of dialogue aiming to the establishment of 
social pacts in exceptional circumstances (economic crisis, regime transitions, etc.). 
Political parties, however, still may play another role as vehicles of bureaucratic 
embeddedness. The central idea behind Peter Evans’ original formulation of the concept is that, 
in peripheral or semi-peripheral societies, states may play a decisive role helping insufficiently 
developed social actors to overcome collective action problems, and coordinating their actions. It 
seems reasonable, however, to suspect that the performance of such role may result very 
different under democratic regimes. What matters to me here is the dynamic role that 
bureaucratic teams with expertise in social policy areas may play in the design of expansive 
reforms. Two types of obstacles may make that role critical for the success of structural reforms 
in contemporary Latin America.  First, the extreme fragmentation of the universe of risk groups 
not covered by existing schemes of social protection. Second, the need to find viable ways of 
articulation of their interests with the ones of risk groups already included.   Placed at the core of 
the system to be reformed, specialized bureaucracies may play a pivotal role by providing 
expertise necessary to craft acceptable formulas for expansion, and by coordinating the interests 
of fragmented groups of outsiders throughout the policy making process. 
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The role in itself would by no means constitute a novelty –several classical studies show 
the importance of expert bureaucrats in the initial development of the region’s welfare regimes. 
The problem is that, with the maturation of institutions and programs, bureaucrats themselves are 
likely to become part of the coalition of insiders. Moreover, in Latin America, the development 
of welfare regimes framed by state structures that had experienced only very incomplete 
transitions from instruments of patrimonial rule into structures of legal-rational domination. 
Under those circumstances, welfare bureaucracies result very permeable to penetration and 
capture by clientelistic networks and patronage exchanges. They thus tend not only to lose any 
capacity to operate as agents of transformation, but also to become pivotal components of very 
resistant distributional coalitions committed to the protection of the privileged status of 
insiders.37  
When that is the case, the challenge is the regeneration of bureaucratic initiative from the 
outside. One possibility is the type of dictatorial re-concentration of authority explored in the 
hypothesis on institutional discontinuities eventually resulting from an authoritarian interregnum. 
A second possibility, extensively put into practice all over the region throughout the cycle of 
market-oriented structural reforms, is the creation of parallel bureaucratic structures filled with 
“change teams,” expected to bypass “vested interests” and operate with independence from them, 
supposed to operate with independence from “vested interests”. The first option has, by 
definition, a necessary connection with specific types of regimes. The second does not –as a 
matter of fact, Latin America has extensively experienced it as part both of authoritarian and 
democratic experiences. What they have in common is a legitimizing rhetoric that presents their 
                                                 
37 This process has been masterfully analyzed by James Malloy  for the case of Brazilian social security (Malloy 1979).  
 
 55 
efficacy as contingent precisely upon an imperative of “disembeddedness.”38 A third alternative 
is the penetration of bureaucratic structures by teams supported by coalitions of insiders and 
outsiders that provide a social anchor guaranteeing the orientation of reforms.  
The type of political embeddedness that I hypothesize to be functional to universalistic 
reforms is decisively mediated by parties in two ways. In first place, because, finding areas of 
compatibility within coalitions of only partially overlapping interests, requires the type of 
political brokerage and articulation that only parties can provide. In the absence of that 
connection, bureaucrats are likely to find themselves either caught in the cross fire of intra-
coalitional conflicts, or captured by most powerful interests. Second, the party also operates as a 
“buffer” between social interests and policy-makers, in the sense of guaranteeing a minimum 
distance from immediate narrow coalitional interests -room for maneuvering that any 
government, no matter how partisan, requires.39 
Needless to say that this Janus-faced role, that simultaneously keeps governmental action 
anchored to a politically articulated equation of interests and protects bureaucratic cadres from 
excessive instrumentalization, is only compatible with some forms of party organization. The 
already described modalities of mandatory tripartite negotiation oriented to the formation of 
                                                 
38 Successful experiences, so the story goes, depend on the isolation of technocratic cadres mysteriously permeated by 
some sort of disinterested commitment to efficiency… and supported by strong executives. The only problem is that 
saints are by definition rare, and disembeddedness is not part of this world, and we have solid evidence that there was 
nothing neutral in the action of those “handfuls of heroes.” (This term was coined at the peak of the Washington 
Consensus’ popularity, by a fervent advocate of neoliberal reform with an only moderate sense of ridiculousness. For 
evidence on the capture of reformist teams in some poster cases of reform in the region, see (Schamis 2002, Silva 1996, 
Silva 2008).) 
39 Not even a partisan government relying on its own majority can afford being “fully partisan”. Governing always 
entails considering diverse constraints –budgetary, technical- and imperatives of governability that preclude a complete 
alignment with the demands of any constituency. (For a brilliant treatment of this point, see (Dunn 2000); for an 
empirical analysis exploring how this buffering role took place in a concrete case, see (Cavarozzi 1975)). 
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policy consensus may become relevant in this sense too -provided that bureaucracies are 
compelled to utilize the consensual input thus generated.  
2.4.5 Reversion of structural retrenchment 
Perhaps even more puzzling than the comparatively high occurrence of regime changes in Latin 
America, is their comparatively high reversibility. In fact, the institutional outcomes of an 
important proportion of the region’s structural welfare reforms have resulted surprisingly 
ephemeral. This subsection suggests an explanation for the important number of structural 
reforms that have been radically reversed within relatively short periods. The hypothesis that will 
guide my exploration is that the instability of structural reforms is determined by the interaction 
between the type of regime and the political dynamics of the specific policy-making processes 
they result from. Under democratic regimes, I contend, consensual policy-making is a necessary 
condition for durable structural reforms. 
Such institutional precariousness does not seem to be not connected with the structural 
nature of the respective foundational reforms per se. Within the region we can also find both 
structural reforms that have successfully passed the tests of time and alternation in government 
of parties with heterogeneous orientations, and parametric adjustments that form part of cycles of 
recurrent contradictory reforms. At the same time, although none of the countries under study 
monopolizes the occurrence of a particular mode of institutional transformation, it seems 
possible to identify two subsets of countries with markedly different capacities to produce 
“virtuous” circles of cumulative institutional change. In other words, we have evidence 
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suggesting that some systemic properties may be associated with the emergence of patterns of 
serial institutional replacement.40  
My hypothesis does not exclude the idea that some structural attributes of the respective 
political systems play an important role in the emergence of this syndrome of chronic 
institutional instability and pendulum-like policy oscillation. Moreover, I am inclined to think 
that, more specifically, institutional legacies from the incorporation period are part of the story. I 
also contend, however, that they operate through their influence on the on short-term strategies 
of political actors. In this stage of development of my theory, I do not intend to predict the 
conditions of emergence of different strategies, but just to identify correlations between some of 
them and the instability of structural reforms.  
I have built a tentative typology based on the observation of the concrete political 
dynamics of the processes leading to the reforms whose stability I intend to explain. The 
typology results from the combination of two dichotomous factors. One is the inclusiveness of 
the process in terms of interest groups and social forces affected by the reform.  Reform 
                                                 
40 The widely shared argument about the “virtuous circle” ideally connecting highly institutionalized party systems 
and consolidated democratic regimes may resonate, in its most general terms, behind my hypothesis. More 
specifically, political parties are listed by Levitsky and Murillo among the components of political systems whose 
weak institutionalization may feed the development of a pattern of institutional change through “serial replacement” 
(Levitsky and Murillo 2009, 2012). My argument has an even closer resemblance with the one recently advanced by 
Flores-Macías to explain variation in the disposition of leftist governments to preserve the institutional legacies of 
market-oriented reforms and gradually build upon them. According to this author, institutionalized party systems 
provide centripetal incentives, thus leading to the recruitment of “insider candidates” and the development of 
consensus-building politics that tend to favor the status quo. Party systems in disarray, on the other hand, are a 
source of centrifugal incentives that encourage the success of anti-system candidates and contentious dynamics 
favoring drastic transformations (Flores-Macias 2012). However, for at least three important reasons, I am reluctant 
to approach the problem through the concept of party system institutionalization common to this literature –which is 
the one developed by Mainwaring and Scully in their influential introduction to Building Democratic Institutions 
(Mainwaring and Scully 1995).  First, such approach discriminates very poorly between the conceptualization of 
institutionalization at the party and at the system level –almost as if implicitly suggesting that the latter would 
emerge as the aggregate consequence of the former. Second, Mainwaring & Scully offer a definition of party 
institutionalization that essentially makes it equivalent to the consolidation of a very specific model of party 
organization –namely, the category of mass party elaborated by Duverger based on the experience of European 
social-democratic parties in the early 20th century (Duverger 1954). Third, institutionalization is presented as having 
unambiguously positive impact on democratic stability and legitimacy –thus ignoring the possibility of cases of 
“overinstitutionalization” with perverse effects. 
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processes will be classified along this dimension as either inclusive or exclusive.41 The second 
dimension is whether or not opposition forces sufficient to extend legislative majorities beyond a 
minimum winning coalition support the reform. The right side of table V.2 shows the categories 
resulting from crossing the two dimensions.  
 
Table 2: Dimensions and types of reform process 
 
INTEREST INCLUSIVENESS TYPE OF REFORM PROCESS 
 Interest groups 
consultation 
Interest Inclusiveness 
 
YES NO Inclusive Exclusive 
Protest 
YES Exclusive Exclusive Hegemonic Factionalist NO Supra-
partisan 
legislative 
support 
NO Exclusive Inclusive Consensual Elitist YES 
 
 
I will contend that non-consensual processes under democratic regimes are a sufficient 
condition for cycles of serial replacement by radical reversal of structural reforms to occur in the 
short- or medium-term. (If an equivalent formulation in terms of necessary conditions is 
                                                 
41 The classification of cases will be decided depending on two aspects: 1) whether the process  there are reasonably 
open and extended consultations with the actors involved; 2) and whether or not the government is open to modify its 
proposal as a result of eventual contentious expressions of massive opposition to it. Consultation implies that the actors 
consulted had to some extent the possibility of providing actual input for the design of the reform –merely informative 
meetings to present a non-modifiable governmental proposal do not qualify. A negative answer to at least one of those 
questions determines the classification of the process as exclusive. 
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preferred, that consensual processes are a necessary condition for the stability of structural 
reforms approved under democratic regimes.) 
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3.0  RESEARCH DESIGN 
To the extent that the distinction between theory-development and theory-testing is valid for 
analytical purposes, this research strategy is designed aiming at the latter goal rather than the former 
–thus allowing to put between brackets the discussion of the methodological legitimacy of lacking 
two separate sets of cases for the respective purposes of developing and testing. 
The main goal is the identification of combinations of structural and institutional 
variables whose interactions affect both the configuration of agents participating in policy-
making processes and the relations among them. The resulting limitation of the feasibility of 
agents’ strategic repertoires is hypothesized to shape the patterns of their interactions, which in 
turn are hypothesized to explain diverse outcomes in terms of institutional reform. It is important 
to remark a basic assumption in terms of the ontology of causation: causal effects are not 
attributed to “variables” –that is, variables are not per se assumed to “make things happen.” 
Causal effects are expected to be the –intentional or unintentional- result of political agency –that 
is, of the interactions of political agents (in this case, mainly, parties, interest groups and 
bureaucracies) that interact strategically within “fields of forces” defined by combinations of 
socioeconomic and institutional variables.  
It follows that it is at the level of those interactions that explanatory connections need to 
be hypothesized and verified. It also follows that both the distribution of agents’ capabilities and 
power and their understanding of their respective interests need to be 
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defined in relational terms –that is, neither power, nor interests constitute absolute attributes, but 
are always constructed in relational –thus context-dependent- terms. That being the  case, a final 
implication is that they can only be observed in movement –that is, as they develop diacronically 
as political processes. 
The chain of assumptions synthesized in the previous paragraph justifies the main 
methodological tools chosen –namely, descriptive typology, set-theoretic analysis based on 
Boolean logic, and process-tracing. Their application is expected to solve what I find to be the 
project’s five central concrete methodological challenges: 1) classification of pre-reform welfare 
regimes; 2) measurement of welfare regime change; 3) testing of hypothesis about the co-
variation of causal configurations and reform processes; 4) identification and description of 
patterns of governance; 5) explanation of variation of patterns of reform. 
3.1 CASE-SELECTION AND LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 
Eleven Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela) are covered both in the descriptive components (analysis of 
welfare regimes and patterns of governance), and in the Boolean analysis of causal configurations. 
Process-tracing will focus on a sample of stages of specific policy processes considered 
representative of the different hypothesized causal processes. 
Regional concentration does not take for granted any essential or self-evident 
homogeneity among Latin American countries. However, it guarantees a reasonable degree of 
control of several exogenous factors –international conjuncture, configuration of the global 
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system, general ideological and intellectual environment, availability of models for policy 
reform42. Conversely, the inclusion of other cases showing important commonalities and 
potentially enlightening, like Mediterranean or post-communist European regimes, or South-East 
Asian countries, would have required the expansion of the model beyond controllable 
dimensions, due to the need to consider the implications of factors as pervasive as the general 
transition from totalitarian regimes, the process of European integration, or some peculiarities of 
Asian developmentalism. Within the region, I chose the eight cases analyzed by Collier & 
Collier (2002), increasing the variance in terms of degree of institutionalization of the process of 
labor incorporation by the addition of Bolivia and Ecuador; Costa Rica, on the other hand, 
expands the range of variation of the dependent variable. Such selection also guarantees 
considerable levels of variation for all the variables to be considered.   
The unit of analysis –and as a result the number of observations- varies across the 
different sections of the project. This is in part result of the variable extension of relatively 
homogeneous processes of reform. Both for  the measurement of the transformation of welfare 
regimes and for the comparison of post-reform regimes, the unit of analysis will be the national 
welfare regime at a specific moment of its historical development –in one case considering 
longitudinal within-case variation, in the other one synchronic cross-sectional variation. For 
purposes of causal inference, the unit of analysis will be the “trajectories of reform” (Palier 
2010). Each unitary trajectory is defined as the chain of political interactions triggered by the 
discussion of a formal initiative aiming to include a project of (total or partial) welfare regime 
                                                 
42 All the countries considered had to deal with the challenges of welfare reform in a context marked by the exhaustion 
of import substitution-based industrialization; the sequence of debt crisis and economic adjustment; dramatically 
accelerated global interdependence; drastic increase of the leverage of international financial agents; and the cycle of 
hegemony and crisis of the “Washington Consensus.” 
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institutional in the public agenda43.  The conclusion of a process is determined by either the 
successful blockade44 of the initiative by some actor endowed with formal or informal veto 
power, or its formal crystallization as a norm approved by the competent authority.  Those 
unitary reform processes may vary in terms of their duration, actors actively involved, and final 
outcomes. But the rules for their delimitation are not absolute. In some cases, we find initiatives 
processed under the same administration that can nevertheless be considered relatively 
independent. In other cases, however, what at first glance appear as separate reform processes, 
are actually chained not only by chronological proximity, but also by the participation of the 
same actors, with no significant variation in the distribution of power, but with important degrees 
of “strategic learning.” For those situations, I have chosen to consider the formally separated 
units of analysis as successive “rounds” of a single encompassing process.  For the micro-
analysis of dynamics and mechanisms of transformation, observation will focus on a sample of 
critical stages –when possible, decisions- in the context of specific processes of reform, 
considered representative of the different types of institutional change identified45. I will 
occasionally reinforce process-tracing with within-case comparisons –both longitudinally for the 
same policy area, and synchronically across policy areas- that follow a logic of “most similar-
systems.” 
                                                 
43 “Formal initiatives” refers to those initiatives that: 1) are minimally systematized in terms of institutional design and 
documented; 2) are presented by some individual or group of individuals explicitly acting as representatives of a political 
party, government, or pressure group; 3) are subjected, formally or informally, to the consideration of representatives of 
the government or other political parties or pressure groups. These restrictions preclude the consideration of informal 
conversations among individual politicians or corporate representatives not explicitly acting as the authorized “voices” 
of the respective parties, corporations, or administrations. However, it does not rule out non-public discussions of 
documented initiatives by individuals exercising formal representation.  
 
44 The blockade can occur before the formal inclusion of the project as an issue in the public agenda, or at some of the 
stages of the process of public debate. 
 
45 This implies a process of sampling cascading through three levels: among countries, among episodes of reform within 
each of the selected countries, and among stages of the policy process within each episode. 
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There will thus be a permanent circulation across levels of analysis. I will compare 
welfare regimes and patterns of governance both cross-nationally –in order to define typologies 
and classify the cases- and longitudinally –in order to assess the changes experienced in each 
case.  
3.2 MEASUREMENT OF WELFARE REGIME CHANGE 
There are two aspects of this problem: a) measurement of the transformations experienced by each 
national welfare regime during the period under study; b) description of cross-national variation of 
post-reform regimes.  
3.2.1 Measurement of outcomes of reform 
The procedure will be longitudinal comparison, for each national case, between the configurations 
of the respective welfare regimes at the beginning and at the end of the period under study –that is, 
circa 1980 and 2010.  
I will characterize welfare regimes based on the structure of three main components –
namely, social security, health care, and social assistance systems.  
3.2.1.1 Social security systems 
I will measure their change by constructing typologies based on multi-dimensional classificatory 
types resulting from the analysis and reduction of property spaces (Becker 1998, Boudon and 
Lazarsfeld 1969, Collier, Laporte, and Seawright 2008, Ragin 2008) composed by the 
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disaggregated analysis of six properties for three types of programs –pensions, unemployment 
insurance, and non-contributory assistance: 
Coverage will be operationalized as the percentage of the population effectively covered 
by the system. 
Rules of access refer to the attributes required for an individual or household to qualify as 
a beneficiary of the system. I will analyze changes affecting these criteria at two levels: a) at a 
more general level, I will treat them as a nominal variable with three possible values, depending 
on whether eligibility is based on citizenship, contributions, or demonstration of need; b) within 
the last two categories thus defined, I will also measure specific parameters of eligibility that can 
be measured as continuous variables (retirement age and years of contribution in one case, and 
qualifying levels of need in the other). 
Benefits include the specific cash transfers or services received by those covered by the 
system. I will consider replacement rates for pensions and unemployment insurance, and the 
levels of cash transfers and the existence or not of conditionality in the case of assistance. 
Funding refers to the distribution of the financial burden, and I will analyze it at two 
levels: in first place, a categorical distinction depending on whether programs are funded through 
general revenue or have a contributory nature; within the second category, I will also analyze the 
relative participation of workers, employers, and government in the funding of programs. 
Fragmentation applies to pensions and unemployment compensations, and consists on 
the number of separate programs existing for specific professional categories. 
3.2.1.2 Health care systems 
In this case, six dimensions will be considered: 
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Fragmentation/Coordination. None of the cases included in this study has a national health 
system; in all cases, the structure of the health care system at the most general level varies depending 
on the relative importance of three sub-sectors –public, private, and social insurance-, and the 
degree of coordination among them . The approach I will follow will be to establish a typology that 
combines three dimensions: a) number of sub-sectors (systems in the region are either dual or tri-
partite); b) degree of segmentation/coordination, measured as an ordinal variable as proposed by 
Mesa-Lago; c) predominant sub-sector, determined by the relative participation in the total 
expenditure in health care. 
Coverage, understood as the percentage of the total population with effective access to health 
care. 
Rules of access, measured by whether legal mandatory coverage exists for different 
occupational categories (salaried and wage-earners, self-employed, domestic service, and rural 
workers), for their dependents, and for the elderly.  
Benefits will be measured based on the existence of a mandatory basic package of services, 
and on whether it includes catastrophic illnesses.  
Funding will be operationalized and measured following the same criteria defined for 
pensions. 
Freedom of choice will be measured as a nominal variable built by crossing the indexes of 
market concentration and freedom of choice provided by Mesa-Lago. 
Participation is a nominal variable defined as whether the institutional design includes the 
participation of workers and employers in the administration of the system. 
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3.2.2 Post-reform cross-national variation of regime types 
Results from the synchronic comparison between the classificatory types previously identified. 
3.2.3 Classification of reforms 
The use of truth tables for purposes of hypothesis-testing requires the dichotomization of variables. 
For that purpose, I will produce aggregate measurements of welfare regime reforms at a nominal 
level, resulting from the crossing of aggregate results along two dimensions of variation: depth and 
general orientation of contents. The first aspect refers to whether the reform aims to drastically 
transform the type of welfare regime (structural reform) or merely to adjust its parameters without 
operating a change of paradigm (parametric reform). 
The second aspect deals with the orientation of the contents of reform, distinguishing 
between expansive reforms and retrenchment. The first category includes reforms that, either 
simultaneously or alternatively, make the regime more inclusive in terms of coverage or 
participation, more egalitarian in terms of the distribution of benefits, increase the generosity of 
benefits without compromising the financial viability, or redistributes its costs in a more 
progressive direction. The second one includes those reforms that, either simultaneously or 
alternatively, produce opposite effects.  
The combination of both criteria delivers a taxonomy comprising four types of reforms: 
structural-expansive, parametric-expansive, structural retrenchment and parametric 
retrenchment. It is important to notice that the definitional strategies to be used along the two 
constitutive dimensions are different. The distinction between parametric and structural reforms 
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follows the classic strategy recommended by (Sartori 1976), based on the identification of a set 
of necessary definitional attributes. Expansion and retrenchment, however, are defined based on 
“family resemblance” (Collier and Mahoney 1993, Goertz and Mahoney 2006) –there are no 
components that are individually necessary to determine whether a reform will be classified in 
one or the other; the presence of a number of attributes sufficient to bias the final aggregate 
result in one direction or the other is the only decisive criterion. The threshold between structural 
and parametric transformations necessarily requires a replacement of the norms46 defining 
eligibility, types of benefits, funding, and administration. 
3.3 TESTING OF MULTI-CAUSAL HYPOTHESES 
The basic goal here is to avoid the reduction to linearity of what are hypothesized to be “network-
like causal processes” (Abbott 2001, Bartolini 2000, Braumoeller 2003, Mahoney 2001) through the 
production of “set-theoretic arguments” (Ragin 2008), based on the idea that “individual institutions 
and their comparative analysis [should] be placed in a broader systemic context by locating them in a 
structured historical process (Streeck 2009).” 
The analysis of causal configurations will proceed through the methodology of crisp sets 
qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA), based on the use of Boolean algebra (Ragin 2000, 
2008). This technique has two basic advantages: on the one hand, it makes it possible for the 
researcher to go from individual causes to more complex relationships constituting causal 
                                                 
46 In terms of the modal types of institutional change proposed by Mahoney and Thelen, we would say that displacement 
is the only one compatible with structural reform. 
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configurations and the establishment of necessary and sufficient conditions (Peters 1998); on the 
other hand, the identification of multi-variable configurations minimizes the “too many variables 
problem.” 
3.4 EXPLANATION 
Rihoux et al (2011:58) observe that “Indeed, QCA techniques, as such, only enable one to identify 
the core ingredients (the core combinations of conditions), not the recipe as such.” In other words, 
strictly speaking, explanation only can emerge from the “unpacking” of causal inference through the 
analysis of causal processes (Falleti and Lynch 2009, Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998, Mahoney 2001, 
Mayntz 2004, Tilly 2001). The technique chosen for the identification of those processes is micro-
level process-tracing (Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2004, George and Bennett 2005) of specific 
trajectories of reform. 
3.5 MODAL TYPES OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
As we have seen, Mahoney and Thelen (2010) identify four types of gradual institutional change –
displacement, layering, drift and conversion. However, only the two first ones have been considered 
as possible outcomes in my hypotheses. In order to re-conceptualize and classify the outcomes of 
the reforms under study here in terms of those modal types, I will consider three indicators: a) the 
introduction of new rules (the common attribute that separates displacement and layering from the 
other two forms); b) whether there is also a removal of old rules (which is what marks the difference 
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between displacement and layering). In order to expand the Mahoney and Thelen’s typology by 
adding the category of serial replacement suggested by Levitsky and Murillo, that first stage of 
assessment will be followed by consideration of a third indication -the stability of the institutional 
results of reforms- in order to identify cases of “serial replacement”. 
3.6 IDENTIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION OF PATTERNS OF GOVERNANCE 
Patterns of governance will be identified by the analysis of national “trajectories of reform” and 
the institutional configurations that constitute their respective final outcomes, contrasting them 
with the diverse ideal-types of governance. The different patterns of governance will be 
identified based on the following indicators. Governance by command: will be operationalized as 
an ordinal variable, ranging from one pole in which the programs being analyzed are entirely 
public to another in which they are fully privatized, with intermediate situations in which public 
authorities have different exercise diverse forms of regulation. Market-based governance will be 
identified based on the existence of services and benefits whose coverage, cost, level, quality, 
etc., are determined by market mechanisms. Governance by horizontal networking results from 
the formation of policy networks that incorporate non-state actors (interest groups, NGOs, 
community organizations) into the policy proves through diverse mechanisms of consultation 
and negotiation eventually leading to more or less consensual solutions. Governance by 
deliberation requires the presence of some form of direct involvement of citizens in the 
deliberative stages of the policy-making process. 
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4.0  AN EXPANDED CLASSIFICATION OF MODES OF POLITICAL 
INCORPORATION 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The goal of this chapter is to justify the proposed classification of the processes of popular 
incorporation experienced by three cases not included in the typology provided by Ruth and 
David Collier –namely, those of Bolivia, Costa Rica and Ecuador. The formula I propose for 
such extension of the universe to study has two parts. First, I will contend that Costa Rica should 
be included, with Colombia and Uruguay, as a case of incorporation through electoral 
mobilization by democratized oligarchic parties. Second, I will argue that the inclusion of the 
other two cases requires an extension of the original typology by adding a fifth category –that of 
frustrated processes of incorporation. 
The hypothesis behind the second component is that, for the purpose of understanding the 
subsequent political dynamics of the respective cases, the incompleteness of incorporation is the 
decisive aspect to consider. This does not necessarily imply that the variables around which the 
Colliers built the original typology –namely, the inclusiveness of the reformist coalition and the 
main agent of incorporation- have no relevance. As I will try to show, those aspects are essential 
to understand, among other things, differences within the category of frustrated transitions. What 
I do think is that, in the absence of a minimally consolidated solution to the problem of political 
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order, the basic, Hobbesian political dilemmas become more determinant than any other 
dimension of political life. In  other words, and for the sake of exemplifying with a concrete 
empirical reference, that the similarities matching Bolivia with Ecuador are, for the purposes of 
this investigation, more determinant than the ones common to Bolivia and Mexico. 
Neither do I imply that the crises of the respective oligarchic regimes had no depth or 
durable consequences for the subsequent evolution of Bolivia and Ecuador. These cases certainly 
experienced significant turning points, but I would say that, strictly speaking, they did not 
constitute critical junctures. By that I mean that they did not produce institutional legacies solid 
enough to have locking-in effects that could guarantee their endurance through path-dependence 
effects. 
To what extent is the latter a qualitative difference? Could it not be argued that, in the 
end, the institutional legacies of incorporation of most cases that the Colliers considered were 
affected by volatility to an important extent? Are the Bolivian and Ecuadorian experiences 
qualitatively different from the cycles of extreme political instability that led almost all of the 
other countries, sooner or later, into military dictatorships? Could we deny that several of the 
eight original cases experienced at different points of the second half of the 20th century 
processes of intense praetorianization that put the Hobbesian question at the top of the agenda? 
My short answer is that the objection would be valid if the focus were on the problem of regime 
stability. However, my concern here is with institutional legacies in terms of bureaucratic 
structures, political parties, mechanisms of interest intermediation, and social policies resilient 
enough to have an impact throughout the most recent cycle of welfare regime reforms. In that 
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regard, and with one possible exception,47 incorporation crises actually constituted critical 
junctures, with institutional legacies that still maintain their political efficacy. In the cases of 
Bolivia and Ecuador, on the other hand, the main legacy is a negative one –that is, the relevance 
of incorporation crises has to do with what they did not achieve. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized in four sections. The first three consist of 
succinct narratives intended to justify the respective classification for the three added cases. The 
last one summarizes the conclusions. 
4.2 BOLIVIA 
Late-19th century Bolivia has been presented as the paradigmatic oligarchic republic.48 
According to the paradigm, a bi-partisan system based on the dualism of liberals and 
conservatives provided services of political representation –obviously restricted to the interests 
of economic elites-under the caucus-type form expected in these situations. The exclusion of 
middle and lower social sectors from power positions and participation in partisan and 
governmental structures was complete (Gamarra and Malloy 1995, Klein 1992). 
The solidity of oligarchic domination reflected the overwhelming supremacy of export 
production within the economic structure, and of minerals among exportable products. The 
conservative faction of the oligarchy, organized around the main families controlling the 
                                                 
47 I find the hypothesis that the Peruvian case has more in common with Bolivia and Ecuador than with Argentina 
worth considering. 
4848 Spanish-speakers did not include more than 20 percent of the total population; the remaining 80 percent was 
excluded from regular political participation (Halperín Donghi 1993). 
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declining production of silver, was displaced  with the turn of the century by its ascendant liberal 
peers, beneficiaries of the substitution of tin for as the main component of Bolivian exports 
(Halperín Donghi 1993). As a matter of fact, the effective agent of the switch was a faction of the 
military, supported by indigenous communities reacting to a policy of systematic assault on their 
collectively owned land. The assault would soon be reinitiated, however. Once the coup 
succeeded, the military turned against their former peasant allies, quickly returning them to the 
political marginalization they had experienced for most of the country’s independent life. The 
hegemony of tin-mining entrepreneurs was quickly consolidated as the military passed control of 
the government to civilians, and the ascending mining entrepreneurial elite merged with the 
traditional landed one. A spectacular expansion of tin production, that turned a growing fraction 
of the indigenous peasantry into a mining proletariat, further reinforced the position of tin-mines 
owners. That cohesive dominant minority successfully blocked any significant mobility for other 
social groups. The timid growth of the middle strata could only be supported by the exercise of 
traditional liberal professions and public employment.  
The crisis of oligarchic order in Bolivia was a long-delayed process.49 Its final stages 
were marked by the successive impacts of the depression and the Chaco War. Bolivia’s rank 
among tin-producing countries had already began to decline by the time the expansive wave of 
the 1929 crack reached the country, further depressing both demand and prices for its main 
exportable product. The bankruptcy of several small producers led to further concentration of 
sectorial ownership. Large corporations developed a series of survival strategies that contributed 
                                                 
49 On the process of disintegration of the oligarchic order and the origins of the revolution, see (Dunkerley 2003, Klein 
1968, 1971, Malloy 1970). 
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to narrow the already fragile basis of the oligarchic order –they reduced the already meager 
salaries of their workers and shrank their contributions to the state budget. 
That was the background of president Daniel Salamanca’s 1932 attempt to decompress 
economic and political tensions by resorting to war. Contention between Bolivia and Paraguay 
around national boundaries in the Chaco area had been intermittently causing friction for several 
years. The Bolivian government saw in it not only an opportunity for diversion, but also to 
expand territories and gain fluvial access to the Atlantic coast. The strategy backfired. 
Paraguayan forces ended up pushing their enemies to the foothills of the Andes, and managed to 
keep part of the occupied territory after the peace negotiations finished in 1935. The disaster 
alienated the support of the generation of young officers that more directly suffered the defeat, 
and the civilian government was brought down the following year by a coup led by Gen. David 
Toro. The new regime presented itself under the label of “military socialism,” triggered a lively 
debate around economic reforms and alternative strategies of development, and seemed to be 
moving further to the left when a younger officer, Col. Germán Busch, replaced Toro. The 
opening, in 1938, of a constitutional convention with a clear predominance of representatives of 
the left among its members, accentuated that impression.50 
The impression quickly evaporated as the convention finished its work. In spite of a 
radical rhetoric of social rights in tune with the zeitgeist of the decade, it maintained the 
conditions that restricted electoral participation to a minority of Spanish-speaking literates from 
middle and upper classes. In 1939, the ascent of Gen. Enrique Peñaranda to the presidency of 
returned control of the situation to the hands of a more conservative faction within the military. 
                                                 
50 On the experience of “military socialism,” see (Klein 1965, 1967). 
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However, the results of the election that made Peñaranda president showed how much things had 
changed: the Revolutionary Leftist Front, including the Communist Party, obtained 20 percent of 
the vote.  
The economic situation did not help to stabilize the political situation. Preservation of 
profit margins through squeezing miners’ salaries had not ceased, and neither had the conditions 
in the international tin market improved for Bolivian exports. In 1942, striking miners were 
massacred by governmental repression in Catavi. The following year, a new military 
intervention, with the support of opposition parties, replaced the Peñaranda administration with a 
government with important participation of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario 
(MNR).  
The MNR had experienced rapid growth predominantly based on middle-class support, 
but its working-class constituency was very modest. It was a heterogeneous mosaic of 
ideological currents, ranging from extreme right to left, that found their common denominator in 
the radicalism of their positions and strategies. After the Catavi episode, it astutely auto-assigned 
the banner of tin miners (Malloy 1970). The international situation did not quiet US suspicions of 
pro-Axis affinities. Due to American pressures on the military, the MNR’s presence in the 
cabinet was short-lived. American anxiety was also fed, from the opposite side of the political 
spectrum, by the results obtained by the communists in the elections for a new constituent 
convention. Although Bolivia remained a traditional, overwhelmingly rural society, the mining 
sector provided the core for the development of a strong unions movement, with important 
influence of the Revolutionary Workers’ Party (PRT), of Trotskyte orientation. 
The military responded to the “recommendations” of the Roosevelt administration with a 
wave of assassinations and massive executions that counted both communist militants and 
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members of the conservative oligarchy among its victims.  This operated the miracle of pushing 
the left and the oligarchy towards an alliance. In 1946, an uprising triggered by a massive strike 
in La Paz ended with both president Villarroel and his nationalist dictatorship. 
Both the evolution of the international situation and the absolute lack of strategic 
flexibility of conservative forces cooperated to accelerate the process leading to the Bolivian 
revolution. Communists had counted themselves among the victors, coming of the Cold War 
worked against their possibilities. Their oligarchic former allies moved quickly to implement a 
conservative restoration that showed how little they had learned. In turn, the MNR reacted with 
the flexibility its adversaries lacked, cleaning an image damaged by its previous involvement in 
Villarroel’s cabinet by dropping all vestiges of fascist ideology from its discourse. The move was 
electorally rewarded: its presidential candidate, Víctor Paz Estenssoro, was the most voted in the 
1951; however, he was unable to get the support of the absolute majority required to become 
president. Still, the episode sufficed to make conservative forces panic, and the new government 
was quick to invite the military to take its place in order to preserve the status quo. 
As other times in Bolivian history, the conservative strategy backfired. A counterstrike 
based on a miners’ militia and a small fraction of the army gained the upper hand in the capital 
city and brought the MNR to power. Its brevity notwithstanding, the episode brought a radical 
redistribution of political power. The army was drastically reduced, making the workers’ militia 
the fulcrum of the revolutionary state’s coercive capacity, and the enfranchisement of the 
illiterate population multiplied the potential scope of electoral mobilization, transforming the 
MNR from a notables party into a mass-based one (Malloy 1970). The MNR made a serious 
attempt to redefine its social bases by pulling some former Trotskyte union leaders, and creating 
the Confederación Obrera Boliviana (COB). In spite of those efforts, the petty bourgeoisie and 
78 
 
other middle sectors continued providing the core of the party’s support, and its relationship with 
the core of the working-class movement would remain a conflictive one. The orientation of the 
revolution during its first year was provided by the COB, that “became a semi-sovereign 
institution that challenged the MNR’s every move (Gamarra and Malloy 1995).” This led Paz 
Estenssoro to turn to the only possible source of a counterweight –the organization and 
mobilization of peasants.  
The vast mobilization of peasant communities in the countryside immediately suggests a 
family resemblance with the Mexican revolution. The drama of the Bolivian revolutionary 
leadership, however, was the absence of anything comparable to the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie 
that provided the social base for the reconstruction of the Mexican state by the PRI.51 The 
Bolivian state –itself hardly comparable with the Porfirian one- was seized by an awkward and 
since the beginning very unstable coalition of the mining proletariat and sectors of the petty 
bourgeoisie and the middle classes. To further complicate things for the MNR, their strategy of 
building support among the peasantry quickly began to alienate important sectors of its urban 
constituencies. In the end, the fragmentation of the coalition originally supporting the 
revolutionary regime precluded the possibility of an “institutionalization of the revolution” based 
on a stable union-party-state system –the Mexican model. The fate of the revolution was to a 
great extent determined by the MNR’s failure at two critical tasks that had been at the center of 
the PRI’s success: the cooptation and domestication of the labor movement, and the subjection of 
the armed forces to civilian authority. Both aspects are connected, since it was the growing 
autonomy of the workers’ militia that led the government to resurrect the army. As its social base 
                                                 
51 On the Bolivian revolutionary state, see (Mayorga and Gorman 1978); for an excellent comparison with the Mexican 
revolution, see (Knight 2003). 
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began to narrow, the revolutionary leadership thus became more and more dependent on sheer 
repression.  
Given the type of social relations predominantly structuring Bolivian rural society, which 
guaranteed the exploitation of indigenous communities based a very traditional hacienda system, 
peasant support was contingent upon an agrarian reform. Representatives of the MNR and the 
COB began to cover the countryside, resurrecting modes of peasant organization with remote 
roots in the country’s colonial past. Although numerically more vast than the miners’ movement, 
the latter’s organizational density and cohesiveness was missing from peasant corporate 
organizations. Their support became nevertheless critical for the government as the very effects 
of the early stages of the agrarian reform began to negatively affect food supplies for urban 
areas.52 This exacerbated frictions inside the revolutionary forces, as unions used their 
organizational structure to guarantee the provision of food for their membership.  
Support for the government among the urban population began to experience a drainage 
in favor of right-wing electoral competition. A totally unexpected ally –the United States- would 
provide some oxygen in the short term, but at the cost of adding to the already complicated 
equation of contradictory demands to which the MNR was subjected. Pressures for a return to an 
orthodox economic policy were actually followed by significant stabilization efforts. However, 
room for maneuvering was also limited by the terms of the nationalization of tin mines. Although 
the COB was able to impose the decision, former owners not only were largely compensated, but 
thanks to their control of refinement activities taking place outside the country, remained able to 
                                                 
52 The dismantlement of the hacienda system was followed by a pattern of land redistribution that substituted a myriad 
of minifundia, with a short-term negative impact on levels of production (Halperín Donghi 1993, Klein 1992). 
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set the price of tin. While this squeezed national production from one side, the improvement in 
working conditions logically demanded by unions added to the effect from the costs side.53  
In the end, and not surprisingly given the alluded limitations in its social coalition of 
support, the basic failure of the revolutionary regime was at guaranteeing minimal conditions to 
frame sustainable capitalist development –precisely the central achievement of its Mexican role-
model. Perhaps the absence of an entrepreneurial class could have partially been compensated by 
some “developmentalist” strategy aiming to induce its development from the top, but the path 
followed by the development of the revolutionary state precluded that possibility. From very 
early on, the multiplication of clientelist practices aiming to coopt the peasantry fed an 
uncoordinated bureaucratic expansion that distorted the structure and compromised the 
effectiveness of a state that was in first place spatially fragmented.  
The dysfunctional pattern followed by the expansion of the state and the party’s inability 
to find a formula for the administration of internal factional conflict fed each other. Clientelistic 
criteria determined the selection of the MNR’s representation in congress. This undermined its 
capacity to provide effective representation for social and regional interests, and simultaneously 
exacerbated factional internal struggles for the colonization of the state apparatus.54 
The revolution entered a second stage in 1956, with the restoration of representative 
democracy and the election of Hernán Siles Suazo. Backed by the moderate wing of the MNR, 
the Siles Suazo administration made progress in terms of economic stabilization, but 
                                                 
53 Not to mention the added effects of the drop in the international prices of tin that followed the end of the Korean 
War (Bulmer-Thomas 2003). 
54 On this, see (Gamarra and Malloy 1995, Malloy and Gamarra 1988, Mitchell 1977). Malloy and Gamarra summarize 
the consequences as follows: “In the long run, factionalism within the MNR converted the legislative assembly into an 
arena from which assaults on the executive power were launched. The MNR’s desire to create a single-party state was 
also sabotaged by the failure of party deputies and senators in congress to provide support for the MNR-controlled 
executive (Malloy and Gamarra 1988).” 
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simultaneously widening the gap between the COB and the MNR.  Although the party’s left 
wing regained influence with Paz Estenssoro’s return to the presidency in 1960, the detachment 
from the original populist orientation of economic policy was not interrupted –neither the 
deterioration of the regime’s support. Things being like that, the possibilities for the politically 
isolated new caste of MNR bureaucrats to remain in control became dangerously dependent on 
the army -which the government had begun to rebuild in order to balance the power of workers’ 
militias. 
The 1960s brought an improvement in international tin prices, but also a regional 
international environment under the impact of the Cuban revolution. Improved external 
conditions had a positive impact on private mining and agriculture in the Oriente region, but the 
state-owned mining sector and oil companies remained stagnated. A recovery plan was 
formulated within the framework of the Alliance for Progress. However, it entailed a series of 
measures towards the labor force that could only be introduced and maintained by increasingly 
repressive practices that repeatedly placed the armed forces in position to arbitrate between the 
state and unions.  
The occasion for Paz Estenssoro to openly request the intervention of the army arrived 
when his disagreements with his vice-president, union leader Juan Lechín, led the latter to 
abandon the MNR, taking with him an important fraction. The military acquiesced to the 
president’s ambitions of reelection, but imposed Gen. René Barrientos as candidate to the vice-
presidency. The abstention of the opposition in the 1964 election emptied the victory of the Paz-
Barrientos ticket of any legitimacy. Barrientos chose to lead a new coup, send his former running 
mate to exile, and make himself candidate in a new presidential election that he won with 60% of 
the vote in 1966. 
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Barrientos’ electoral campaign presented himself as a legitimate son of the 1952 
revolution and inheritor of its principles, and indeed the military did not attempt to reverse any of 
the key reforms introduced by the MNR. What the 1964 coup marked was the opening of a new 
stage, where the center of gravity of the political process moved to the army.  The general 
dynamics, however, quickly began to resemble the ones under civilian rule. For a while, 
Barrientos used a civilian organization, the Frente de la Revolución Boliviana (FRB), to organize 
and support his congressional support. The FRB quickly sled into a logic guided by clientelistic 
factionalism. Barrientos then turn to his own corporation in his search for some anchorage that 
could guarantee governability.  However, his colleagues would soon prove to be neither less 
ambitious, nor less prone to factionalism, than their civilian predecessors. 
Barrientos consolidated the gap between the government and the COB. The other side of 
the coin was the steady ruralization of the MNR’s electoral support. The military aimed to secure 
peasant support through the consolidation of the agrarian reform, and a program of highway 
construction that finally began to integrate something resembling a national market. The main 
results were the slow emergence of a class of commercial entrepreneurs, a timid expansion of 
domestic industry, and the displacement of the country’s economic center of gravity to the Santa 
Cruz region.  
The military made a brief attempt to resurrect the original revolutionary coalition in the 
late 1960s. Gen. Alfredo Ovando, Barrientos’ successor in the presidency, insinuated an 
approach with the left the unions. After he failed, the radical fraction of his colleagues trusted the 
mission to Gen. Juan José Torres. Torres actually succeeding at convoking an Asamblea 
Popular. The extreme radicalism of the alternatives the latter debated had the only significant 
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effect of alarming economic elites and fortifying conservative currents among army officers, 
who forced the replacement of Torres with Gen. Augusto Bánzer in 1971. 
Favorable international markets and ruthless repression enabled Bánzer to reach the 
dubious honor of becoming the most durable authoritarian presidency in Bolivian history by 
maintaining himself in power until 1979. The benefits of a brief prosperity in the late 1970s were 
extremely modest, but seemed to suffice, combined with repressive brutality, to keep the 
opposition silent until the fraudulent elections supposed to secure Bánzer’s succession by his 
chosen heir. The new elections organized by the military after replacing Bánzer revealed that the 
resurgent opposition was also fragmented by the irreversible split of the MNR. None of the two 
parties resulting from the split, aligned behind Paz Estenssoro and Siles Suazo, was able to 
secure the necessary majorities to have its candidate elected. The decision thus fell in the hands 
of the legislators, who were unable to break the impasse, leading to a new election that Siles won 
with a clear majority, triggering a new coup, this time from a military faction involved in drug 
trade and led by Gen. García Meza. The new dictatorship was brutal but brief. It was ended 
within a year by a massive popular mobilization that returned Siles to the presidency just in time 
to deal with an inflationary spiral that would climb above four digits the following year. For 
several years, the imperatives of economic adjustment would monopolize the attention of public 
authorities in a democracy that 30 years after the revolution still managed to keep the vast 
majority of its indigenous population marginalized from effective political participation. 
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4.3 COSTA RICA 
The Costa Rican process of incorporation has received careful comparative attention from Deborah 
Yashar and James Mahoney, with diverging conclusions about the roots the country´s democratic 
stability in the second hand of the 20th century.55 However, even those who defend the importance 
of the period of liberal reform covering the late 19th and early 20th centuries seem agree on situating 
the critical turning point of the process of expansion of political in the three decades beginning in 
1930. Consensus also exists around the central role played by political parties as agents of 
incorporation. Debate still remains lively around the distribution of merits between the main 
partisan actors, as well as around the degree of continuity between those actors and the political 
establishment of the oligarchic republic. 
Part of the difficulties have to do with the gradualism of the process –which did not 
exclude political turbulence. Even if highly consequential, the 1948 civil war constituted a stage 
of a more extended process.56 The early stages of the political incorporation of popular and 
middle sectors had begun in the previous decade, and political turbulence and the main actors to 
resort to armed confrontation to resolve their differences lasted well into the 1950s. 
Around beginning of the 20th century, the Costa Rican social structure had been only  
marginally touched by industrialization or urbanization. However, some of its peculiarities 
favored the insinuation of some potential sources of demands for an expansion of the social base 
of political life, important enough to call the attention of some members of the ruling elite.  Two 
                                                 
55 See (Mahoney 2002, Yashar 1997). 
56 For a penetrating re-evaluation of the significance of the civil war, see (Lehoucq 1991). 
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of them have been repeatedly invoked as very consequential for the long-term fate of democracy 
–a high literacy rate, and a social pyramid that was considerably flatter and more ethnically 
integrated than the regional average. Also unusual in that context was the continuity of civilian 
rule.57 The distinctive importance of a rural middle-class of independent coffee-growing 
“yeomen” has become a persistent myth, but one not lacking its grain of truth.58  
Although numerically reduced, some urban professional categories had been 
experimenting with the organization of guilds and mutual-aid societies since the late 19th 
century. Although the results of such efforts were not always durable, they contributed to the 
political mobilization of artisans and laborers.59 However, the direction of political life remained 
confined in the hands of an entrepreneurial class whose core was formed by those controlling 
coffee production and commercialization –large farm owners, millers, and exporters. Urban 
society has slowly begun to turn more complex, as prosperity encouraged that bourgeoisie of 
cafetaleros to diversify its investments through commercial and industrial activities. Conversely, 
capital originally accumulated in those activities were invested in the purchase of coffee farms.  
If the elite became more diverse, politics would still remain within the parameters of an 
oligarchic order for a while. This was not only a matter of the narrowness of both electoral 
franchise and the recruitment of political leadership. It also included the systematic resort to 
fraud to manipulate electoral results (Lehoucq and Molina 2002). Political parties adjusted to the 
                                                 
57 Crucially, according to Booth, “Costa Rica did not develop a quasi-feudalistic hacienda system in which a Creole 
aristocracy controlled highly concentrated land holdings and exploited Indians and black slaves as elements of plantation 
economic production. Without haciendas, economic elites never came to depend on an armed force to ensure cheap 
rural labor, a practice that elsewhere bred militarism and authoritarianism (Booth 1999).” See also (Gudmunson 1995). 
58 For a discussion of gaps and coincidences between Costa Rica’s democracy official foundational mythology and its 
effective historical experience, see (Gudmunson 1986). 
59 The first unions federation, the Confederación General de Trabajadores (CGT) was born in 1913, as a result of the 
efforts of a group of Marxist activists that had initiated a Sociedad de Trabajadores in 1909 (Booth 1987). 
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traditional caucus model, and in a state of permanent flux, resulting from their recurrent 
fragmentation in cliques of notables clustering around personalistic leaderships.  
Things began to change in the 1920s. The prosperity brought by the European war had 
stimulated the expansion of “enclaves” of banana plantation, owned by the United Fruit 
Company and oriented to the international market, that provided conditions facilitating 
unionization efforts. The intensification of ideological debate as a result of overseas 
development, the development of a leftist intelligentsia, and the end of prosperity pushed in the 
same direction.   The impact of the depression triggered a series of strikes that peaked in 1933, 
facilitating the foundation, by militants linked of the Communist party, of the Confederación de 
Trabajadores Costarricences (CTC). Communist militants had been particularly successful, in 
the previous years, in the formation of scanty but highly concentrated and very cohesive nodes of 
unionization in banana plantations (Hytrek 1999).   
Small and medium coffee growers, and urban popular sectors, had been already 
supporting the emergence of small parties for a while, but without immediately challenging the 
predominance of the traditional ruling stratum. The unrest of the early 1930s sufficed to trigger 
initiatives of “enlightened reform” from the top. This change involved three central actors: 
president Rafael Calderón Guardia, the Communist Party, and Archbishop Víctor Manuel 
Sanabria. The result was an unexpected coalition of communist and social-christian forces that 
set the bases of the Costa Rican welfare state.60 
Calderón was a physician with an impeccable conservative pedigree, who chose to 
respond to the growing manifestations of popular political discontent with an anticipatory 
                                                 
60 On the formation of the coalition, see (Hytrek 1999, Miller 1993). 
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strategy, redefining the political profile of his Partido Nacional Republicano (PNR).  A useful 
blueprint was provided by some early versions of the European Christian Democratic right that 
had attempted to incarnate the paternalistic solidarism of the Rerum Novarum encyclical.  With 
the blessing of the Archbishop, Calderón forged an alliance that included the Communist Party 
as a member of the coalition ruling Costa Rica for two consecutive terms. Legislation creating a 
social security system in 1941 and a labor code in 1943 were the most visible products of that 
cooperation (Rosenberg 1981, 1983). 
The alliance between Calderón and the communists triggered the organization of multiple 
sources of opposition. It was resisted, in first place, from within the PNR itself, where social 
reforms rose concerns among the aristocracy of coffee producers. The conservative party was a 
less appropriate vehicle for the opposition of middle sectors that, in spite of disliking the 
presence of the Communist Party in government, were not necessarily against social reform. 
That would provide the target constituency for the formation of a Social Democratic party. The 
social democrats were also more attentive to the needs and demands of small and medium coffee 
producers, and other components of a middle class of entrepreneurs who, without showing 
particular interest in redistribution, could benefit from other forms of governmental intervention.   
Teodoro Picado, Calderón´s successor since 1944, renewed the alliance with the 
Communist Party. The labor unrest caused the end of the war-induced bonanza combined 
between 1946 and 1948 with an escalation of political violence from the social democratic 
opposition. The conservative opposition aligned behind the Partido de Unión Nacional (PUN), 
founded by Otilio Ulate with the purpose of competing for the presidency in 1948.  That year, 
the PUN established an alliance with the social democrats led by José Figureres. The results of 
an election marked by fraud from both sides ended placed the decision on its results in the hands 
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of the PNR legislative majority. The annulation of the victory that the opposition claimed for 
itself. Figures reacted with an armed uprising resisted by the allied forces of the government and 
the militias of banana plantation workers organized by the Communist party. The war was brief 
and bloody. The military victory of the insurrection led to the establishment of a junta 
commanded by Figueres that ruled for eighteen months.  
The Junta combined political repression and social and economic reform. It suppressed 
several unions suppressed and outlawed the Communist Party outlawed, fully nationalized the 
banking system, imposed an important tax on wealth, and convoked a constitutional assembly. 
The last two reforms contributed to unify the conservative opposition, which won a majority of 
votes in the elections for a constitutional assembly. With a conservative majority, several 
initiatives of the social democrats were blocked, and the constitution only experienced marginal 
changes, save for the suppression of the armed forces and the creation of an independent 
authority for the organization and supervision of elections.   
The future of the Costa Rican political system remained uncertain for several years. A 
persistent myth maintains that a pact among partisan elites eased the stabilization of 
constitutional rule.61 Abundant evidence actually points in the opposite direction: the temptation 
of an armed response to electoral defeats remained very strong among the main political actors 
well into the 1950s. The PLN was able to articulate a victorious coalition for the 1952 election. It 
captured the support of the petty bourgeoisie and of the workers of banana plantations from the 
Atlantic coast with an ambitious program of social and economic reforms. Essential for Figueres’ 
political survival was that his progressive preferences in many policy areas did not preclude a 
                                                 
61 See, for example, (Booth 1999, 2007); disc. (Bowman and Baker 2007). 
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vigorous anti-communism. In the early years of the cold war, this constituted a precious asset for 
those having to live “so far from god and so close to the United States.” Under the light of the 
contemporary Guatemalan experience, it looks determinant for the tolerance and occasional 
support that the United States granted Figueres, in spite not only of his social reformism, but also 
of some gestures of independence in Costa Rica’s foreign policy. For many decades, 
representatives of the government, the opposition, and the rulers of neighboring countries, 
deployed a feverish competition, lobbying different branches of the United States government 
for support for their respective political agendas. 
The PLN managed to consolidate a hegemony that only partially was based on political 
exclusion –if the ban on the Communist Party was maintained, the conservative opposition was 
able to win presidential elections and govern three times during the following three decades.62 
During those periods, however, the PLN maintained legislative majorities. Combined with 
institutions structure that granted the governmental agencies in charge of social policies wide 
margins of autonomy, those majorities guaranteed the consolidation of what most closely has 
ever resembled a welfare state in Latin America. The end of the national tradition of electoral 
fraud, the alternation of parties that it made possible, and the acceptance by the conservative 
opposition of the strategy of development and social protection established by the social 
democrats, also favored the gradual installation of a consensual style of policy-making in several 
areas.  
Of course, the continuity of a model born with a strong partisan imprint owes a lot to the 
fact that six out of the nine men who occupied the Costa Rican presidency between 1953 and 
                                                 
62 Under Mario Echandi (1958-1962), José Joaquín Trejos (1966-1970), and Rodrigo Carazo (1978-1982). 
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1998 belonged to the PLN,63 and four out of the former six had been members of the 1948 
revolutionary junta. What is crucially absent in the PLN’s hegemonic strategy, is the type of top-
down cooptation and encapsulation of unions and other interest groups in vertical structures of 
corporate representation controlled by the party.64 
4.4 ECUADOR 
Ecuador’s political history has been marked by a secular struggle for hegemony between the 
regional oligarchies of the coast –where Guayaquil constituted the dynamic center of the 
Ecuadorian economy during the 19th century-, and the highlands –organized around Quito-. The 
1895 civil war that ended with a victory of the coastal liberals led by Eloy Alfaro, is usually seen 
as the turning point that marked the country’s access to political modernity under the sign of 
liberalism. After defeating the highlands’ conservative landowning elite, Alfaro indeed pursued 
some of the mandatory lines of the typical 19th century liberal program. The state was 
secularized, and a rail line linking Quito with Guayaquil –ant through the latter to the external 
world- began to operate in 1908. However, the effective economic integration remained very 
limited, since the highlands’ economy lacked a base of exportable production. Discontinuities 
                                                 
63 José Figueres (1953-1958 and 1970-1974), Francisco Orlich (1962-1966), Daniel Oduber (1974-1978), Luis Alberto 
Monge (1982-1986), Óscar Arias (1986-1990), and José Figueres Olsen (1994-1998). Figueres, Orlich, Olduber, and 
Monge had participated in the junta. The generational replacement arrived with Oscar Arias still included don Pepe´s son. 
64 Although the party developed important connections with organized labor through the Confederación Costarricense de 
Trabajadores Democráticos, the link lacks the verticality that we can find in the relations between APRA, Peronism, the PRI, 
or even AD, and their respective labor constituencies (Booth 1987). Besides, the PLN´s core constituency has 
historically been among the middle classes. 
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also remained notorious between coast and highlands regarding social relations, since the 
exploitation of indigenous workers by landowners was not affected by the new liberal hegemony. 
Alfaro failed not only to undermine the basis of the socioeconomic power of the 
highlands’ traditional landowning, but also to keep liberals unified under his leadership, which at 
the point of his second presidency had become too authoritarian and populist for the palate of the 
party’s notables. Their internal divisions made it impossible for the liberals to remain in control 
after by a mestizo mob tragically ended Alfaro’s second presidency by lynching him, and the 
Quito-based conservative supremacy was restored. As limited as modernization was the 
magnitude of pressure from below for an opening of the political game, although the oligarchy 
marginally renewed itself by allowing the access of some upper-middle class parvenus recently 
enriched by commercial activity. In 1925, a military coup opened an attempt to introduce the 
modernization the notables had proved incapable of leading, by means of the “progressive 
dictatorship” of Isidro Ayora, but the results were hardly more impressive. The traditional 
hacienda would survive well into the second half of the century, as would the economic and 
social structural dualism between la costa and la sierra. The country’s economy would remain 
stagnant for almost three decades (Ayala Mora 1991). 
The emergence of popular political agitation would have to wait until the 1930s, when 
the depression reached Ecuador and ended the ephemeral boom of cacao production that coastal 
planters had enjoyed in the previous decade. The impact of the crisis was particularly brutal, 
since the country could not find an alternative product to replace cacao as the outward-based 
engine of the economy. Although the dimensions of a highly fragmented internal market still 
organized to a great extent around local production blocked the development of substitutive 
industrialization, the expansion of export plantation had provided an opportunity for unionization 
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of workers in the coast. The significant progress of workers’ organization had been mainly the 
work of communist activists. However, the political benefits of their joint mobilization with the 
expanding poor population of Guayaquil, would go to a populist leader from the liberal 
oligarchy: José María Velasco Ibarra.  
However, this first populist experience would be short lived. Although Velasco 
succeeded at expanding his base of support beyond the traditional liberal constituencies of the 
coast, he proved much better at agitating popular opposition to the oligarchy than at solving the 
problems that made that agitation possible. He also failed at securing support from the military to 
discipline his disenchanted followers through repression. However, what the military would not 
do for Velasco, they accepted to do for the liberal oligarchy in 1935, when they removed him 
from the presidency. The military’s willingness to support the political elite would evaporate 
during the following decade, and their passivity was crucial for the success of a Velasquista 
uprising in 1945.  
Velasco Ibarra’s first comeback –there would be several more throughout the following 
decades- counted on the support of socialists, communists, and dissident liberals. Governmental 
action did not change the basic problems of the Ecuadorean economy in any significant way, but 
Velasco’s propensity to authoritarian practices provided once more an excuse for his removal by 
the military. The veteran caudillo would return in 1952, this time conservative acquiescence. 
After winning a new election, he repeated the pattern of progressive detachment from his 
supporters and escalating authoritarianism. This time the conservatives allowed him to complete 
his term, counting on his failure to win the 1960 election, which in fact he won. His aging 
notwithstanding, he soon proved his inclinations for an authoritarian style acquiescence of the 
conservatives 
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In the meantime, the social structure of the Ecuadorean coast had been transformed by 
the consolidation of a new stratum of owners of middle-sized properties benefitting from the 
accelerated growth of banana exports. The renewed and diversified economic elite of the coast 
begun to find itself poorly represented by the traditional liberal elite. A parallel process 
increasingly separated the even more traditional landowners of the highlands from a society 
transformed by accelerated urbanization. The drama of Ecuadorean democracy was that, in the 
absence of a social force capable of sustaining an alternative hegemonic elite, popular forces 
repeatedly found themselves forced to choose between  the decadent oligarchies and the ever-
returning Velasco. It took until the 1970s for those forces to consider an alternative on the left, 
turning Velasco Ibarra into a preferable evil for the military.65 
Velasco’s last presidency changed little. A more significant turning point arrived when 
the armed forces, stimulated by the example of their Peruvian colleagues, chose to lead 
themselves the long-pending transformations of Ecuadorean society. They also followed their 
neighbors in the quick loss of their progressive momentum. Concessions to foreign companies 
for the exploitation of oil in the Amazonas region could have provided the resources for a longer-
lasting or more ambitious transformation. However, the Ecuadorean government made the 
mistake of exceeding the parameters set by the OPEC for production and prices, paying with the 
marginalization of their country in international markets (Martz 1987). When, by the end of the 
decade, the military chose to set themselves aside and allow a return to constitutional rule, the 
                                                 
65 See (Cueva 1982, Halperín Donghi 1993) 
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results of the programs of economic modernization they had sponsored were indeed modest 
(Handelman 1981).66 
In 1978, a new constitution approved via referendum finally removed historical 
restrictions on the franchise, abruptly adding two million voters to electoral registers (Conaghan 
1995). Jaime Roldós, a member of the coastal merchant elite, won the 1978 presidential election 
running as substitute candidate for his father in law, Assad Bucaram, whose populist style the 
military had found close enough to Velasco’s to merit a veto on his candidacy. When the 
premature death of the president put Christian Democratic leader Osvaldo Hurtado in his place, 
the debt crisis was already making itself felt in Ecuador, and the implementation of austerity 
measures consumed the remainder of his term. The orthodox orientation of economic policy was 
accentuated after the arrival of conservative León Febres Cordero to the presidency in 1984. The 
neoliberal turn lasted until 1986, when disastrous midterm electoral results and brief 
sequestration by a faction of the armed forces with congressional support, persuaded the 
president of a change of direction. The following year, the effects of the debt crisis, already 
magnified by political instability, reached a new peak when an earthquake damaged the pipeline 
that transported oil from the interior lowlands to the coast. 
Catherine Conaghan has situated at this point the “foundational moment” at which 
Ecuador began to develop a modern party system “for the first time in its history (Conaghan 
1995).” However, the same author continues by immediately remarking the limitations of the 
Ecuadorean party system as it looked more than fifteen years after the transition. Apart from its 
extreme fragmentation and volatility, Conaghan observes, “[political parties] have been 
                                                 
66 On the dynamics of the transition to democracy, see (Conaghan 1987, Isaacs 1993). 
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marginalized in the policy-making process, especially in the economic sphere. […] The result… 
is that the party system is increasingly dissociated from critical decision-making spheres inside 
the state and disconnected from the electorate.” This had a direct negative impact on the parties’ 
legitimacy, which dovetailed with recurrent party splits and leaderships defections to turn the 
system into one of “floating politicians” and “floating voters.” True, the main lines of the post-
1978 multi-partisan mosaic were defined by splits from the long-lasting Liberal Radical and 
Conservative parties. However, that persistence had not been the result of any adaptive capacity. 
It rather resulted from recurrent military interventions that prevented a much earlier 
marginalization of traditional parties, by discontinuing successive attempts to undertake the tasks 
that both Liberals and Conservatives repeatedly proved incapable of performing –actually, not 
even interested in trying.67  
As was the case with Bolivia, the region-wide terminal crisis of import-substitution found 
Ecuador still struggling to find the social and political forces, and the institutional forms, that 
could consolidate a stable institutional frame for political representation. But the frustration of 
incorporation was in the Ecuadorean case more complete and radical. Not only were the 
traditional parties incapable of recycling themselves according to the Colombian or Uruguayan 
pattern; potential alternative corporate and partisan actors were aborted in the strict sense of the 
term. Indeed, a comparison with the Bolivian experience makes the MNR and the COB almost 
look as stories of success. Neither did the military, during their brief “peruanist” vogue, 
transform the Ecuadorean state in any durable fashion that could anchor subsequent political 
development. The only enduring legacy of recurrent aborted attempts of incorporation was, 
                                                 
67 See (Cueva 1982, Fitch 1977). 
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precisely, the persistent volatility not just of parties, but of the whole institutional frame of 
political competition. 
4.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The narratives that fill the previous three sections of this chapter are deliberately schematic, but I 
hope sufficient to support my central contention about the nature of the respective processes that 
led the three countries from an oligarchic order into the era of mass politics. Bolivia and Ecuador 
experienced aborted processes. This diagnosis results neither from the quantitative limits of the 
part of popular sectors effectively incorporated, nor from the fragility of the brief democratic 
experiences that the expansion of participation brought. The crucial aspect is that the processes 
did not give birth to any institutional legacy solid enough to structure political life in any durable 
way in the aftermath of those frustrated cycles of incorporation. In particular, both the stable 
organization of interest intermediation and the creation of basic state capacities persisted as 
pending tasks. For Bolivia and Ecuador, the persisting challenge would be not just the formation 
of stable governing coalitions, but the government’s capacity to govern at all. 
The case of Costa Rica, where the period of incorporation left one of the most durable 
institutional webs of the region, is on the other extreme of the regional range of governability. 
The centrality of political parties as vehicles for the expansion of political participation seems to 
be pretty obvious. It is also clear that the strategy of incorporation does not fit the corporatist 
pattern. What may be more debatable, is the degree of continuity between the oligarchic party 
system and the one that replaced it. Is it totally accurate to place Costa Rica in the same category 
of Colombia and Uruguay? The continuity is clear throughout the mutation of conservative 
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forces that ended in the creation of the PUSC, but not so for the PLN. However, neither did the 
PLN replicate the pattern of comprehensive contestation of the existing political establishment 
from the outside, nor was controlled mobilization by authoritarian means part of its recipe. In 
any case, this is a question that, for my current purposes, can stay open. The relevant questions, 
in terms of the theoretical framework I intend to apply, are two, and I think that those answers 
are clear. The first one refers to whether we have a corporatist legacy –to which the answer is no. 
The second question is about the distribution of the political benefits of the expansion of social 
protection, and I think that we clearly do not have the monopoly typically found in populist 
experiences, but a bipartisan consensus around the main orientation of the system.  
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5.0  WELFARE REGIMES IN CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA 
This chapter is structured around four questions. First, what are the types of welfare regime that 
we can identify in Latin America around 1980 and around 2010? Second, to what extent does the 
clustering of cases in different categories around 2010 mirror the one in 1980? Third, is it 
possible to identify trends of welfare regime-transformation –either across categories or 
category-specific? Fourth, considering those same transformations in terms of their institutional 
forms, is it possible to identify patterns of institutional change? 
Based on those questions, the chapter is organized in four sections. In the first one, I 
briefly discuss the main typologies recently developed to classify Latin American welfare 
regimes. In the second one, I present and discuss data on the different dimensions of welfare 
regimes, for the 11 countries considered in this studies, at two points in time –circa 1980 and 
2010- and define a number of typological categories. The third section analyzes the changes 
experienced by the different countries for each of the measured dimensions, and identifies some 
general trends. I seek to identify patterns of change along two axis. The first one has to do with 
the configuration of the welfare regime; the second one focuses of the type of institutional 
transformation through which changes in welfare regimes have taken place. The fourth section 
presents the main conclusions.  
The chapter’s main findings can be summarized as follows. First, in spite of the 
importance that systems of social security had for processes of popular incorporations, there is 
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only very limited correspondence between types of incorporation and the welfare regimes we 
find around 1980. Second, neither is it possible to find perfect correspondence between the 
clusters of cases found in 1980 and 2010. Third, changes in the configuration of welfare regimes 
have been significantly more common in Latin America than in the OECD world. Fourth, neither 
for pensions, nor for healthcare systems, it is possible to identify any homogeneous trend across 
the region –there is no convergence towards a “regional model.” Fifth, to the extent that there are 
common trends, they result from the challenges that changes in labor markets and demographic 
trends have imposed on employment-based systems of social protection.   
5.1 WELFARE REGIMES IN LATIN AMERICA: DISCUSSION OF TYPOLOGIES 
5.1.1 General overview 
Several typologies are available that attempt to conceptualize the configuration of Latin American 
welfare regimes under import-substituting industrialization. Until very recently, most of the literature 
has revolved around three solutions. The first one is conceptual stretching. It consists of 
conceptualizing Latin American regimes as imperfect manifestations of some of the categories 
coined by Esping-Andersen for developed countries. The most common version sees most cases as 
modelled on the Bismarckian blueprint, and Costa Rica as the only solitary exception with some 
resemblance to the Scandinavian model. The other side of conceptual-stretching is what Sartori 
called “degreeism.” In this case, it consists of analyzing the diversity among the vast majority of 
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cases typified as corporatist in terms more or less “complete” versions of the continental European 
paradigm.68 
The second solution is chronologically previous to the irruption of Esping-Andersen’s 
typology, and it did not rely, strictly speaking, on the category “welfare regime.” Until recently, 
it was by far the most cited classification of the region’s “worlds of welfare capitalism.” Carmelo 
Mesa-Lago’s classified the region’s social security systems in three groups, based on the timing 
of their initiation and expansion –namely, pioneers, intermediate, and late-comers. These 
categories provide a useful device for preliminary descriptive analysis. Although each category 
has a solid core in a couple of paradigmatic cases, their boundaries are fuzzy and there is an 
important number of “borderline cases” whose classification is debatable. But the main 
shortcomings have to do with the limited explanatory leverage of this categorization. 
Chronological proximity undoubtedly results in some common traits that play an important role 
in the dynamics of systems of social protection.69 However, it does not lead us too far in the 
understanding of at least two problems. First, variation within categories –for example, 
Argentina, Brazil, and Cuba, are among the pioneers. Second, the fact that some resemblances 
across categories are stronger than within them –for example, Costa Rica, an intermediate 
developer, has more in common with some pioneers (i.e. Uruguay) than with most members of 
its cohort (like Mexico).   
                                                 
68 See, for example, (Barba 2005, Del Valle 2010, Huber and Stephens 2012). 
69 The two main factors operating behind the commonalities among contemporaneous systems are on the one hand the 
repertoire of available models and external influences; and on the other hand, the effects of system maturation. See 
(Mesa-Lago 1978, 1989, 1991b). 
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In the mid-1990s, Fernando Filgueira introduced a third option that has since then been 
gaining popularity.70 That is the construction of a typology of Latin America welfare regimes 
that, while clearly inspired by Esping-Andersen’s, acknowledges the need to create new types to 
accurately conceptualize the realities of the region. One again, we have a tripartite distinction –in 
this case between cases of segmented universalism, dualism, and residualism. To some extent, 
this is an attempt to retain Mesa-Lago’s most rewarding insights, but integrating them with the 
political economy approach proposed by Esping-Andersen. Filgueira’s is the effort that carries 
more explanatory leverage and potential for theory-development. He also notices that two 
dimensions not considered in the original typology –namely, levels of spending and coverage-, 
requires consideration when dealing with the underdeveloped world. This typology has, 
however, an important limitation for my purposes. It works pretty well for the point of departure 
and part of the development process, but does not offer an equally rounded-up classification of 
the results of the cycle of transformations that followed the exhaustion of import-substitution 
industrialization. In other word, it does not provide a classification fitting the current situation. 
Somehow, advantages and limitations are reversed in the alternative recently provided by 
Juliana Martínez-Franzoni –probably the most comprehensive and methodologically elaborate 
attempt to build a typology of welfare regimes currently existing in the area.71 This is also the 
author that makes the most consistent effort to work within the theoretical parameters set by 
Esping-Andersen –and as a result deals with some of their ambiguities and problems of 
operationalization. The result, however, is an interesting typology that fits the current situation, 
but has far more limited leverage for the purpose of explaining how things got here.  
                                                 
70 See (Filgueira 199, 2005, 2007a). 
71 See (Martínez Franzoni 2005, 2008c, b). 
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5.1.2 Armando Barrientos’ “conservative/informal” model 
From my point of view, the discussion of Esping-Andersen’s model that Armando Barrientos 
developed with the Latin American experience in mind provides a more useful point of departure –
even disagreeing with some of his conclusions.72 Barrientos’ main strengths in this regard are 
twofold. First, he has carefully reconstructed the adjustments and refinements accumulated 
throughout Esping-Andersen’s successive restatements of his theory in response to diverse 
criticisms. Second, as a result, he avoids conflating the discussion of theoretical categories with the 
analysis of the author’s original methodological choices –particularly regarding indicators and 
statistical techniques.73  
Two of Barrientos’ observations are especially useful and one of his limitations 
particularly complicated. The limitation is that he does not offer elements for discrimination 
within the region –his position is that similarities outweigh differences among Latin American 
welfare regimes, which may thus be included in a single category. I will later discuss this point 
during the analysis of the data. The first important observation is about these regimes’ main 
mirror in the developed world. It does not point to any of the members of the original trilogy of 
ideal types, but to the distinctive “Mediterranean model” identified by some authors for Southern 
European countries.74 The singularity of this model would result from a combination of traits of 
the “pure” liberal and conservative types. Like the former, they are to a great extent under-
                                                 
72 Actually, Barrientos elaborates on Ian Gough’s pioneering efforts to extend the theory of welfare regimes to the 
underdeveloped world. See (Gough 1999, 2004). Gough’s main insight is the relevance that high informality has for the 
production of welfare in the periphery. 
73 Indeed, an important problem that has largely affected the vast debate around The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, is 
the fact that some of its author’s methodological choices fit his theoretical categories very imperfectly. See (Emerijck 
2013, Powell and Barrientos 2004, Van Keersbergen and Vis 2014). 
74 On the argument about a specific Southern European welfare regime, see (Ferrera 1996). 
103 
 
developed and residual; however, they have in common with the latter the centrality of the 
family as a provider of welfare.75  
But the fit between Southern European models and Latin American realities is imperfect 
too. Two limitations are crucial. The first one is the “truncation” of welfare regimes built upon 
occupational status in countries with extensive informal labor markets. The second is the very 
limited development of means-tested assistance programs of the type that characterizes liberal 
welfare regimes. The combined result is that social insurance and job protection, that constituted 
the core of welfare regimes in Latin America, only rarely reached beyond middle classes and 
privileged sections of urban working classes. On the one hand, unlike the typical conservative 
configuration, social protection scarcely reached beyond formally employed workers. On the 
other hand, the limited reach of states in the provision of welfare was not necessarily associated 
with a pervasive extension of the role of the market. The full development of market mechanisms 
met two main obstacles. First, the size of informal employment, and in some cases, of the 
informal economy in general. Second, the limited spatial penetration and integration even of 
informal markets in those areas in which subsistence-oriented peasant production was the 
predominant form of economic activity. An important consequence was that the role of families 
in the production of welfare ended being as crucial as in the typical conservative configuration.  
Based on consideration of those aspects, Barrientos typifies “the” Latin American 
welfare regime as conservative/informal. This ideal type would be defined by a mix combining 
the following attributes: 1) “Truncated” state components, structured around formal 
employment-based social security systems segmented along occupational categories, and 
                                                 
75 According to Barrientos, an important feature in this respect is the lack of any explicit basic income maintenance 
provision, which results in the fact that programs not originally designed for that purpose (i.e. disability pensions) end 
partially fulfilling the function (Barrientos 2009). 
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occasionally including very marginal social assistance programs.76 2) Labor-market components 
that were split between a very imperfectly institutionalized formal section, and an important 
informal section. 3) Families –extended ones in particular- playing a central role in the 
production of welfare. 4) A fractured systemic configuration, with very limited integration 
between formal and informal components.77 In terms of outcomes, this is a mix that results in 
very limited decommodification –access to social protection is directly contingent upon insertion 
in the labor market-, and high familialism. This has two central consequences in terms of 
stratification. First, a fracture between “insiders” and “outsiders” to the formal labor market and 
to the social security system. Second, within the universe of “insiders” the stratification that 
results from social security systems that not only do not correct the hierarchical organization of 
the labor market, but in some cases even exacerbate it. The aggregate result is a structure that, 
due to its fractures, is severely weakened in its capacity to guarantee the reproduction of the 
regime. 
How well does the “conservative/informal” model fit Latin American realities? I think 
that the scheme’s main virtues are three. First, its emphasis on the importance of informality and 
the truncation it determines. Second, Barrientos has been, together with Martínez-Franzoni, 
among the first to “bring familialism back-in” to the analysis of Latin American social protection 
systems. Third, the hypothesis of the deficiencies of formal labor markets as the determinant of 
the failure of structures of stratification to guarantee the reproduction of the model. As we will 
                                                 
76 I would add and emphasize a negative attribute that constitutes a central difference even with the closest European 
mirrors: the virtual absence of active labor market policies.  
77 Barrientos emphasizes the importance of this lack of systemic integration and indicates through the use of the dash to 
separate its formal and informal components, as opposed to the hyphen that he introduces to designate the liberal-
informal configuration, characterized by the development of forms of social assistance that play a bridging role. 
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see, all these considerations, become especially useful to explain some tensions and 
transformations experienced by all social protection systems of the region from the 1980s on. 
5.2 THE CONFIGURATION OF PRE-REFORM WELFARE REGIMES IN LATIN 
AMERICA 
Barrientos’ solution presents a key limitation: it cannot account for the variation across national 
experiences without resorting to “degreeism.” In the end, and in spite of the importance of some 
factors operating in all cases, it is a fact, as Tables 25 to 28 show, that we arrived at the 1980s with a 
very diverse mosaic of configurations.78 
5.2.1 When quantitative differences become qualitative: the problem of truncation 
The idea of welfare regimes emerged precisely as a response to the limitations of continuous 
measures –typically based on levels of public social spending. The assumption that the explanation 
of variation among social protection systems requires a typological classification is at the very root 
of the approach. Paradoxically, however, we need to start by introducing variation in levels of social 
spending and in the extension of coverage to understand the nature of some of the qualitative 
discontinuities we are dealing with.79 Indeed, attempts to apply Esping-Andersen’s categories to the 
study of the underdeveloped world often forget that they were developed on the assumption of 
                                                 
78 See Appendix A at the end of this chapter. 
79 See (Filgueira 2005). 
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relatively high levels of spending and coverage. Within the Latin American universe, however, the 
percentage of the total population covered by social security circa 1970 ranged from 68% to 9%, 
while the level of social expenditure as a percentage of GDP varied between 17% and 5.9%. The 
distance between such extremes is thus more than a matter of degree.  
Barrientos’ selection of the crucial defining characteristics of Latin American welfare 
regimes is an accurate one. The problem results from the fact that, although “truncation” is a 
pervasive attribute, whether it leaves out 30% or 90% of the population results in qualitative 
discontinuity. Indeed, his “catch-all” ideal type fits pretty well the initial configuration of social 
protection systems in Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, and perhaps Peru. However, the mismatch is 
significant with several countries that can be clustered on two groups.  
First, we have the cases of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and perhaps Peru, in which the 
development of social protection stopped too short to constitute an element of integration. 
Indeed, Filgueira is correct when he characterizes theirs as an exclusionary pattern. This in turn 
has, as we will see, very significant political repercussions. Formal labor market and social 
protection “outsiders” are, in purely numerical terms, an overwhelming majority in relation to 
“insiders.” It thus comes as no surprise when we notice that most cases in this group are also the 
ones with less successful experiences of political incorporation under import-substitution 
industrialization –as well as the ones with higher levels of institutional instability during the 
period studied here.  
Second, we have the cases of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. These are the closest to 
Southern European experiences, fundamentally for two reasons. One is a considerably more 
extensive and integrated development of formal labor markets, which had a proportional positive 
effect on the coverage of social security systems. The other one is the development of some 
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social assistance programs (particularly health care services) that, even if limited and chronically 
affected by shortages of most resources, were still relatively effective, thanks to the smaller size 
of their target populations. Of course, I am not implying that that “truncation” did not actually 
occur, or was negligible in these cases, but its consequences were considerably milder than in the 
rest of the region. Additionally, some structural factors contributed to more integrated 
developments of social protection in these countries. During the incorporation period, they were 
less affected by spatial fragmentation. This worked in favor of more integrated market and state 
structures.  Especially important, this in turn reduced the cross-regional variation of the reach 
and quality of social assistance programs. Once again, it is not accidental that we find in this 
group the highest concentration of cases in which incorporation occurred in political contexts 
marked by contending elites competing for popular support.  
And we have, of course, the Costa Rican outlier, which is interesting, among other things, 
because it reveals the limitations of quantitative information for this type of analysis. Although 
levels of spending and coverage would clearly place the country in the same group of Argentina, 
Chile and Uruguay, the development of its welfare regime had from very early on a universalist 
and inclusive vocation that was missing in the others. Two elements in the Costa Rican system of 
social protection have been particularly important in this regard. First, a more important element 
of state participation in the welfare mix –especially in the provision and coordination of 
healthcare services. Second, the early development of a number of non-contributory benefits –
pensions in particular. By breaking with the contributory principle earlier and more radically, 
Costa Ricans pushed the outcomes in terms of decommodification farther than any other country 
in the region. Does that mean that it is correct to classify their welfare regime as a social 
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democratic one?80 It is certainly the Latin American case that comes closest in terms of 
universalization and decommodification of social protection. However, at least three important 
limitations persist. First, the development of social services, essential for the moderation of 
gender-based stratification, is notoriously more modest than in the Scandinavian pattern. Second, 
Costa Rica surprisingly lacks a system of unemployment insurance. Third, in spite of having 
what probably is the most consensual policy-making style in the region, it has not developed the 
type of labor-market regulation based on neocorporatist arrangements that characterizes not only 
the social democratic model, but also the conservative one.81  
5.2.2 An alternative typology 
Summing up, I suggest the classification of the pre-reform welfare regimes of the eleven countries 
considered in this study in four categories –namely, exclusionary, conservative/informal, extended-
conservative, and incomplete universalism.  
Exclusionary welfare regimes are defined by a mix of marginal state participation, high market 
informality, and a central role for families in the production of welfare. This is the group that 
combines the lowest levels of decommodification and the highest degree of familialism. These 
exclusionary welfare regimes have social security systems with very limited coverage, extended to a 
minority of urban middle classes, with access and benefits determined by conditions of formal 
employment.  
                                                 
80 This alternative has been suggested, for example, by (Huber 1996, Sandbrook et al. 2007). 
81 See (Clark 2013, Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea 2012, Martínez-Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea 2012, 
Mesa-Lago 2008, Sánchez-Ancochea and Martínez Franzoni 2013, Sojo 1994, Trejos and Güendell 1994). 
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Table 3: Latin American welfare regimes, circa 1980 
 
 WELFARE MIX OUTCOMES STRATIFICATION CASES 
TYPE of WELFARE 
REGIME 
    
Exclusionary Predominance of 
informality; limited 
development of state 
& market 
Low 
decommodification; 
low 
defamilialization 
Truncation at levels 
of very limited 
coverage. Main 
cleavage between a 
majority of outsiders 
and a minority of 
insiders covered by 
social insurance. 
Segmented social 
insurance 
Bolivia, 
Colombia, 
Peru. Ecuador 
Conservative/Informal Dual structure. 
Important presence 
of the state in the 
modern sector; 
subsistence of 
important informal 
sector comparable to 
exclusionary 
countries. 
Medium 
decommodification 
in the modern 
sector. 
De-familialization 
remains low, since 
the model of social 
insurance assumes 
male breadwinner. 
Truncation still leaves 
important sectors of 
society (especially 
rural ones) without 
coverage. High 
segmentation of the 
structure of social 
insurance. 
Brazil, Mexico, 
Venezuela 
Extended conservative Balance between 
state & market, with 
predominance of the 
state. 
Medium 
decommodification. 
Low 
defamilialization. 
Though not universal, 
coverage is very 
extended. High 
segmentation of the 
structure of social 
insurance 
Argentina, 
Chile, Uruguay 
Incomplete universalism Predominance of the 
state. Marginal role 
of the market.  
Medium-high 
decommodification. 
Low 
defamilialization. 
Extended coverage. 
Segmentation is 
uneven across policy 
domains (still high in 
pensions). 
Costa Rica 
 
 
Public social assistance programs are barely developed in exclusionary welfare regimes, 
and marginally compensated by an uncoordinated mosaic of philanthropic activities, NGOs, and 
international aid. Labor market regulation is minimal. The main line of stratification separates a 
minority of insiders from the vast majority of outsiders. Although stratification within the former 
exists as a consequence of the fragmented pattern of corporatist incorporation common to most 
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of the region, the reduced size of the sector as a whole sets relatively narrow limits to the number 
of special regimes. Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru are included in this category.82 
Conservative/informal welfare regimes are the result of the truncated nature of processes 
of industrialization that, while confined in their reach to a few urban centers, were nevertheless 
highly developed. Participation of the state in the welfare mix is significant, through 
employment-based social security systems that provide extended coverage and important levels 
of benefits. Coverage developed, however, within the limits of the “anti-schumpeterian triangles” 
identified by Evans as the social core of import-substitution industrialization. Beyond those 
coalitions, high levels of informality and the spatially uneven development and superficial 
penetration of the state, determine levels of familialism comparable to the ones present in 
exclusionary regimes. Decommodification, while undoubtedly more advanced than under 
exclusionary regimes, is still limited both by truncation and by the contributory bases of access 
to social protection. We thus find a pattern of stratification that combines significant truncation 
and a high level of hierarchical segmentation among occupational categories of insiders. 
Remarkably, the expansion of public bureaucracies associated with the pattern of 
industrialization makes civil servants a powerful component of the coalition of insiders, creating 
the conditions for a potentially significant public/private cleavage. Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela 
are the cases belonging to this category.83 
 
                                                 
82 See on Bolivia, (Monterrey Arce 2013); on Colombia (Ramírez 2004); on Ecuador (Naranjo Bonilla 2013); on Peru 
(Lavigne 2013, Mesa-Lago 1978). 
83 On Brazil, see (Malloy 1979); on Mexico (Brachet-Márquez 2007b, Dion 2010); on Venezuela (Gómez and Alarcón 
2003, González and Lacruz 2007, Salcedo 2012). In general, (Filgueira 2005, Haggard and Kaufman 2008, McGuire 
2011, Mesa-Lago 1978, 1989, 1991b, Segura-Ubiergo 2007). 
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Extended-conservative regimes constitutes the type of regime most closely resembling 
Esping-Andersen’s corporatist ideal type. They were possible in contexts in which the impact of 
industrialization was spatially more extended and homogeneous, and penetrated social structures 
more pervasively. If truncation was by no means absent, it was limited by higher levels of 
organization and more consolidated and evenly extended state structures. As a result, the state 
component of the mix was larger in comparison with conservative/informal regimes. Social 
security systems had a more extended coverage, and benefits were particularly generous for 
regional standards. What was not different was the employment-based pattern of access, and the 
fragmented pattern of incorporation. Social assistance, although very modestly development, had 
a more visible impact thanks to the more limited scope of truncation. Its impact also benefitted 
from the results of more homogeneously consolidated states and more extended modernization in 
terms of infrastructure. Labor market regulation developed to an extent comparable to the one we 
find among conservative/informal regimes, although stable neocorporatist mechanisms of 
coordination and active policies were equally absent. Decommodification was thus modestly 
increased by the extension of social insurance and assistance programs, although always within 
the limits set by employment-based contributions, and by conditions of access and benefits that 
replicated the labor market’s occupational hierarchy.  In terms of stratification, this regime 
created a more extended but equally segmented coalition of insiders, with a potential 
public/private line of fracture comparable to the one present under conservative/informal 
regimes. Argentina, Chile and Uruguay are classified in this category.84  
                                                 
84 On Argentina, see  (Isuani 1985b); on Chile (Arellano 1985, Borzutzky 2002, Mesa-Lago 1978); on Uruguay (Filgueira 
and Filgueira 1994, Mesa-Lago 1978, 1989, Papadópulos 1992). 
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Finally, Costa Rica constitutes a class in itself, that I have dubbed incomplete 
universalism. This is the welfare mix with highest state participation of the region. Unlike the 
case of the previous category, the main source of progress in terms of universalism was not 
moderate truncation, but rupture with the contributive principle. The main aspects that expressed 
this rupture were the extension of non-contributive pensions, the development of more efficient 
forms of social assistance (especially through emphasis on preventive basic healthcare), and the 
establishment of the principle of citizenship-based access to healthcare. Within that context, 
labor market regulation was surprisingly underdeveloped. However, the expansion of the public 
bureaucracy gave public sector-unions relatively high political leverage in comparison with their 
private-sector peers. Decommodification in this case reached its highest regional levels, but the 
limited development of services oriented to the correction of labor market- and household-based 
gender stratification preserved familialism to an important degree.85 
5.2.3 Welfare regimes and political incorporation 
Table 4 juxtaposes the expanded typology of patterns of incorporation and the typology of welfare 
regimes around 1980. The purpose of the table is to show that, in spite of some coincidences that 
may become meaningful throughout the following chapters, there is no systematic correspondence 
between the two groups of countries. With the exceptions of Mexico and Venezuela, and Bolivia 
and Ecuador, no pair of countries having followed the same path of incorporation developed the 
same type of welfare regime. That suggests that, no matter how functional incorporation and the 
development of social protection may be to each other, their logics only partially overlap. 
                                                 
85 See (Martínez-Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea 2012, Mesa-Lago 1989, Sánchez-Ancochea and Martínez Franzoni 
2013). 
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Since explaining the emergence of systems of social protection is not one of my goals, I 
will not pursue that aspect here. However, as I intend to show further ahead in this section, only 
partial overlapping also exists between both of these typologies and the one I develop to classify 
welfare regimes around 2010. All I mean to suggest by noticing it, is that such partial 
overlapping seems to suggest some connections, but by no means any sort of direct 
monocausality. 
 
Table 4: Type of incorporation process vs. welfare regime circa 1980 
 
TYPE OF INCORPORATION 
Electoral 
mobilization by 
oligarchic parties 
Party-led 
corporatism 
State-led 
corporatism 
Comprehensive 
mobilization 
Failed 
incorporation 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Uruguay 
Argentina 
Peru 
Brazil 
Chile 
Mexico 
Venezuela 
Bolivia 
Ecuador 
Costa Rica Argentina 
Chile 
Uruguay 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Venezuela 
Bolivia 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Peru 
Incomplete universalism Extended conservative Conservative/informal Exclusionary 
TYPE OF WELFARE REGIME circa 1980 
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5.3 STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND THE EMERGENT DISJUNCTURE BETWEEN 
RISKS AND PROTECTION 
Although transformations in the social structure are not the focus of this dissertation, a quick 
reference is required before entering the analysis of the current anatomy of welfare regimes. There 
are three reasons for that. The first one is that the access of reforms proposals to the public agenda 
is not understandable without relating it to the effects of a series of “hidden revolutions" (Filgueira 
1996) that simultaneously produced new social risks and undermined social protection systems’ 
capacity to cope with the old ones.86 Second, even before the implementation of reforms, the 
gradual widening of that disjuncture between institutions and social reality determined equally 
gradual processes of institutional transformation through omission and drifting. Third, since even 
successful reforms get at best to imperfectly tap the risks they are meant to address, the latter 
immediately begin to interact with and gradually re-shape the action of new institutions in novel 
ways. 
Here is where Barrientos’ emphasis on the importance of truncation and informality 
becomes most illuminating.87 It is important, however, to keep in mind that, significant as they 
were, their effects dovetailed with those of secular demographic transformations and the 
dynamics of maturation built in the social security systems themselves. What follows is just an 
                                                 
86 This does not imply the idea that the quick escalation of social protection reform to the top of public agendas in the 
region was a direct reflection of that gap between risks and institutional capabilities. Public problems are always 
constructed as such through active political mediation. That mediation, however, is never an act of creationism operating 
ex nihilo. See (Gusfield 1981). 
87 See especially (Barrientos 2004, 2009, 2011). 
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enumeration of the most influential trends of socioeconomic change, with no pretension of 
exhaustive elaboration on their multiple interactions.88  
First, a demographic transition reduced the dependency ratios, hitting extended-
conservative regimes the hardest (Riesco and Draibe 2007). Second, a crisis of the patriarchal 
family model that, combined with an accelerated feminization of the labor force, created multiple 
points of friction with the familialist bias of existing welfare mixes. Among others, it decisively 
accentuated the incidence of gender-based stratification effects not reversed –and in some cases 
even exacerbated- by the configuration of social protection. Third, an expansion of informal 
economic activity that accentuated the truncated nature of welfare regimes throughout the 
region.89 This put pressure on existing social protection at multiple points. a) it drastically 
expanded the need for non-contributory forms of social assistance; b) it contracted the fiscal 
basis of social security programs funded through payroll taxes; c) it also narrowed the population 
matching conditions of eligibility for social security benefits. Fourth, processes of massive rural-
urban migration that contributed to the overflowing of urban infrastructure and diverse public 
services, accentuating the incidence of a number of social risks –especially those associated with 
insufficient sanitation. Fifth, the growth of structural, long-term unemployment –itself one of the 
forces feeding informalization- and of precarious employment, which simultaneously constituted 
a source of new social risks and negatively impacted fiscal revenue.  
                                                 
88 On the different processes listed below and their multiple interconnections, see (CEPAL 2002, Chackiel 2001, 
Fernández-Kelly and Shefner 2006, Filgueira 1998, Filgueira and Peri 2004, Filgueira 2007a, 2008, Repetto 1996, Roberts 
1979, 1995, 1998). 
89 Some indicators of these changes appear in Tables 36 and 37 
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5.4 THE PRODUCTION OF WELFARE AFTER THIRTY YEARS OF REFORMS 
A quick glance at basic aggregated data on the changes experienced by legislation and institutions 
dealing with social protection produces contradictory impressions. On the one hand, the presence of 
common trends is unmistakably evident. One of the most striking aspects is the extended 
recognition of social rights in contemporary Latin American constitutions.90 Table 39 also shows the 
consolidation of a common menu of social insurance programs. On the other hand, however, there 
is wide variation among final outcomes of the last thirty years of transformations. An elementary 
grouping of countries based on a quantitative comparison of levels of welfare effort around 2006, 
without being drastically different from the one we found around 1980, shows important 
displacements.91 This would suggest that pre-reform welfare regimes, while strongly influencing 
reform trajectories and outcomes, did certainly not completely determine them. This would in turn 
provide preliminary support for the central hypothesis about the need to analyze interactions 
between regimes and other institutional configurations, which will provide the content for chapters 
V to VII. This section will not point at any specific explanatory formula, but limit itself to identify 
region-wide trends and classify present-day configurations.  
Regarding the latter goal, however, an important caveat applies. As the dynamic, process-
based analyses in chapters VI and VII will show, those configurations are far from stabilized. 
Once again, there is an important graduation of levels of stabilization –or, perhaps better, 
multiple patterns of (in)stability. Indeed, although some countries have gone through cycles of 
radical reform followed by equally radical backlashes, in sharp contrast with others exhibiting far 
                                                 
90 See Table 39. 
91 See Table 40. 
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more gradual and cumulative patterns, even the latter present in many aspects very fluid 
panoramas. More important from the more general point of view of the theory of welfare regime 
change, not even among the last group is regime shift a rarity –something that relativizes the 
inherent stability taken for granted by OECD-centered researchers.  
5.4.1 Regional trends of welfare regime change 
Even a superficial analysis shows at least nine clear master lineages of change that pervaded the whole 
region throughout the last three decades –although with chronological and spatial variations in 
intensity. First, an extended and on average steady increase of aggregated social spending.92 Second, the 
constitutionalization of entitlements to different forms of social protection in terms of universal 
citizenship rights.93 Third, and in many cases in flagrant contradiction with the previous trend, a 
retrenchment of states’ participation in the welfare mix, and a correlative expansion of the role of 
market mechanisms.94 Fourth, a qualitative displacement of predominant forms of states’ intervention in 
the mix, from provision to regulation, coordination, and last-resort insurance; and a correlative 
increase in the importance of private providers. Fifth, a significant homogenization –at least formally- 
of the menu of programs forming part of social security systems.95 Sixth, the almost universal 
expansion of the assistential component of social protection, by means of diverse types of means-tested 
programs. Seventh, and strongly associated with the previous aspect, some important gains in terms of 
access (especially to primary health care), that nevertheless frequently coexists with very uneven 
                                                 
92 See Table 40 in Appendix B. 
93 See Table Appendix B. 
94 This is most clear in the case of pension systems; see Tables 32 and 33 for a summary of outcomes of pension reform. 
On the general structure of health care systems, see Table 34; the proportion between public and private spending on 
health care in Table 35. 
95 See Table 38, already cited. 
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distributions in terms of the quality of services. Eight, an important relaxation of the degree of regulation of 
labor markets in general, and of the protection of jobs in particular. Ninth, and directly associated with 
that, an important decline of the importance of employment as the anchor of social protection.96 
5.4.2 A diagnosis of aggregated impacts 
How should we typify and classify the combined effects of this transformations in terms of the 
recomposition of welfare mixes? As I already mentioned, I find Barrientos’ focus on the centrality of 
labor market regulation to be a good starting point. Although I disagree with his sweeping diagnostic 
about the consequences of transformations introduced in that realm, I find it useful in order to 
introduce and structure the discussion. The diagnostic is structured by four statements that focus on 
the nodal points of the problem.97 1) Changes in the labor market operated a de facto dismantling of 
employment protection. 2) This caused the conservative components of social policy to fall away, 
with a subsequent weakening of the role of the labor market as the main stratification device. 3) 
Although the informal segment of the welfare regime remained relatively unchanged throughout the 
1990s, since around 2000 it has been reconfigured by a new brand of anti-poverty programs that 
“combine the alleviation of poverty with investments in human capital directed at breaking the 
persistence of poverty across generations.” 4) The general aggregate result has been a recomposition 
of the welfare mix that shifted from conservative/informal in the 1980s, to liberal/informal in the 1990s, 
to liberal-informal in the 2000s. 
                                                 
96 See Table 36 for the evolution of the population contributing to social security; and Table 39 on the expansion of 
non-contributory benefits. 
97 See (Barrientos 2009, Barrientos, Gideon, and Molyneux 2008, Barrientos and Santibáñez 2009). 
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5.4.3 A critique 
I have already made explicit my agreement with the first statement, and the reasons why I consider it 
especially relevant as identifying a recurrent mode of institutional transformation of welfare regimes. 
My points of contention are the following. 
5.4.3.1 The conservative components of social policy did not “fall away” –or, at least, they 
did not everywhere 
The problem has not been disintegration but further truncation, fundamentally as a result 
of the growth of informal employment. Truncation had, of course, more drastic consequences on 
exclusionary welfare regimes, of which segmented social insurance systems already had a 
modest presence before reforms. The situation was very different in those welfare mixes whose 
core was formed by conservative social security systems –that is, in conservative/informal and 
extended-conservative regimes. It can be reasonably argued that a displacement in the direction 
of a liberal-type mix, based on a combination of privately-provided insurance and means-tested 
assistance, with a drastic reduction of risk-pooling, has taken place in the cases of Chile and 
Mexico.98 That has certainly not occurred in the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela. Among these countries, we find indeed the common denominator of a contraction of 
the conservative social security core. This was the combined result of a deterioration of services 
that produced skimming at the top, in favor of the private sector; and truncation with trickling-
                                                 
98 The Chilean case provided the archetype of radical retrenchment ending on a mix with a clear predominance of the 
market. Although that model cannot be said to have been reversed, the Lagos and Bachelet administration introduced 
important reforms that strengthened state participation. Especially important among these was the AUGE plan, which, 
while preserving the multi-provider structured, guarantees universal access to basic health services and a package of 
catastrophic illnesses that has been gradually expanded. See (Barrientos, Gideon, and Molyneux 2008, Pribble 2013). 
120 
 
down to social assistance at the bottom. However, segmented public social security systems did 
by no means collapse in the first three cases –although it may be experiencing a slow process of 
“death by a thousand cuts” in Venezuela. In Brazil the pension system was not even partially 
affected by the privatizing tide in the 1990s, and has been going through a gradual process of 
reduction of a segmentation of benefits disproportionally favorable to civil servants. The 
healthcare system, in the meantime, has combined the consolidation of a dual structure of service 
provision with a strengthening of the public sector and the gradual implementation of universal 
coverage mandated by the 1988 constitution. Partial pension privatization was introduced in 
Argentina and Uruguay, but including compensations for insiders that left untouched most of the 
partial regimes benefiting specific occupational and professional categories.99 The respective 
healthcare systems, in the meantime have highly fragmented dual structures that, however, a) 
were part of the pre-reform configurations; and b) include non-profit entities as the core of the 
respective private sectors. Finally, Costa Rica moved towards a mixed pension system through 
the creation of a private pillar, but did it in parallel with a series of parametric reforms oriented 
to the recomposition of the financial viability of the public pillar. And it has consolidated an 
integrated universal healthcare system, with overwhelming –even if recently receding- 
predominance of public provision. 
                                                 
99 See the right column of Table 25. 
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5.4.3.2 The labor market remains a powerful stratification device; what has happened is 
that further truncation has brutally simplified the lines of stratification, and turned them 
rather into lines of fracture 
True, there has been an almost universal contraction of the proportion of economically 
active population that has access to social insurance through formal employment.100 However, a) 
that proportion is by no means negligible in several cases in which, significantly, insiders still 
constitute powerful veto coalitions; b) positions with respect to the formal/informal boundary 
determine whether access to social protection takes place through social insurance or social 
assistance; and c) the position in the occupational hierarchy of the formal labor market 
determines whether social insurance takes place through the public or the private sector. The 
aggregated result, rather than the more integrated type of regime that the substitution of the 
hyphen for the dash is meant to indicate, is actually a variety of versions of dualization, that 
drastically eliminate risk-pooling and solidarity between those who participate in formal labor 
markets and those who do not. This split has been given an unmistakable institutional 
crystallization by the omnipresence of Ministerios de Desarrollo Social that administer the 
modest tax-funded assistance programs totally disconnected from the social security 
administrations that control the most significant portion of public social spending. 
                                                 
100 Although in some cases, like the Uruguayan, the number of those who gain access through the formal employment of 
their spouses or parents may have simultaneously expanded, as will be shown in chapter VII. 
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5.4.3.3 The “productivist” orientation of the last wave of social assistance programs is at 
least debatable –in any case, it cannot be assumed based on declarations of intentions, and 
it is probably too soon for a serious evaluation of durable impacts 
An important ingredient underlying the thesis of an effective integration of assistance and 
insurance under the hypothesized (hyphenated) liberal-informal regime, is the notion that last-
generation anti-poverty programs go beyond merely “compensatory” goals. Unlike traditional 
means-tested assistance, that aimed to merely guarantee a minimum consumption capacity, they 
include diverse forms of conditionality as incentives for the development of human capital. 
Underlying is, of course, the strong and debatable assumption that “human capital” is the key for 
the discontinuation of mechanisms of inter-generational transmission of poverty. I am not going 
to discuss that assumption here, but several authors have provided good reasons to be skeptical 
about the likelihood of the accumulation of human capital effectively happening under the 
conditions in which these programs tend to operate.101 Two limitations appear as particularly 
important. In the first place, we have the problems of continuity that result from the high 
dependence that these programs have on funding subjected to important oscillations –i.e., 
international cooperation and non-steady sources of revenue. As opposed to the recycling of 
professional skills that tends to predominate in developed contexts, the construction of human 
capital in contexts of structural poverty and marginality is a long-term enterprise. Second, it 
requires a network of services and infrastructure largely absent from the areas in which it is 
expected to take place, and that are frequently contingent upon massive investments in 
infrastructure way beyond the budgetary limitations of focalized programs. 
                                                 
101 For a good summary of arguments and a penetrating discussion, see (Valencia Lomelí 2008); also useful are (Bastagli 
2009, Cecchini and Madariaga 2011). 
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5.5 A TYPOLOGY OF POST-REFORM WELFARE REGIMES 
5.5.1 Multiple directions of change 
At first sight, the current panorama looks messy and extremely diverse, but in the end not more than 
what I can find these days in Europe –only a different diversity that expresses the gap between the 
developed and the underdeveloped universes. What is clear is that neither the wave of market-
oriented reforms, nor the backlash that followed it, entailed uniform patterns of transformation.  
Change has occurred pretty much everywhere, and it has been significant. Some of the 
oldest and most extended original Bismarckian cores have proved very resilient (Argentina, 
Uruguay, and to a lesser extent Brazil), but others were dismantled or drastically transformed 
(Chile, Mexico). Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that established coalitions of 
insiders have very often more resilient that the general configurations of the systems to which 
they owed their benefits. The price of structural change has been, more often than not, the need 
for reformers to compromise with those coalitions. A direct result has been the predominance of 
trajectories of change by layering that have consolidated fragmentation and coordination 
problems as perhaps the most extended common denominator of regional systems of social 
protection.  
It is not, of course, that a decade of “Washington consensus” passed with no durable 
consequences. Its posthumous balance probably disappoints its former most enthusiastic 
advocates, who would have liked it to go deeper. Still, the balance between states and markets 
changed drastically in favor of the latter in several cases. This has been the case both for 
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pensions (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay), and for health care 
systems (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru). 102 
However, we can find changes in the opposite direction too. The state has sometimes 
recovered ground after drastic and sometimes very ephemeral withdrawals –as in the cases of 
pension systems in Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela-, restoring something very close to a 
status quo ante. Some other times, the pendulum went back as violently as it had previously done 
towards the market, but the resulting configuration is a new one –the case of pensions in Bolivia. 
Yet in some other –admittedly few- cases, the strengthening of the public component of the mix 
was not part of a backlash, but of gradual processes of reconfiguration of its mode of operation –
cases of health care in Brazil, Costa Rica, Uruguay. What is clear is that, if the old state-centric 
matrix is gone for good, a “market society” model -in the Polanyian sense- has not replaced it. 
Still, the progress of de-commodification has been moderate at best. This may be at first 
surprising, if we recalled the already alluded omnipresence of social rights in constitutions. In 
practice, however, ruptures with the contributory principle in the direction of an effectively 
rights-based approach has been extremely difficult and rare.103 Reforms in health care systems 
have been multiple, happened everywhere, and in some cases have had important impacts on 
some aggregate indicators (McGuire 2010); however, most health care systems are still 
organized according to the region’s historical basic tripartite blueprint.  If anything, there has 
been an important de facto re-commodification –significantly, most clear examples of 
institutional change by drifting induced by policy omission come from this policy domain. Re-
commodification has been even clearer in the case of pensions, where eight of our eleven 
                                                 
102 See Tables 32 to 34. 
103 For a detailed discussion in these terms, see (Cecchini and Martiínez 2012). 
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countries have introduced structural changes entailing privatization and the narrowing or 
complete suppression of solidarity by risk-pooling. With a few exceptions, most progress in 
terms of the coverage of social protection has occurred through social assistance –predominantly 
means-tested.  
It is nevertheless possible to identify an extended and diffuse consensus around some sort 
of “minimalist universalism.” Its most tangible expression is the generalization of non-
contributive pensions, standard packages of minimum health care benefits, and guaranteed 
coverage from “catastrophic illnesses.”104 The importance of these developments should by no 
means be underestimated; however, their impact is frequently undermined by their insertion in 
systems that maintain their fundamental principles. There has also been considerable 
convergence around the tightening of some basic parameters of retirement schemes –mainly, 
minimal retirement ages and ratios between contributions and benefits. The distribution of the 
contributory burden, however, remains diverse.105  
The effects of perseverance in respect for the contributory principle are magnified 
because Latin American countries tend to find no less persistent difficulties to expand the 
effective contributive bases of their systems of social protection. This is one of the central 
differences between “growth to the limits” as it affects developed welfare states and as  it takes 
place in this region –where it actually is “to the limits”…of the formal market.  
The dualization of social protection is the most obvious and important consequence. It 
has had its most transparent institutional expression in the omnipresence of those ministries of 
social development that it would probably been politically incorrect but not inaccurate to name 
                                                 
104 See Tables 34. Also, but with considerably lower frequency, the prohibition of exclusion from insurance based on 
pre-existing conditions, as a way to prevent practices of adverse selection (Mesa-Lago 2008).  
105 See table 36.  
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“ministries of the poor.” From a certain angle –particularly relevant from those qualifying for 
social assistance- the dualization of social protection represents a progress with respect to their 
truncation. But it adds to the stratifying effects of the respective welfare regimes –or, more 
accurately, it displaces it, turning the “outsiders” of the social protection system into “second-
class insiders.” Form a political point of view, one of the central questions, which I explore in 
Chapters 6 and 7, is whether that new status facilitates the formation of coalitions potentially 
leading to the reduction of inequalities in the distribution of benefits. A priori at least, the 
institutional crystallization of the line separating insured groups from those covered by social 
assistance does not seem to contribute to that type of coalitional dynamics.  
5.5.2 Continuity and change in welfare regimes 
If we repeat the strategy used for an initial approach to the pre-reform situation, and we begin 
with a glance at the ranking of countries according to their levels of social spending,106 the 
stability of membership in the top and bottom clusters is clear. Does this tell us anything, beyond 
confirming well-established notions about the rigidities of public budgets? 
The cases of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru107 confirm how difficult it is to break certain 
vicious circles. To a great extent, the three countries maintain the basic exclusionary nature of 
their systems of social insurance. Bolivia has recently reversed the privatization of its pension 
system that occurred under Sánchez de Losada (1997), but has maintained the structure of 
individual savings accounts, and the most important innovation has been the creation of a 
                                                 
106 See Table 31 in Appendix B. 
107 For good, in-depth country overviews, see (Lavigne 2013, Monterrey Arce 2013, Naranjo Bonilla 2013); for quick but 
still very detailed glances (Mesa-Lago 2008, United States Social Security Administration 2011). 
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solidarity fund for purposes of assistance. The creation of a unified health care system is part of 
the agenda of the Morales administration, but things still look uncertain. Similar considerations 
apply to the projected health care reform of Rafael Correa’s government in Ecuador. Ecuador’s 
experiment of structural pension reform was born virtually dead –the reform was annulled by the 
constitutional court. So far, the effective reach of social insurance remains extremely limited in 
both cases. The same basic considerations apply to Peru, where the Fujimori administration 
created a parallel system of privately managed individual retirement accounts.108 Not only the 
global coverage of social insurance remains extremely narrow, but most of the important number 
of parametric adjustments of the last decade have consisted in patchwork aiming to remedy the 
short-term financial health of the new system.  
The main innovation is the expansion of means-tested cash transfers and services both in 
Bolivia and Ecuador –particularly the latter’s Bono de Desarrollo Humano.109 The immediate 
impact of those programs in terms of poverty alleviation has been important –we could say that, 
due to the extremely modest coverage of social insurance, they have become the core of the 
respective systems of social protection. Precisely for that reason, the possibility may exist to turn 
those extensive social assistance programs into a door to transition to more permanent universal 
solutions with an emphasis on social investment. Such possibility, however, would be to a great 
extent contingent on the removal of two types of bottlenecks. First, the development of the 
extensive infrastructure of services required for the effective attainment of the goals that on 
paper the programs have regarding the development of human capital. Second, the limited 
inclination so far shown by the respective governments to consolidate the institutional frames 
                                                 
108 See (Arce 2001, Cruz-Saco 1998). 
109 See (Barrientos, Gideon, and Molyneux 2008, Barrientos and Hulme 2010, Barrientos and Santibáñez 2009, Cecchini 
and Madariaga 2011, Cecchini and Martiínez 2012). 
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and long-term financial sustainability of their social policies.110 In any case, both situations are 
too recent and remain too uncertain to further anticipate directions of change. 
Colombia is, among the members of the original category of exclusionary regimes, the 
one that may have been experiencing changes leading to a category switch. Apart from the 
expansion of social security spending, it has introduced important changes in the central 
principles guiding access to social protection.111 The constitutional reform of the early 1990s 
provided the opportunity for an intense debate, with-ranging participation of diverse interest 
groups and social movements.112 The result was a comprehensive reform of the social protection 
system that tipped the welfare mix decidedly in favor of the market –although not with the 
dogmatic enthusiasm of other experiences.  
Mexico has to an important degree converged toward a similar orientation.113 However, 
different points of departure resulted in different trajectories. In the Colombian case, due to the 
initial underdevelopment of social protection, the trajectory entailed an expansion based on 
commodification. In the case of Mexico, the path toward market-based social protection entailed 
a process of re-commodification, given the relative important development of the Bismarckian 
component of its dual pre-reform regime. The change, in the last case, did not go too far beyond 
the original limits of social insurance –although, as was also the case in Colombia, it made more 
                                                 
110 As we will see in Chapter VIII, the Correa administration has seems to have more disposition for institution-building; 
however, it also shows a preference for a technocratic style of policy-making that conspires against the formation and 
permanence of solid reformist coalitions. 
111 Colombia’s quadripartite health care system is well-coordinated, in spite of its lack of integration. The public 
insurance sector is divided between a contributory and a subsidized component. There is also a private sector, and a 
transitory public one, based on the network of public hospitals. There is complete separation of functions between 
insurance (through private firms), financing (through a mix of contribution and public subsidies), and provision (through 
multiple providers). See (Cruz and Carrera 2004, Flórez and Camacho 2012, Franco-Giraldo 2012, Mina Rosero 2013, 
Ramírez 2004, Uribe 2004, Yepes 2000). 
112 See (Brachet-Márquez, Alonso, and Uribe Gómez 2012, Cárdenas, Junguito, and Pachón 2008). 
113 See (Brachet-Márquez 2007b, Dion 2010, Valencia Lomelí, Foust Rodríguez, and Tetreault Weber 2012). 
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progress in the area of basic health care than in the pension system.114 As a result, the Mexican 
welfare regime is still a dual one, but the massive expansion of social assistance has changed the 
nature of its duality. Though the chain linking PRONASOL, PROGRESA, and Oportunidades –
products of the partial recycling and expansion of social assistance by successive 
administrations- targeted programs have become a stable and increasingly important component 
of social protection in Mexico. Recently, important progress has been made in the direction of 
suppressing some of the lines of segmentation introduced in the pension system in order to 
protect some special regimes from the effects of privatization. However, both the Mexican and 
Colombian pension systems remain highly fragmented. 
That is perhaps one of the main differences with Chile, but not the only one.115 To some 
extent, the Chilean case is a class in itself. It certainly is the one who has gone the farthest in 
terms of the predominance of the market component of its welfare mix. The brutal conditions 
and radicalism that marked the dismantlement of its Bismarckian legacy allowed also the 
suppression of segmentation to an extent that would have been unthinkable not only under 
democratic conditions, but also for the PRI. The Chilean system of social protection thus has an 
uncommon degree of internal cohesiveness and homogeneity of principles across policy areas. It 
also benefits from the economy with the lowest levels of informality. However, the same factors 
                                                 
114 Mexico’s health care system is tripartite, with very low integration/coordination among the three sectors –each of 
which performs all functions. The private insurance sub-system covers less than 5% of the population. Mandatory 
insurance constitutes the most important component (close to 50% of the population), and is extremely fragmented in 
multiple contributive schemas. Public assistance covers 41% of the population. The completely excluded population is 
estimated in 7%, predominantly rural and indigenous. The Seguro Popular de Salud, introduced in 2003, would in theory 
make coverage universal by providing a voluntary contributive option –except for the poorest 20%- for those lacking 
access to social insurance through regular formal employment. However, the mandatory basic package only includes 
13% of the diagnoses covered by the main social insurance system. The Seguro has also exacerbated the system’s 
segmentation, and its implementation is undermined by the extreme differences in infrastructure and quality of services 
between wealth and poor states (Lakin 2010, Valencia Lomelí, Foust Rodríguez, and Tetreault Weber 2012). 
 
115 See (Barrientos 2002, Borzutzky 2002, Castiglioni 2012, Robles Farías 2012). 
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underlying the consistency of the regime explain the levels of inequality and poverty that were 
also part of the “Chilean miracle.” That has allowed for an important role of social assistance in 
the welfare equation of the country. The other peculiarity of its situation, was the long continuity 
–briefly interrupted and recently reinitiated- of center-left administrations that developed an 
incremental effort to reinforce public participation in the production of welfare. However, the 
limits of that effort have been consistent too, and both the pension and the health care system 
maintain a clear predominance of the market.116 
If anything, social assistance has had an even more explosive –although also considerably 
more erratic and uncoordinated- expansion in Venezuela.117 What also is characteristic of the 
Venezuelan path is the continuity of the highly fragmented core of social insurance. Considered 
as a whole, the evolution of the Venezuelan system of social protection resembles in some 
aspects the Mexican configuration –a dual structure with the novelty of a massive expansion of 
social assistance programs. However, the former did not experience anything remotely similar to 
the latter’s process of privatization of the formal core –the attempt that constituted a sort of 
swan’s song of the Punto Fijo system was reversed before being implemented.  
                                                 
116 Access to health care services increased significantly with the introduction of the AUGE plan (Plan de Acceso Universal 
con Garantías Explícitas) in 2004, and with its expansion in 2011. Virtually 100% of the population has access, either 
through co-payments or free of cost, depending on levels of income, in the public sub-system (FONASA); or to 
individual privately contracted insurance with the ISAPREs (Instituciones de Salud Previsional). The private sector covers 
16% of the population, while 74% is insured through the public sector. However, out-of-pocket expenses are high, 
particularly for the poorest households –in 2012, expenses in medication constituted 57% of the total health care 
spending of the poorest quintile. Insufficiencies regarding the quality of services and speed of attention in the public 
sector often forces low-income households to resort to private providers. The 2008 reform of the pension system 
introduced a solidary pillar, and guaranteed access for any individual in situation of poverty. However, the value of the 
average solidary pension paid in 2013 (U$ 332) was not only below the minimum wage (U$ 376.5), but far from the 
replacement rate recommended by the OECD (70%) with respect to the average salary (U$ 906.7). See (Robles Farías 
2012). 
117 See (Díaz Polanco 2006, González and Lacruz 2007, Maingon 2004, Salcedo 2013). 
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Brazil is probably the most important case of migration from the group of 
conservative/informal welfare systems, but exactly in the opposite direction to the one followed 
by Mexico.118 While Mexico tends to converge with Colombia by developing a new type of dual 
system with a liberal core and an assistential periphery, Brazil tends to move upwards in the 
direction of Costa Rica’s incomplete universalism. The Brazilian pattern has three components. 
First, the preservation through reform of its Bismarckian pension system. Second, the reform of 
health care in the direction of a unified universal system.119 Third, the development of what is, 
together with the Mexican one, the most successful massive program of targeted assistance 
through conditional cash transfers.   
Brazil is, with Costa Rica, the case of most consistent incremental rupture with the 
contributory principle in the domain of health care –the situation is different in the Brazilian 
pension system though. In Brazil, however, it was the military dictatorship that introduced the 
first turning point of the process, by introducing a program of noncontributory benefits for rural 
workers. The other turning point was the 1988 constitutional reform, that played, in terms of 
health care, a “foundational” role analogous to the one observed in the Colombian  case. 
However, the Constitution also confirmed the strong segmentation of the pension system.120 This 
has combined with the scale and federal nature of the Brazilian state, and with the extreme 
inequalities of the Brazilian social structure to exacerbate the fragmentation among programs and 
sub-regimes operating at the state- and municipal level.  
                                                 
118 See (Ansiliero and Paiva 2008, Antía and Provasi Lanzara 2011, Arretche 2004, Caetano 2009, Hunter and Borges 
Sugiyama 2009, Lewis and Médici 1998, Lobato and Burlandy 2000, Robles Farías and Mirosevic 2013). 
119 Brazil has a dual system. Unified under a Sistema Únido de Saúde, the public sector is highly fragmented between 
federal, state, and municipal levels –although coordination has recently improved. Although supplementary, the private 
sector is important, and much of its services are provided through subcontracting with the public system. Coverage is 
virtually universal, but the quality and availability of services is very unevenly distributed. 
120 All this is analyzed with greater detail in Chapter VII. 
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It is also important to recall that the building of the unified national health system had to 
find ways of compromising with a pre-existing powerful private sector –something that Costa 
Rica has never had.121 Indeed, if both health care systems have dual structures with public 
predominance, the complementary role of the private sector is considerably more marginal in this 
case. On the other hand, the Costa Rican pension system was not capable of surviving without 
the introduction of a private pillar.122 Still, its public component is considerably more 
homogeneous and has a less stratified distribution of benefits. On the other hand, the more 
integrated and egalitarian Costa Rican social structure has required a far more modest 
development of targeted programs –although noncontributory pensions are an important part of 
the system of social insurance. 
Finally, the extended conservative regimes of Argentina and Uruguay are perhaps the 
cases of most stubborn continuity of an extended, highly fragmented Bismarckian legacy.123 
Still, both introduced significant structural alterations in their welfare mixes in the 1990s through 
the creation of mixed pension systems. In both cases, however, the strength of the respective 
coalitions of insiders imposed considerable fragmentation on the final outcome. The process was 
recently reversed in Argentina, resulting in an imperfect return to the pre-reform configuration 
that looks institutionally uncertain and financially unsustainable. Both countries maintain 
tripartite health care systems, with important private components of a sui generis nature –the 
                                                 
121 The Costa Rican health care system is based on virtually universal insurance, through contributions and fiscal 
transfers, totally integrated under the direction of the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social. The Health Ministry is in charge 
of direction, regulation, and supervision. Most provision takes place through the CCSS’s own branches, although a small 
fraction of services are contracted with private providers. See (Castro Méndez and Martínez Franzoni 2010, Clark 2001, 
2004, 2013, Martínez Franzoni 2008a, Martínez-Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea 2012, Román Vega 2012, Sánchez-
Ancochea and Martínez Franzoni 2013). 
122 This process is also briefly analyzed in Chapter VII. 
123 See (Alonso and Di Costa 2013, Repetto and Chudnovsky 2009, Repetto and Potenza Dal Masetto 2012) on 
Argentina; on Uruguay see (Alegre and Filgueira 2009, Amarante and Vigorito 2012, Antía and Provasi Lanzara 2011, 
Filgueira and Hernández 2012). 
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respective central actors, the Argentinean obras sociales and the Uruguayan instituciones de 
asistencia mutua- constitute non-profit entities.124 It is also true that the financial difficulties of 
many of those institutions has brought important displacements in the mix, favoring the 
expansion of profit-oriented schemes of private insurance. The aggregated result has been the 
accentuation of the complex fragmentation of both systems. 
Both countries recently witnessed efforts to reinforce the regulatory role of the state. So 
far, the Uruguayan experience has been the most successful one. Building upon a fiscal reform 
that expanded the contributory base of the system, it included the creation of a solidarity fund 
through which risk-pooling and coverage had an important expansion, although access remains 
in the end tied to formal employment (Papadópulos 2012). While the system remains complex 
and segmented, the mix has been altered in favor of the state. As in the cases of Brazil and Costa 
Rica, differences in scale and federalism explain part of the divergence, with sometimes 
contradictory results. On the one hand, the federal structure has made it possible in Argentina to 
successfully experiment with some extension of basic health attention in provinces lacking the 
heavy burden of corporatist structures of sectorial governance.125 The very same factors that have 
made the experience possible, however, have been its scaling up politically unfeasible so. 
The expansion of informality has been behind the increased importance of social 
assistance in both cases. The process was more marked in Argentina, where the depth of the 
                                                 
124 Both countries have tripartite systems with historically very low coordination and integration –although that has 
improved considerably in Uruguay since the 2005-2007 reform. In Argentina, most of the population is covered by 
insurance through obras sociales, funded through contributions and predominantly managed by trade unions, follow 
occupational lines of segmentation. The public sector –highly fragmented across provinces and municipalities-, and 
private prepaid health care plans complete the system. In Uruguay, the central role corresponds to the institutos de 
asistencia médica colectiva, not-for-profit providers financed by premium. The last reform introduced a basic separation of 
functions, improved coordination, and created a solidary fund that expanded coverage significantly and reduced out-of-
pocket expenses. The basis of access, however, remains contribution-based and linked to employment.  
125 See the analysis of the interesting experience of the province of Neuquén in (McGuire 2010). 
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crisis in the early 2000s and its consequences in terms of social agitation led to considerably 
larger and long-lasting anti-poverty programs. The vitality of the movements of the unemployed, 
and the complexity of their multiple interactions with the Peronist partisan machine have fed the 
recurrent renovation and extension of some programs initially conceived as emergency solutions. 
However, there has also been an important effort to turn temporary solutions into permanent 
universalist programs –that has been the process behind the universalization of family 
allowances, that was replicated in Uruguay.126  
5.5.3 An alternative typology 
So the current kaleidoscope of systems of social protection shows important degrees of continuity, 
but the welfare regimes have experienced important changes. In many cases, they have resulted in 
important alterations in the balance between state and market ending in re-commodification. But 
even the most stubbornly resilient systems have been in the end forced to give some response to 
pressing changes in the social structure. The drastic expansion of social assistance and the 
dualization resulting from it constitute the most notorious common denominator, shared by all 
countries to variable degrees. 
I propose a modified classification based on five types –incomplete universalism, 
segmented universalism, liberal /assistential, conservative/assistential, and exclusionary 
assistential. 
                                                 
126 On the Argentinean experience, see (Alonso and Di Costa 2013, Garay 2010, Repetto and Chudnovsky 2009); on 
Uruguay, see (Pribble 2013). 
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5.5.3.1 Exclusionary/Assistential 
This category includes the cases of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. The welfare mix includes a high level 
of informality, states with an important assistential role but limited capacities, poorly 
institutionalized markets, and a small and highly segmented contributions-based component. This is 
the most markedly truncated type, and also the one with the lowest level of decommodification and 
highest familialism. Truncation provides the most visible line of a brutally simplified stratification. 
5.5.3.2 Conservative/assistential 
Venezuela fits this category. It includes a highly deteriorated but highly resilient, highly 
segmented contributory core, where neither marketization, nor universalization have made 
advances. Truncation is less brutal than in the previous category, but dualization is –in part due 
to a political dynamics that I analyze in detail in Chapters 7 and 8- even more marked. It is also 
the case in which assistance is most extended, segmented, and poorly institutionalized. The state 
is the central component of the mix, but somewhat paradoxically the informal sector is also 
important. Decommodification is significant, but limited in its reproduction and potential long-
term effects by fragmentation and informality. 
5.5.3.3 Liberal/Assistential 
This type includes Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.  Its mix is the one with most 
pronounced marketization, but the informal sector remains is an important component. The result 
has been high re-commodification. Stratification follows two main lines. First, the stratifying 
effect of the market operates more or less directly, only very tenuously mediated by marginal 
risk-pooling. Second, those same stratifying effects make social assistance important. Its impact, 
however, varies considerably within the category, due to very diverse levels of informalization. 
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Table 5: Types of welfare regime in Latin America, around 2010 
 WELFARE MIX OUTCOMES STRATIFICATION CASES 
TYPE of WELFARE 
REGIME 
    
Exclusionary/assistential Truncated 
development of 
state & market. 
Important informal 
sector. 
Low 
decommodification. 
Low 
defamilialization. 
Between outsiders and 
insiders, due to 
subsisting truncation of 
social protection. 
Among insiders, 
between those insured 
ant the ones relying on 
assistance. 
Bolivia, 
Ecuador, 
Peru 
Conservative/assistential State and market 
are more 
developed, but still 
high levels of 
informality. 
Medium 
decommodification. 
Low 
defamilialization. 
Focalized CCTs 
simultaneously 
introduce moderate 
decommodification 
and reinforce 
familialism. 
Between recipients of 
social assistance and the 
insured. Among the 
insured, high 
fragmentation among 
occupational categories 
Venezuela 
Liberal/assistential Predominance of 
market, although 
with a still 
important residual 
of state 
participation. 
Subsistence of 
important levels of 
informality. 
Medium/low 
decommodification, 
depending on 
policy domain. Low 
defamilialization. 
Between recipients of 
social assistance and the 
insured. Among the 
insured, due to special 
regimes & 
marketization. Among 
generations, due to the 
segmentation of pension 
privatization. In 
healthcare, significant 
variation in quality and 
coverage of services 
across regions. 
Chile, 
Mexico, 
Colombia 
Segmented universalism Predominance of 
the state. Important 
marketization. 
Informality still 
significant. 
Medium 
decommodification, 
depending on 
policy. Scanty 
elements of 
defamilialization. 
Between recipients of 
social assistance and the 
insured. Among the 
insured, high 
segmentation in special 
regimes. Stratification  
from marketization in 
some policy domains. 
Among generations,  
from segmented 
pension privatization. 
Argentina, 
Uruguay 
Incomplete universalism State is 
predominant. 
Significant 
informality, partially 
moderated by 
universal programs. 
High/medium 
decommodification, 
depending on 
policy domain.  
Between recipients of 
social assistance and the 
insured in some policy 
domains. Segmentation 
persists in some 
domains (pensions). 
Brazil, Costa 
Rica 
 
137 
 
5.5.3.4 Segmented Universalism 
This includes Argentina and Uruguay. The state  remains the most influential component 
of the mix, but both the market and the family play important roles. The informal sector is 
considerably less extended than in other types but nevertheless significant compared to the past 
configuration of these countries. Correspondingly, assistance is reduced in comparison to the old 
corporatist core of the system of social protection, but by no means negligible. As a result, the 
pattern of stratification is probably the most complex, since it combines in a relatively balanced 
cocktail the considerable segmentation of the social insurance system, the effects of the recently 
expanded private component, and the consequences of moderate truncation. 
5.5.3.5 Incomplete Universalism 
This last category includes Brazil and Costa Rica.  It is the type with the most robust 
participation of the state, and as a result the one with the most significant level of 
decommodification. Universal rights play an important role as determinants of access to benefits, 
but universalism remains incomplete in two senses. First, its logic is unevenly influential across 
policy domains –in both cases, less for pensions than for healthcare. Second, informality also 
constitutes an important limitation, although it is significantly moderated by multiple non-
contributory benefits. Stratification effects are thus uneven across policy areas. 
5.6 CONCLUSIONS 
The basic finality of this chapter was to assess the magnitude and nature of the changes I intend to 
explain. The instrument was a descriptive analysis of the configuration of social protection systems 
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in the different countries under consideration at both extremes of the period covered by my 
research. The result are two typologies of welfare regimes. They are the consequence of both of the 
synchronic cross-national diversity I found both at the beginning and at the end of the period, and 
the longitudinal transformations experienced by most countries along the last three decades.  
Table 6: Pattern of incorporation vs. welfare regime, around 1980 and 2010 
TYPE OF INCORPORATION 
Electoral 
mobilization by 
oligarchic 
parties 
Party-led 
corporatism 
State-led 
corporatism 
Comprehensive 
mobilization 
Failed incorporation 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Uruguay 
Argentina 
Peru 
Brazil 
Chile 
Mexico 
Venezuela 
Bolivia 
Ecuador 
Costa Rica Argentina 
Chile 
Uruguay 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Venezuela 
Bolivia 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Peru 
Incomplete 
universalism 
Extended 
conservative 
Conservative/informal Exclusionary 
TYPE OF WELFARE REGIME circa 1980 
TYPE OF WELFAR REGIME circa 2010 
Incomplete 
universalism 
Segmented 
universalism 
Liberal/assistential Conservative/assistential Exclusionary/assistential 
Brazil 
Costa Rica 
Argentina 
Uruguay 
Chile 
Colombia 
Mexico 
Venezuela Bolivia 
Ecuador 
Peru 
 
That diversity is not a consequence of the absence of region-wide trends. Actually, even 
if with different depth, all social structures experienced some comparable transformations, but 
with the mediation operated by their respective institutional legacies. There has thus been no 
convergence, but neither has there been parallel evolution of cases with analogous legacies. 
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Perhaps the most interesting result, is that neither the legacy of political institutions of processes 
of incorporation, nor the foundational anatomy of welfare regimes, have completely determined 
the different paths. Neither the categories of the typology of welfare regimes around 1980, nor 
the distribution of cases between them, mirror the types of processes of incorporation built by the 
Colliers and expanded in Chapter 3. But neither do they correspond exactly with the profiles of 
welfare regimes identify around 2010. On the other hand, connections and continuities, and some 
parallel trajectories still can be identified. That suggests that the idea of searching for 
explanations around the interactions of both sets of institutions may have put us on the right 
track. 
One final comment on the potential heuristic value of the typologies themselves. A 
classification that proposes five types for eleven cases may at first glance not look very 
impressive in terms of its power of reduction of empirical diversity. Two observations on the 
point. The first one is that it constitutes an initial approach to still very fluid and dynamic 
realities. The second one is that those eleven cases are supposed to cover most of the range of 
variation present in the region.  I will not include here an attempt to make the countries I left 
outside127 fit in this types, but I suggest the hypothesis that most of them could reasonably find a 
place here. 
                                                 
127 I have in mind Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Paraguay. 
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6.0  ASSESSMENT OF CAUSAL CONFIGURATIONS 
This chapter and the following two constitute the empirical core of the dissertation, since they are 
the ones that provide and analyze the evidence sustaining the central hypotheses. This one is 
organized in three sections. First, I present the values assigned to the different cases for each one of 
the independent variables. Next, I organize the evidence in truth tables and proceed to the 
assessment of the hypothesized necessary and sufficient conditions determining different reform 
outcomes. Finally, I provide a general discussion of the results and a series of conclusions. At the 
end of the chapter, I include as an appendix a chronology of reforms and a brief description of the 
respective contents, in order to justify their classification. 
6.1 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES 
6.1.1 Causal conditions 
I have discussed the difficulties affecting the operationalization and measurement of some variables 
in the methodological chapter. The purpose of this section is to review the assignation of scores for 
the different variables to the cases under study. Table V.4 of the Appendix summarizes the scores 
assigned to the causal conditions hypothesized to explain variation in welfare regimes, for the 
different cases.  
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Authoritarian interregna. I find three cases that experienced authoritarian regimes that introduced 
clear and durable institutional discontinuities (AUTH) –Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. In all the other 
registering authoritarian interregna (Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay), the 
dictatorships of the 60s and 70s had devastating effects at many levels -including non-negligible 
effects in terms of institutional deterioration, but did not introduce clear discontinuities through the 
building and consolidation of new institutions.  
Financial crisis with hyperinflation. I classify five cases as having had crises of balance of payments with 
hyperinflation (DHYP) –Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela.128  
Corporatist legacies. Only three of the “classic” parties of the period of incorporation 
maintained the type of connection with labor unions established by the pattern of corporatist 
incorporation and interest intermediation (CORP) – Argentine Peronism, Mexican PRI up to the 
access of Vicente Fox to the presidency, and Venezuela’s Accion Democrática.  
Independent labor movements and post-incorporation labor-based parties. Strong connections not 
entailing subordination between an electorally powerful party and a politically relevant and 
independent labor movement (IUP) are identified in Brazil (PT-CGT) and Uruguay (Frente Amplio-
CNT).  
As for established parties supported by a balanced coalition integrating insiders –that is, 
organizations of workers from the formal sector and covered by social security systems-, and 
outsiders –social movements and voters lacking formal employment and lacking protection from 
                                                 
128 See (Bulmer-Thomas 2003, Mahon 1996). 
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social security- I find six clear cases: Argentine Peronism, Brazilian PT, Chilean Socialist Party and 
UDI, Mexican PRI, and Uruguayan Frente Amplio.129 
Institutionalized social dialogue. Strictly speaking, regular comprehensive social dialogue and 
concertation is only a permanent attribute of the Costa Rican polity –and in that case, more as part 
of a consensual policy-making style, than due to formally institutionalized mandates. However, 
during particular conjunctures, other political systems have found circumstantial functional 
equivalents: Brazil  and Colombia during their respective processes of constitutional reform in 1988 
and 1991, and Mexico´s anti-inflationary social pacts.130  
Bureaucratic embedded autonomy. Finally, I scored as having an autonomous-embedded 
bureaucracy in the relevant policy areas the cases of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay after 
2000.131 
Inclusiveness of processes of structural reform. The values assigned to the different reform processes 
are detailed in Table 45.  
                                                 
129 On Peronism, see (Auyero 2001, 2007, Gibson 1997, Levitsky 2003, McGuire 1997); on PT, see (Hunter 2007, 2012, 
Hunter and Power 2007); on Chilean parties, (Luna 2008, 2010b, Luna and Altman 2011, Torcal and Mainwaring 2003); 
on the PRI, (Cornelius et al. 1994, Gibson 1997, Luccisano and Macdonald 2012); on Frente Amplio, (Luna 2007). 
130 On Brazil, see (Weyland 1996a); on Colombia (Brachet-Márquez, Alonso, and Uribe Gómez 2012, Cárdenas, 
Junguito, and Pachón 2008, Ramírez 2004); on Costa Rica (Martínez Franzoni 1998, 2008a, Martínez-Franzoni 1999, 
Sánchez-Ancochea and Martínez Franzoni 2013); on Mexico (Roxborough 1992). 
 
131 See in general (Longo and Ramió 2008, Santiso and Whitehead 2006, Zuvanic, Iacoviello, and Rodriguez-Gusta 
2010); on Brazil (Borges Sugiyama 2008, Falleti 2010, Geddes 1990, McGuire 2010, Schneider 1993); on Chile (Dávila 
Avendaño 2010, Silva 1995, 2008); on Uruguay (Fuentes 2013). 
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6.1.2 A quick glance at aggregated outcomes 
 I have included as Appendix C a list of the episodes of reform considered in this study, 
organized chronologically by country. The list includes, for each event, a brief description of the 
content of the reform, and a classification according to the typology proposed in Chapter 2. 
Tables 42 and 43 summarize the information contained in Appendix A. 
A quick glance at the tables suggests a few interesting observations. First, generally 
speaking, there has been no shortage of reformist attempts: the aggregate result, counting both 
successful and failed reformist attempts, for the 11 countries during a period of 30 years (1982-
2012), are 148 episodes (an average of almost five reforms per year within the observed 
universe). True, the number shrinks significantly if we consolidate those attempts that clearly 
constitute successive, connected rounds of extended efforts of reform132; but the number is still 
impressive (134 and an average of more than four). If we leave out of the counting those 
programs created to deal with emergencies, or for the short-term alleviation of situations of 
extreme poverty, and concentrate on the core of the systems, we have 101 reforms.   
Second, the number of successful structural reforms is impressive too. Considered 
together, regardless of their concrete orientation, the total number is 21 –even after consolidating 
different episodes of what could be considered unitary efforts developed throughout several 
years. The number of what we may call radical re-reforms (that is, structural reforms reversing 
previous structural reforms) is still striking (4) for a policy domain usually painted as paradigm 
of institutional resilience.  
                                                 
132 At least we could confidently cluster the following episodes: Argentina 1995a&b; Brazil 1988, 1990, 1991c&1993b; 
1991a&1992; Chile 2005&2010; Colombia 1993&1994; Mexico 1984&1986; 1992a&1995; Uruguay 2005, 2007a, b&c; 
Venezuela 2006, 2007& 2010. 
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Third, the frequency of reforms distributes unevenly across countries. As Table 43 
shows, if we only count successful reforms it spans from  Costa Rica’s 5 events, to Argentina’s 
19, within the three decades between the “official” birth of the debt crisis and 2012. 
Interestingly, however, countries tend to cluster in two relatively compact groups. If we only 
count successful attempts, the group of “hyperactive” countries, including Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay, oscillates between 19 and 13 events (Argentina and 
Uruguay, respectively). In the “stable” group, that includes Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, and Venezuela, it goes from 5 (Costa Rica) to 7 (Chile). But perhaps still more 
puzzling is the odd internal composition of both groups. Of course, some results, like, for 
example, the presence of Chile and Costa Rica on one side, and of Argentina and Bolivia on the 
other, are hardly surprising. But the presence in the first group of Mexico and Uruguay, and the 
proximity of Ecuador to Chile and Costa Rica, somehow challenge the well-established 
reputations of some political systems frequently presented as paradigms either of stability or of 
restlessness. Moreover, there is no apparent correlation between those clusters and the usual 
grouping of countries according to different attributes of their welfare regimes133, somehow 
suggesting that their resilience may have at least as much to do with systemic attributes of the 
respective polities as with the internal configuration of policies. 
What do we obtain if we consider different policy areas separately? First, pension reform 
has been considerably more frequent than healthcare reform (73 and 28 cases respectively)134. 
Second, at first glance at least, it looks like reaching pension reform was easier than getting 
                                                 
133 See chapter V supra. 
 
134 For the purpose of all the calculations in this paragraph, I consider “deflated” numbers –that is, I cluster episodes 
belonging to the same reform process. Needless to say that, with such small numbers, percentages merit careful use, but 
I think they are still useful for descriptive purpose. 
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healthcare reform through –the respective percentages of failed reform attempts are 9.6% and 
18%. Third, among successful reforms, structural ones are more common in health care (34.8%) 
than in pensions (19.7%). Fourth, structural pension reforms are more likely to be reversed –
while no structural healthcare reform has been reversed, 29% of structural reforms were. Fifth, 
the predominant directions of structural reform are also different –while cases of retrenchment 
constitute 57% (8 in 13) of pension structural reform, they are 25% (2 out of 8) of healthcare 
structural transformations. 
A group of reforms merits brief separate consideration namely, those that created 
programs targeting populations in situation of poverty (44) through different instruments and 
with diverse purposes.  Among such programs, it is possible to distinguish three sub-types: 1) 
non-contributory pensions or allowances granted according to criteria that combine categorical 
definitions with means-testing (in most cases, elderly or permanently disabled individuals in 
situation of poverty); 2) non-conditional cash transfers targeting individuals or households in 
situation of poverty, and conceived as temporary safety nets to alleviate the impact of structural 
adjustments or otherwise caused recessions; 3) conditional cash-transfers, targeting unemployed 
household heads or households in situation of poverty, that tend to combine small cash transfers 
with diverse services and interventions –all contingent upon the beneficiary assuming a series of 
responsibilities. While services and payments may contribute to alleviate situations of poverty in 
the short term, programs in the last group frequently include the development of human capital 
as a central goal towards the reduction of structural poverty. The first type of program often 
corresponds to the development of a non-contributory pillar as a stable component of social 
security systems, and has been created all along the three decades under study. The other two, on 
the other hand, tend to correspond to different and successive “waves” resulting from different 
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paradigms for the design of social assistance programs targeting poor households. The first wave 
took place between the late 80s and early 90s, coinciding with the peak of the influence of the 
“Washington consensus,” and aimed at the moderation of the social costs of structural 
adjustments. In spite of some early experiences started already in the late 90s, the mainstream of 
the second wave belongs to the “post-Washington consensus” age. This last category receives a 
more detailed analysis in Chapter 8. 
6.2 ANALYSIS OF TRUTH TABLES 
6.2.1 Necessary conditions for structural replacement 
Retrenchment by substitution –that is, involving institutional displacement (Mahoney and Thelen 
2010, Streeck and Thelen 2005) is neither very likely, nor completely unviable. The occurrence of 
this type of transformation requires, as a necessary condition, the joint presence of two exogenous 
impact: authoritarian interregna introducing strong institutional discontinuities, and deep debt crises 
associated with hyperinflationary processes. Those exogenous impacts are assumed to have 
reciprocally reinforcing negative effects on the relative strength and veto capacity of distributional 
coalitions expected to support the continuity of welfare regimes as originally designed.  
Using the notation of csQCA:135 
AUTH + DHYP → SRD 
where  AUTH means Authoritarian interregnum with high institutional discontinuity 
                                                 
135 For a list of the coding of variables, see Appendix D. 
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 DHYP means Crisis of balance of payments with hyperinflation 
 SRD means Structural retrenchment with displacement  
 + is the logical operator OR 
For the purpose of testing joint necessity, it is necessary to consider all the cases showing 
the outcome. With respect to that universe, the critical subset is the one containing cases where 
the combination is absent.136 
 
Table 7: Data matrix for analysis of sufficiency of AUTH and DHYP 
 
CONDITIONS OUTCOME 
 
 
AUTH DHYP SR CONTENT 
 Argentina 1994a 0 1 0 PR 
 Bolivia 1997 0 1 1 PR 
 Brazil 1990 1 1 1 HCE 
 Brazil 1991a 1 1 0 PR 
 Chile 1981a 1 1 1 PR 
 Chile 1981b 1 1 1 HCR 
 Peru 1991a 1 1 1 HCR 
 Peru 1993 1 1 1 PR 
 
       
The results not only disconfirm the hypothesis of joint necessity, but also discourage the 
alternative proposition of independent sufficiency. The first conclusion results from the cases of 
reform in rows 2 and 4; the second one, by the occurrence of reform in Mexico in the absence of 
hyperinflation and by its frustration in Brazil in spite of it.  
 
                                                 
136 It is important to notice that the hypothesis does not state that structural reform is a necessary outcome of the 
analyzed conditions –in that case, negative cases with not attempted reforms would be relevant. The hypothesis is that 
authoritarianism and crises with hyperinflation create conditions necessary for the success of an attempted reform –
which implies the irrelevance of any case in which a reform was not attempted. 
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Table 8: Truth table for sufficient conditions for structural retrenchment 
 CONDITIONS OUTCOME 
n ny Cons. X→Y 
ROW AUTH DHYP SRD ~SRD 
1 0 0   0 0 ---- ---- 
2 1 0 Mex97  1 1  [C] 
3 1 1 
Chi81a&b; Per 
91a&93 
 4 4 1 V 
4 0 1 Bol97 Bra91a 2 1  [C] 
  
 
Could the latter be considered not strictly relevant? The 1991 episode was one of 
Fernando Collor’s frustrated attempts to privatize the pension system. It is worth a brief 
commentary, since its irrelevance would allow for the sufficiency of the hyperinflation condition. 
What could save the hypothesis is the debatable relevance of the case. In fact, one could argue 
that by 1991, the Brazilian hyperinflation, usually dated between December 1989 and March 
1990, had already peaked and declined –the critical question would then be how long the effects 
of a debt crisis with hyperinflation should be expected to last. The answer is, not surprisingly, 
that it depends. I determined in advance that I would not be dealing with an in-depth analysis of 
the mechanisms that operate to translate the impact of the crisis into an increased feasibility of 
welfare regime structural reforms. Still, I would like to point towards a possible clue for further 
exploration. The most important mechanisms suggested by the literature on the topic operate at 
two levels. On the one hand, the capital flights resulting from a crisis of balance of payments are 
supposed to taint the balance of forces against owners of fixed assets (mainly industrialists 
benefiting from the general ISI policy complex), and bias it towards owners of liquid assets 
(mainly the financial sector) in position of blackmailing the government with the threat of capital 
flight. Moreover, governments not infrequently react to this type of situation, as part of desperate 
attempts to send tranquilizing signals to capital markets, placing representatives of the most 
internationalized business sectors in command of economic policy. On the other hand, the 
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devastating impact of hyperinflation on the business environment, and on the purchasing power 
of common people, is expected by some models to make societies give priority to stabilization, 
thus increasing their willingness to “swallow the bitter pill (Weyland 2002)” of painful 
adjustment measures. Regarding the first aspect, the more fragile situation of international 
financial interests associated with the centrality of the public banking sector in the Brazilian 
developmental model has been observed –especially in comparison with Mexico. That 
comparative weakness not only had to do with the quantitatively and strategically smaller 
presence of international banking in the financial sector, but also with collective action problems 
and the underdevelopment of cohesive and comprehensive business organizations. In any case, it 
seems clear that the hypothesis needs to be reformulated based on more detailed knowledge of 
the mechanisms through which the impact of financial crises reaches the solidity of coalitions of 
interests. 
6.2.2 Sufficient conditions for the blockage of structural reform 
The assumption here is that legacies including corporatist structures of interest intermediation 
operate as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they posit very solid obstacles for attempts at 
reform through displacement; on the other hand, they provide an instrument of control when a 
party with a privileged connection with corporate actors is in power. This section works on the 
hypothesis predicting necessary effects of corporatist legacies, provided its main political beneficiary 
is in the opposition. I predict that such combination is sufficient to frustrate any initiative of 
structural reform entailing a reduction of benefits for corporate privileged groups. 
The resulting proposition would be: 
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CORP * PPO → ~SR 
where   CORP   means Institutional legacy of corporatist pattern of labor 
incorporation 
 PPO  means Populist137 party in the opposition 
 ~SR  means No structural reform 
*  refers to the logical operator AND 
 
Table 9: Data matrix to test sufficient conditions for frustration of structural reform 
 CONDITIONS OUTCOME 
 CORP PPO ~SR PR HCR 
Argentina 1984 1 1 1  x 
Venezuela 1999 1 1 0 x  
      
 
I will not be testing for sufficiency as an attribute of each condition individually 
considered, but of their combination. In technical jargon, within this model the corporatist legacy 
and a populist opposition party operate as so-called INUS conditions –“insufficient but necessary 
part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result.”138 The relevant 
universe it that of the cases of attempted structural reform including both conditions. Within that 
universe, the critical cases are the ones not showing the respective predicted outcome –that is, in 
                                                 
137 Remember that the adjective “populist” is used here not to refer to any populist party, but to refer to parties that are 
part of the incorporation legacy, and that maintain the linkages to unions that resulted from a corporatist pattern of 
incorporation. 
 
138 This is directly connected to the equifinal and conjunctural nature of the type of causal complexity assumed by the 
model. The fact that the combination is sufficient but not necessary, implies the existence of alternative combinations 
leading to the outcome. However, the necessity of the individual factors (CORP, PPP, PPO) for the combined effect 
implies a conjunctural type of causation.  
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which reform would eventually take place in spite of the hypothesized sufficient condition for its 
frustration.139 
The case for this hypothesis is admittedly weak. The first problem is the Venezuelan 
reform of social security in 1999 with Acción Democrática in the opposition. The relevance of 
the case, however, could be questioned by arguing that, by that time, the debacle of the political 
establishment in general and of Acción Democrática in particular had already gone far enough to 
make any defense of privileges from the Punto Fijo regime too risky a challenge (Morgan 2012, 
Murillo 2001, Seawright 2012).  
 
Table 10: Truth table for sufficient conditions for failure of structural reform 
 CONDITIONS OUTCOME 
n ny Cons. X→Y 
ROW CORP PPO SR ~SR 
1 0 0 ----- -----     
2 1 0 Arg94, 08; 
Mex84, 92-95 
     
3 1 1 Ven99 Arg84 2 1 0.5 [C] 
4 0 1 ----- -----    ---- 
 
However, the more serious problem is shortage of observations. This is a consequence, 
among other things, of the extended permanence in government of two of the three parties 
associated with persistent corporatist practices –Peronism and PRI. But there is also the fact that 
“negative cases” constitute crucial evidence for a hypothesis about those parties’ capacity to block 
reforms, and those “dogs that don’t bark” are often harder to locate… precisely because they do not 
bark. We know only too well that successful political strategies are about precluding things from 
                                                 
139 The caveats of the previous test apply here too. Cases in which no attempt was made at structural reform do not 
count, since the hypothesis does not claim to predict the emergence of initiatives of reform, but the viability of a specific 
type of structural reform, in the first case, and of structural reforms tout court in the second one. 
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happening perhaps more often than about making things happen. And we know that deterrence of 
the adversary from even attempting a move is one of the key manifestations of political influence 
(Hacker and Pierson 2009). One option, in order to strengthen the argument, is to reason 
counterfactually. At least for the Argentine case, we have considerable evidence of the intimidating 
capacity of the Peronist opposition to Alfonsín. What we need is evidence that the Alfonsín 
administration ever considered the idea a substitutive reform as a desirable alternative. What seems 
reasonable to assume, under the light of evidence collected for the study of other policy areas, is that 
it would not have dared counting on support from the Peronist opposition for any formula that the 
unions could perceive as a threat to their benefits.  
Finally, there is the possibility of modifying the hypothesis. The argument could be made 
more general by extending it to cases in which strong interest groups responding to the interests of 
insiders to social security systems develop organic linkages with a strong political party in the 
opposition. That would allow consideration as relevant of the multiple frustrated initiatives of 
pension reform in Brazil under Cardoso and in Uruguay under Lacalle.140  
6.2.3 Sufficient conditions for emergence of mixed systems (partial structural reform) 
This section tests the other side of the coin just analyzed. While the previous section was about 
sufficient conditions for the frustration of structural reform, this is about sufficient conditions to 
determine its moderation. Structural reform under democratic conditions, I contend, is contingent 
upon the neutralization of opposition from insiders. This has two implications. The first one is the 
incumbency of those mainly dependent of the electoral support of coalitions of insiders. The second 
                                                 
140 On Brazil, see (Brooks 2009, Caetano 2009, Madrid 2003, Melo 2004, 2007, Pinheiro 2004, Weyland 1995a, 1996a, b, 
2006); on Uruguay (Brooks 2009, Castiglioni 2005, Kay 1999, Müller 2003, Papadópulos 1992, 2001). 
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one is the necessary watering-down of the content of reform in order to protect insiders’ benefits. 
This necessarily results in a fragmentation of the effects of reform, which in turn requires a process 
of institutional layering. A part of the institutional legacy, necessary to guarantee already established 
benefits, remains untouched by the reform. Institutional innovations are attached to that core, 
resulting in a mixed system. 
The conditions leading to this type of solution are different depending on the type of 
initial incorporation associated with the establishment and early expansion of social insurance. 
The next two sub-sections analyze separately cases of incorporation by a hegemonic force 
leading to corporatist legacies, and cases of incorporation through the co-participation of 
traditional parties leading to pluralist legacies. 
6.2.3.1 Cases of corporatist legacy 
This sub-section is about how the other edge of the “corporatist sword” operates. Mixed structural 
reform by institutional layering, I contend, is a necessary result of corporatism when its main 
political beneficiary is in power. 
The resulting proposition is: 
CORP * PPG → MSR 
 where  CORP   means Institutional legacy of corporatist pattern of labor   
    incorporation 
 PPG   means Populist141 party in government  
                                                 
141 Remember that the adjective “populist” is used here not to refer to any populist party, but to refer to parties that are 
part of the incorporation legacy, and that maintain the linkages to unions that resulted from a corporatist pattern of 
incorporation. 
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 MSR   means Mixed structural reform142 
*  refers to the logical operator AND 
 
Table 11: Data matrix to test the sufficiency of CORP*PPG 
 
CORP PPG MSR PR HCR 
 Argentina 1994a 1 1 1 x 
  Argentina 1996a 1 1 1 
 
x 
 Argentina 2008 1 1 0 x 
  Argentina 2011 1 1 1 
 
x 
 Mexico 1984 1 1 0 
 
x 
 Mexico 1992a 1 1 1 x 
  Mexico 1995 1 1 1 x 
  
       Table 12: Truth table for sufficient conditions for mixed structural reform 
 CONDITIONS OUTCOME 
n ny Cons. X→Y 
ROW CORP PPG MSR ~MSR 
1 0 0 Col94; CR95; 
Uru94 
----  3  [?] 
2 1 0      [?] 
3 1 1 
Arg94a&96a; 
Mex84, 92a, 95 
 5 5 1 T 
         
4 0 1 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
Once again, the relevant universe it that of the cases including both conditions. Within 
that universe, the critical cases are the ones not showing the respective predicted outcome. The 
                                                 
142 A mixed structural reform is one that is not fully substitute, but somehow preserves and incorporates some 
institutions or programs of the old order in order to protect the benefits of the main interests privileged by it. In Mesa-
Lago’s typology, it would result in a new model that is either parallel or a mixed.  I partially differ, however, with Mesa-
Lago’s operationalization. He includes the Mexican pension reform of 1997 among the cases of substitutive structural 
reform. For the purposes of the current analysis, I classify that reform as a mixed one, considering that, even if the 
public system was closed to new entrants, the structures of its administrations were maintained and all those already 
insured at the time of the reform were granted the possibility to choose, at the time of their retirement, between a 
pension regulated by the public system of defined benefits or one based on the private system of individual 
capitalization. 
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first proposition would then be disconfirmed by any case in which CORP and PPP are 
simultaneously present, and a substitutive structural reform was successfully attempted.143 
Two cases may be problematic for this proposition –Argentina 2008 and Mexico 1984. 
Things look different, however, if we briefly consider the contents of the respective reforms. The 
Mexican Ley General de Salud, de 1984, was an initiative that created the institutional frame for 
the development of a National Health System. The Ministry of Health was assigned the leading 
role in the formulation and coordination of the process. This had direct effects in the balance of 
power, within the governmental apparatus, between the Ministry and the Instituto Mexicano del 
Seguro Social.144 According to González Rossetti, “[f]ormally, the MOH was in charge of the 
health sector, but historically the IMSS outweighed it financially, organizationally, and 
politically, at both the federal and state levels. The IMSS bureaucracy and its leadership also 
perceived a threat in the designation of the MOH as head of the sector and the creation of a 
health cabinet, because this severed its direct link to the president for policy decision making 
(González Rossetti 2004).” The project put strong emphasis in the decentralization of service 
provision. The decentralization of facilities of the Ministry of Health, that were merged at the 
state level with the ones belonging to the IMSS’s Programa Solidaridad to create autonomous 
state-level health sub-systems, “forced the IMSS to forsake the IMSS-Solidaridad infrastructure 
and health labor power (González Rossetti 2004).” Its authorities did not dare frontally opposing 
an initiative directly backed by president De La Madrid. However, after two years it had 
managed to put together a powerful coalition. Essential for its power was the resistance of state 
                                                 
143 The caveats of the previous test apply here too. Cases in which no attempt was made at structural reform do not 
count, since the hypothesis does not claim to predict the emergence of initiatives of reform, but the viability of a specific 
type of structural reform, in the first case, and of structural reforms tout court in the second one. 
144 See (Brachet-Márquez 2007a, b, Dion 2010). 
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governors, concerned about the possible new fiscal responsibilities associated with the 
decentralization. IMSS employees reluctant to be transferred to the orbit of the MOH reinforced 
the coalition by sabotaging the project at the implementation level, and even potential 
beneficiaries were successfully organized to protest the changes in procedures and displacement 
of services. By then, the context of economic crisis and political unrest had changed the 
presidential priorities, and the decentralization process was interrupted after 14 out of 32 states 
had implemented it. In the following sexenio, the Salinas administration did not review the law, 
but just reversed the process in practice, by going back to the previous centralized management 
of the budget without making distinctions between reformed and not-reformed state-level health 
administrations (Brachet-Márquez 2007b, González Rossetti 2004). Two observations are 
important here. The first one is that, in the context of Mexico’s sui generis authoritarian regime 
by the early 80s, a good part of the tug of war between government and opposition took place 
within the PRI itself. A central purpose behind the creation of that oxymoronic formula was, 
precisely, the absorption of conflicts on interests into the party structure in order to manage them 
in less disruptive ways. In this case, the main sources of opposition were frictions between 
bureaucratic bailwicks controlled by the same party, on the one hand, and in the always delicate 
equilibrium between the Mexican presidency and state governors. The final result, however, was 
pretty similar to the ones of other conflicts internal to PRI and Peronism that I will analyze in 
next chapter: a head of the executive that ends watering-down a project in order to appease 
conflicts running across the party structure. As a result –this is the second observation-, even if 
conflicts did not emerge during the law-making process and legislation was not reversed or 
amended to somehow give formal expression to the blockade, the policy ended “mixed” for all 
practical purposes. 
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As for the Argentine 2008 pension reform, its goal was the complete reversion of the 
privatization led by the Menem administration in 1994, when the acceptance of the second, 
private pillar by Peronist unions took painstaking negotiations between the executive and one of 
the central partners in its support coalition. The same unions simply found nothing to object, 14 
years later, to a radical revision.  
6.2.3.2 Cases of pluralist or discontinued populist legacy 
According to the data in Table V.5b, the hypothesis in the previous section, even if fully consistent, 
has only limited coverage –it explains 5 out of 8 cases of mixed reform. This result suggests the 
existence of at least one alternative path that would explain the cases of the first row, consisting on 
the creation of mixed systems in Colombia, Costa Rica, and Uruguay.  Here I will suggest and test a 
path valid for cases with institutional legacies produced by pluralist incorporation through bi-
partisan systems.  
When that was the case, we find no hegemonic actor monopolizing the benefits of 
incorporation, which are distributed in a more even way. Co-participation in the process thus 
created vested interests in the continuity of the social protection system for multiple partisan actors. 
Any of those actors would face too high political costs if it took exclusive responsibility for a reform 
entailing significant retrenchment. The predicted consequence is their convergence on one of two 
strategies: either non-cooperative blame avoidance, or cooperation to share blame for a reform 
protecting the beneficiaries of the existing system. Considering that even shared blame might entail 
significant political costs, I do not expect parties to choose such a cooperative strategy unless 
exposed to the risk of higher costs. I will hypothesize as an additional condition, necessary for a 
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shared-blame strategy to happen, the emergence of a significant electoral challenge from third 
parties.  
The proposition to test would then be: 
LBPI*TPC → MSR 
where  LBPI  means Legacy of bi-partisan incorporation 
 TPC  means Third-party/ies challenge 
 MSR  means Mixed structural reform 
 *  refers to logical operator AND. 
The cases that are relevant for this hypothesis are all those presenting the sufficient 
configuration –the hypothesis would be disconfirmed by any case showing the condition but not the 
outcome. The three cases in row 3 are consistent with the hypothesis. This is another configuration 
for which “non-barking dogs” are important. Thus, even if not directly relevant for the sake of  
consistency, the cases on row 2 are worth considering as ancillary ones, since they reinforce the idea 
that “founding” parties should be expected to avoid taking blame for a reform in the absence of a 
significant challenge by third parties.145  
Table 13: Truth table for sufficient conditions for mixed structural reform (II) 
 CONDITIONS OUTCOME 
N ny Cons. X*Z→Y 
ROW LBPI TPC MSR ~MSR 
1 0 0 ------- ----    ---- 
2 1 0  Uru85, 90-92    [?] 
3 1 1 
Col94, CR95; 
Uru95 
 3 3 1 T 
4 0 1  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
                                                 
145 The value as ancillary cases is further strengthened by the state of financial imbalance that the social security system 
presented at the time, which made reform not only recommendable but urgent. 
 
159 
 
 
6.2.4 Necessary conditions for structural expansion 
Any inclusive expansion of coverage, entailing more egalitarian distributions of benefits and 
burdens, depends both on the combined effects of systems of interest intermediation, type of party 
in government, and bureaucratic components of the legacy from incorporation. I concretely 
hypothesize the following necessary conditions, that can be combined in alternative paths: a) the 
presence either of strong labor unions connected with ruling parties without subordination or of 
institutionalized mechanisms of concertation guaranteed by the state; b) a governing party capable of 
articulating a base wide enough to combine the “classical” demands of the remaining old “populist” 
constituencies (“insiders”), with the new demands of excluded sectors and new social movements 
(“outsiders”); d) an autonomous specialized technical bureaucracy. 
The notation is: 
(IUP + ICM) * GIOP * EBA → SEXP 
where IUP   means Independent union-party connection 
 ICM  means Institutionalized concertation mechanism 
 GIOP  stands for Governing insider-outsider party 
 EBA  means Embedded bureaucratic autonomy 
 SEXP  means Structural expansion 
This hypothesis differs to the previous ones in that it postulates a necessary set of 
conditions for a given outcome. Here the relevant cases are those of structural expansion, and the 
hypothesis would be disconfirmed by the existence of at least one case showing that outcome 
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and the absence of any of the conditions hypothesized as individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient.  
 
Table 14: Data matrix to test for necessary conditions for structural expansion 
 CONDITIONS OUTCOMES 
 IUP ICM GIOP EBA SEXP PEXP HCEXP 
Brazil 1988 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
Brazil 1990 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 
Chile 2005 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Colombia 1993 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
Costa Rica 1995 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Uruguay 2005-07 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
 
This is the most complex hypothesis, and several decisions regarding measurement and 
the classification of cases may result debatable. First, we have the choice for leaving out two 
cases of dubious irrelevance, since some readers may consider them examples of structural 
expansion –the creation of a universal old age flat pension by the administration Sánchez de 
Losada in 1993 and the reversal of the privatization of Argentine pensions by the Fernández 
administration in 2008. Regarding the BONOSOL, I think that Weyland provides an exact 
appreciation when he states that although “political and tactical calculations led pension 
reformers… to go beyond the Chilean model… they did so simply by addition, not modification. 
The BONOSOL did not affect the private pension system as such but merely sought to make it 
politically viable (Weyland 2006)146.” The Argentinean case is basically an attempt to return to a 
statu quo ante through the reversal of the previous privatization by the Menem administration 
that entails no effort to expand the system in order to make it more inclusive –in other words, the 
                                                 
146 But see (Müller 2009) for a different evaluation. 
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dual nature of the Argentine system of social protection remains basically untouched by the “re-
reform.”147  
 
Table 15: Truth table for necessary conditions for structural expansion 
 CONDITIONS OUTCOMES 
n ny Cons. (X+Z)*W*U→Y 
ROW IUP ICM GIOP EBA SEXP ~SEXP 
1 0 0 0 0  Arg pre99; Peru     
2 0 0 0 1       
3 0 0 1 0  Arg99-00& post-
2003; Ven99-
200? 
    
4 0 0 1 1       
5 0 1 0 0       
6 0 1 0 1 CR95      
7 0 1 1 0  Mexico pre2000; 
Ven99 
    
8 0 1 1 1       
9 1 0 0 0  Bol pre 2005; 
Mex post2000; 
Uru pre2004 
    
10 1 0 0 1       
11 1 0 1 0       
12 1 0 1 1 Bra03-05; Uru05      
13 1 1 0 0       
14 1 1 0 1 Bra88, 90, 91c, 
94, 98a, 00; 
Col93 
    
T 
15 1 1 1 0 Bol10      
16 0 0 1 1 Chi05      
 
 
Second, is the inclusion of the Chilean health care reform of 2005. One aspect, which I 
find less arguable, is the nature of the reform. It is true that there is no dismantlement of the basic 
institutional structure of the system –that is, not a reform by displacement. But most analysis 
reach the same conclusion: there is a very important alteration of the balance between the public 
                                                 
147 Moreover, I tend to agree with Giselle Datz when she finds the origins of the counter-reform in the financial 
urgencies posed to the government by the condition of Argentina’s sovereign debt, rather than by any consideration of 
social justice (Datz 2012, Datz and Dancsi 2013). Interestingly, some clever intuitions of the role of the elements that 
ended leading the evolution of the Argentine system along this path can be found in (Brooks 2009). See also (Arza 2012, 
Mesa-Lago 2009). 
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and private components, a clear increase in regulation, and an expansion of both of the coverage 
of the system and its accessibility for non-privileged sectors. Perhaps most important, however, 
is change in terms of risk-pooling.148 Last but not least, the ulterior parametric adjustment 
introduced by the Bachelet administration in 2010 clearly builds upon possibilities open by the 
2005 reform (Castiglioni 2012). 
Finally, there is the possible issue of the scores given to Colombia in relation to the 
existence of an institutionalized mechanism of comprehensive concertation of interests, and of a 
political party capable of building a comprehensive coalition of interests of insiders and 
outsiders. My contention is that, in an exceptional conjuncture, the Constituent Assembly 
provided a functional equivalent for both, by establishing “a broadly representative commission 
to resolve the underlying differences over the organization of the social security and health 
sectors (Ramírez 2004).”149 
Provided that the preceding justifications result persuasive, the data in Table V.6b forces 
us to discard the initial hypothesis of necessity. According to Table V.6b, there are six possible 
alternative combinations that are sufficient to produce the outcome: 
ICM*EBA + IUP*GIOP*EBA + IUP*ICM + IUP*ICM*GIOP + GIOP*EBA → 
SEXP 
The terms of this initial proposition can be reorganized, to obtain a considerably more 
parsimonious expression. If we extract EBA from those paths that have it as a common factor:  
EBA* (ICM + IUP*GIOP + GIOP) + IUP*ICM → SEXP       
                                                 
148 See (Huber and Stephens 2012, Pribble 2013, Pribble 2006, Solimano and Vergara 2007). 
149 See also (Chávez G. and Montoya 2011, Esteves 2012, Le Bonniec 2002). 
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Which can be rewritten as:  
EBA*(GIOP + ICM) + IUP*ICM   → SEXP      
The three possible alternative paths (EBA*GIOP; EBA*ICM; IUP*ICM) can still be 
further simplified, obtaining the sufficiency of either ICM or the combination EBA*GIOP. 
This results suggest three initial reflections. First, an important caveat: any comparison of 
the alternative paths taking the respective conditions individually would be at odds with the very 
notion of conjunctural causation.150 Second, if follows that, even if according to a strict logic of 
propositional algebra, a process of logical reduction can lead to eliminate several individual 
conditions and combinations, these may nevertheless retain analytical relevance for process-
tracing. In other words, EBA and GIOP may be jointly sufficient to produce the outcome, but the 
process leading to it in itself may be different in the presence of IUP, and that may constitute 
valuable information, even if it can be disregarded for the sake of parsimony. Third, the 
alternative paths, which are equivalent as sufficient conditions for the general outcome defined 
of structural expansion, may entail relevant differences at a more disaggregated levels, either 
between different formulas of structural expansion in the same policy area, or across policy 
areas. In any case, further elaboration requires the type of in-depth intra-case analysis that is 
provided in the next chapter. 
                                                 
150 For example, if based on mere consideration of the combinations corresponding to the first and second path, we 
assumed that EBA operates in both cases in the same way, and that GIOP and ICM contribute in equivalent ways to the 
outcome. That may actually the case, but it cannot be assumed without analyzing the mechanism in action –it may also 
be the case that, for example, EBA operates in qualitatively different ways depending on whether it combines with 
GIOP or with ICM. 
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6.2.5 Sufficient conditions for reversibility of structural reforms 
The next hypothesis is about the short- and medium-term stability of structural reforms. A strong 
assumption here is that, although those processes are naturally constrained by structural legacies 
from the incorporation period, the stability of their outcomes is to an important extend contingent 
upon short-term strategies of political actors. The purpose of this section is not to explain those 
strategies, but to try to identify their incidence on institutional instability –more specifically, to 
explain the important number of structural reforms that have been reversed within relatively short 
periods. The hypothesis that will guide my exploration is that the instability of structural reforms is 
determined by the interaction between the type of regime and the political dynamics of the specific 
policy-making processes they result from. Under democratic regimes, consensual policy-making is a 
necessary condition for durable structural reforms. 
The symbolic notation: 
~CONS*DEM → RRSR 
where ~CONS means absence of Consensual processing of structural reform 
DEM means Democratic regime during the process of structural reform  
 RRSR  means Radical reversal of structural reform 
The universe of relevant cases is thus that of structural reforms processed in democracy 
and in a non-consensual fashion. The critical cases for the disconfirmation of the hypothesis 
would be those that, having experienced in the past a structural reform under the mentioned 
conditions, have not experienced a reversal.  
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Table 16: Data matrix for sufficient conditions for radical reversal of structural 
reform 
 CONDITIONS OUTCOME 
 ~CONS DEM RRSR PSR HCSR 
Argentina 1994a 0 1 1 X  
Bolivia 1997 1 1 1 X  
Brazil 1988 0 1 0  X 
Chile 1981 1 0 0 X X 
Colombia 1993 0 1 0  X 
Colombia 1994 0 1 0 X  
Costa Rica 1995 0 1 0 X  
Ecuador 2001 1 1 1 X  
Mexico 1992-95 1 0 0 X  
Mexico 1995 1 0 0 X  
Peru 1 0 0   
Uruguay 1995 1 1 0 X  
Uruguay 2005-07 1 1 0  X 
Venezuela 1999 1 1 1 X  
 
 
First, a brief commentary on some cases whose exclusion or inclusion could be 
debatable. One of them, the Argentine 2008 pension reform, was led by the current government 
of a historical populist party, following the non-consensual policy-making pattern that has 
singularized the Fernández administration.151 The pension reforms approved in Bolivia and 
Venezuela in 2010 and 2000 respectively, developed through hegemonic policy-making 
processes. Perhaps the health care reform approved and implemented by the first administration 
of the Frente Amplio (2005-2009) should at first glance be defined as a hegemonic one, since the 
governing party had an absolute majority that enabled it to rely exclusively on its own 
                                                 
151 Not only there was no opening of the process to the input of social organizations, interest groups, or independent 
experts; the recommendations of the “white book” resulting from the comprehensive debates developed in 2001 were 
completely ignored (Mesa-Lago 2009). 
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legislators, and made no significant effort to form an extended legislative coalition. That fact 
notwithstanding, and as I show in the analysis of the process included in the next chapter, the 
project in itself built upon a long process of policy learning dating back to the Concertación 
Nacional Programática, in 1984, and to subsequent discussions under the Sanguinetti 
administration. Those ambiguities notwithstanding, the decisive test of the pudding for the 
hypothesis tested here requires the rotation of governing party, which has yet to arrive in the four 
cases.  
Another potentially problematic decision is the coding of the Mexican 1995 pension 
reform as not having been radically reversed. It is true that the pension reform that the Fox 
administration got approved in 2004 was not a mere parametric adjustment, since it precisely 
targeted the core of the compensations conceded by the PRI in order to overcome opposition 
from unions and bureaucrats –the special, privileged pension system preserved for the employees 
of the IMSS (Meyer and Marier 2005). However, the main content of the 1995 reform –that is, 
the attributes based on which we classify it as structural- remain in place. Moreover, the 
replacement of the defined-benefits system by one of defined contributions based on individual 
accounts is completed through this second reform, by mandating IMSS employees to enroll into 
a mandatory contributory private pension plan.  
 
Table 17: Truth table for sufficient conditions for radical reversal of structural 
reform 
 CONDITIONS OUTCOME 
n ny Cons. X*Z→Y 
ROW ~CONS DEM RRSR ~RRSR 
1 0 0 ----- ------ ---- ---- ---- L.I. 
2 1 0  
Chi81a&b; 
Mex92-95; Per 
3 0 0 N.R. 
3 1 1 Bol97; Ecu01 Uru95 4 3 0.25 [C] 
4 0 1 Arg94; Ven99 Bra88-90; 
Col93-95; CR95 
5 2 0.4 [C] 
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The evidence synthesized in table 17 clearly dictates the rejection of the hypothesis. In the 
relevant row (3) we have one reform that, although processed in a non-consensual way, has not been 
reversed –which kills the case for the combination of democratic regime and lack of consensus as a 
joint sufficient condition for the reversal of structural reforms. Some policy-makers participating in 
the process have suggested that the insufficient votes collected by an attempt to reject the 
Uruguayan reform through popular referendum, confirmed something like an ex post facto consensus. 
More solid is the argument that the strategy followed by reformers in this case was one of 
anticipated de-activation that divided a potentially extended opposition. Indeed, the solution not 
only preserved to a significant degree the segmentation of the reformed system, but decisively added 
the option to remain under the PAYG regime for those contributors of age 40 and above (Kay 
1999, Müller 2003, Papadópulos 2001). This would suggest the possibility of adjusting the 
hypothesis through the exclusion of reforms in which the structural component is watered-down by 
segmenting it with significant compensations for insiders –that would, so to speak, create an ex-ante 
implicit consensus.  
Some cases in row (4), if not strictly relevant for the confirmation of the proposition, 
indirectly reinforce it, by providing examples in which strategies of consensus seem to have been 
rewarded with institutional continuity. However, the same row includes information pointing in the 
opposite direction too. Indeed, the drastic reversals occurring in Argentina and Venezuela suggest 
that, even if the absence of consensual strategy were sufficient to produce reversal, the strategy by 
itself does not suffice to prevent it.  
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Maybe we should consider looking somewhere else. That is, in fact, one possible reading of 
the similarities between the four cases of reversal, which would send us back to explore systemic 
factors. The four episodes of reversal (Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela) took place in 
contexts of pervasive institutional instability. Maybe a first general conclusion should be that the 
main operating forces are not policy-specific. This very basic hypothesis can be further elaborated in 
at least three directions that are not mutually exclusive. First, an argument on pervasive institutional 
instability; second, one based on the idea of an encompassing anti-neoliberal backlash; third, one 
centered on the hypothesis of a re-distribution of power among coalitions of interests. According to 
the first story, the reversals would express a more pervasive syndrome of institutional 
precariousness; in the second, they would owe their instability to the underlying ideological 
orientation. An obvious possible line for further exploration –that will not be pursued here- is the 
comparative analysis of reversed structural reforms across policy areas, to see is they have a common 
anti-market orientation, or converge in the benefit of the same interest groups. 
The cases on row (2) may become relevant at this point. Indeed, they share an unequivocally 
radical pro-market orientation. However, substantial continuity notwithstanding, the three cases 
(Chile, Mexico and Peru) have experienced important cycles of post-structural reform adjustment 
that solidified some aspects of the private components of their systems, but simultaneously 
moderated some effects in terms of inequality or exclusion by re-enforcing public regulation.152 It 
seems that the key point is not necessarily (or at least not exclusively) neoliberalism. Of course, they 
also have in common the authoritarian nature of the governments responsible for their structural 
reforms. Should we conclude that dictatorships have an advantage over democracies in terms of the 
                                                 
152 See Appendix A. 
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durability of their institutional innovations? Evidence against that simplistic conclusion, both from 
the region and from outside it, is abundant. Now, if we look at all cases of institutional continuity 
after structural reform, regardless of regimes, it is easy to identify a common propensity to gradual 
institutional change in general.153 Did we describe a whole circle to end in the not very original 
conclusion that institutional innovations processed in the context of stable institutions have a higher 
chance to last? It may be a start, but only if the obvious questions follows, which institutions then? 
We could by at least identifying which institutions to exclude. Constitutional structures, 
electoral systems, degrees of centralization, party systems and types of parties are heterogeneous 
enough to make them the foundation of any monocausal hypothesis. Neither would a path-
dependent argument based on legacies from the incorporation period fly. Economic structures and 
strategies of development are also diverse, as are in consequence the equations of winners and losers 
among socioeconomic coalitions. So far, I have only been able to come up with one alternative: they 
tend to be the countries in the region that have got closest to building states that allow governments 
to govern.  Now, that is admittedly little more than a start, and one that cannot be accepted without 
considerable caution. Indeed, “the state,” being one of those concepts without which I do not 
expect social scientists to get too far, can very easily turn into one of those passe partout categories 
that in the end leave us with little more than some brilliant, hyper-abstract grand récit. So the 
possibility of it providing any useful theoretical direction depends on careful further elaboration not 
only on the concept itself, but also and fundamentally on strategies for the observation of the state. 
Where should we search –perhaps more accurately, what should we look at- in order to “see” the 
state? The direction suggested in the theoretical chapter was based on three recommendations: 1) 
                                                 
153 A diagnose, however, that is admittedly less accurate for Colombia and Peru than for the rest of countries. 
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think relationally; 2) observe public policy-making processes.  In other words: try to find out how 
governments do what they do when they try to govern. The following two chapters are an attempt 
to put that in practice. 
6.3 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical core that sustains the hypotheses developed in this dissertation is organized in three 
successive chapters, beginning with the current one. Its goal has been the identification of 
correspondence between types of reform of social protection systems and configurations of factors 
hypothesized to determine those patterns of reform and the institutional transformations in which 
they result. The relationships between hypothesized causal configurations and outcomes has been 
formulated in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.  
Simple descriptive analysis of the data shows frequent policy change, diversity, and an 
important incidence of structural reform, in a context of predominance of gradual institutional 
change. Latin American welfare regimes have been repeatedly modified, and in several, 
occasionally contradictory directions. Not surprisingly, the strategy that governments of the most 
diverse ideological orientations tend to adopt by default is the attempt to buy the existing system 
as much time as possible by prolonging its financial viability through diverse parametric 
adjustments. But, as I said, structural reforms, if far less common, happen, and in relative terms, 
more frequently and easily than in the North-atlantic area. Actually, they may sometimes happen 
too frequently and too easily –or, perhaps more precisely, the easy way. Variation in terms of 
political viability seems to be important, however, not only across countries, but also across 
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policy areas. Structural pension reforms are more difficult to obtain than healthcare ones, and 
once obtained, more likely to be reversed. 
According to my theoretical model, the emergence of the need for reform is the combined 
effect of the institutional design of the existing regime, and changes in the socioeconomic 
structure that lead to increase the risks (both old and new) lacking protection, and the population 
of “outsiders.” However, it is also my contention that the political viability and final 
configuration of reforms is determined by the interaction of institutional factors that shape the 
formation of reformist coalitions and their relative power.  
The descriptions in the previous chapter had shown that, while the anatomies of welfare 
regimes in Latin America are very diverse, there has been also repetition of a few patterns of 
transformation -namely structural retrenchment by institutional displacement; structural reforms 
leading to institutional fragmentation by processes of layering; structural incremental expansion; 
reversal of processes of structural retrenchment implying cycles of serial replacement. I thus 
produced and tested hypothesis exploring possible causal factors systematically associated with 
those patterns. I produced five types of hypotheses: 1) on the conditions making possible 
structural retrenchment by institutional displacement; 2) on the conditions determining the 
frustration of structural reforms by displacement; 3) on the conditions that determine partial 
structural reforms leading to a fragmentation of the system by structural layering; 4) on the 
necessary conditions for structural expansion; 5) on sufficient conditions for the reversion of 
structural reforms. 
I suggested that structural retrenchment by displacement necessarily required the 
combined exogenous impacts of an authoritarian regime and a debt crisis associated with 
hyperinflation. This hypothesis was disconfirmed by reforms occurring both in the absence of 
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hyperinflation (Mexico), and of authoritarianism (Bolivia). The possibility of a sufficient impact 
of crisis with hyperinflation would require the exclusion of the Brazilian 1991 frustrated pension 
reform as irrelevant. I briefly insinuated in the respective section why that possibility could make 
sense. In any case, further in-depth exploration is required on the impact of the crisis on the 
balance of power between private and public components within the Brazilian financial system, 
and on the relationships between owners of liquid and non-liquid assets.  
Next I explored the conditions determining the political viability of different versions of 
structural reform. One hypothesis maintains that the combination of a legacy of corporatist 
intermediation with the presence of the main party benefiting from it in the opposition constitute 
a sufficient condition to frustrate any structural reform aiming to reduce the benefits of insiders. 
Evidence supporting the hypothesis is weak for two reasons. One is the retrenchment of the 
Venezuelan pension system approved in 1999 with Acción Democrática in the opposition; I 
provided some reasons why that case could be left aside. But then we have the problem of 
shortage of evidence. This results, first, by extended permanence in government of the parties 
considered in the hypothesis; and second, by a shortage of “negative observations.” I suggest two 
ways to improve on this situation. One is obtaining evidence of more initiatives discouraged in 
advance by a negative evaluation of the conditions hypothesized as sufficient for their 
frustration. The other is increasing the number of relevant cases by re-formulating the hypothesis 
in more general terms, to include more generally parties that count insiders threatened by the 
reform among their core constituencies. 
In any case, the most interesting consequences of corporatist legacies operates by 
defining the conditions under which structural retrenchment is possible, as well as the forms 
under which it is politically viable. The prediction here is that, with corporatist legacies, 
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structural retrenchment necessarily requires their main partisan beneficiary to govern, and can 
only take place through some mixed formula that segments the reach of retrenchment in order to 
protect or compensate corporatist constituencies. Evidence provided supports the hypothesis. 
Mixed structural reforms are also to be expected under systems with a different type of 
institutional legacy. Where incorporation was processed by the democratization of a by-partisan 
oligarchic system, mixed structural reform will require those parties to cooperate in a blame-
sharing strategy. This in turn has the presence of a significant challenge from a third party as a 
necessary condition. This hypothesis was confirmed by the pension reforms introduced by 
Colombia, Costa Rica and Uruguay in the mid-1990s. Combined, the last three hypotheses also 
support some more general conclusions about the relevance of legacies from the preceding 
critical juncture. First, the confirmation of their enduring causal effects. Second, that 
prolongation of effects, however, does not operate through necessary univocal correspondence 
between specific patterns of incorporation and specific types of welfare regime. Resemblance 
may be stronger between welfare systems having emerged from radically different patterns of 
incorporation. What those patterns determine is a commonality in terms of political conditions 
for reform and reform contents. 
I found structural expansion of systems of social protection to be, on the one hand, less 
demanding than initially hypothesized in terms of necessary conditions –which does not mean, 
however, that those conditions are more common. On the other hand, alternative sets of 
conditions exist that can lead to the same outcome. I have identified two paths. One is based on 
the existence of institutional mechanisms making possible the concertation of interests (some 
sort of functional equivalent of a neocorporatist arrangement).  The other one is the 
combination of an embedded autonomous bureaucracy and a governing party capable of 
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articulating a coalition of insiders and outsiders. Regardless of the disconfirmation of the initial 
hypothesis, these results do confirm the more general intuition underlying it. Structural 
expansion requires institutional environments favoring the action of brokers, needed to 
compensate the collective action problems of outsiders and favor the articulation of their 
interests with those of insiders.  
Finally, I explored the conditions determining the reversibility of a significant fraction of 
structural reforms. The results led me to discard the hypothesis explaining such outcomes based 
on the attributes of specific political processes leading to the reform in each case. The subsequent 
discussion led me to reconsider systemic variables, and to propose as an alternative hypothesis 
the centrality of what I am reluctant to call state capacity. 
The next chapter consists of a series of process-tracing based analyses that aim to 
reconstruct the concrete causal mechanisms underlying the regularities confirmed in this one.  
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7.0  TRACING PROCESSES OF WELFARE REFORM 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter has two central goals. First, the identification of causal mechanisms eventually 
explaining the associations that resulted from the QCA practiced in chapter 5. Second, the 
exploration of possible factors or mechanisms that might had been disregarded in the initial 
hypotheses. With that purpose, this introduction is followed by four sections. Section II analyzes 
the interactions between populist parties in government and official unions during the pension 
reforms experienced by Mexico under the PRI and by Argentina under Peronism in the 1990s. 
The focus of the respective narratives is on the combinations of carrots and sticks through which 
those parties attempt to obtain unions’ support, and the latter in turn press for compensations. 
Section III considers three experiences of structural expansion of healthcare systems, in Brazil, 
Costa Rica, and Uruguay. The focus here is in the paths that made possible the advancement of 
more inclusive and egalitarian policies against the resistance opposed by beneficiaries of 
established schemes. Throughout the exploration, I concentrate on two analytical points. One is 
the ways in which policy legacies shape both the constellations of actors opposing reform and 
their power resources, thus setting parameters for viable reformist strategies. The second one is 
the articulation between interest groups, political parties, and bureaucratic teams.  
176 
 
Section IV analyses processes of pension reform in the same three cases studied in 
section III. These episodes are inspected in less detail; its main purpose is an exploratory  use as 
ancillary cases, aiming to detect differences across policy areas worth pursuing in future 
research. 
Section V discusses the chapter’s main conclusions, which can be summarized as 
follows. First, the confirmation of the resiliency of policy legacies as determinants of subsequent 
paths of policy change. Second, the configuration of inter-party competition is essential to 
explain the strategies and timing chosen by parties depending on constituencies of insiders, when 
pressed to reform existing social policy arrangements against the interests of those insiders. 
Third, pressures from below orchestrated by organized interests of insiders show important 
levels of efficacy in the blockage of reforms aiming to expand coverage and equality. Pressure 
from organized coalitions of outsiders is far less common and powerful. Outsiders are to a 
greater extent dependent on “external” agents for the articulation of their interests. Fourth, in the 
context of high fragmentation of interests and frequent absence of hegemonic actors that 
characterizes Latin American politics, bureaucratic actors are frequently crucial for the 
articulation of reforms. As a result, the bureaucratic field tends to become the central arena in the 
definition of the contents of reforms and the configuration of policies. Fifth, partly as a 
consequence of the resilience of policy constituencies, partly resulting from the centrality of 
bureaucratic arenas, partly because of the collective action problems of reformist forces, 
institutional renewal by displacement tends to be extremely difficult. That being the case, 
institutional transformation tends to take place through patchwork and layering. Finally, the 
importance –admittedly variable, and never self-sufficient- of a component of political 
craftsmanship that seems very resistant to theoretical modeling.  
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7.2 PARTY, STATE AND PRESSURE GROUPS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
CORPORATIST LEGACIES 
7.2.1 The Mexican pension reform (1990-1995) 
Raúl Madrid has written that “The move toward pension privatization responded not so much to 
the long-term problems of the Mexican social security system as it did to the more immediate 
and serious macroeconomic problems that the country faced. Policymakers advocated pension 
privatization in large part because they believed that it would boost the country’s domestic 
savings rate, thereby reducing the country’s vulnerability to cutoffs of foreign capital (Madrid 
2003).” The statement is correct, but it runs the risk of oversimplifying the process leading to 
pension privatization. Actually, the fine analysis provided by Fabio Bertranou reveals that there 
was nothing necessary or self-evident in the linkage between Mexico’s shortage of capital and 
the diagnosis that identified pension privatization as its hypothetical solution (Bertranou 1995, 
Bertranou 1998). Instead, his reconstruction presents this result as the result of a confrontation of 
political strategies in a scenario determined by three elements: the problems of the social security 
system, the availability of a model based on the Chilean experience, and the development of the 
private financial sector. 
Although the pensions paid by the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS) were not 
on average particularly generous –although they could be for a few privileged occupational 
categories- financial problems emerged relatively early. They came from a combination that we 
should already find familiar. First, the deterioration of the system’s dependency ratio. This is 
consequence of factors operating on both of his components: on the one hand, the effect of 
178 
 
population aging on the volume of benefits to cover; on the other hand, the impact of the 
stagnation of formal employment. In addition to these structural factors of system maturation, we 
also find more contingent ones. One is the failure of successive administrations to increase the 
level of mandatory contributions (Brachet-Márquez 2007b, Dion 2010, Madrid 2003). Another is 
the high level of evasion by employers. Finally, the diversion of funds from the pension system 
to subsidize the infrastructure of the IMSS national healthcare network (Brooks 2009).The 
combined result was an acceleration of the formation of bottlenecks that other systems, in spite 
of their wider coverage, took longer to develop. 
Although its first pension programs for civil servants and diplomats date from the mid-
nineteenth century, Mexico ranks among the “second generation” of developers of social security 
schemes. The core of its system developed between 1925 and 1953, with a gradual expansion of 
coverage and benefits between 1954 and 1973 (Mesa-Lago 1978). It shared the pattern of 
fragmented incorporation of different occupational categories, oriented to ensure labor 
quiescence in the key sectors of the economy (Madrid 2003). In accordance with the peculiar 
combination of authoritarianism and corporatist representation that characterized the Mexican 
political system during the key period of expansion of social security programs, eventual 
tensions between government, business associations and unions were handled by the former with 
“a combination of appeasement and repression,” that allowed the participation of corporative 
representatives in the supervision and administration of the system (Madrid 2003). The 
expansion of the system was shaped by an accumulation of federal laws and decrees and state 
laws –often modified several times-, that gave birth and regulated more than a dozen separate 
sub-systems at the federal level and a myriad of state-level ones, without any agency that 
provided comprehensive planning or coordination (Mesa-Lago 1978). Services, benefits and the 
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requirements to gain access to them were distributed across occupational categories and 
geographic regions in a way that generated important inequalities, with low-income groups 
working in non-strategic activities and workers in poorly unionized sectors being the worst 
covered (Brachet-Márquez 2007b, Dion 2010, Mesa-Lago 1978). Later economic development 
delayed the appearance of problems due to maturation154. By the early nineties, however, some 
problems became more apparent due to the combined effects of the low level of contributions 
and financial decisions concerning the investment of funds accumulated in the last years, 
generating protests from the National Unified Movement of Retirees (Madrid 2003).  
The emergence and consolidation of new stakeholders in the financial sector was directly 
stimulated by financial crises. In 1976, a first balance of payments crisis induced some financial 
liberalization, but a boom of oil revenue allowed a quick recovery from the loss of international 
reserves and devaluation, and also stimulated a drastic expansion of banking lending. The 1982 
crisis was a different story, with widening current account deficits, massive capital flight, and a 
drastic withdrawal of foreign financial support. Although the initial response was an increase in 
government intervention that included the nationalization of banks, the incoming De La Madrid 
administration initiated the removal of controls. Further balance of payments difficulties in 1988, 
and negotiations toward the formation of NAFTA, stimulated the process, leading to the re-
privatization of nationalized banks and the de-regulation and opening to foreign competition of 
the domestic financial market (Bulmer-Thomas 2003). 
                                                 
154 By the end of the 1960s total social security expenditures represented 3% of GDP, the average ratio between active 
and passive insured was 15.2:1, and the system covered 23.7% of the economically active population (Mesa-Lago 1978). 
Still twenty years later, the system’s numbers ranked well within the regional context: in 1986, total spending of the social 
security system was 2.7% of the GDP and showed a surplus equaling 0.2% of it -in the same year, the deficits of 
Argentina and Uruguay were 0.7 and 2.2 of respective  GDPs. The coverage had then climbed to 53% of the 
economically active population (Mesa-Lago 1994); the actives-passives rate was7:1 (Bertranou 1998). 
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This general trend towards opening was complicated and shaped by conflicts internal to 
the financial sector, between the traditional financial oligarchy (banqueros) and a new type of 
financial entrepreneurs operating in the Mexican Stock Exchange (bolseros) that started to 
emerge in the 1960s. The debt crisis was an opportunity for the strengthening of the position of 
the bolseros, who were best positioned to benefit from business niches created by the 
liberalization of international capital market transactions (Minushkin 2002). The nationalization 
of banks accentuated the redistribution of power within the sub-sector, and consolidated an 
alliance between the bolseros and the upper ranks of the governmental technocrats dealing with 
the regulation of the sector. During the Salinas administration, the coalition was strengthened, 
shaping the timing and sequence of an opening that closely met the preferences of the bolseros. 
The results of both the re-privatization of banks and the final stages of financial liberalization 
accentuated the transference of economic power in favor of this sub-sector155. 
The share of non-bank assets in the Mexican financial market grew exponentially 
between the last years of the López Portillo government and the following administration –that 
included Petricioli as Finance Minister-. Ownership concentrated in a small number of firms, 
consolidating a “new financial elite” that further expanded its power acquiring and controlling 
stock in financial and industrial companies, thus intertwining its interests with some strategic 
ones in the export-oriented sector of the economy.156 Coordination between bolseros and policy-
                                                 
155 Interactions between financial and political power throughout this process are revealing. The 1976 crisis provided the 
stimulus for the López Portillo administration to foster the development of a modern, independent securities industry 
that could provide the basis for an alliance to counterbalance the power of banqueros.  In the process, Gustavo Petricioli, 
president of the National Securities Commission, played a key role not only through the design of a series of reforms of 
the regulatory frame, but also by actively supporting the creation of the Mexican Stockbrokers Association (Maxfield 
1991; Minushkin, 2002). 
156 See (Heredia 1995, Minushkin 2002). 
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makers became even closer from the beginning of the Salinas administration. Analysts of the 
Stockbrokers Association gained direct participation in the writing of initial drafts of different 
laws directly affecting the interests of bolseros. In 1990, the governmental decision to use the 
Bolsa as the means through which all remaining state-owned firms would be privatized 
“guaranteed the casas de bolsa revenues from the privatization program.” It also “opened the 
door for the bolseros to purchase banks once the privatization process began, using their casas de 
bolsa as the basis for forming financial groups and to finance bank purchases (Minushkin 
2002).” This gave a decisive impulse to the consolidation of a new type of conglomerate157.  
The reshaping of the financial sector has been mentioned among the direct antecedents of 
the privatization of the Mexican pension system. Control of mobile assets turned the restructured 
financial sector into an essential ally for the government. Ideological affinity with the 
technocratic teams inside the institutions controlling monetary policy facilitated fluid 
communication. According to Bertranou, the Mexican Association of Stockbrokers had “tried 
[…] to administer directly the pension funds of the private firms and pressed the government to 
make it obligatory to create those supplementary pension funds on the part of the private firms 
that would consequently dominate an emerging and very lucrative market.” In 1990, when the 
financial problems of the social security system brought its reform into the governmental agenda, 
the Commission on Pension funds of the Association prepared a project for privatization along 
the lines of the Chilean model. The project was sent to both the Bank of Mexico and the 
Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público. These institutions were put in charge of the 
coordination of the Pension Stabilization Program, created in early 1990, and began to promote 
                                                 
157 Heredia (1995: 202) observed that “Most of the major banks sold by the government in 1991 were bought by 
financial groups whose economic power at the end of the 1970s was negligible.” 
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the Chilean solution. The linkage between pension reform and the problem of scarcity of national 
internal savings was thus installed in the public debate (Bertranou 1998).   
The ideological and programmatic cohesiveness developed through those networks was 
also a precious resource at the moment of engaging in competence for bureaucratic spaces. 
Beginning with de la Madrid’s arrival to the Presidency in 1982, presidents themselves brought 
to the stage a new type of technocrat, with valuable connections at the very top of the system 
(Camp 1995, 2002). Still, the circulation of influence across policy domains was not automatic. 
In order to tighten their grip on social policy-making, the new technocrats had to progress step 
by step. In conjunction with the Brokers Association, the Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito 
Público and the Bank of Mexico –explicitly supported by the presidency- promoted a new 
perspective on the social security system. Its difficulties were reconstructed as public problems, 
through new conceptual lenses. A formal redistribution of power among institutions followed 
once projects for structural reform gained steam and found strong resistance from top and mid-
level bureaucratic sectors in the Instituto Mexicano de Seguridad Social (IMSS). Both the IMSS 
and the Secretaría de Trabajo y Previsión Social were withdrawn from the process of design of 
reforms, and displaced to the role of presidential representatives during subsequent negotiations 
with unions (Bertranou 1998: 90; Mesa-Lago and Muller 2002: 692).  More and more, the 
problems of low national savings rates and the financial difficulties of the IMSS were tied in the 
official discourse and the public debate (Bertranou 1995).  
By the end of 1990, the government had put together a preliminary proposal. The project 
included the creation of a privately managed complementary pension system, which would 
gradually absorb contributions to the IMSS up to the latter’s complete privatization. The 
proposal was only, and very discreetly, presented to the IMSS authorities and to the Unión Social 
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de Empresarios Mexicanos (USEM). Not surprisingly, the latter gave its blessing and the former 
manifested frontal opposition to the privatization.  
By mid-1991, the government had prepared a more elaborate version that further 
specified the details of its proposal. It did not make this one public either, but it presented it to 
the Congreso del Trabajo158. In the best PRI tradition of corporatist negotiation, the CT’s strong 
negative reaction was also expressed behind closed doors (Bertranou 1995, Maceira and Murillo 
2001, Madrid 2003). Bertranou synthesizes the unions’ approach in four points. First, the defense 
of the social protection network. Second, the separation of the problem of the financial viability 
of the IMSS from the internal savings one. Third, the linkage of the problems of social security 
and structural unemployment. Fourth, the centrality of the social protection system for the 
preservation of the corporatist arrangement on which the Mexican political system rested. In 
Bertranou’s words, “What government and unions debate in this initial stage is a certain image of 
the game and its basic rules. […] According to the government, the financial sector is part of the 
decision (and of the general organization of the game) […], according to the unions, however, 
this sector has no legitimate part in the game (Bertranou 1995; my translation).” 
The unions’ veto led the Salinas administration to withdraw this second version, but not 
the idea of the creation of a complementary system. The new formula for it included none of the 
amendments the CTM had suggested. It was based on the funding of individual capitalization 
accounts with contributions from employers, and their management by the banking sector. It also 
introduced a new element in the bargain: the inclusion in the new Sistema de Ahorro de Retiro 
(SAR) of the employers’ contributions to the workers’ housing fund (INFONAVIT). The unions 
                                                 
158 The Congreso del Trabajo was the space of coordination of all the union federations integrated in the official system of 
interest representation. 
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flatly rejected this new version. The bargain entered a stalemate that the government broke  by 
combining the courting of some of the unions competing with the CTM with a couple of threats 
–namely, the incarceration of union members who were not up to date with their taxes, and the 
flexibilization of labor legislation (Bertranou 1995). With the votes of the PRI’s tightly 
controlled legislative majority, the creation of the SAR was rubber-stamped in congress at the 
beginning of 1992. As Madrid correctly synthesizes, the creation of the SAR did not involve 
privatization, but neither did it solve the financial strangulation of the IMSS. During the last year 
of the Salinas administration, the general deterioration of the country’s economic situation 
worsened the problems of the IMSS (Brachet-Márquez 2007a). 
The technocratic cadres of the ministries of Finance and Commerce continued lobbying 
for a radical pension reform. According to testimonies collected by Brooks, the Zedillo 
administration introduced an important tactical turn. Reformist technocratic cadres concluded 
from the experience under Salinas that “arguments had to be made at an institutional level 
(Brooks 2009).” Also essential were the conclusions that, according to Brooks, the architects of 
the reform extracted from a failed state-level experience of replication of the strategy of the 
Chilean dictatorship. In the state of Nuevo León, the quick approval by the state legislature of the 
privatization of the state’s civil servants’ pension system was followed by a vigorous 
mobilization led by the teachers’ union. The vertically well-integrated organization of the peak 
national federation of public employees mobilized support from outside the state for the Nueva 
León unions. Central among the protesters’ complaints was the attempt to recognize the rights 
acquired by workers who had been contributing to the public system through the creation of a 
“recognition bond.” For the reformers working at the federal level, Brooks writes, “the lessons of 
this reform debacle were clear: They had to ‘leave aside technical reality’ and work within the 
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realm of citizens’ perceptions of the issue. Regardless of the actuarial fairness of the recognition 
bonds, they reasoned, the perception that such a bond was politically unfair meant that pension 
privatization would only be viable if it rested on the perceptible protection of acquired rights 
(Brooks 2009).” Work on the public perception of the reform would be necessary. The goal was 
to present changes as imposed by the situation of the IMSS –which was actually complicated but 
not critical-, and necessary for the preservation of the acquired rights of contributors to the 
system. Also important was to detach the perception of privatization from the extremely negative 
image of the financial sector, accentuated by the last chapter of a chain of financial crises. 
Focus was then placed on the situation of the IMSS. Particularly consequential would be 
the penetration of its bureaucracy by a reduced team of technocrats appointed and coordinated by 
a member of the presidential economic team. Several authors agree on the importance of 
“horizontal networks among like-minded technocrats [that] allowed the change team at the IMSS 
to continue to have access to information, knowledge and policy advice from the Finance 
Ministry (González Rossetti 2004).”159 Immediately after becoming president, in December of 
1994, Ernesto Zedillo required a comprehensive study evaluating the actuarial situation and 
perspectives of the IMSS. The results were available –but not immediately made public- in early 
1995. The government then presented a series of projections –as Brooks remarks, “unverifiable 
for ordinary citizens”- raising concerns about the financial sustainability of the IMSS in the long 
term. This was in turn associated with the continuity of the nationalism and solidarity principles 
that were the “permanent” legacy of the Mexican Revolution. Privatization, the official argument 
                                                 
159 The value of the assets provided by those networks in terms of political support, coordination and information 
became especially apparent when the IMSS director made an attempt to counter-attack by replicating the strategy 
through the creation of an alternative change team linked to the IMSS (the CEDESS). Lacking not only ideological and 
programmatic cohesiveness, but also direct linkages with the key ministries, the CEDESS team failed to transform the 
institution “from a think tank into a change team (González Rossetti 2004).” See also (Bertranou 1995, Madrid 2003). 
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went, although certainly entailing the swallowing of a “bitter pill,” was also a way to break the 
dependence from foreign capital that had been at the root of the peso crisis. The center of gravity 
of the debate was thus displaced from the intrinsic fairness of the reform itself to its soundness as 
a path for the restoration of a sound general macroeconomic situation. The Economic Cabinet 
appointed a technical committee with the task of formulating a new proposal for reform. 
The presidential committee worked throughout 1995, arriving at a formula that closely 
followed the Chilean blueprint, and was presented to congress in November. The projected 
system established more stringent conditions for retirement, and mandated current contributors to 
the IMSS to displace their deposits to individual retirement accounts, to be administrated by the 
new Administradoras de Fondos de Retiro (AFOREs). It is important to remember, before 
analyzing the political dimensions of the final stage of the process, a basic condition of 
possibility of a sweeping privatization. The short age, limited development, modest benefits, and 
narrow coverage of the Mexican pension system kept the financial cost of the transition low 
(Madrid 2003).  
The management of opposition was mainly an internal matter for the PRI, which could 
count on the enthusiastic support of the business community and the tacit acceptance of the PAN, 
whose ambiguous position responded to tactical considerations, not to disconformity with 
privatization. In any case, the opposition parties did not control enough seats to block approval in 
the legislature. The very limited coverage of the system being reformed set relatively narrow 
limits for the mobilization of pensioners. The most important opposition came from unions, and 
the government managed it with a combination of carrots, sticks, and divide-and-conquer.  The 
essential fact was that the unions’ depended too heavily on the state, and enjoyed too 
comfortable an insertion in its corporatist structures, to risk it in an open confrontation (Collier 
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1992, Middlebrook 1995, Zapata 1993). Besides, working-class organizations in general had 
been since the previous decade suffering the joint consequences of economic crises and the 
secular transformations of the economic structure (Zapata 1995). Last but not least, we should 
not forget the divisions of the official labor movement itself (Murillo 2001). From the very start, 
the government had prudently chosen to exempt the Instituto de la Seguridad Social al Servicio 
de los Trabajadores del Estado (ISSSTE) from the reform, thus eschewing costly confrontations 
with the powerful unions of public employees and teachers, and with the armed forces (Madrid 
2003).160 A group of unions that were part of the PRI’s syndical core –the Sindicato de 
Trabajadores de la Seguridad Social among them- attempted a rebellion through the constitution 
of a Frente de Defensa de la Seguridad Social. In the end, however, governmental pressure and a 
few concessions that did not touch the core of the reform were sufficient to turn the SSNTSS’ 
opposition into support (Madrid 2003). 
7.2.2 Pension reform in Argentina (1992-1994) 
The Argentinean pension reform was considerably more arduous than the Mexican one. A priori, 
its feasibility was enhanced by the far more serious actuarial situation; however, a considerably 
more extended coverage not only entailed higher transition costs, but also a more extended 
potential coalition of insiders. While the Zedillo administration had to deal with the discredit of 
its predecessor’s attempt to revise the PRI’s ideological tradition, the hyperinflationary chaos 
that ended the Alfonsín administration gave Menem a window of opportunity to attempt a radical 
                                                 
160 This in spite of the fact that the actuarial situation of the ISSSTE was considerably worse than the one of the IMSS 
(Mesa-Lago 1989). 
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rupture with the Peronist tradition. He thus pursued a linkage strategy that integrated the reform 
of the pension system in a wider, encompassing movement of privatization.  
Like the PRI, the peronists in government could build on a legacy of corporatist 
structures providing organic connections with predominant hegemonic labor organizations. 
However, Peronism was internally more fragmented, and its loyal unions had maintained in the 
immediately previous years considerably higher levels of mobilization. Acquiescence was thus 
harder to obtain for the Menem administration, which could neither count on its own 
congressional majority. The legislative arena thus had a centrality in the Argentine case that it 
lacked in Mexico. The Mexican government was far more capable of containing the process 
within the boundaries of the bureaucracy –where, paradoxically, it faced a more challenging 
situation. In fact, both governments followed to a great extent parallel strategies, based on the 
penetration of the administrative structures of the respective social security institutions with 
teams of market-oriented economists directly controlled by Finance and Economy ministries. 
However, the discredit of the IMSS was considerably less advanced, and by-passing the 
established bureaucracy was more difficult for the Mexican reformers. Their Argentinean peers 
found that task easier, but were in turn forced to make participation in the design of the reform 
accessible for stakeholders to a greater extent. More important, opposition forces were far more 
successful in Argentina at taking the conflict from behind closed doors and making it more 
contentious. In the end, this lead to an equation of compensations for insiders that affected the 
core of the reform –something that did not happen in Mexico. On the other hand, we should not 
forget that Mexican reformers had been more proactive, with a preemptive strategy that from the 
beginning segmented the part of the system targeted by reformers, to avoid confrontation with 
the most powerful branch of the labor movement. 
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The structure and actuarial situation of the pension system were in the Argentine case far 
more inimical to any project of full privatization. Argentina had one of the oldest systems of the 
region, with extended coverage and a very generous equation of benefits and conditions for 
retirement.161 But at the same time, and partially for the same reasons, it presented one of the 
most critical actuarial balances.162A deep reform then was not only necessary, but also urgent, 
already in the 1980s; however, the costs of a hypothetical sweeping transition to a pure private 
system would have been astronomical.  
The frontal opposition of Peronist unions that from very early on marked the limits for 
the Alfonsín administration minimized drastically the political viability of any structural revision 
of the system by the Radical president. The treatment of the problem by the Alfonsín 
administration thus combined growing transfers from the federal treasury and the delay of the 
indexation of benefits. The gigantic toll taken by hyperinflation on pensions’ purchasing power 
stimulated a massive series of lawsuits that indebted the government to more than four million 
pensioners. In 1986, the president declared the system in a “state of emergency.”163  
In 1991, Walter Schultness, an international expert with a solid reputation was appointed 
at the Secretaría de Previsión Social –hierarchically subordinated to the Ministry of Labor- by 
minister of the Economy Domingo Cavallo. Schultess’ instructions included the formation of a 
pension reform team. Clearly inclined towards a Chilean-type solution, Schultness did not 
                                                 
161 At the moment of reform, legal retirement ages were 50 and 55 for women and men, respectively. The connection 
between total individual contributions and pension benefits was a relatively loose one, since only the last 10 years 
previous to retirement were taking into account for the calculation of benefits (Müller 2003). 
162 See (Alonso 2000, Isuani and San Martino 1998, Kay 1999, Madrid 2003, Mesa-Lago 1991b, Müller 2003). 
163 See (Brooks 2009, Mesa-Lago and Müller 2002, Müller 2003). 
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include social security experts from the established sectorial bureaucracy in this team, 
monopolized by economists with preferences resembling his own. Following the finalization of 
multiple studies and evaluations of the situation of the system, the public debate on pension 
reform began in 1992.  
Although the reform team was in general reluctant to share information on the march of 
its work, the mobilization of diverse interest groups had already began by the time the executive 
presented a first draft to congress in mid-1992. At that time, the Chilean blueprint was reaching 
the peak of its influence in the region, and the general situation of the Argentinean economy 
seemed to put optimum leverage in the hands of the international financial agencies that 
promoted it.164 From early on in the process, stakeholders made their positions clear. The 
financial sector and diverse voices from business organizations publicly manifested their support 
for privatization. When Schultness commented that compensations for previous contributions to 
workers below 45 did not form part of the government’s plans, protest instantly erupted, and 
unions and pensioners organizations expressed distrust for the Chilean model.165 Almost from 
the beginning, discussions with the participation of the government, political parties in the 
opposition, unions and other organizations of stakeholders, developed based on an agreement on 
the need to maintain the total contribution rates and the level of employers’ contributions (Mesa-
Lago and Müller 2002). 
                                                 
164 Argentina signed in 1992 an Extended Fund Facility agreement with the IMF that included a commitment to legislate 
a structural pension reform by 1993. The inclusion of conditionality was suggested by the Menem administration as an 
element to increase pressure on congress to pass the necessary legislation (Müller 2003). 
165 See (Alonso 2000, Brooks 2009, Madrid 2003, Mesa-Lago and Müller 2002, Müller 2003). 
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The government initially proposed a mixed system. It would be based on a public 
component guaranteeing a basic pension, and a pillar based on individual capitalization funds, 
designed according to the Chilean pattern. At the time of submitting the project, Menem offered 
a “package deal” guaranteeing full paid statutory benefits for pensioners, provided that the laws 
on pension reform and on the privatization of the state-owned oil company were approved 
“without touching a comma.”166 All insured under age 45 would be forced to switch to the new 
system. 
The “package deal-strategy” did not work. The reactions of interest groups aligned 
consistently with the already expressed positions. The financial sector and other business groups 
showed enthusiasm for the signaling of a solid commitment to market-oriented reforms. 
Pensioners, trade unions, opposition parties, and some sections of the governing party objected to 
several aspects. Targets of criticism ranged from the disappearance of the principle of inter-
generational solidarity, to the exclusively private administration proposed for the new tier –quite 
understandable during the recent record of the Argentinean banking system. Objections also 
focused on the loss of acquired rights and the high administrative costs of the private pillar.  
The intensity of protests persuaded the government to withdraw and revise the proposal. 
A second one followed in August 1992 that included a compensatory to secure acquired rights, 
and the obligation for all active insured workers to switch to the new system. The Peronist CGT 
called a general strike. However, the possibility of turning trade unions into stakeholders through 
the creation and administration of their own pension funds entered tripartite discussions with 
                                                 
166 See (Müller 2003, Torre and Gerchunoff 1999). 
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government and employers held in the meantime.167 Still, the absence of several Peronist 
legislators from a decisive vote on this second formula put pressure to obtain the creation of a 
pension fund administered by Banco Nación. The incorporation of choice for all the insured, 
regardless of age, between public and mixed system, still required further pressure. The Radical 
party threatened blocking the law although further modifications were included. Protests were 
being weekly staged by dissident unions and pensioners’ organizations, which also initiated the 
recollection of signatures to call a plebiscite on the reform –they collected 1.3 million (Müller 
2003). A new round of modifications made possible the approval by congress of a new formula 
in June 1993. A Peronist majority guaranteed approval in the Senate in September.  
The process ending in the final approval of the creation of a mixed system took 15 
months. Current contributors would be free to choose among the public and the mixed system.168 
A “compensatory benefit” would be granted to those who chose to enter the latter, and an 
“additional” one to those staying in the former. Unions, cooperatives, mutual aid associations, 
and banks, were authorized to manage complementary pension funds (Alonso 2000, Hujo 2004). 
                                                 
167 On the evolution of negotiations and the successive strategies, see (Alonso 1998, 2000, Müller 2003, Torre and 
Gerchunoff 1999). The strategy of buying support with the distribution of dividends from privatization was not 
completely new, since the precedent already existed of some unions’ participation in the benefits of the privatization of 
the respective state-owned enterprises (Murillo 2001). 
168 However, workers failing to make a timely choice  would by default be enrolled in the private system (Brooks 2009). 
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7.3 THE POLITICS OF STRUCTURAL EXPANSION 
7.3.1 Healthcare reform in Costa Rica (1988 – 1998) 
Costa Rica arrived at the 1980s with a public unified health care system. A single public 
institution had a monopoly of health insurance, and the state was by far the main provider of 
curative and preventive services. This had important consequences for the distribution of power 
among the usual stakeholders found in healthcare systems. In the late 1990s, over 90% of Costa 
Rican doctors worked for the state, although approximately a third of them had also private 
practices. There were also 6 small private hospitals.169 
The Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social (CCSS) is one of the multiple “semi-
autonomous” entities forming part of the Costa Rican state. The status of “semi-autonomy” 
implies a budget independent from that of the central government –around the time of reform, 
the former equaled close to 25% of the latter. The CCSS has historically had a strong reputation 
as being an institution with a solid and highly centralized organizational structure, elevated levels 
of professionalization and technical expertise, and wide margins of autonomy in the definition of 
its policies.170 Although the Ministry of Health is in charge of the regulation of medical markets 
and responsible for health campaigns and the monitoring of water and food quality, it lost any 
control on the administration of public hospitals in 1973. The separation between CCSS and 
                                                 
169 See hospitals (Clark 2004, Martínez Franzoni 1998).  
170 A 2001 law guaranteed the CCSS’s independence from the budgetary supervision and control of the finance ministry. 
Its policies are directed by a tripartite board. Employer and worker  organizations choose their representatives, while the 
president’s cabinet picks the government’s ones (Clark 2004). 
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Ministry of Health was not just institutional; they pursued independent agendas, with almost no 
coordination. 
The problems at the root of initiatives of reform in the late 1980s and early 1990s were 
those typical of mature health care systems in countries having made their transition to a 
“developed” demographic model. Funding having fallen behind rising costs, the deterioration of 
installations –especially in regional hospitals-, the obsolescence of equipment, and doctors’ 
declining productivity, began to have an impact on the quality of services. The long waiting lists 
and emerging inequalities in coverage led to corrupt practices, through which users attempted to 
bypass the system’s bottlenecks. Tax evasion by employers and unpaid contributions from the 
central administration further complicated the financial situation of the CCSS. The rigidity of the 
organization’s bureaucratic traditions and administrative techniques added a managerial deficit 
that contributed to inefficiency (Clark 2004). However, the expansive wave of the reforms of the 
1970s lasted well into the 1980s, and it took almost the whole decade, until the interruption of 
sustained economic growth and a general crisis of the model of development combined with this 
constellation of difficulties. During the administration of Rodrigo Carazo (1978-1982), debate on 
health policy would remain confined to specific aspects of the existing system (Martínez 
Franzoni 1998). 
Criticisms gravitated around the still-ongoing accommodation of private interests to the 
unification of the system, focusing on the tensions between preventive and curative services and 
on the bureaucratic rigidities of the CCSS. According to Martínez, although the debate was 
basically a continuation of the one around the universalization of social security in the previous 
decade, the public legitimacy of the system and the solidity of its bureaucratic core precluded 
any formulation of open criticisms. In consequence, Carazo’s modest initiatives did not target the 
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CCSS, but the Ministry of Public Health and the network of community-based centers of primary 
care. The governing Unity Coalition attempted a deepening of grassroots participation by 
replacing the community organizations closely associated with the PLN with new Unidades de 
Participación Popular (McGuire 2010). The attempt to moderate top-down control by 
stimulating community involvement did not go too far though (Martínez Franzoni 1998). 
Moreover, the strategies of the most important pressure groups involved –namely, physicians 
with private practices and CCSS workers- aimed at accommodating and consolidating their 
positions within the existing system. The most striking aspect of those years, however, is the 
CCSS’ capacity to maintain itself out of the domain of legislative innovation, successfully 
exercising a veto power that guaranteed that changes could only succeed if discussed and 
processed within its organization.  
Although macroeconomic problems had kept increasing steadily by the time the PLN 
recovered the presidency with Luis Alberto Monge (1982-1986), the CCSS’ budgetary autonomy 
kept it out of the reach of the reductions on the budget of the central administration that affected 
the Ministry. Those cuts accentuated some of the problems of the system as a whole, leading its 
two centers of authority to sign a coordination agreement in order to avoid duplications and 
services overlapping. However, priority was given by both branches to the preservation of the 
respective jurisdictions and autonomy, thus keeping the division of labor between them basically 
intact. When an in-depth revision of the system oriented to the improvement of cost-efficiency 
reached the agenda, still under the Monge administration, it was due to the initiative of the 
CCSS. Criticisms tended them to concentrate on some deficiencies of the structural design of the 
system –particularly, on the absence of incentives to increase cost-effectiveness and on the 
curative bias. So, more and more in the second half of the decade, the preventive services 
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maintained within the orbit of the Ministry of Health began to be perceived as part of a solution 
for the long-term financial sustainability of the social security component. This resulted on 
further transferences of services to the CCSS –an important relief for the Ministry’s strangled 
budget. It is in these years that Martínez’s careful reconstruction identifies a turn towards “a new 
language revolving around notions of productivity, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness (Martínez 
Franzoni 1998).”  
Although a detailed analysis of the process is beyond the purposes of this section, the 
reactive capacity of the CCSS during these years is impressive. It was able to successfully block 
initiatives of reform initiated in Congress. At the same time, it had also the capacity to 
autonomously proceed with a series of measures that, by reducing expenditures, corrected and 
stabilized a delicate financial situation.171 In parallel, it created some limited opportunities for the 
accommodation of the private interests of physicians. But most striking is its preemptive 
capacity, expressed in a series of pilot programs. Among them were some that, although 
absolutely marginal in the general equation of the agency’s services, took the initiative in the 
introduction of a “public-private mix” in the delivery of services.  Particularly consequential 
would be in this sense the creation of the first medical cooperatives, that began to operate 
between 1988 and 1990,  as providers of services to be contracted by the CCSS (Marín 1990). 
Thus, when the discussion of formulas for the reorganization of health services started to 
gravitate around the paradigm of incorporation of private providers of services, a blueprint was 
already available that largely set the terms of the debate. 
                                                 
171 For detailed descriptions and analysis, see (Güendell 1987, Martínez Franzoni 1998, Trejos and Güendell 1994). 
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Experimentation and piecemeal innovation played an important role smoothing the 
transition into the very different environment that framed the discussion of sectorial policy 
reforms in the 1990s. In turn, for those experiences to work in that direction, the continuity of a 
cohesive technobureaucracy that made their accumulation as institutional learning possible was 
essential. It is in that sense remarkable that the cycle of healthcare reforms has been in Costa 
Rica almost totally in the hands of career functionaries, with very marginal participation of ad-
hoc technical teams.  
The independence of technobureaucratic teams did not mean political isolation. Equally 
important, the “political embeddedness” of the top positions of the CCSS included the two main 
parties. Thus, once articulated, the reforms negotiated among experts could count on a supra-
partisan consensus. Notice, in this regard, that during the 1990s healthcare reform had two 
pivotal moments-1988-1991 and 1994-1998- that respectively correspond to administrations of 
the PLN and the PUSC. While the chronological proximity suggests the possibility of 
considering them as consecutive stages of an encompassing reform cycle, a first glance at the 
contents leads exactly in the opposite direction. While the first wave concentrated on 
strengthening the private sector through decentralization and contracts with private providers, the 
second one was built around the introduction of competition in the public sector.172  
Should we then speak of serial institutional replacement? Quite the contrary. In spite of 
their differences, the second reform ended in some relevant aspects building upon the results of 
the previous one. But what is puzzling is that the respective predominant orientations were 
inverse to the ideological profiles of the respective parties in charge. Indeed, while the pro-
                                                 
172 For detailed descriptions of reform contents, see (Clark 2004, Martínez-Franzoni 1999, Mesa-Lago 2005, 2008). 
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market experiment took place under during the administration of the social-democratic PLN, the 
conservative PUC was the ruling party during the second one.  
The cohesiveness of the bureaucratic structure was relevant in yet another sense. I have 
already mentioned the timid move towards the development of a component of private providers. 
It resulted from a series of diverse experiments attempting to tackle the overcrowding of clinics 
and to increase cost-effectiveness. In 1988, the CCSS signed a contract putting the 
administration of an important clinic in the suburbs of San José in the hands of a private 
cooperative of doctors. The new model, an initiative of the top echelons of the CCSS and the 
Ministry of Health, did not win homogeneous support from the former’s technical cadres. The 
board of directors vetoed the possibility of extending it to other clinics. Although estimations of 
higher costs per patient were among the alleged reasons, concerns with the circumvention of 
established chains of command by private medical teams and loss of control over the delivery of 
services were central to the CCSS’s negative evaluation of the new solution (Clark 2004). When 
the government passed to the hands of the PUSC in 1990, very positive preliminary evaluations 
by external consultants stimulated the creation of two new cooperatives. The bureaucracy 
maintained an opposition that would end leading to a project with bi-partisan support that moved 
things exactly in the opposite direction. In the meantime, however, the CCSS did not sabotage 
the projects already in place –and this is highly remarkable. The agency’s experts expressed their 
opposition to the reform by questioning its long-term sustainability and compatibility with the 
system’s general orientation, not by blocking or sabotaging its execution (Martínez-Franzoni 
1999). 
Negotiations with the IADB and the World Bank initiated in the last year of the Calderón 
administration would result, already under the presidency of José Figueres Olsen (1994-1998), 
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on a loan agreement. It is important to mention, in first place, that the rotation of parties in power 
did not affect the continuity of the negotiations. Second, that bi-partisan negotiating teams of 
experts from the social insurance agency guaranteed the continuity of the process resulting in the 
loans. Third, that the institutional anchorage of the technical teams was also fundamental for the 
selective incorporation of external models to happen.   
It was the simultaneity of an outbreak of measles and employers’ complaints about 
having to pay for private doctor visits for their employees, that moved sectorial authorities of the 
Calderón administration (1990-4994) to initiate the discussion of reforms with experts from the 
World Bank. During those days, the World Bank, strongly influenced by the Chilean experience, 
backed a model of health care reform that emphasized decentralization and the separation of the 
purchaser and provider roles. Costa Rican experts –predominantly from the CCSS- had strong 
reservations about this paradigm, and from the beginning frontally rejected any model based on 
the creation of private health insurers. The formula that finally made the loan agreement possible 
was a compromise one. It included the modernization of payment collection technology and the 
separation of roles suggested by the WB. However, separation would take place within a system 
entirely remaining in the hands of the CCSS, which would purchase services from its own 
operational units. The idea was that improvements in terms of efficiency would result from 
competition for contracts among public providers. Costa Rican negotiators also obtained the 
inclusion of a plan to drastically restructure the primary care system based on the creation of 
Equipos Básicos de Atención Integral de Salud (EBAIS). This last component aimed at 
correcting a territorial distribution of primary care services that did not match regional variations 
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in demographic density, through the creation of integral healthcare teams distributed on a 
capitation basis.173  
To explain such a final mixed result, entailing a very selective choice from the 
international agencies’ menu, it is essential to observe that, by the time negotiations began, Costa 
Rican experts had already initiated an independent exploration of available foreign models. 
Indeed, institutional connections had allowed exchanges with experts from the British healthcare 
system in the second half of the 1980s. Previous institutional relations of cooperation with 
Sweden were also important when in 1991-92 the Costa Rican technical elites looked to expand 
the range of choices beyond the regional hegemony of the Chilean paradigm.174 It is also 
important to consider the management by reformist teams of their connections beyond political 
parties. Although the process included instances of dialogue with stakeholders, this only 
happened once the projects were rounded up. Contacts to present the plan to unions and 
physicians’ professional organizations did not initiate until 1993, when terms of agreement with 
lending institutions were fully defined.175  
Other sources of opposition were managed through watering the reform down in the 
implementation stage. According to Clark, those aspects of the reform that involved changes in 
                                                 
173 The World Bank had initially rejected the idea of each EBAIS being headed by a doctor, arguing that it would make 
the program financially unsustainable. Costa Rican experts insisted, counting on the suppression of duplication through 
the absorption by the CCSS of functions provided by the Ministry of Health to compensate for the increase in costs. 
174 According to Martínez, experts working on plans for reform repeatedly travelled to Spain and Sweden during those 
years (Martínez-Franzoni 1999). 
175 Three were the main concerns of unions and doctors’ professional organizations. First, the possibility of a split or 
privatization of the CCSS. Second, the modalities under which the medical personnel of the Ministry of Health would be 
transferred to the CCSS. Third, what doctors saw as a devaluation of their professional practice –the Colegio de Médicos 
criticized the idea of the EBAIS arguing that with them doctors would end practicing not medicine, but public health. 
Reassurance was provided against the possibility of privatizations, and the conditions under which employees from the 
Ministry of Health would be transferred were carefully negotiated with unions. Backed by the presidential candidate of 
the PLN, then in the opposition, the agreement then received unanimous approval in the legislature. 
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the administrative routines and accounting methods of the CCSS were deliberately put in very 
vague terms in the agreement. This in turn made it possible to considerably slow down the de-
concentration of decision-making and the transition to independent management and financial 
accountability far more gradual and receptive to the objection of the CCSS bureaucracy. 
7.3.2 Healthcare reform in Uruguay (2005 – 2007) 
The Uruguayan healthcare system consists on an institutional complex that, in spite of its very 
transparent limitations, proved extremely difficult to reform. As a recent survey observes, most 
of its main components were already in place in the early decades of last century, and the scarce 
significant institutional changes until very recently had been introduced during periods of 
authoritarian rule (Fuentes 2011). Since the return of democracy, unsuccessful attempts were 
made by different administrations, and what makes that situation especially paradoxical is the 
extended consensus among circles of experts and the political elite around the need to reform the 
system. 
To a great extent, that persistent blockade resulted from the density of a web connecting 
multiple private actors with veto capacity, who interacted at many levels with a state that had 
very limited regulatory powers in the sector. Two were from very early on the main components: 
a private one, made of private mutual insurance funds,176 that covered upper and middle classes; 
                                                 
176 The oldest of these non-profit instituciones de atención médica colectiva (IAMCs) date from the mid-19th century, and were 
created by communities of immigrants as funds of mutual aid. The model –which resembles the original foundations of 
the French one- was replicated throughout the subsequent century by new waves of immigrants, and by diverse unions, 
corporations, and religious entities. The resulting sui generis situation was that, contrary to the predominant Latin 
American pattern, by the late 20th century the proportion of Uruguayan population covered by the private sub-system 
was larger than the one using public services. Of course, what was by no means atypical was the extremely fragmentation 
of a system with multiple “special regimes” and crossed by inequalities. 
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and a public one, for those who could not afford private services. With the passing of time, the 
coverage of the private subsystem had extended to the point of including some sectors of the 
working class. Throughout the last four decades of the 20th century, the viability of the private 
subsystem became increasingly dependent on public subsidies. The state began subsidizing 
mutual funds and the health-care costs of civil servants in the 1960s; a subsequent stage entailed 
the extension of subsidies to employees in the private sector; finally, in the early 1980s, formal 
agricultural and domestic workers obtained access to mutual insurance (Filgueira and Alegre 
2009). 
The military dictatorship (1973-1984) introduced an important institutional innovation 
when it consolidated the multiple social insurance health funds to put them under the centralized 
authority of the Dirección de Servicios de Salud del Estado (DISSE, which in turn constituted a 
branch of new Dirección General de la Seguridad Social (DGSS). Administration of health 
insurance was put in the hands of the Banco de Previsión Social (BPS), using the already 
established structure of pension administration to collect health taxes and paying IAMCs a flat 
per-capita rate defined by the administrative authority. As a result of this reorganization, and 
particularly during times of economic crisis, transfers from the state to the private sector, based 
on contributions to social security, more and more become an essential condition for the 
financial survival of the private non-profit sector (Papadópulos 2012). The system was not only 
highly fragmented, but also extremely inefficient, among other things as a consequence of the 
combination of the poor management of IAMCs and the deficient capacity of a regulatory 
authority that was also a provider. 
With almost 1.5 million people privately insured, and around 1 million using the public 
subsystem, formal coverage had become close to universal by the end of the 20th century. 
203 
 
However, the implementation of a regime of co-payments aiming to alleviate the burden of state 
contributions probably contributed to restrict effective access, by driving a section of the 
population formally entitled to opt-out of the insurance system and use public services. On the 
other hand, the massive incorporation of new categories of workers began to exceed the 
infrastructural and financial capacity of mutual insurance companies to an extent than subsidies 
only partially compensated, leading to a decline in the quality of services. These problems were, 
of course, exacerbated by the universal trend of sustained increase of the costs of healthcare, 
accentuated by the premature ageing of the Uruguayan demographic structure (Pereira, Gelber, 
and Monteiro 2005 ). 
The general deterioration of the services provided by the sector of mutual insurance 
determined exit on both extremes. At the bottom, it began to overcrowd the installations of the 
public subsystem. At the top, it resulted in the development of two additional tiers. First, a 
number of private “medical emergency units” appeared as an alternative of the slowness and 
inefficiency of non-residential services provided by mutual companies. These services were 
mainly purchased by middle and upper classes as a complement to enrollment in one of those 
companies. More recently, a fourth tier began to expand at the top, made of for-profit medical 
insurance plans. Finally, the contraction of formal employment unavoidably narrowed the 
financial base of the central private component, dependent as it was on out-of-pocket payments 
and contributions to social security.177 Thus, by the end of the century, the system was burdened 
by strong inequalities affecting the infrastructure, quality of services, and medical salaries across 
                                                 
177 Membership in this component went from 1.5 million to 1.3 million between 1990 and 2004 (Pereira, Gelber, and 
Monteiro 2005 ). 
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sub-sectors;178 high co-payments for medicines and exams; overcrowded centers of assistance; 
and a strong bias towards curative medicine as opposed to primary care and prevention.179 
There was no shortage of initiatives of reform since the return to democratic rule. During 
the first Sanguinetti administration (1985-1989), two projects presented to the parliament for the 
creation of a national unified healthcare system were rejected. A third project, approved in 1986, 
that attempted a modest administrative rationalization of the system, strengthened the authority 
of the Ministry of Public Health, and introduced some degree of centralization, had only partial 
implementation with the creation of the Administración de Servicios de Salud del Estado 
(ASSE). The main concrete transformation was the creation of the Administración de Seguros de 
Salud del Estado (ASS).   During the Lacalle administration (1990-1994), a new initiative, in this 
case based on the model then promoted by the World Bank, was rejected. In 1999, Moraes and 
Filgueira summarized the situation after yet another failed reform in these terms: “The problem 
now faced by the health care system, is that the mutual aid societies system is in as deep 
financial trouble as before, and quality suffers as a consequence. Also the public system is said to 
be understaffed, inefficient and with inadequate financial resources. All this is coupled with 
increased expenditure. One of the major reasons why [the 1995] reform failed can be traced back 
to this configuration and to the type of solutions that were being sought. Health care reform was 
not about expanding coverage, it was about cutting costs and limiting transfers to the private 
system (Moraes and Filgueira 1999).” 
                                                 
178 Differences were also important between Montevideo and the rest of the country. In 2006, while in the capital the 
percentages of the population using the private and public subsystems were 57.6 and 38.4, the proportion for the rest of 
the country was almost exactly inverse -38.3 and 59.2 % respectively. As for the composition of spending on healthcare, 
the private sector received 74.64 % and the public one 25.36% (Fuentes 2011).  
179 See  (Busquets 1995, Fuentes 2011, Papadópulos 2012). 
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Although the focus of this section is on the successful 2005 reform, the frustration of the 
one attempted by the second Sanguinetti administration (1994-1999) merits a few observations 
on its main bottlenecks, since they suggest where to look for the keys of the 2005 success. What 
makes the 1995 episode especially striking, is the fact that the same administration that failed at 
reforming healthcare could, counting on an unusually solid and stable coalition of the two 
traditional parties, introduce important reforms in the pensions and public systems (Filgueira and 
Alegre 2009). Put in few words, the central problem was the inadequacy of the “disembedding” 
political strategy chosen in order to cope with a sectorial configuration of powerful veto players. 
All around the world, the power of medical corporations is among the crucial bottlenecks 
for almost any healthcare reform.180 In Uruguay, as opposed, for example, to the Costa Rican 
case, that power can count on a limited dependence on the state budget, and on the fact that 
physicians, on top of being service providers, are employers and run all components of the 
system.181 In 1995, minister of Public Health Alfredo Solari –a member of the medical elite 
himself- chose to challenge the interests of the corporation securing support neither from a 
coalition of potential winners, nor from the legislature. Since the core of the reform, as Moraes 
and Filgueira observe, was not an expansion of coverage, potential winners were disperse and 
                                                 
180 On this, see, for example, (Immergut 1992). 
181 “It is not rare to see one doctor holding leading positions in a mutual aid society, a public hospital, and a council on 
state health policies or the health program of social insurance (Moraes and Filgueira 1999).” The corporate interests of 
the medical profession are represented by three organizations. The Sindicato Médico del Uruguay (SMU) represents mainly 
physicians resident in the capital, but it also runs its own mutual aid institution, which is the country´s largest provider of 
medical services. The Federación Médica del Interior (FEMI) represents physicians from the rest of the country, and has 
the same double role of union and entrepreneurial organization, since it controls 23 local mutual aid institutions. Finally, 
the Sociedad Anestésico-Quirúrgica (SAQ) split from the SMU, and represents the professionals of a  group of medical 
specialties (like anesthesiologists) with considerable pressure capacity, their reduced size notwithstanding. The 
representation of non-medical healthcare workers is split between two unions –the Federación de Funcionarios de la Salud 
Pública (FFSP) and the Federación Uruguaya de la Salud (FUS), corresponding to public and private sector respectively. See 
also (Fuentes 2011). 
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not directly identifiable.182 In that context, the minister’s strategy was virtually suicidal. First, the 
project was articulated by an ad-hoc team of experts, without consulting or incorporating 
stakeholders to the process of elaboration. Second, once work in such a narrow policy 
environment was complete, presentation to interest groups took place, but no feed-back from 
those exchanges was transformed in inputs by modifying the original project. Third, no 
systematic attempt was made to secure parliamentary support –something that stakeholders 
opposing the reform actively did. Crucially, some of the proposed changes frontally clashed with 
the interests of the federation of the mutual aid schemes operating outside the capital, whose 
members had dense direct access to congressmen representing the respective areas.183 
Additionally, changes aiming to increase the efficiency of non-medical workers also alienated 
support from the respective unions, which had direct linkages with the left-wing opposition. 
Ironically, the reform introduced during the first administration by the Frente Amplio (FA) in 
2005, would have many points of contact with the one projected by Solari, but the political 
strategy was completely different. 
To some extent, the 2005-07 reform benefitted from the conjunctural impulse of the 2002 
economic crisis, which led several providers to bankruptcy and closure, accentuated the 
                                                 
182 The reform aimed at the reinforcement of the coordinating and regulatory authority of the MSP; the decentralization 
of the system by increasing the autonomy of ASSE and of the management of hospitals; focalization of state subsidies in 
order to reach the neediest sections of the population; strengthening of the competitive capacity of public hospitals vi-á-
vis private ones; and a gradual process of elevation of salaries of public sector physicians, in order to level them with the 
ones paid in private institutions. The key innovation, however, was the idea of allowing the insured population to chose 
between IAMCs and a system of communal hospitals resulting from the decentralization of ASSE and provided with 
diverse competitive advantages, like the elimination of co-payments for medicines. 
183 The main sources of opposition from private entities had to do with the reduction of public subsidies and the 
strengthening of competition from public hospitals. Fuentes reminds us that the medical profession has in Uruguay 
historically counted a non-negligible direct representation by legislators who were physicians themselves, constituting a 
sort of “internal lobby” that operated across partisan divisions (Fuentes 2011); see also the interviews with legislators 
quoted by (Pribble 2013). 
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migration towards the public sector, and forced an increase in co-payments. Notice how the crisis 
induced a process of de facto transformation that resembles the one Jacob Hacker identified in 
the case of the United States’ social security system, and that he presents as an example of policy 
drift (Hacker 2005). Without any change in institutional structures, and in spite of the continuity 
of providers and services –or, perhaps more accurately, partly because of it- a drastic change in 
the environment induced displacements that altered the balance between the system’s private and 
public components. This ended precipitating an implicit consensus around the idea that 
“something needed to be done” with the healthcare system. Of course, consensus about what the 
“something” should be was not even implicit. However, the succession of failed reforms at least 
had at least produced a sedimentation of ideas about what it could not be. 
The reform created a Sistema Integrado de Salud (SIS) that maintained the presence of 
two sub-systems. Subsisting fragmentation notwithstanding, systemic institutional coherence was 
considerably increased by the creation of a national health board (the Junta Nacional de Salud, 
JUNASA), and of a consolidated national fund (Fondo Nacional de Salud, FONASA).184 Also, 
while provision of services in the public sector was decentralized, the regulatory capacities of the 
MSP were considerably increased. At the same time that the role of private providers –mainly 
IAMCs- was consolidated, there was a reduction of out-of-pocket expenses through the increase 
of financial resources from general revenue and social security contributions. This made possible 
an important extension of coverage, to include one of the most vulnerable populations –namely, 
                                                 
184 The fund is built with mandatory tripartite contributions collected by the social security authority, which reimburses 
providers for the services consumed by the respective users. Contributions are calculated based on workers’ salaries. The 
law also mandates the gradual incorporation of pensioners, and it allows the insured to choose between public and 
private providers. There is also the possibility of a complementary payment based on performance, as an incentive for 
providers to increase some quality indicators. Management of the fund is in the hands of JUNASA, a decentralized 
board in the orbit of the Ministry of Public Health that includes representatives from the ministries of Health and 
Finance, from the BPS, and from providers, users and workers. 
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that of children and teen-agers, who access the system through the respective insured household 
heads. However, it also sets some limits –access remains contingent upon formal employment.185  
There are several important elements of continuity with the pre-reform system. The first 
and probably most consequential one, is the preservation of the non-profit institutions of 
collective medical attention. The idea of creating a fully public system was defeated very early 
on during the Frente Amplio’s internal programmatic discussion. It was clear for the vast 
majority of experts and stakeholders, that the structure was too tightly organized around the 
network of non-profit private providers, and that these entities enjoyed a wide legitimacy among 
the population (Fuentes 2013).186 Second, the role of the social security system as the main 
entrance to the healthcare system was preserved. Third, the still clear bias toward curative 
attention was barely affected.187 From an institutional point of view, then, there was an important 
degree of innovation, but not of displacement; it would not be completely accurate, however, to 
speak about layering. 
Guillermo Fuentes’ careful analysis shows that the final design was within the parameters 
of Frente Amplio’s program, but also entailed important changes resulting from the need to 
compromise with different stakeholders. This in turn was part of a purposive process of 
consensus-building that incorporated input from diverse actors to the final elaboration of the 
reform. The general programmatic lineages were already to a great extent in tune with proposals 
                                                 
185 This is the reason why several policy-makers have insisted in the importance of the linkages between the healthcare 
reform, tax system reform, and the expansion of social security coverage by incorporating domestic and self-employed 
workers (Papadópulos 2012). 
186 Of course, the same factor operated also in the opposite direction: at no point, during any of the previous 
administrations, the hypothesis of a full privatization was considered. In other words, a robust policy legacy ended 
operating as a centripetal factor, that de facto narrows down the menu of reform options actors may consider politically 
feasible, despite of wider ideological differences. 
187 See (Papadópulos 2012, Pribble 2013). 
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elaborated by the peak labor unions’ federation and by the SMU. This was not accidental. 
Fuentes clearly identified the existence of a “reformist coalition” that pre-dated the 2004 
election. Including experts, representatives of non-medical workers’ unions, and members of 
medical organizations ideologically close to the Frente Amplio, it participated in the definition of 
master lineages for a reform during the elaboration of a program to campaign on. Crucially, this 
team did not start from scratch, but tried to build as much as possible upon existing proposals 
and studies produced or ordered by diverse stakeholders. Important technical input was also 
provided by experts from CINVE, a think tank that had produced several sectorial studies, 
evaluations and proposals, and that provided an important number of the experts for the new 
administration.188 
Leaving aside substantive contents, four decisions were important for the deactivation of 
potential sources of opposition. First, the creation of a Consejo Consultivo, that provided an 
institutional space for the participation of private providers and diverse civil society 
organizations. The government avoided the presentation of a proposal with conclusive 
definitions, save for a few very general lines, trying to obtain a consensus to which all 
participants could feel to have contributed. It is important to notice, however, that such a strategy 
was not exempt from risks –it provided participants with a new potential veto point.189 Second, 
there was a decision to avoid by-passing the structure of the Ministry of Public Health. The 
ministry became the institutional locus of the direction of the reform, and its technical teams 
were involved in the stages of policy-design; the new JUNASA was placed within its orbit. This 
                                                 
188 Particularly important was that the main responsible for the articulation of the political and technical aspects of the 
reform was Daniel Olesker, an economist who had been director of the Instituto Cuesta Duarte, the CNT’s think tank, 
and in that role had advised unions in the elaboration of their proposals for reform. 
189 Cfr. (Fuentes 2013, Pribble 2013) 
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not only worked as a successful preemptive strategy; it also provided a channel for the 
incorporation to the process of a significant capital of institutional learning accumulated through 
almost three decades of attempted reforms. Third, there was an analogous choice for the BPS to 
be in charge of the fund, and for the social security system to be the main entrance to the SIS. A 
different solution would have resulted in a huge drainage of resources from the BPS, most likely 
leading to alienate the support of the social insurance bureaucracy. Finally, exceptions were 
made for the private insurance companies in the mandate to allow the participation of 
representatives of workers and customers in the direction –companies had frontally rejected such 
participationas “interference in the management of private business (Fuentes 2011).” 
It is important not to forget, on the other hand, that the full consequences and 
implications of some of those decisions would only become completely transparent through the 
implementation of the reform. For example, Fuentes observes that, through their participation in 
the Consejo Consultivo, private entities pressed for and obtained their inclusion in the JUNASA 
–that is, the agent of regulation, which periodically evaluates the fulfillment of standards of 
attention by providers. In other words, the actors to be regulated have direct participation in the 
authority meant to regulate them (Fuentes 2013). What makes this particularly important, is the 
fact that, critical as it is, the moment of formal approval of the legal framework that sets the 
parameters for the reform at a “macro” level is far from being “all” the reform. This is more 
complex that a simple distinction between “approval” and “execution.” Some components of the 
institutional transformation –typically, the decentralization of the administration and 
management- are effectively defined through the process of implementation. This creates 
opportunities for actors controlling critical resources to delay or distort the reform in the mid-
term, without having to pay the price of a frontal opposition in the “foundational” conjuncture. 
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This in turn points at the importance of decisions about the sequencing of different components 
of reforms. In this case, the government’s choice was to give chronological precedence to the 
financial dimension. This to some extent had to do with the situation of bankruptcy or acute 
financial emergency faced by several IAMCs, and constituted a very powerful incentive for their 
engagement in the process. However, it came associated with the deferring of changes in 
management and the provision of services. Thus, the real transformative reach of the reform 
remains to a great extent uncertain.190 
Finally, I want to point to the process through which the financial architecture was 
decided. It entailed friction between the team managing the reform from the Ministry of Public 
Health and the economic team. The crucial observation is that it could have had a different 
definition, had the governing party had less solid connections with unions and other social 
organizations. In this sense, the comparison between the Chilean and Uruguayan healthcare 
reforms developed by Jennifer Pribble is very revealing. In both cases, bottlenecks emerged as a 
result of disagreements between economic and social policy-makers. In the Chilean case, the 
electoral-professional organization of the Socialist Party provided social policy-makers no 
leverage vis-á-vis the economic team. In the Uruguayan case, the mobilizational structure of the 
governing party produced direct connections with grassroots organizations that ended deciding 
the tug of war against the preferences of the economic team (Pribble 2013).   
                                                 
190 In this respect, see the interview to former health minister, Alfredo Solari, extensively quoted by Fuentes (Fuentes 
2013). 
212 
 
7.3.3 Healthcare reform in Brazil 
Among the three cases reviewed in this section, the Brazilian healthcare reform is the one that 
gets closer to what we usually describe as a bottom-up dynamics –that is, a process of change 
that is the direct result of mobilization of civil society groups. Precisely for that reason, however, 
it also confirms the centrality of bureaucratic structures and technical teams operating from 
within the bureaucracy –and of the paths for the penetration of those spaces from below.  
The formation of a unified healthcare system in Brazil was the result of a double process 
of expansion of coverage and decentralization of service provision. That process, although 
gradual and progressing incrementally along three decades, to a great extent expanded the 
transformative potential of a brief conjuncture of institutional discontinuity. Indeed, the 
constitutional reform of 1988 represented a turning point in the foundational principles of the 
Brazilian welfare regime . However, that is necessarily only a part of the story. If there is 
something Latin America has never had reason to worry about, that is shortage of constitutional 
reforms including extensive declarations of foundational principles. If the 1988 reform ended 
crystallizing as a turning point, that resulted from subsequent political agency that put that 
window of opportunity to good use. The Movimiento Sanitarista (MS), which operated as a 
“subversive elite” (Falleti 2010) is the crucial actor of that story. However, not even in 
conjunctures of drastic institutional transformation can political agency count on a tabula rasa, 
and it is precisely the complexity and rigidity of the background of policy legacies with which 
the reform had to work that makes this story interesting. The universalization of healthcare could 
only happen in Brazil through important institutional ruptures, yet these ruptures were introduced 
in an incremental way. 
213 
 
That having been said, the complexity and multiplicity of layers in the policy legacies 
that defined the playing field for the reform also has to be underscored. If Brazil had gone 
through one of the most robust attempts at incorporation through a state reorganized on 
corporatist bases, it also subsequently had one of the military dictatorships most consistently 
productive in terms of institutional discontinuities. Its relationship with the legacy of varguismo, 
however, was in many areas a contradictory one, and so was, as a result, its impact on the 
welfare regime. What the military did pursue consistently, however, was the expansion of the 
coverage and penetration of the Brazilian state. They thus provided a structure that, if infiltrated 
by reformist forces, could constitute a powerful instrument for reform. 
In Brazil, provision of health care services took place, until the 1960s, by means of three 
subsystems –private, public, and social security. Social security was the most important. It had 
consolidated, under Vargas, in the form of a typical Bismarckian structure, organized in multiple 
Institutos de Aposentadorias e Pensoes (IAPs) corresponding to the fragmented incorporation of 
different professional categories. Funded with mandatory contributions of employers and 
employees, the IAPs provided diverse packages of services, either through their own networks –
in the case of the richest institutes-, or through contracts with the private sector. Social security 
was not only marked by inequalities resulting from the highly stratified menu of special regimes; 
it was also very limited in coverage -7.4% of the total population in 1960 (Malloy 1979).  The 
network managed by the Ministry of Health constituted a completely separate structure, confined 
to preventive and chronic care, and split in several units and programs that operated with a 
complete lack of coordination. The private sector consisted mainly of physicians that exercised 
the profession independently and collected payment directly (Falleti 2010, Lobato and Burlandy 
2000). 
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The numerically most important categories excluded from social insurance –rural 
workers, urban informally-, under-, or self-employed- were also politically excluded. Until 1958, 
requirements of literacy precluded a vast majority among them from enjoying voting rights, 
which in turn made them irrelevant as potential constituencies to court through eventual 
expansions of coverage. The case was quite the opposite with the privileged insured minorities, 
integrated in powerful coalitions of interests with state-sponsored unions, politicians, and the 
bureaucratic cadres of the respective IAPs. Projects for the rationalization of the system by 
homogenizing insurance regimes –including one by Vargas, frustrated by a coalition of 
bureaucrats and unions in 1945- did not prosper until the law that, in 1960, introduced the 
standardization of benefits. Organizational and financial fragmentation, however, remained 
untouched until 1964.  
Throughout its many years of duration, the military dictatorship introduced a series of 
important changes. They began in 1964, with the unification of all the social security institutes 
under the Instituto Nacional de Previdência Social (INPS), and the replacement of the politically 
embedded and clientelistic bureaucracies of the IAPs with cadres with a technocratic profile 
(Malloy 1979). In 1971, it extended healthcare and social security coverage to the unemployed, 
the self-employed, and rural workers, through the creation of a Fundo de Assistência ao 
Trabalhador Rural (FUNRURAL). Funding for the new program would come from taxes on 
agricultural wholesalers and urban firms’ payrolls (Malloy 1977a). The importance of 
FUNRURAL, as several scholars have noticed 191 goes beyond its immediate political effects and 
the limitations of the benefits it initially granted. From the perspective of the foundational 
                                                 
191 See(Falleti 2010, Lobato and Burlandy 2000, Malloy 1979, McGuire 2010, Weyland 1996a).  
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principles of the welfare regime, it was the first rupture with the contributory principle on which 
the social security system had up to that point been built.192 
Subsequent reforms, however, introduced new forms of institutional fragmentation. In 
1974, responsibility for the provision of medical care to workers covered by the social security 
system became competence of the new Ministry of Social Security and Social Assistance. The 
Ministry of Health, in turn, kept the responsibility for the development and coordination of a 
national health policy. It also remained in charge of preventive medicine, a network of hospitals 
for the treatment of chronic disease, and a network of basic health care services covering some of 
the poorest areas. In 1977, a new reform created the Sistema Nacional de Prêvidencia Médica e 
Asssistência Social (SINPAS), split the pensions and healthcare subsystems, and placed the latter 
under the direction of the Instituto Nacional de Asssistência Médica de Prêvidencia Social 
(INAMPS), created as part of the SINPAS (Lobato and Burlandy 2000).  
Within that institutional frame, the healthcare system consolidated the profile that the 
movement of reform would aim to transform in the 1980s and 1990s. Its defining attributes, 
according to Lobato and Burlandy, were: centralization, institutional dualism, orientation to the 
transference of resources to private providers, limited coverage, and regressive financing (Lobato 
and Burlandy 2000). The distribution of authority, resources, and management responsibilities 
followed in general a trend of concentration in the hands of the central government, detrimental 
to the budgetary and administrative authority of state governorships and local administrations. 
The bi-cephalic structure progressively operated in the direction of a drainage of resources from 
the Ministry of Health to the one in charge of social security, resulting in an important decline of 
                                                 
192 Of course, the political goals behind the reforms were by no means virtuous. If the unification of the social security 
system had its target in the political clout of unions, the creation of FUNRURAL simultaneously attempted to co-opt 
movements of rural workers, and to consolidate the presence of the state apparatus in the Northeast (Malloy 1979). 
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the latter’s investment in infrastructure and a general deterioration of its services. The system’s 
serious limitations notwithstanding, the population it covered expanded very quickly, at the pace 
of the country’s industrialization. The private healthcare sector was the main beneficiary of this 
expansion.193 The government exercised almost no control over the quality and orientation of the 
services that it contracted with private providers, more and more the predominant type of 
medical treatment tended to be curative, specialized, costly, and hospital-based (Lobato and 
Burlandy 2000). According to Falleti, the new INAMPS played a central role institutionalizing a 
model with such characteristics, with a spatial distribution biased toward the most profitable 
areas, thus becoming “the main channel for the transfer of public resources to the private sector 
(Falleti 2010).” 
The origins of the Movemento Sanitário (MS) are back in the days of the Goulart 
administration. Based on the principle of healthcare being a basic universal human right, the 
movement departed from the impossibility of analyzing or reforming services without a 
comprehensive consideration of the macro-structural socioeconomic environment in which they 
were provided. They thus emphasized the connections between social policy areas, and the 
dependence of healthcare results on decent housing, education, and employment. In more 
specific terms of healthcare policy in the narrow sense, their proposal had to pillars: preventive 
attention, and municipalization of service-provision. The 1964 military coup entailed an abrupt 
closure of any possibility of access to the state for the movement –which counted among its 
members a high proportion of militants of the Brazilian Communist Party. The sanitaristas then 
started to develop a strategy involving three parallel channels. First, in order to provide an 
                                                 
193 The proportion of hospital beds belonging to the private sector went from 14% to 73 % between 1969 and 1976 
(Lobato and Burlandy 2000). See also (McGuire 2010, Weyland 1995b). 
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environment for the discussion and diffusion of their proposals, they created the Centro 
Brasileiro de Estudos de Saúde (CEBES), and began to publish a journal (Saúde em Debate). 
Second, they decided to accept and occupy positions in the public bureaucracy whenever 
possible. Third, they lobbied congress.194 The conclusions of the Alma-Ata conference on basic 
health care, held in 1978, had an important effect in the sense of expanding attention on the 
sanitarista approach, and strengthening its legitimacy (Falleti 2010). 
There is general agreement on the importance of the federal organization of the Brazilian 
state for the success of the sanitarista strategy of infiltration, which proceeded from the bottom 
echelons of the administration, at a municipal level. The gradual apertura of the political game 
through the realization of elections, was also important, since it provided access to local 
administration to representatives of the opposition, who in turn facilitated the incorporation of 
professionals from the movement. Things were also facilitated by the fact that the movement’s 
first initiatives targeted the poorest and most peripheral areas of the country, and, based on basic 
and preventive medicine as they were, had very low cost. The first aspect made it acceptable to 
private providers; the second one caught the interest of politicians from those geographic areas, 
and made it attractive to the military (Weyland 1996a). However, the first important program, 
articulated in 1976, found the opposition of bureaucrats in the social security administration, 
concerned about the use of INAMPS resources. The Programa de Interiorização das Acões de 
Saúde e Sanejamento (PIASS) was co-designed by teams of sanitarista doctors from the Ministry 
                                                 
194 According to Weyland’s reconstruction, this strategic re-orientation was caused by the failure of the strategy of 
popular mobilization initially chosen by the movement. In Weyland’s words “They tried to gain a massive following in 
society, especially among the poor, whose needs they claimed to represent. This strategy of mobilization was not, 
however, very successful. Poverty made many of the poor concentrate on the needs of their families or neighborhoods. 
Clientelism strongly reinforced  their focus on small-scale demands, exacerbated divisions among them, and restricted 
support for a national-level movement (Weyland 1995b).” 
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of Health and the Instituto de Planejamento Econômico e Social. It consisted on the implantation 
of a network of small sanitary stations in areas of low population density (Falleti 2010). In three 
years, the program installed 1,250 posts in 700 municipalities of the Northeast and Minas 
Geraes, and served eight million people.  
Some operative aspects of the PIASS were particularly innovative, for example, the 
strategy of selecting and training members of the local population –in the vast majority of cases 
only having elementary education- as health agents (McGuire 2010). But the program also 
entailed a rupture with historical limitations and established practices of the sectorial 
bureaucracy.  According to Falleti, this impact worked in four main directions. First, it 
stimulated coordination among ministries. Second, it fostered vertical coordination among 
different levels of government (national, state, municipal), not only for funding purposes, but 
also in the implementation of the program. Third, it strengthened the position of state health 
secretaries, particularly in their recurrent tug of war with the federal social security bureaucracy. 
Fourth, it initiated a process that would lead to the formation of the Conselho Nacional de 
Secretários de Saúde, in 1982 (Falleti 2010).  
In spite of the accentuation of the opposition from the social security administration, the 
continuing deterioration of the financial situation of the system opened a new window of 
opportunity for sanitarismo. Many of the recommendations made by a presidential advisory 
board formed to discuss an encompassing healthcare reform pointed to the need to increase 
vertical coordination, in the direction anticipated by the PIASS. The appointment of Eleutério 
Rodriguez Neto as Planning Director provided an opportunity to inject elements of the 
alternative healthcare model in the program resulting from the proposal of the presidential 
commission. Rodriguez Neto successfully articulated a coalition of state secretaries of health as a 
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counterweight for the opposition within the INAMPS. The result were the Açoes Integradas de 
Saúde, which lead, among other changes, to an important process of decentralization. 
A key element in the strategy of sanitarismo, as the process of transition to democracy 
accelerated, was the linkage between the demand for recognition of health care as a universal 
right and the demand for democratization –or, perhaps more accurately, the universalization of 
healthcare as part of democratization (Lobato and Burlandy 2000). The penetration of the 
national bureaucratic apparatus made notorious progress with the initiation of a civilian 
administration (1985-1990).195 However, access of more members of the movement to positions 
of authority also stimulated the active opposition of the private sector. It is also important to 
acknowledge that the escalation of bureaucratic positions had a second, not so virtuous side. 
“This institutional penetration… also involved the sanitary movement in the vicissitudes of 
bureaucratic politics, which rages inside the Brazilian state. […] Members of the movement 
gained positions in different state agencies, which were often locked in long-standing 
bureaucratic rivalries over influence and resources. Trying to demonstrate good job performance 
and thus further their career prospects the new state officials soon absorbed the organizational 
interests of their agencies. In this way, they were drawn into ‘bureaucratic politics.’ This 
wrangling created tensions inside the sanitary movement and led to competing reform efforts 
(Weyland 1995b).” Interestingly, one of the most divisive conflicts followed organizational 
cleavages inside the bureaucracy –it was about whether the INAMPS should be put under the 
authority of the Health Ministry or the Social Security one.   
                                                 
195 According to Weyland, “While party politicians were appointed ministers, reform-minded experts had a strong voice 
in the second echelon (Weyland 1995b).” The following narrative of the conflict between reformist bureaucrats and 
private interests follows Weyland’s reconstruction (Weyland 1995a, b, 1996a). 
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Still, the deepest cleavage emerged between the new reformist authorities of the 
INAMPS and different sectors of the medical business. At its core was the former’s intention to 
transform the relationship with the latter from one of contractual agreement among equals, to one 
of subordination of the medical establishment to planning and supervision by public sectorial 
authority. After a cycle of frustrated negotiations, minister de Almeida Magalhães decided to cut 
the gordian knot by decree. Private operators’ rejection of the norm put the minister in a difficult 
position, since the public sector was held hostage by its need of private infrastructure to fulfill its 
obligations. In the context of a conflict that had escalated in political visibility, the realization in 
Brasilia of the 8th Conferência Nacional de Saúde, in 1986 represented a substantial step forward 
in the consolidation of the project of a single national health care system. With the participation 
of professional associations, political parties, and diverse organized sectors of civil society, the 
conference was organized by the Ministry of Health as a forum for the generation of inputs for 
public policy. Attendance to the conference and the activity of the multiple working teams 
revealed the density of the network weaved by the sanitaristas based on the extension of the 
PIASS and other programs. This did not discourage opposition from medical business, though –
actually, quite the contrary. It also made clear that support from reformist civil society 
organizations was not likely to alter the balance of power in any significant sense. Some 
members of the reformist movement began considering that dismantling the blockade required 
some agreement contingent upon them somehow scaling-down their goals. Magalhães then 
turned to state- and municipal-level bureaucracies for support, and introduced an unexpected turn 
in the conflict by abruptly deciding to start the decentralization of healthcare in 1987. 
Weyland’s hypothesis is that political conflicts among the left and the right wing of the 
governing PMDB need to be considered to make sense of this sudden turn. He contends that, 
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from Magalhães perspective, the transference of INAMPS to state governments was preferable to 
their placement under control by a Ministry of Health controlled by conservative PMDB 
politicians. The creation of the Sistema Unificado e Decentralizado de Saúde represented a threat 
for many powerful actors. It was, of course, resisted from within the INAMPS bureaucracy, but 
also by medical businesses enjoying a favorable position in the structure in place. 
Decentralization would also impact on the operation of patronage networks benefitting 
conservative politicians, and directly affect president Sarney´s loyal partisans in the Ministry of 
Health. Caught by surprise by the ministerial decision, its adversaries were nevertheless quick to 
recover. With presidential support, patronage-controlling politicians from the governing coalition 
pressed for the removal of several reformist leaders from top positions in the bureaucratic 
hierarchy –Magalhães himself resigned in mid-1987, and Sarney removed the reformist president 
of the INAMPS a few months later. The conservative counter-strike did not completely reverse 
the decentralization process, but certainly precluded it from developing into the drastic 
restructure intended by its promoters. It also diffused the political initiative of sanitaristas 
operating from within the government.  
The next round took place in the constitutional assembly. In a certain way, it very closely 
paralleled the previous one. The goals of the sanitaristas were advanced by their allies in the 
relevant constitutional committees, who obtained two things. First, the declaration of health a 
universal right. Second, he inclusion of a mandate for the integration of a decentralized unified 
healthcare system, which “would give priority to public facilities and contract private medical 
providers only as a last resort (Weyland 1995b).” That sufficed to trigger a conservative reaction 
that resulted in the watering-down of the projected mandate. Once again, the attempt to secure 
the most radical version of the reform by calling for popular support proved sterile: the gathering 
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of signatures to make a “people’s amendment” possible only collected 54,133.  Also once again, 
bureaucratic politics divided reformist forces, since sanitaristas holding positions in MPAS and 
INAMPS aligned with their respective agencies. Declaration of a universal citizen right to 
healthcare finally made its way into the new constitution, but definitions on the master lines of 
the future system meant to materialize the right were kept vague -although the role of the private 
sector was characterized as “supplementary.” The considerable latitude allowed by this final 
formula made it clear that at least one more decisive round would take place, around the content 
of a new health system law.  
If the scenario was new, the actors were exactly the same, although some of them had 
been further weakened. Neither the “pure” sanitaristas, nor the conservative legislative block 
representing business interests could craft a decisive majority. Reformist bureaucratic cadres 
were divided and efforts to mobilize popular support were sterile. The executive produced a draft 
meant to partially meet everybody’s aspirations. Although the formula resulting from 
negotiations among legislators had already diluted the transformative potential of the law, 
president Collor and his minister of health still found it threatening for their control of patronage 
resources, thus deciding to further dilute the law with a partial veto.196 Crucially, the law 
strangled the financial viability of the reform, by keeping its dependence on contributions to 
social security. By 1998, 51% of the population were buying healthcare services out of their 
pockets, 80% of doctors had their own practices, and 50% of hospitals served privately insured 
patients (Arretche 2004). A big part of the next round would take place inside the Executive. 
                                                 
196 The presidential veto affected 25 articles, mainly dealing with the closing of INAMPS, ear-marked resources for the 
Sistema Único de Saúde, and automatic transfers to municipalities. Instead, he fostered individually negotiated agreements 
with municipalities (Arretche 2004). 
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The main forces driving the evolution of the healthcare system during most of the 1990s 
was demand for services from middle and upper classes, from the employees of state-owned 
enterprises, and from the fractions of the working class that could count on well-organized 
unions. Fed by dissatisfaction with the quality of services provided by the public sector, that 
demand led the numbers of health insurance providers and of their clients to triple and double, 
respectively, between 1987 and 1998 (Arretche 2004). Regulation remained clearly 
underdeveloped during most of the same period. The Collor administration (1990-1992) 
successfully slowed decentralization, reinforcing to some extent federal control over 
municipalities, and significantly cut down federal health transfers. Defenders of the reform could 
only resort to the constitutional mandate, and for a while the debate tended to spin around the 
constitutionality of presidential decisions (Carvalho 2001).  
President Itamar Franco (1992-1994) restored some of the sanitaristas’ by picking one of 
them (Jamil Haddad) as his health minister. An important reversal towards decentralization then 
took place thanks to the active participation of experts from the Health Ministry and local health 
authorities in the Grupo Especial de Descentralização (GED). The GED had considerable 
impact through the production of a series of norms that secured the participation of local 
governments in the health policy-making process. The new norms diversified the options for 
states and municipalities to choose the conditions under which their responsibilities regarding 
healthcare would expand. This restored the dynamism of the decentralization process. Still, two 
powerful forces continued operating in the opposite direction. First, the limitations on the flux of 
financial resources favored by the subordination of the Ministry of Health to its Finance and 
Planning peers (Arretche 2004). Second, the administrative obstacles put by former officials of 
the INAMPS now operating from the Ministry of Health on the way of funds transfers. An 
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additional factor, which could operate in either direction, was the state governors’ position 
toward the decentralization process (Arretche 2004). 
Things turned more favorable for reform under Cardoso (1995-2002). First, minister 
Adib Jatene, working with stakeholders and municipal authorities, obtained a consensus around a 
new Norma Operativa Básica that consolidated a more participative policy-making process. 
Jatene’s margins for maneuvering, however, were decisively limited by his weakness vis-á-vis 
his colleague at the Ministry of Finance. The second fundamental change was the arrival, 
following Jatene´s resignation, of a successor with more political clout –José Serra. Serra had the 
occasion to test his muscle in 1998, when the creation of an Agência Nacional de Saúde 
Suplementar (ANS) triggered a struggle for its control between the Health and Finance ministries 
that ended with a victory for the former. The best indicator of the magnitude of the change was 
the increase in the participation of transferences to municipalities in the total budget of the 
Ministry of Health: from 1.7 to 24 % between 1993 and 1998. In 2000, a constitutional 
amendment consolidated the trend by specifying percentages of the respective budgets mandated 
to be spent on health care for all levels of government.197  
                                                 
197 Initiative of a legislator from the PT, the amendment was backed by a wide legislative coalition (McGuire 2010). 
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7.4 A QUICK GLANCE AT SOME ANCILLARY CASES 
7.4.1 Pension reform in Uruguay 
With origins going back to the 19th century, and being among the countries of the region that got 
closer to reaching universal coverage, the problems of the Uruguayan pension system were 
already apparent in the early 1970s. Although it was less fragmented than, for example, its 
Chilean equivalent, it suffered from very early on from the least favorable demographic 
dynamics of the region. As in the Argentinean case, the effects of an early demographic 
transition were compounded by extremely generous benefits and access conditions.198 Although 
funded with contributions from workers and employers, the system started to require transfers 
from the state treasury very early on. By 1983, 52.2 % of total public expenditure went to social 
security, and pensions constituted 90 % of total expenditure on social security.199 Still, structural 
pension reform only came after a decade of frustrated attempts. The accumulation of frustrated 
attempts during the two administrations immediately following the end of the dictatorship 
resembles what occurred with healthcare during the same period. However, blockage was in this 
case the accomplishment of a coalition of the left-wing opposition, the labor movement, and 
                                                 
198 Retirement benefits were calculated on the basis of the average income of the last three active years. Minimum 
retirement age was 55 and 60 for women and men respectively (Papadópulos 1992).  
199 See (Brooks 2009, Mesa-Lago 1978, Müller 2003, Papadópulos 1992, 2001). 
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pensioners’ organizations, in which the latter’s mobilization and sheer number played the most 
determinant role.200  
This quick revision only considers two aspects of the chain of frustrated attempts that 
finally ended with the 1994 reform that created a mixed system. The first one is the recurrence of 
strategies of blame-avoidance of the three main parties alternating in the opposition, all reluctant 
to participate in a reform with a potentially very high electoral cost, given the size of the 
constituency formed by insiders.201 The two traditional parties, Blancos and Colorados, had 
historically co-participated in the expansion of a system to whose problems both contributed 
through the inflation of benefits and clientelistic manipulation. In turn, the Frente Amplio was 
too dependent on the mobilizing capacity of the unions’ movement to risk frictions with some of 
the most powerful groups enjoying benefits from the system, which could compromise a steady 
process of electoral expansion. Significantly, although none of the parties was initially 
enthusiastic about the referendum proposed by pensioners’ organizations to incorporate the 
indexation of their pensions to the constitutional text, the three of them ended supporting it.202  
Pensioners’ mobilization consolidated during the first Sanguinetti administration (1985-
1989). In 1987, the government was able, after several concessions, to put together a minimal 
congressional coalition to pass a very modest parametric adjustment aiming to reduce the 
                                                 
200 Both the Frente Amplio and the peak unions’ federation initially opposed the universal indexation of retirement 
benefits demanded by pensioners’ organizations, but finally supported the referendum initiative that ended incorporating 
it to the constitution in 1989(Filgueira and Papadópulos 1997). 
201 The social security system covers 700.000 people, in a country with a total population of 3 million .(Moraes and 
Filgueira 1999). 
202 The amendment mandates the automatic increase of social security benefits, by the average raise of salaries in the 
national economy, each time public salaries are increased. 
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incidence of transfers to social security on fiscal deficit. The reform, however, included a new 
mechanism of indexation that triggered the initial efforts towards the organization of pensioners, 
that continued through the campaign of recollection of signatures to force a referendum. The 
referendum took place simultaneously with the 1989 national election, when the new indexation 
regime was approved with 82 % of the total vote. Such result triggered a fiscal crisis that pushed 
pension reform to the top of the agenda of the Lacalle administration (1990-1994). After a first 
frustrated project of parametric reform, two commissions –one political and the other technical- 
were formed, with participation of the four parties holding parliamentary representation. The two 
groups spent several months accumulating information and discussing multiple alternatives. 
However, when their work materialized in a governmental project that picked the alternative of a 
state-managed, defined-contribution system of individual accounts, sent to congress for 
consideration in early 1992, both the Colorados and the Frente Amplio denied their support.203 
The government then changed its strategy, and a few months later passed, counting of votes from 
the traditional party in the opposition, a parametric reform as part of the annual budget law. 
Pensioners’ associations and the peak unions’ federation called for a new plebiscite to declare the 
procedure unconstitutional. The initiative, supported by presidential candidates from all parties, 
collected 74 % of votes in the 1994 election. The Lacalle administration still accumulated two 
more failed attempts at parametric reform.204 
In the meantime, a consultancy agreed between the Ministry of Economy and Finance 
and the IADB analyzed different possible scenarios, concluding that the actuarial imbalances of 
                                                 
203 See (Filgueira and Papadópulos 1997, Müller 2003, Papadópulos 2001). 
204 (Kay 1999, Müller 2003, Papadópulos 2001). 
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the system made any possible parametric reform insufficient. The results were available in 1994, 
and had restricted circulation. Shortly afterwards, the results of the presidential election led Julio 
Sanguinetti to his second presidency, but also showed an electorate almost evenly split in thirds 
between the two traditional parties and the Frente Amplio. The challenge from the left provided a 
powerful incentive for cooperation between Blancos and Colorados, who agreed on a coalition 
that would guarantee a two-third’s majority in both chambers. Sanguinetti formed a new 
committee to study a pension reform in advance to the inauguration of his presidency, in March 
1995. Initially invited to join the group, the Frente Amplio divided internally around the issue 
and ended abandoning the committee. The project for the creation of a mixed system resulted 
from the three-month work of a bi-partisan commission of experts that did not open consultations 
with any organization of stakeholders. Some of them were given the opportunity of a hearing 
once the project was submitted by the executive for parliamentary consideration. With only 
marginal alterations, the legislative coalition of Colorados and Blancos transformed it into law in 
September (Papadópulos 2001). 
The design of the reform pre-emptively deactivated some potential sources of resistance, 
and aimed at fragmenting the opposition. Significantly, it not only maintained the mechanism of 
indexation introduced through the 1989 plebiscite, but extended it to the newly created second 
tier. It also preserved five privileged “special regimes.” Finally, it split the insured population in 
different sub-groups, according to age and income, and a mandated the creation of a public 
administrator of pension funds, that would compete with private ones.205   
                                                 
205 For a detailed description, see (Brooks 2009, Kay 1999, Müller 2003, Papadópulos 2001). 
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The second important question is why the same coalition that was able to make a pension 
reform failed to produce a healthcare one. Filgueira and Moraes have emphasized two aspects. 
First, the enabling importance of a “linkage strategy” that made the reform of social security the 
acid-test for the bi-partisan coalition as a new approach to the country’s governability problems. 
Second, the segmentation of losers, in order to make an encompassing coalition less likely 
(Moraes and Filgueira 1999). There is also a component of political craftsmanship that is highly 
contingent and resists modelling. The main broker operating behind the health care reform 
underestimated the role of political factors, believing in the absolute persuasive power of 
technically sound expertise. He made no attempt to engage stakeholders in the design of the 
reform, and took the legislative coalition for granted, ignoring the channels of access that 
members of the medical elite had to political parties. 
At a more general level, there are also processes of political learning that, if on the one 
hand take place embedded in concrete policy environments, are also to some extent 
generalizable. Veto coalitions only can manifest themselves through veto actions. It is always 
possible, of course, to identify in an institutional map certain points where legal attributions put 
those placed in the respective institutional position in position to exercise a veto. However, it is 
not possible to directly read the disposition to veto of a concrete player benefitting from that 
placement on the institutional map. In the end, effective exercise even of formally defined 
capacities to veto is an outcome of political entrepreneurship. Even more important –and 
interesting- is the fact that very often the most effective veto capacities are not built in the 
institutional structure, but produced through purposeful political action. If that is the case, if veto 
coalitions only fully manifest themselves through the actual exercise of their veto power, 
overcoming that power may to some extent contingent upon processes of political learning. The 
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reform of social security, has we have seen, arrived after a decade entailing multiple rounds of 
trial and error. Finally, we have factors of a structural nature, determining differences between 
both policy sectors. In first place, the old problem of the difficulties of to build coalitions of 
those potentially accessing future diffuse benefits against those confronting immediate 
concentrated and clearly identifiable losses. 
7.4.2 Pension reform in Costa Rica 
The parallelisms between the Uruguayan and Costa Rican welfare regimes have been remarked 
more than once. Even if considerably more recent in its development, by 1990 the latter also had 
wide coverage, enjoyed extended and robust legitimacy among the citizenry, and was fragmented 
in multiple special regimes corresponding to specific professional and occupational categories.206 
Other attributes are more idiosyncratic. First, the system of social protection more 
comprehensively developed under democratic conditions in the region. Second, a tradition of 
consensual policy-making. Third, a technically solid and autonomous sectorial bureaucracy 
enjoying high levels of legitimacy.  
The most recent cycle of pension reform included a structural one, that introduced a 
mixed system in 2000, and its adjustment in 2005. 207 As we will immediately see, there are good 
reasons to consider both episodes as stages of a comprehensive reform process that actually 
                                                 
206 As a whole, the public pension system covered 64.5 % and all salaried workers and 5 % of non-salaried workers in the 
early 1990s: the respective fractions were 56.8% and 21.7 % in 2004 (Martínez Franzoni 2008a). At the beginning of the 
1990s, the system included 19 special regimes that covered diverse privileged occupational categories. See (Martínez 
Franzoni 1998, 2008a, Mesa-Lago 2004, Mesa-Lago and Müller 2002, Sánchez-Ancochea and Martínez Franzoni 2013). 
207 The narrative that follows is based on (Mesa-Lago and Müller 2002). 
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began in 1996. The most striking aspect of the cycle, is the inclusiveness of the painstaking and 
protracted negotiations that lead to consensual solutions. These negotiations marked a very 
different pattern from the one followed by the healthcare reform of the 1990s. They were a direct 
result of an intense reaction from civil society organizations to the top-down strategy chosen by 
the authorities of the CCSS. As a result, the cadres of the CCSS lost political initiative during 
most of the phase of design. The other remarkable aspect of the process is the participation of the 
ILO, which not only played a role lubricating frictions between the CCSS and the concertation 
forum, but also assisted social organizations by filling the gap of expertise vis-á-vis the technical 
governmental cadres. 
During the Figueres Olsen administration of the PLN (1994-1998), and after a cycle of 
parametric reforms introduced between 1991 and 1995, in 1996 the CCSS abruptly introduced, 
after consultations restricted to employers, a set of important changes.208 The reaction from civil 
society was probably a joint result of the substance of the reform and the rupture with the 
consensual tradition through which it was introduced (Mesa-Lago and Müller 2002). In any case, 
organizations representative of diverse interests occupied the offices of the CCSS’ Board of 
Directors, and obtained the sine die suspension of the reform. An encompassing debate around 
the problems of the social security system followed throughout 1997. The debate revealed an 
important consensus on diagnostic and divergence around the desirable solutions. According to 
Mesa-Lago and Müller, seven proposals for a reform, ranging from parametric adjustment to 
substitution of a private system, were presented between late 1995 and mid-1998. Interestingly, 
the substitutive one, backed by experts from the World Bank, was flatly rejected on a 
                                                 
208 The package included an elevation of retirement age, changes in the formula for the calculation of benefits, and an 
increase in workers’ contributions. 
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combination of technical and political arguments (Weyland 2006). The suggested parametric 
adjustment, supported by some social organizations, was insufficient to tackle the system’s main 
problems. An impasse followed, that the new administration of Miguel Ángel Rodríguez (1998-
2002) broke with the establishment of a Foro Nacional de Concertación and the inclusion of the 
pension system among the issues it should consider. The commission formed with that purpose 
included 30 members representing a wide spectrum of interests, which studied and evaluated a 
proposal for the creation of a mixed system elaborated by the government, presenting it to public 
opinion afterwards. By the end of 1998, the commission reached a consensus. Its report passed to 
the legislature, which took almost a year to draft a law that re-introduced several of the 
parametric changes opposed by social organizations, in spite of the long preceding negotiations. 
Finally, unions, cooperatives, women´s movements, and other organizations, obtained the 
inclusion of a series of measures aiming at the improvement of the system’s administrative 
efficiency. In exchange, they agreed to the creation of the pillar of individual capitalization 
defended by the government and business organizations, who also accepted the possibility of 
public pension fund administrators. The reform became effective in May 2001 (Martínez 
Franzoni 2008a).209  
Oxygen did not last too long. A report made public by the CCSS at the beginning of 2004 
predicted the insufficiency of contributions to finance pensions on 2005, and of interests from 
reserves to cover them by 2015; the fund, it added, should be expected to collapse 2022. The 
                                                 
209 The reform reorganized the pension regime in three complementary pillars. The first one, with defined benefits, is 
mandatory for salaried and self-employed workers. The second pillar is complementary, with defined contributions and 
mandatory for salaried workers. The third one is complementary, voluntary, and available for any contributor. The first 
one is funded by contributions from the government, workers and employers; the second one by workers and 
employers, and the third one only by workers. The second and third pillars are managed by different administrators, 
created by public and private entities, competing under conditions regulated by the state. A number of administrative 
changes were also introduced with the goal of reducing evasion and income underreporting.  
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projections were corroborated by and independent study of the ILO, excepting for the collapse, 
which it predicted for 2007. Following a suggestion from unions and cooperatives, the Board of 
Directors of the CCSS formed a Comisión Técnica Institucional that incorporated representatives 
of multiple social organizations and was meant to provide input previous to any decision to be 
made by the CCSS. During the subsequent discussion of different alternatives, the ILO had an 
important participation, assisting the CTI with technical input that convinced of the need for a 
parametric adjustment. An agreement was difficult to reach, and it was finally the result of the 
acceptance, by all participants, of an alternative suggested by the representatives of the ILO.210 
The core of the proposal was the scaling-down of pension replacement rates according to the 
earnings of the insured. A new technical group was formed afterwards, in which the ILO assisted 
negotiators from the public sector and social organizations to consolidate all the agreed points in 
a consistent draft. The CCSS approved the proposal in 2005.211  
7.4.3 Pension reform in Brazil 
The process of pension reform was also an arduous one in Brazil. Brazilian society shows a 
consensus around the idea of state responsibility as the central provider of social insurance that is 
no less intense than the ones found in Costa Rica or Uruguay. However, equally extended is 
acceptance of the inequalities in the distribution of benefits determined by the Bismarckian route 
                                                 
210 For a detailed presentation of the alternatives supported by the different participants in the negotiations, see  
(Martínez Franzoni 2008a). 
211 It was a parametric reform basically aiming at balancing contributions and expenses. Although the legal retirement 
age remained unchanged (65), the number of required contributions was increased from 240 to 300. The main 
innovation was the mentioned scaling-down of replacement rates depending on salary –previous to the reform, there 
was a flat replacement rate of 52.2 % of real salary.  
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of development (Brooks 2009). We have already seen the importance of the 1988 constitutional 
reform for the consolidation of universal social rights as a constitutional mandate.212 I will not go 
through the history of the pension system as in depth as I did with healthcare. I will just remark 
that, in the case of the former, recognition of the universal right in principle came associated with 
the acceptance and consolidation of deep inequalities in practice.213 The core of the problem are 
the privileges granted by the civil servants’ pension regime, which by 2002 covered 13 % of the 
beneficiaries of the pension system as a whole with 42 % of its total resources, and accounted for 
72% of the system’s total deficit.214 Despite the creation of new sources of benefits, the growing 
gap between revenue and benefits paid, put the need for some severe adjustment –thus for 
constitutional amendment- at the top of the agenda the day after the approval of the constitution.  
With the support of some business organizations and direct input from neoliberal think 
tanks, the economic team of the Collor administration (1990-1992) accumulated a couple of 
aborted attempts.215 First, the Ministry of the Economy elaborated a project of constitutional 
                                                 
212 The 1988 constitution determined that pensions should be adjusted monthly according to inflation, and equalized the 
minimum pension to the minimum wage –up to that moment, it had been half of the minimum wage. The average 
benefit rose 78 % in real terms between 1988 and 1996; benefit expenditures of the pension system rose by 136% 
between 1990 and 1996 (Madrid 2003). 
213 Among the professional and occupational groups benefitting from privileged retirement schemes counted some with 
considerable political influence, like the judiciary, the military, the employees of the social security system, and 
congressmen themselves. Although pensioners’ associations did not mobilize very effectively, public sector labor unions 
were among the strongest and most active (Madrid 2003, Weyland 1996b). 
214 See (Brooks 2009, Caetano 2009). 
215 Partial privatization of pensions was advocated by several business organizations, some of them very powerful, as was 
the case of the Federaçao Industrial do Estado de São Paulo. However, the highly fragmented structure of business interests 
representation in Brazil, by making speaking with a single voice extremely difficult, reduced drastically their influence on 
public policy (Schneider 2004, Weyland 1995a, 1996a). On the other hand, however, some of them supported think 
tanks or technical teams through which they could articulate their own proposals. Some of them found a receptive 
audience in the Collor administration (Kay 1999, Madrid 2003). Although liberal economists clearly consolidated, from 
the early 1990s on, some solid positions among the Finance and Planning Ministries, as well as the Central Bank, the 
bureaucracy of the social security system was considerably harder to penetrate (Madrid 2003). Other conditions were 
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amendment aiming to scale back privileged benefits and to privatize social insurance above an 
income level of three to five times the minimum wage. The project faced strong opposition in 
Congress –including parliamentarians aligned with the government- and the executive finally 
eliminated this component from the package of constitutional amendments it submitted to 
Congress in October 1991 (Weyland 1995a). The following year, Collor appointed in the 
direction of the social security administration a team of new officials coming from the private 
insurance business, with instructions to elaborate a new project to partially privatize pension 
insurance. The initiative found fierce resistance at all levels –civil society, parliament, and the 
state apparatus (especially from bureaucrats at the MPAS). The government never even 
submitted it to congress (Weyland 1995a). 
The social security deficit came back to the table as hyperinflation was finally tamed by 
the Plan Real (1993-1995), which ended the possibility of patching structural fiscal deficit 
through inflationary means. However, stabilization did not come in Brazil associated with a 
radical neoliberal offensive. An important process of privatization notwithstanding, the Brazilian 
developmentalist state was not dismantled, but rather refurbished, under the two consecutive 
Cardoso administrations. That having been said, it is also true that projected constitutional 
amendments aiming to reform the pension system count among Cardoso’s most recurrent 
frustrations.216 The first attempt came when he was still Itamar Franco´s Minister of Finance, as 
part of a package of amendment proposals submitted to congress in 1993.  The idea was to 
                                                                                                                                                             
also less favorable in Brazil for privatization projects to prosper. The country not only had in common with Argentina 
and Uruguay a level of pension obligations that would have made the fiscal cost of a structural transition extremely high, 
but also was considerably less affected than Mexico or Argentina by problems low saving rates and shortage of capital. 
216 The fact that several specifications are detailed in the articles through which social rights were constitutionalized 
makes the reform of multiple aspects of the pension regime contingent upon special majorities. Constitutional 
amendments require separate votes in both federal chambers, each one of them with at least a 3/5 majority. 
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maximize the window of opportunity provided by the constitutional revision. The package 
combined restrictions on length-of-service pensions and reductions of entitlements for privileged 
sectors -like the military and public employees217- with the redefinition of social insurance as 
social welfare. The initiative found strong opposition from unions, left-leaning parties, and even 
centrist and conservative legislators concerned about a reduction of patronage shortly before a 
congressional election. The executive did not push too hard either (Weyland 1995a, 1996a). 
A new attempt took place shortly after the inauguration of the first Cardoso 
administration, in 1995. Once again, the amendment aiming to remove specifications on pension 
provision from the constitutional text was bundled with other proposed changes –concerning tax 
and administrative reform. It also insisted with the 1993 proposals for the tightening of public 
employees’ retirement conditions. This second attempt was as unpopular as the previous one. It 
found its main opponents among the CUT –which had 40% of its members among civil servants-
, and from the Associaçao Nacional dos Fiscais de Contribuçoes Prêvidenciarias (ANFIP). The 
latter is the national association of social security auditors, which counted on a solid technical 
reputation and rejected the governmental diagnostic of the pension reform as facing an actuarial 
crisis. The CUT’s organic connections with the PT guaranteed the former’s rejection of the 
reform. According to Brooks, the 1998 currency crisis introduced a turning point in the public 
perception of the reform, finally making it possible for it to pass through congress.218 Its impact 
                                                 
217 The main changes in this sense –which made the reform highly unpopular-, were the switch from time-of-service to 
time-of-contribution requirements, and a ceiling on the pensions of former public employees (Brooks 2009). 
218 See (Brooks 2009, Pinheiro 2004). The main changes introduced by constitutional amendment No 20, are the 
following: 1) benefits for public employees hired after the reform would be based on contribution time; 2) mandatory 
retirement after 70 for both men and women; 3) minimum retirement ages of 60 (men) and 55 (women), depending on 
minimum contribution time of 35 or 30 years, respectively; 4) suppression of the rule establishing 36 best months out of 
the last 48 previous to retirement for the calculation of benefits; 5) suppression of special pensions, excepting 
professions entailing particular health risks; 6) cap on the amount received as pension (R$ 1,200.00, and in no case more 
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on the country’s huge fiscal imbalances, however, fell short of what the government considered 
necessary. Evaluation of the political costs that a second constitutional amendment in less than a 
year might have, convinced the second Cardoso government to pursue the only relevant aspect 
that could be modified without touching the constitution. Law 9.876, approved in 1999, 
tightened the formula for the calculation of the benefits of private sector retirees, and introduced 
an element of modest through the social security factor. However, no further changes affected 
the scheme for public employees (Caetano 2009). 
As in other social policy matters, an important degree of continuity endured the 
replacement of the PSDB by the PT as the governing party. Thus, Lula da Silva obtained, before 
the conclusion of his first mandate, the passing of the amendment required to redefine the 
parameters of the civil servants’ pension regime. Interestingly, the new president’s rhetoric to 
justify his proposal of amendment virtually replicated the one of his predecessor –defending its 
redistributive fairness by emphasizing the connection between extended poverty and the 
privileges contained in some privileged pension schemes. As expected, the government’s 
initiative brought a frontal clash with one of the PT’s core constituencies.  Public sector unions 
mobilized against the reform –a violent strike of three days took place in front of the national 
congress during a crucial voting (Brooks 2009)– and got support from opposition parties to the 
left of the government. The reforms introduced under Lula’s presidencies aimed at two main 
goals: 1) securing the long-term financial sustainability of the system of retirement benefits for 
employees of federal, state- and municipal governments; 2) initiating a process of gradual 
                                                                                                                                                             
than the salary during active life); 7) participation of government, employers, contributors and retirees in the 
management of the system. 
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convergence of benefits and conditions for retirement between private- and public-sector 
employees.219 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter had two main goals. First, the understanding of causal mechanisms eventually 
explaining the associations that resulted from the QCA practiced in chapter 5. Second, the 
exploration of explanatory factors or mechanisms that might have been disregarded in the initial 
hypotheses. 
The first conclusion refers to the endurance of policy constituencies. They may be shared 
by co-participants in the development of social security, predominantly benefit parties emerged 
after incorporation junctures, or be mainly controlled by hegemonic parties benefitting from 
corporatist forms of interest intermediation. In any case, they represent the main obstacle for any 
reform entailing some homogenization of benefits and burdens, either between insiders and 
outsiders, or across categories of insiders. Whatever the case, the partisan actors benefitting from 
privileged connections with them, if in the opposition, will never risk future electoral growth by 
                                                 
219 Constitutional amendment No 41, approved in 2003, introduced the following alterations: 1) harmonization of 
contributions, set at 11% for all public servants; 2) an 11% deduction for those retirees receiving benefits 11% above the 
cap or higher; 3) cap for new entrants to public service in entities having complementary pension funds; 4) minimum 
retirement ages of 55 and 60 for women and men, respectively (professors of primary and secondary education 
exempted); 5) a 5% annual deduction on the benefits of those who chose to retire at an age between the minimum 
previous to the reform and the new one; 6) modification of formula for the calculation of benefits; 7) unification of 
administration of special regimes at the federal level. Constitutional amendment was approved in 2005. It created a 
special inclusionary regime for low-income workers and housewives; restored some benefits suppressed by the previous 
amendment; modified the rules for transition from pre- to post-reform regimes; and introduced a minimum requisite of 
25 years of contribution to qualify for retirement benefits.  
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detaching themselves from the protection of their interests. However, the exhaustion of the 
financial sustainability of existing social protection schemes may force those same parties, once 
in government, to push for reforms similar to the ones they opposed before.  
Second, some aspects of the configuration of party systems may alter both the timing of 
those hard choices, and the competitive strategies through which they are implemented. The 
Uruguayan case suggests that traditional parties partially sharing a constituency of insiders may 
need the push provided by the threatening growth of a third force, in order to switch from non-
cooperative blame avoidance to cooperation in the blaming of share. The case of Costa Rica may 
suggest a qualification of this conclusion, however. Could it be that, under certain circumstances, 
cooperation can occur even in the absence of that threat? Of course, the rarity of the Costa Rican 
case recommends cautiousness in the generalization of any conclusions from its experience. Still, 
three elements of that experience may be worth retaining as guidance in future explorations. 
First, the existence of systems with an extended coverage, resting on the legitimacy coming from 
an equally extended supportive consensus, may be regarded by partisan actors as a “public good” 
worth preserving through cooperation. Second, the accumulation of processeses of political 
learning developed through the reiteration of cooperation may have a facilitating effect, even in 
the absence of formally institutionalized environments of coordination and cooperation. Third, 
the configuration of civil society may also be relevant for the feasibility of that type of 
consensus-building behavior. I am concretely thinking of the relatively even organizational 
topography of the Costa Rican civil society, lacking hegemonic or clearly predominant actors 
with privileged access to some political party. This creates the possibility of the type of process 
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underlying the 2000-05 pension reform, where an extended coalition of social forces pressed 
from the outside on the political establishment.220 
The cases analyzed in this chapter, however, suggest that the “political convertibility” of 
pressure from below, from a reactive defensive force, into a proactive, constructive one, is very 
limited. This, of course, leads into the importance of existing policies for the articulation of 
collective action. Once again, we confirm the asymmetry between coalitions of outsiders and 
insiders, and the opposition between the feasibility of protective coalitions of potential losers 
with tangible immediate losses, and prospective winners from diffuse future gains. 
That structuring power of existing policies operates across several types of actors. My 
initial theoretical model, however, only elaborated explicitly on one type –namely, the forms of 
collective organization of recipients of social benefits. Most of the cases reviewed here 
recommend further elaboration in order to model the impact of diverse configurations of 
business interests. Evidence in this direction is diverse, and crosses policy areas. In healthcare, 
we have the differential impacts of a policy legacy involving an overwhelmingly predominant 
public sector (Costa Rica), and another with a more equilibrated balance between a still 
important public sector and a highly fragmented private one, with a heavy presence of non-profit 
entities (Uruguay). Based on Pribble’s recent work, we could add, on the pole opposing the 
Costa Rican configuration, the case of Chile, where a radical process of privatization led to the 
consolidation of a powerful sector of medical business. 
On the other hand, comparison between the cases of pension reform in Mexico, on one 
side, and Argentina and Brazil, on the other one, confirms that there is nothing automatic in the 
                                                 
220 Of course, an additional requisite for this type of result to be possible, is that the political establishment is inclusive 
and legitimate enough not to be questioned in its role as such –otherwise, there is a short step to an Argentine-type “Que 
se vayan todos” situation. 
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process of conversion of benefits from public policies into effective capacity for political agency. 
It is interesting, in this regard, to observe how the combination of capital crisis and liberalization 
of financial markets, created opportunities for an important restructuration of the Mexican 
financial sector. Those opportunities, however, only crystallized with the contribution of a new 
frame of social policies. Moreover, in order to transition from successful business 
entrepreneurship to successful political entrepreneurship, they benefited from a structure of 
business representation that, as Ben Ross Schneider has shown (Schneider 2004, 2005), is in turn 
a partial result of state initiative. With much more fragmented regimes of business-interests 
representation, neither the Brazilian financial sector, nor the Argentinean one, were capable of 
developing comparable political clout.221  
Schneider has also convincingly shown, in a very recent book, that fragmentation is a 
pervasive attribute of capitalist structures throughout the region (Schneider 2013). Interestingly, 
although that attribute is to a great extent shared by Latin American states, it may be the case that 
the latter continue to be necessary substitutes for the organizational limitations of collective 
actors –at least in the realm of social policy reform.  Most cases considered in this chapter have 
confirmed the relevance of the role that in that sense sectorial technical bureaucracies play. 
Three general observations may be extracted about it. 1) Technical cadres placed in power 
positions in sectorial bureaucratic structures have been key actors in the articulation of every 
process of structural expansion. This does not mean that the impulse for reform necessarily has 
to come from inside the established bureaucracy –actually, that is another aspect in which the 
Costa Rican healthcare reform of the 1990s is pretty unique. But it means that no project of 
                                                 
221 This organizational fragmentation of business representation may also be relevant to explain the rarity of durable 
frames of interest concertation and policy coordination, with important consequences, among others, for the 
development of welfare regimes. 
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systemic expansion has made significant progress by either working against established 
bureaucracies or bypassing them. 2) Bureaucracies have very often been the central arenas where 
political struggles around contents of reform have taken place. 3) Those intra-bureaucratic 
dynamics tend to occur along two lines of cleavage. One, internal to sectorial bureaucracies in 
social policy areas, between reformist teams and established ones; the other one, between social 
policy experts and economic teams with headquarters in ministries of finance, central banks, and 
planning agencies. In both types of conflicts, but very especially in the second, the success of 
reformist teams of social policy experts is highly dependent on direct support from political 
parties with the capacity to articulate coalitions of interests favorable to reform. 
The Brazilian and Costa Rican experiences reveal potentially consequential difference 
across social policy sectors. In the case of healthcare, the emphasis on the decentralization on 
service provision opens the possibility for piecemeal transformation through the gradual scaling-
up of pilot experiences of innovation initially introduced at the municipal or state level.  
Finally, multiple episodes remind us of something that should be obvious, but of which 
political scientists seem to be in need of periodical reminding. That is, the importance –
admittedly variable, and never self-sufficient- of a component of political craftsmanship that 
seems very resistant to theoretical modeling.  
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8.0  TARGETED PROGRAMS AND THE NEW POLITICS OF DUALIZATION 
This chapter is on the contemporary politics of social assistance in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Venezuela. Its goal is not to explain the emergence or expansion of social assistance per se –which, as 
I intend to show in the initial section, has been virtually universal across the region. My intention 
here is to get a better understanding and suggest some preliminary hypotheses around the political 
use of social assistance for purposes of political mobilization. My main contention is that the 
organizational structures of governing parties interact with historical legacies from processes of state 
formation to determine cross-national variation in the political logic according to which programs of 
this type are organized and implemented.  
It is a hypothesis that, in the most general terms, has been explored and tested by Juan 
Pablo Luna and Rodrigo Mardones. However, these authors have so far concentrated on the 
differences resulting from the presence of machine parties in government, focusing their 
empirical analysis on the cases of Argentina and Chile. In their typology, there is a category 
corresponding to what is frequently labeled as “populist left,” that has remained to a great extent 
residual. My impression, however, is that important variation can be identified among the cases 
usually included in it, which suggests the need to further develop Luna and Mardones’s 
potentially very rewarding initial intuition. 
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The chapter includes five sections. The first section quickly reviews the role of social 
assistance in the foundational configuration of contemporary systems of social protection. The 
second section contains a descriptive analysis of the expansion of social assistance in Latin 
America during the three decades covered by this study. Its focus is on is most innovative aspect 
–namely, programs based in conditional cash transfers. In the third section, I present and discuss 
Luna and Mardones’s theory, and suggest a possible direction for its extension. Section four 
consists of narratives tracing the processes leading to the recent emergence and growth of such 
types of programs in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. The final section presents some 
preliminary conclusions. 
8.1 BISMARCKIAN WELFARE REGIMES AND THEIR BUILT-IN DUALISM 
Non-contributive policies of social assistance are not in in themselves new –actually, they probably 
constitute the component of current social protection systems with the most ancient genealogy222. 
Relegated to a residual position by the development of social security systems, assistance programs 
for the “deserving poor” (Castel 2003, Barrientos and Hulme 2010) remained a component of 
variable importance in most welfare regimes throughout the 20th century. The persistence of a dual 
structure of social protection is in fact inherent to the very nature of liberal and corporatist regimes. 
It results from the de facto exclusion of a part of society by the dependence of access to social 
                                                 
222 A brief classic and still valid analysis of the English poor-law tradition and its overflowing by the tensions emerging 
from the transition to an industrial society, in the second chapter  of The Great Transformation (Polanyi 1985). A masterful 
and far more detailed account of the emergence of the idea of “social property” as a response to the new social risks in 
(Castel 2003); also for an abridged but still comprehensive presentation of the thesis, see (Castel 2002). A fascinating 
exploration on the mutations of the idea of poverty throughout the Middle Ages and the early modernity in (Geremek 
1994); on the situation of the poor in early modern European societies see Wolff. 
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security on a contributive capacity based on formal employment.  During the prosperous “golden 
years” of the postwar, the visibility of that “social residual” was minimized in most continental 
European welfare systems, which seemed to be “moving towards Beveridge through Bismarck.”  
That possibility looked pretty unrealistic in most of Latin America, in spite of the 
unmistakably Bismarckian pedigree of social security systems in the region. Even during the 
brief golden days of the pioneering social security systems of the Southern Cone, at the peak of 
the  import-substitution-led prosperity, the magnitude of the respective “social residuals” was far 
from negligible223. As we have already seen, the results of industrialization and urbanization 
were here more modest; many areas stayed confined to the possibilities of a subsistence 
economy; urban economic activities showed high levels of informality. The resulting limitations 
of the development of social security itself made the truncation and hierarchical segmentation of 
welfare regimes far more apparent. As is well known, it took several decades until the massive 
presence of sub-populations in situations of poverty or indigence produced the emergence of 
some anti-poverty programs of a more than testimonial magnitude. Actually, what is most 
striking about the recent wave of conditional cash transfers is not the amount of resources they 
receive224, but the suddenness and extension of the consensus that surrounds them.  
The contention that most systems of social protection in the region have tended to 
expand, if to different degrees and ad varying speed, following a shared pattern of fragmentation 
has been a leitmotiv throughout this dissertation. Indeed, in a majority of cases, a process of 
                                                 
223 Even in the context of what Tulio Halperin Donghi once described as “the modest miracle of the ‘Uruguay 
Batllista’,” someone with a dark sense of humor could observe that “Uruugay se preocupa tanto por los pobres, que hasta les da 
un carnet,” [“The poor received so much consideration in Uruguay, that they were even granted a carnet”]. The joke 
referred to the equivalent of today’s “welfare assistance cards,” popularly known as “carnet de pobre.” 
224 See Table 18. 
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institutional layering –building up on existing cores of social protection that were already 
internally fragmented themselves- has split most societies in the region in three categories. At the 
top, we find a privileged minority with the means to access high-quality insurance from private 
providers operating in markets with diverse levels of regulation. A resilient core in the middle 
includes those categories that have been able to remain, through their regular participation in the 
formal labor market, covered by the corporatist social security systems developed under the 
decades of ISI-based development. The third category includes those who, as a result of diverse 
circumstances, lack the means to purchase services from the private tier, and the contributive 
capacity to participate in the middle stratum. 
I have already pointed out that, excepting a few successful cases of almost universal, 
citizenship-based coverage, we could find this basic architecture of stratification not only 
everywhere in Latin America, but also in most of the developed world. From a comprehensive 
point of view, and in spite of non-negligible differences in terms of benefits, quality of resources, 
effective coverage, etc., the differences have to do less with the tripartite architecture itself, than 
with the relative magnitude of its components and with the internal fragmentation of the central 
one. To the extent that risk-pooling remains confined to the latter, we can say that its boundaries 
express and contribute to solidify, in first place, the upper and lower limits225 and fragmented 
                                                 
225 Actually, the image of a vertical accumulation of layers may lead to a serious misunderstanding of the underlying 
dynamics, since there is no symmetry between upper and lower boundaries. Although the middle section is in many 
cases closer to the bottom than to the top –both in terms of status and of material quality of life-, relative distances may 
be reversed in qualitative terms. Regardless of the considerable socioeconomic inequalities separating them, strata at the 
top and middle are interconnected –particularly by relationships linking them to state and market- to an extent that an 
important section of those at the bottom are not. That is, in the end, the fulcrum of what, not always in a conceptually 
precise way, is referred to as marginalization, exclusion, or disaffiliation. The essential phenomenon is, more than the 
creation of a stratum below, the emergence of a sort of parallel society aside. Thus, the image of a lateral displacement may be 
more accurate than that of a vertical descending mobility –among other things because the former seems to be far more 
difficult to reverse. It is for that reason that, instead of middle classes, I refer to a middle section, that includes a working-
class component that, regardless of its low placement in the distribution of income, has a definite insertion in the 
structures of the formal economy –the frequent precariousness of that insertion notwithstanding.  In the end, that is the 
reason why, as a perceptive historian suggested some time ago, the social realities emerging in Latin America from the 
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nature of the processes of political incorporation of the first two thirds of the 20th century. Those 
boundaries, however, were not static during the remainder of that century and the first decade of 
the current one. Their current fluidity is the consequence of the subsequent accumulation of the 
attempt of conservative incorporation through the creation of a market society, and of the 
backlash triggered by its frustration. 
The next section aims to make sense of the forces shaping the configuration and 
expansion of this expanded and “refurbished” residual component of welfare regimes. If residual, 
non-contributory, means-tested assistance is not new, some forms of providing it are –at least 
partially.. Or maybe after all not so much. 
8.2 THE “THIRD WAVE” OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: POSSIBLE 
EXPLANATIONS 
As Table V.2 shows, a wave of conditional cash-transfer programs226 (CCTs) has literally covered the 
area during the last 10 or 15 years. The trend is striking in several ways.  In first place, because of its 
                                                                                                                                                             
cycle of neoliberal reforms show a closer resemblance with the region’s pre-industrial past than with the post-industrial 
configurations of Western European societies (Halperin Donghi 1992). (Kenneth Roberts points in the same direction 
through the distinction between proletarianization –resulting from the “trickling-down” of membership in the middle 
classes- and sub-proletarianization (Roberts 2002).) 
226 Clustering all CCTs in a single category is common practice, and fits the purpose of the current chapter, but it is not 
free from risks. In all cases, they constitute attempts at reducing critical poverty levels. They attempt to do so through 
designs that find a common denominator in three constant attributes: a monetary transfer, criteria of conditionality, and 
targeting (Bastagli 2009). However, some additional goals make in occasions a significant component –for example, the 
formation of human capital among the target populations. Variation is important regarding the amounts of transfers, the 
type of conditionality, the variables determining eligibility, the precision of focalization, and the size of the target 
population. Besides, targeting includes in some cases additional secondary criteria that further discriminate diverse sub-
populations among the poor. Other schemes –among my cases, Bolsa Familia- approximate the goal of guaranteeing a 
basic income to all those in extreme poverty (Cecchini and Madariaga 2011, Valencia Lomelí 2008). 
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pervasiveness –the eleven countries considered here have had at least one CCT program within the 
last two decades.227 Second, because of the wide consensus that seems to exist around them in 
multiple spheres. In fact, not only from expert teams of international financial agencies have these 
programs received enthusiastic support and funding, but also from governmental techno-
bureaucratic cadres, as well as from quite a few academics. More importantly, support among 
political elites crosses the ideological spectrum. Third, and associated with acceptance across parties, 
are the programs’ continuity in spite of partisan alternation in government, in those cases in which 
incumbents lost elections after having initiated them228. True, none of the referred alternations left 
the respective CCTs untouched, but continuity in the general conception prevailed over adjustments 
in coverage, funding, the delivery of services, or the quality of bureaucratic controls. It is also true 
that, in those cases in which there has not been replacement of governing parties, opposition forces 
have frequently criticized what they see as essentially electoral strategies, distorted in their 
instrumentation by clientelism and political manipulation. But even in these cases, critiques have 
been less a matter of principle than of practical implementation. Of course, this reluctance of 
opposition forces to present a frontal attack to CCTs may itself be a matter of electoral calculation, 
but in that case it betrays an implicit acknowledgment of their popularity among voters –or at least 
among some of them. 
                                                 
227 Just for the sake of remarking the magnitude of pervasiveness, it is worth mentioning, in addition to the cases 
included in this study, the following programs: Red de Protección Social (Nicaragua); Red de Oportunidades (Panama); Tekopora 
(Paraguay); Solidaridad (Dominican Republic). For a brief descriptive survey and general analysis, see (ECLAC 2010); 
more analytical are (Barrientos and Hulme 2010, Bastagli 2009, Hanlon, Barrientos, and Hulme 2010, Valencia Lomelí 
2008); some interesting ideas, although in the context of more general analyses in (Mares and Carnes 2009, McGuire 
2011). 
228 This has been the case of the two programs with widest coverage, which have also provided a blueprint for 
replication –namely, Bolsa Familia, initiated in Brazil under Cardoso and expanded by the subsequent PT administrations, 
and Progresa, initiated by the PRI and continued by the PAN under a new name (Oportunidades). Perhaps more striking, 
because of the ideological distance between the parties alternating, is the willingness of the Piñera administration to 
preserve the programs initiated by the Socialists.  
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Such extended acceptance is in itself revealing. To a great extent it is the result of making 
virtue out of necessity. Regardless of important variation in their efficacy and the quality of their 
design and implementation, CCTs have an immediate and tangible impact on the everyday 
difficulties of some poor or indigent populations. In many cases, they further concentrate on 
particularly vulnerable sub-populations –children, single mothers, elderly. Moreover, they do so 
within the parameters recommended by international financial agencies for social policies. They 
are focused, administered in a decentralized way, and occasionally involve private and non-profit 
sectors in the implementation and delivery of services –and this is in turn associated with the 
introduction of supply-side transfers. Especially, they are “cost-effective”, and can count on 
financial cooperation from the agencies. The fact that they involve only marginal increases in 
public spending and can be covered within the limits of existing taxation systems, make them 
also palatable –or at least tolerable- to right-wing parties. Last but not least, they do not represent 
“free lunches.” Thanks to diverse forms of conditionality, they require the fulfillment of certain 
responsibilities by recipients –which, at least in principle, reassures their effective concentration 
on the “deserving poor,” in the best tradition of the poor-laws. Given that the responsibilities in 
most cases relate to the obligation to keep children in school and have their health regularly 
monitored and protected, they have also been defended as “investments in human capital” that 
should weaken the chains of inter-generational transmission of poverty. 
The extreme heterogeneity across their respective specific circumstances of emergence 
defies any easy generalization. Their omnipresence excludes any direct connection with 
structural or institutional configurations. They have been initiated or consolidated by parties in 
diverse positions of the ideological spectrum, ranging from the PRI after the consolidation of its 
neoliberal turn under Salinas and Uribe’s “right-wing populism” in Colombia, to the left in both 
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its “institutional” (Brazil, Chile, Uruguay), and “radical” (Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela) 
incarnations. In between, Cardoso’s center-left PSDB, the brief experience of the Argentine 
Alianza, and the Kirnchnerist version of Peronism also form part of the list. In some cases –
typically Progresa in Mexico, there was a direct connection between the initiation of the 
program and quickly mounting electoral challenges,229 but that was not the predominant 
situation. In other cases, like Argentina, recent research has identified a connection with 
contentious popular mobilization,230 but that has been more a source of pressure for preservation 
and expansion than for initiation –and in any case, a top-down technocratic logic has been 
overwhelmingly predominant across cases (McGuire 2011, Pribble 2013).  
 
Table 18: Budget and coverage of CCTs (several years) 
COUNTRY CCT/TOTAL1 CCT/POOR2 CCT/GDP3 CCT/SPS4 SPS/GDP07 
Argentina 8.7 36 0.8 (2003) 0.9 23.2 
Bolivia 18.5 35.3 0.35 2.2 16.2 
Brazil 26 83.3 0.41 (2006) 1.7 24.8 
Chile 6.8 51.7 0.11 (2005) 0.8 12.4 
Colombia 17.8 41.6 0.2 1.3 14.9 
Costa Rica 2.9 17.4 0.3 1.6 17.4 
Ecuador 37.1 83.9 0.84 13.1 6.4 
Mexico 23.3 71.2 0.43 3.7 11.6 
Peru 8 22.2 0.16 1.8 8.7 
Uruguay 10.1 54.7 0.6 (2006) 2 22 
Venezuela N/A N/A N/A N/A 13.4 
Source: ECLAC (2010); Valencia Lomeli (2008). 
Notes: 
1 Coverage of CCTs as percentage of total population, last year available. 
2Coverage of CCTs as percentage of population under poverty line, last year available. 
3 Spending on CCTs, as percentage of GDP, last year available. 
4 Spending on CCTs, as percentage of total social public spending, last year available (2006-2009). 
 
                                                 
229 On this, see (Dion 2010, Garay 2010, Luccisano and Macdonald 2012, Belasco 2012, Hawkins 2010). 
230 See (Garay 2007, 2010, Patroni and Felder 2012, Svampa and Pereira 2003). 
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More convincing is the hypothesis of an intersection between three factors. First, a long-
process of deterioration in the situation of popular sectors. Second, its accentuation by the 
conjunctural impact of recessive situations that suddenly brought a combined sense of 
emergency and anxiety about the potential for a radical backlash. Third, familiarity with the 
previous experience of temporary safety nets designed to moderate the impact of some programs 
of stabilization and adjustment231. Table V.8 shows that the initiations of CCT programs were 
immediately preceded by situations of economic recession in 10 of 14 cases.  
However, even if the social consequences of recessions may contribute to explain the 
emergence of some of the programs, the magnitude of those consequences varies considerably 
across countries. More important, they can explain neither the persistence of some CCTs 
spanning several years beyond the dissipation of those hypothetical causes, nor the sudden 
generalization of this particular design. Even if the itineraries of their diffusion has still to be 
systematically reconstructed, there is evidence of intense cross-fertilization. It is also clear that 
the international agencies’ willingness to lend their support and direct involvement has been 
growing over time –something that may have probably facilitated and stimulated the diffusion of 
experiences and model (Valencia Lomelí 2008). 
The novelty in terms of the substantive underlying approach should not be exaggerated. 
As a matter of fact, as we have noticed, it fits the general parameters of the cycle of neoliberal 
reforms pretty well. A quick glance back to the days in which shock therapies were profusely 
recommended and applied reveals several points of contact with the safety nets extended to 
“shield the poor” (Lustig 2001) from the secondary effects of the “bitter pill” (Weyland 1998) of 
                                                 
231 Between 1985 and 1997, temporary safety nets were implemented in Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela 
(see Table V.2, supra). 
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orthodox stabilization.232 In the end, the string aligning all those beads is, at a structural level, the 
accumulation of the successive impacts of debt crisis and stabilization in the 1980s, structural 
reforms in the early 1990s, and the oscillations of unstable patterns of growth in the late 1990s. 
Under that light, the recessions of the late 1990s and early 2000s contiguous to many CCTs 
appear as just another bead. And the changes in levels of poverty and indigence presented on 
Table 18 become misleading indicators of the real magnitude of the “social emergency” 
accumulated by the beginning of the last decade.  
 
Table 19: Conjunctures of economic recession preceding CCTs 
COUNTRY CCT PROGRAM Initiation 
of 
Program 
Recession1 Per 
Capita 
Income 
Poverty1 Indigence1 
Argentina Plan Jefes y Jefas 
Desocupados 
2002 
1999-02 -14 7.2 
0 
4.8 Familias por la Inclusión 
social 
2005 
Bolivia Bono Juancito Pinto 2008 -----------    
Brazil Bolsa Familia 1995 1996-99 -1.9 0.6 -0.3 
Chile Chile Solidario 2002 -----------    
Colombia Familias en Acción 2001 1997-99 -3.3 2 1.7 
Costa Rica 
Superémonos 2001 1999-02 2.8 0 0.1 
Avancemos 2006 ------------    
Ecuador Bono Solidario 1998 1997-99 -2.3 3.7 4.6 
Ecuador 
Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano 
2003 ------------    
Mexico 
Progresa 1997 1994-96 -6.7 3.9 2.6 
Oportunidades 2001 2000-02 -0.8 -0.9 -1.3 
Peru Juntos 2005 1997-99 -1.2 0.5 -1.4 
Uruguay PANES 2005 1999-02 -6.8 2 0.2 
Source: ECLAC (2010). 
Notes: 
1Porcentual change resulting from recession. 
                                                 
232 For more in-depth analyses of concrete experiences during the 80s and early 90s, see also (Graham 1994, Lustig 1995, 
Mesa-Lago 1994). 
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A parallel chain aligns the escalation of the problem with the narrowing of the space of 
possible solutions. This second chain has a very concrete, material dimension defined by a 
context of “permanent austerity” (Pierson 2001, 2011). Such context is accentuated in the first 
place by the decline imposed on social spending by the prevalence of fiscal considerations. Also 
contributing to it, are the rigidities imposed on the internal composition of social budgets by the 
financial imbalances of social security systems that have the core of their beneficiaries among 
the middle sectors. But there is still a third dimension of continuity, that actually is essential for 
the consolidation of the ones operating at the structural and policy levels: the persistent success, 
in spite of that background, of the displacement of the focus of debates on social policy from 
inequality to poverty. 
 
8.3 THE POLITICAL INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE: 
PATTERNS AND DETERMINANTS 
Under the light of this dissertation’s central concern with institutional change, the modalities of the 
resolution (or not) of the problems of political incorporation, and its general consequences in terms 
of patterns of democratic governance, I would like to point to two aspects of the development of 
this generation of poor-targeting programs. The first one is the extent to which the decision to split 
and deal separately with the risks of “insiders” and “outsiders” to established social security systems 
has received institutional confirmation. Indeed, from very early on in some cases, governments 
tended to place the administration and expansion of the new “pro-poor” policies in the orbit of new 
“ministries of social development” created for that specific purpose. In the cases in which such 
institutional innovation did not take place, programs developed under the control of offices directly 
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attached to the presidency –which is also in itself significant. In other words, efforts of 
incorporation of anti-poverty programs into integrated and coordinated webs of social policies, 
assembling them in a coordinated way with established structures of social protection, have been 
rare.  
Table 20: Institutional changes associated with development of CCTs 
COUNTRY YEAR ADMINISTRATION NEW MINISTRY 
Argentina 1999 De La Rúa Ministerio de Desarrollo Social 
Brazil 2004 Lula Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome 
Chile 2011 Piñera Ministerio de Desarrollo Social (replaces MIDEPLAN) 
Colombia 2003  
Agencia Internacional para la Accion Social y la Cooperacion 
Internacional1 
Ecuador  Correa 
Ministerio de Inclusión Económica y Social (replaces Ministerio 
de Bienestar Social) 
Ministerio Coordinador de Desarrollo Social 
Mexico 1992  Secretaría de Desarrollo Social 
Peru 2011 Humala Ministerio de Desarrollo e Inclusión Social 
Uruguay 2005 Vázquez Ministerio de Desarrollo Social 
Venezuela 1993 Caldera Ministerio de la Familia (dismantled by Chavez in 2000) 
 2000 Chávez Ministerio de Salud y Desarrollo Social 
 2005 Chávez 
Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y Participación Popular (later 
re-baptized as Ministerio del Poder Popular para la 
Participación y Protección Social).  
Notes: 
1 A Ministry of Social Protection was also created in 2002, but Familias en Accion was put under control of the presidential 
agency. 
 
The second aspect is the form in which the political use of targeted programs and their 
possibilities as incorporation tools are limited and shaped by bureaucratic resources and party 
structures. The overwhelming majority of research on the topic has been concentrated on 
identifying the forms of strategic allocation of funds and programs by politicians, and the 
magnitude of the electoral returns of this type of operation. What I find most suggesting and 
worth exploring in future investigation, is the implications of the hypothesis suggested by Luna 
and Mardones, and indirectly supported by diverse case studies. These authors’ point of 
departure is the contention that “mechanically translating investment rationales from one 
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institutional context to another is misleading.” The “investment rationales” guiding the allocation 
of targeted social funds by incumbents are constrained by factors other than observed electoral 
returns (Luna and Mardones 2010). The alternative model they propose predicts three “political 
investment scenarios,” produced by the interaction of two factors –the presence or not of an 
incumbent machine-party, and the state bureaucracy’s capacity to target and oversee the 
allocation of funds.  
The first distinction, depending on whether a machine-party controls government, follows 
an extended finding of the literature on clientelism and on bureaucratic politics –namely, that 
machine clientelism undermines the technical bureaucratic capacity of the state. “In machine 
party systems, national incumbents build-up their government coalitions by benefiting regional 
or provincial bosses that form their support base. […] In short, in these cases, policy allocations 
should disproportionately favor the core constituencies of quasi-hegemonic and incumbent 
partisan machines, along with marginal investments in swing-vote constituencies (Luna and 
Mardones 2010).” Abundant research confirms that the predicted scenario of clientelistic 
distribution has actually been the case with two of the paradigmatic machines of the region in 
government  –the Mexican PRI and Argentine Peronism.233 
 
Table 21: Machines, state capacity, and three scenarios for political investment 
  
Incumbent Partisan Machine 
No Yes 
Bureaucratic Capacity 
to Target and Oversee 
High Selective distributive politics 
Clientelistic distribution 
Low Massive distributive politics 
Source: (Luna and Mardones 2010) 
                                                 
233 On Argentina, see (Auyero 2001, Calvo and Murillo 2004, Gibson and Calvo 2001, Levitsky 2003, Stokes 2005); on 
Mexico (Greene 2008, Magaloni 2008, Rocha Menocal 2001). 
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Since the machine is what makes it possible for incumbents to monitor the compliance of 
recipients of social policy in their electoral behavior, in the absence of this type of partisan 
structures “targeted social funds might be simply deployed as electoral campaign gifts to enable 
credit-claiming [by candidates].” In these circumstances, Luna and Mardones reason, “these 
funds do no provide the material incentives for crafting quid pro quo clientelistic pacts, because 
those pacts cannot be enforced.” This provides incumbents with more maneuvering space to 
develop alternative strategies, targeting beyond core partisan constituencies. However, that space 
may be constrained in a different way by the availability of alternative instruments allowing the 
fine-tuning of investments. A qualified autonomous technical bureaucracy has in this sense, the 
argument goes, decisive yet mixed effects. On the one hand, “greater state capacity shrinks the 
available budget for political targeting;” on the other hand, it also facilitates “much needed 
information for designing and fine-tuning a complex portfolio to allocate marginal discretionary 
spending.” In other words, efficient public targeting systems provide a functional substitute of 
party machines, but at the same time preclude the development of pervasive clientelism. The 
effects are reversed in the absence of sufficient state capacity. On the one hand, reduced 
overseeing capacity expands the possibilities of discretional distribution; on the other hand, it 
limits the possibilities for a precise targeting, leading to a pattern in which clientelism is replaced 
by massive distributive politics. Luna and Mardones associate Brazil, Chile, Mexico under the 
PAN, and Uruguay, with the pattern of selective distributive politics.234 As examples of massive 
                                                 
234 On Brazil, see (Belasco 2012, Hunter and Power 2007, Zucco 2008); on Chile (Calvo and Murillo 2010, Luna and 
Mardones 2010); on the changes resulting from the transition from Progresa to Oportunidades in Mexico (Luccisano and 
Macdonald 2012); on Uruguay (Luna 2007). From a comparative perspective, see (Ansell and Mitchell 2011, Sewall 2008) 
for comparisons between Bolsa Familia and Progresa; (Belasco 2012) compares Bolsa Familia with Venezuelan Misiones. 
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distributional politics, they point to the FONCODES experience in Peru under Fujimori235, and 
insinuate the possibility of including Bolivia and Venezuela. 
8.4 A CLOSER LOOK AT “MOBILIZATIONAL SOCIAL POLICY” 
The last mentioned cases merit further discussion, since their recent experiences bring additional 
elements to the repertoire of uses of social policy for purposes of political incorporation. Samuel 
Handlin has introduced the distinction between “technocratic” and “mobilizational” social policies 
(Handlin 2012). This opposition to a great extent parallels the one introduced by Sebastián 
Etchemendy, between a “social policy-based” left (izquierda de política social), that privileges inclusion 
through social policies;  and an “actors-based left” (izquierda de actores) that gives priority to political 
mobilization (Etchemendy 20012). In both cases, they constitute attempts to identify emergent 
replacements of the role played by labor unions both in the transmission of popular demands to 
labor-parties and in the political encapsulation of those constituencies by parties. Ruth Collier and 
Handlin have presented the problem, in more general terms, as one of transition between successive 
“popular interest regimes”, and Kenneth Roberts, in turn, has referred to the “crisis of labor 
politics.”236 
Regardless of semantic variation, there is one recurrent underlying dilemma. As a result 
of combined effects of changes in socioeconomic structures and changes in public policy, the 
comprehensiveness and solidity of unions as vehicles for the articulation of popular interests was 
                                                 
235 See (Kay 1996, Roberts and Arce 1998, Schady 2000). 
236 See (Collier and Handlin 2009b, a, Roberts 2007c). 
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drastically reduced during the period under study. This not only created an atomization of 
interests resulting in serious collective action problems; effects also passed, through the crisis of 
the parties historically based on those constituencies,  to party systems, which experienced 
variable doses of increased volatility and diminished participation. The transformations of 
welfare regimes are not alien to those dynamics. They had contributed significantly to facilitate 
interest-aggregation and popular collective action, consolidate constituencies, solidify partisan 
identities and loyalties, structure party-competition along programmatic cleavages, and to 
integrate societies in general. Not surprisingly, then, the crisis and contraction of social 
protection and the crisis of labor politics were components of a single process in which they 
multiplied each other. As we have already seen, the effects of the contraction of systems of social 
protection that had never been fully inclusive were magnified by a series of demographic 
changes and migratory displacements that further expanded the populations beyond their 
coverage.  
The reasons to worry relate not only to considerations of social justice, but also to 
repercussions in terms of democratic governability and social integration in general. It is not 
accidental that the countries in the region with more consolidated party systems also exhibit the 
most solid and comprehensive systems of social protection. Conversely, we find on the other 
pole of a continuum with shades of grey, situations combining collapse of formulas of political 
representation from the ISI days and very precarious systems of social protection. Those 
configurations not only fed a higher propensity to social conflict and political volatility; the 
deficit of partisan representation and the presence of massive populations exposed to a 
combination of old and new social risks also provided opportunities for creative political 
entrepreneurship. This is the part of the context that explains the frequent combination of the 
259 
 
pattern of massive distributional politics predicted by Luna and Mardones, and the type of 
mobilizational social policy identified by Handlin. 
8.4.1 The political sources of social assistance diversity (I): organizations and strategies 
The clustering of Morales’ Bolivia, Correa’s Ecuador, and Chavez’s Venezuela in this sub-universe –
sometimes, but not always, in the company of the Kirchners’ Argentina- provided a tempting easy 
and relatively straightforward classificatory device for the early literature on the “left turn.” More 
and more, however, the accumulation of scholarship has demanded a more nuanced image, in which 
the analysis of how they differ from each other has become analytically more rewarding.237 Although 
the available evidence is still fragmentary and not always easy to compare, I believe it is possible to 
suggest some basic hypothesis as direction for future research. I will present a very simple 
preliminary argument. Where the post-neoliberal backlash consolidated new political forces that 
emerged as external challengers of the respective political establishments, mobilizational social policy 
has been a central component of repertoires oriented to consolidate political hegemonies. Those 
policies have reached diverse degrees of institutional consolidation, and their implementation entails 
variable combinations of effective autonomous popular participation, co-optation, and top-down 
manipulation.   
The mix of those ingredients has essentially depended on the form of development of the 
new hegemonic political forces previous to their access to power, and to the magnitude and type of 
                                                 
237 See (Luna 2010a, Levitsky and Roberts 2011, Roberts 2007b, 2009). 
260 
 
reaction from challenged elites238. This factor has also been consequential for the substantive 
contents and design of social policies.   
Perhaps the most striking common aspect of the recent experiences in Bolivia, Ecuador, 
and Venezuela, is the fact that, radical rhetoric notwithstanding, innovations in social policy have 
been predominantly introduced under the form of short-term projects of focalized assistance. In 
other words, the main strategy looks like a collage of attempts to overcome the “truncated” 
(Barrientos 2004) nature of previously existing systems of social protection by consolidating 
their fragmented nature, through the expansion and thickening of their assistential layers.239  
Put to look for the political rationality, one can think of two types of hypotheses. First, it 
can be read as part of a more general strategy of minimization of potential frictions and 
blockades by circumventing existing institutional structures and organized interests. This type of 
consideration fits the impatience with the slowness of democratic bargains that has characterized 
these administrations. It is less consistent, however, with the confrontational, hyper-
presidentialist style that their leaders have repeatedly chosen to increase the expediency of their 
governmental action. Why by-passing the existing social security administrations when one has 
enough power to obtain a tailor-made constitutional reform? One argument could be that, since 
permanent confrontation involves costs and risks even for the most overwhelming plebiscitarian 
hegemonies, picking one’s battles makes good political sense. In this perspective, it seems only 
                                                 
238 The reasoning behind the argument to a great extent parallels –and has been inspired by- the one developed by 
Kenneth Roberts to explain the variation of organizational forms among populist movements (Roberts 2006). 
239 Comprehensive analyses of the respective social policy mixes are not abundant, and their quality if very 
heterogeneous. On Bolivia, see (Durán Valverde and Pacheco 2012, Monterrey Arce 2013, Müller 2009, Riggirozzi 2010, 
Wanderley 2009, Marco Navarro 2010); on Ecuador (Minteguiaga 2012, Nehring 2012, Ruiz Chiriboga 2009); on 
Venezuela (Briggs and Mantini-Briggs 2009, De Venanzi 2010, D'Elía 2006, Handlin 2012, Jones 2008, Maingon 2006, 
Muntaner, Guerra Salazar, Benach, et al. 2006, Muntaner, Guerra Salazar, Rueda, et al. 2006, Vera 2008). 
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logical, if one intends to confront foreign investors in the mining sector, or regional oligarchies 
around re-centralization, to try to minimize the irritation of middle sectors. Distrust on the 
technical capacity and political loyalty of established bureaucracies might add to this line of 
thinking. In the three cases of Bolivia, Ecuador, and –to a lesser extent- Venezuela, the new 
leftist governments took control of weak states, with limited coercive capacity in important parts 
of the territory, low levels of geographic and functional internal coordination, and bureaucracies 
of poor technical quality, often colonized by clientelistic networks controlled by local 
oligarchies. This also fits these governments’ preference for revenue from the exploitation of 
natural resources as the main instrument to increase their financial leverage –in itself, a way of 
bypassing the need to negotiate and build consensus around new fiscal pacts. 
The second type of explanation does not necessarily contradict the first one. Chávez, 
Correa and Morales reached the presidency on the shoulders of vast majorities. However, if 
conclusive, those majorities were also fragile. They were more the result of frustration and anger 
toward existing political establishments than of any programmatic coincidence –their 
heterogeneity was the other side of their extension. With the partial exception of Bolivia, they 
had been the result of sudden eruptions, not of steady growth, thus poorly organized and not 
encapsulated by party structures. On the other hand, the antagonizing political style of the three 
leaders could not work with less than plebiscitarian majorities. In that context, the chosen type of 
social program simultaneously minimized intra-coalitional distributive conflicts, and allowed for 
much higher degrees of political discretion in the administration of rewards.  
However, the most interesting aspect is that, similarities between the three processes 
notwithstanding, the available political instruments were in some aspects very different -and that 
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may have been consequential, I suggest, for the design of social policies.240 Evo Morales’ 
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) emerged as the “political instrument” of an original core of 
autonomous peasant movements, frequently developed around communities with long traditions 
of deliberative self-government, and only much later extended to incorporate urban 
constituencies. Rafael Correa gained political visibility from a ministerial position, detached 
himself from a disintegrating government with a very clever sense of timing, and built his 
independent leadership on a mediatic presence and circumstantial support from indigenous 
groups to whom, once in the presidency, he did not believe to owe much loyalty. Hugo Chávez 
came from the military, which constituted his more reliable connection with a state apparatus 
permeated by corruption, historically colonized by AD and COPEI, and penetrated by diverse 
corporate interests tightly connected to partisan elites.  
Such diversity of original conditions was heavily consequential for the subsequent 
trajectories of the respective administrations. Correa was quick to detach himself from the 
indigenous movements that had supported him during his presidential campaign, as well as from 
the beginning showed his preference for a project of centralized “re-foundation” of the 
Ecuadorian state241. Chávez oscillated between unsuccessful attempts to co-opt some corporate 
forces, using the army to penetrate the state apparatus, and using it to circumvent bureaucratic 
structures and build the logistics his social campaigns. This novel format of social policy entailed 
                                                 
240 Regarding the specific political circumstances of emergence of each of the three movements, their processes of 
electoral growth and the resulting organizational transformations, see for Bolivia (Anria 2010, Barr 2005, Crabtree 2009, 
Crabtree and Whitehead 2001, Laserna 2007, 2010, Madrid 2011, Mayorga 2005b, Mayorga 2002, Tsolakis 2010); for 
Ecuador (Conaghan 1995, 2011, De La Torre 2000, Ospina 2008); for Venezuela (Coppedge 1994, 2005, Corrales and 
Penfold-Becerra 2011, Crisp 1998, Hawkins 2010, López Maya 2011, López Maya and Panzarelli 2009). Some useful 
comparisons focusing on more specific aspects, and including at least one of the three cases are (Conaghan and Malloy 
1994, De La Torre 2013b, Luna 2010a, Madrid 2012, Mayorga 2006, Philip and Panizza 2011, Morgan 2012, Sánchez 
2008, Seawright 2012, Segura and Bejarano 2004, Silva 2009, Van Cott 2005). 
241 To the extent that one analyst characterized his leadership style as “technopopulism” (De La Torre 2013a). 
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a project of encapsulation of constituencies through their participation in social programs –which 
does not mean, as we will see, that they were necessarily incompatible with genuine concerns 
about encouraging direct participation. Morales could count on more solidly organized 
constituencies, which made them less volatile, but also less deferential. 
The electoral expansion of Evo Morales’ Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) looks 
certainly fast, if compared with the far more gradual processes of political accumulation 
experienced, for example, by the PT in Brazil or the Uruguayan Frente Amplio. It lacks, 
however, the abruptness characteristic of the eruption of the majorities that put Chávez and, 
especially, Correa, in the presidency. As a matter of fact, already in 2002 MAS performed quite 
impressively in the election that resulted in Sánchez de Losada’s second presidency. The 
foundations of the party, however, lie even farther back in the past. It is well known that its 
initial organizational building blocks, and core social bases and constituency, emerged with the 
cocalero movement of the Chapare and other peasant organizations. Those movements were a 
direct result not only of the policies directly aiming at the eradication of the cultivation of coca in 
the area, but more generally of a pervasive process of “ruralization of politics (Anria 2010).” 
Such process was decisively stimulated by the political decentralization mandated by the 1994 
Popular Participation Law and the 1995 Law of Administrative Decentralization. So when the 
MAS formally emerged, in the early 2000s, it was as an umbrella organization aiming to project 
at a national level a coalition of already consolidated peasant organizations.  
The escalation of social mobilization that would find its first peak in the Water War 
constituted a decisive turning point for the MAS to gain visibility at a national level. The 
movement’s capacity to go beyond the specific vindications of the cocaleros and articulate a 
more comprehensive anti-neoliberal identity was a key component of the scaling-up process; so 
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would be the party’s capacity to articulate in a Janus-faced strategy electoral and contentious 
mobilization242. But that “supra-class” (Anria 2010), coalitional strategy, also required 
organizational adjustments and a diversification of linkage strategies, particularly in order to 
develop urban constituencies. If the MAS did undoubtedly adjust in creative ways, it also 
showed a remarkable capacity to appropriate for its own purpose part of the political capital built 
by other actors. The capture of networks and political operators previously developed by 
Conciencia de Patria (CONDEPA), once this party began its decline, was an essential part of the 
process.243 Indeed, according to Anria, the urban penetration of MAS cannot be understood 
without referring to the dealignment that resulted in CONDEPA’s electoral evaporation. “MAS 
did not simply fill the vacant space; [A]long with CONDEPA’s evanescence, there was a transfer 
of their political practices to MAS. This occurred as ex-CONDEPA operators and leaders 
quickly became masistas (Anria 2010).” 
The point I want to emphasize is that, as the contentious escalation of the early 2000s led 
to a clustering of the forces released by the backlash of neoliberal reforms around MAS, the 
party’s electoral growth went hand in hand with the diversification of its constituencies. This 
process entailed a series of challenges that would only become more acute with the passage from 
opposition to government. First, the compatibilization of the only partially complementary 
demands of the different pieces of such a diverse coalition, and the administration of the friction 
eventually occurring among them. Second, the development of levels of coordination and 
                                                 
242 See (Anria 2013, Laserna 2010, Madrid 2011, 2012). 
243 “This party was built around the charismatic leadership of [Carlos] Palenque, and its political practices combined the 
extensive use of clientelism, paternalism, plebiscitary appeals to the masses, unmediated relationships to constituents, 
and a strong antisystemic discourse. In part because CONDEPA failed to consolidate party structure and to forge 
organic linkages with its constituency, once the charismatic leader died in 1997 the party practically died along with its 
founder (Anria 2010).” 
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professionalization of partisan elites necessary to guarantee at least a minimum of governing 
capacity. Third, also aiming at this last goal, the moderation of the use of the party’s contentious 
repertoire.  
Once in government, those problems would dovetail with the ones already alluded that 
result from the diminished capacities of a state fragmented by capture by socioeconomic elites 
and clientelistic colonization by the parties now in opposition. Those dilemmas were by no 
means Evo Morales’ exclusive ones; specific modulations of time and space notwithstanding, 
both Chávez and Correa had to suffer through them too. Throughout the remainder of this 
section, I intend to show two things. First, that the respective attempted solutions were decisively 
constrained by the specific trajectories that led each one of them to power. Second, that, being in 
all cases central components of those attempted solutions, the respective social policy mixes 
exhibit differences that are themselves product of those specific paths. Third, without exception, 
the solutions were developed by complicated processes of trial and error, with results chronically 
precarious and uncertain. 
The strategy of the MAS combined four elements. First, the incorporation, usually by 
invitation, of public intellectuals, and of candidates, political operators and militants, who had in 
the past been enlisted in diverse leftist parties and brought organizational expertise, familiarity 
with electoral campaigning, and parliamentary experience. Second, an impulse towards the 
“oligarchization” of decision-making processes. Third, a strident emphasis on nationalist rhetoric 
as the only possible ideological common denominator. Fourth, growing reliance on Morales’ 
leadership as the most solid unifying factor, and as final arbiter in situations of internal 
stalemate. As we will immediately see, all four elements can easily be identified in the cases of 
Ecuador and Venezuela. The distinctive element of the Bolivian situation was the solidity of the 
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foundational coalitional fulcrum, which made the blending of new partners and procedures very 
imperfect and incomplete. As a result, Roberto Laserna could identify the persistent 
fragmentation of the Morales administration in three factions with different ideological 
orientations, political priorities, and preferred areas of activity.244  
Neither Chávez’s Revolución Bolivariana, nor Correa’s Revolución Ciudadana, had any 
comparable foundational core of autonomous popular mobilization; actually, they were both born 
out of very different elite organizations.  In the first case, the embryo was a clandestine civil-
military conspiratorial organization initiated by young officers in the 1980s with the explicit goal 
of overthrowing the puntofijista regime. The activities of the Movimiento Bolivariano 
Revolucionario 200 (MBR 200) were decisively intensified by the cycle of popular riots 
triggered by the neoliberal reforms of the Pérez administration in 1989. A direct result, three 
years later, was an aborted military coup that ended with Chávez and some of his colleagues in 
prison. Once pardoned by president Caldera, Chávez oriented his activities to the formation of 
study groups and “Bolivarian committees,” mixing civilians and former military with purposes 
the elaboration and diffusion of the movement´s doctrine and political strategy.245  The MBR 200 
                                                 
244 See (Laserna 2007, 2010). This author identifies in first place an indigenista current, represented by Minister of Foreign 
Affairs David Choquehuanca, that includes most of the aymara leaders, and that prioritizes the “cultural and democratic 
revolution,” emphasizing the process of “internal decolonization” and the recognition of indigenous identities. Second, a 
“socialist” current, under the intellectual leadership of vice-president  Álvaro García Linera and predominantly formed 
by  militants of “the old statist lef,” technocrats aiming to re-edit the developmentalist formulas of the 1960s, and hard-
core marxist ideologues.  Third, a “populist” orientation, incarnated in president Morales himself, that sees the 
administration as a “government of social movements,” organized around the demands and direct participation of 
unions, peasant movements, and diverse community-based organizations. According to Laserna, each one of the three 
orientation has its own preferred area of activity and predominance within the government. The mark of the indigenistas is 
particularly apparent in the official rhetoric, the symbolic dimension of governmental action, and the external image of 
the country, reaching high visibility in the media and the Constituent Assembly. The formulation and development of 
public policies –particularly in the economic realm- constitutes a jurisdiction that tends to be controlled by the socialists. 
In spite of an important participation in the cabinet, the Constituent Assembly, and the legislative, the populists have 
their preferred stronghold in the administration of the movement’s presence and contentious activity in the streets. 
245 See (Corrales and Penfold-Becerra 2011, López Maya and Panzarelli 2009, Roberts 2006). 
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thus entered into a stage of expansion that, according to López Maya, quickly led it to a point 
when, leaving aside its peculiar military-civilian origins, it closely began to resemble other 
contemporary Venezuelan mass parties. The same author notices, however, that it could never 
contain all those that “through the most diverse social and ideological paths,” had come to 
sympathize with its leader. Already in the mid-1990s, bolivarianismo was fed by heterogeneous 
mosaic of popular organizations, leftist parties, and other more informal groups (López Maya 
and Panzarelli 2009). The decision to abandon electoral abstention, in 1997, seemed to require a 
drastic organizational re-orientation. However, the Movimiento Quinta República (MVR) was 
initially conceived as a parallel structure with exclusive purposes of electoral campaigning. The 
subsequent recurrence of elections and plebiscites would end leading it to replace the MRB 200. 
However, what did not change was Chávez´s reluctance to move it beyond a very primary level 
of organizational development, keeping it a pure instrument of almost permanent electoral 
mobilization, with a vertical and highly centralized structure of command with him at his top. 
Rafael Correa´s campaigning instrument and administration also developed from an elite 
organization, but of a completely different nature. The Foro Ecuador Alternativo (FEA) was 
created by a group of economists, academics, and entrepreneurs, aiming to develop 
programmatic alternatives to then hegemonic neoliberal orthodoxy.246 The FEA gained visibility 
and credentials of intellectual respectability through a series of studies, publications and 
seminars that may have contributed to place Correa in Alfredo Palacio´s cabinet, as Finance 
Minister, in 2005 (Ospina 2008). Correa only lasted three months as a member of an 
administration in accelerated decline, and the FEA and a group of personal acquaintances would 
                                                 
246 “Unlike Evo Morales, whose political career and MAS party began in the grassroots struggle over coca eradication 
policies, the Correa Project was hatched inside the heads of a small group of intellectuals, technocrats, and political 
operatives (Conaghan 2011).” 
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provide the initial nucleus for the creation of the Movimiento PAIS (Patria Altiva y Soberana), 
with the purpose of organizing his presidential campaign. PAIS was little more than an electoral 
campaign command organization, an attribute accentuated by Correa´s decision not to present 
candidates to congress. Moreover, the results obtained in the first round of the presidential 
election were quite modest –Correa gained access to the runoff with 22.84% of the vote, and 
most of support that ended making him president was completely external to his organization. 
Actually, that support did not even fully come from the center and left; according to Conaghan, 
the combined forces of left and center-left were insufficient to form a pro-Correa majority. That 
majority could only be completed thanks to many local political bosses who, having “left open to 
freelance” by Lucio Gutiérrez’s reluctance to endorse any candidate, chose to back Correa 
(Conaghan 2011). 
8.4.2 The political sources of social assistance diversity (II): strategies of hegemonic 
governance 
The three new elected administrations initiated with very similar priorities and strategies. In all cases, 
efforts were oriented in first place to accumulate governmental power and increase state autonomy 
with respect to traditional socio-economic, political and bureaucratic elites. The process of power 
accumulation operated along three axis. First, a vertical one, that linked states to different coalitions 
of interests and corporate interests –what the Correa administration would call des-corporativización 
(“de-corporatization”) of the administration.247 Second, a horizontal, spatial one, that involved the 
relationship between central governments and regional and local authorities –frequently captured by, 
                                                 
247 See (Ospina 2008, 2009, Ramírez Gallegos 2010). 
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or at least clearly aligned with, local oligarchies (Eaton 2011, 2013). Third, a horizontal one defining 
the distribution of power among the different branches of the central government.  
These parallel movements were handled through diverse strategies, but two instruments 
were central pieces in all cases: constitutional reforms and the expansion of rents from the 
exploitation of mineral resources. The effects of constitutional reforms operated a several levels. 
They accentuated the foundational auto-assigned character of the respective administrations, 
crystallized their ideological and programmtic orientations in the new constitutional texts, 
strengthened presidential authority, opened the legal viability of extended mandates, and 
strengthened governments’ plebiscitarian legitimacy. The expansion of rents from mineral 
resources were legitimized, quite in tune with the nationalistic rhetoric of the three regimes, as 
initiatives toward the restoration of “national sovereignty.” They also provided fiscal space for 
the fulfillment of electoral promises without facing the complexities of significant re-definitions 
of taxation systems (Mazzuca 2013, Weyland 2009a, b). 
Social policies were a central concern of the three administrations from the beginning, 
which immediately increased the resources assigned to the alleviation of situations of poverty. 
What is striking, however, is the extent to which the new post-neoliberal mixes of social policy 
resembled –in some cases even continued- their neoliberal predecessors. True, efforts were clear 
in the three countries not only to increase levels of expenditure, but also to improve the design 
and implementation of some policies; and some relevant initiatives were introduced, for 
example, in the area of primary health care for pregnant mothers and infants. Yet, the big picture 
of segmented welfare regimes with very limited risk-pooling remained basically untouched. Of 
course, the argument could be made that initiating in-depth structural reforms required the 
creation of minimal political conditions by developing basic state capacities, and that doing 
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otherwise would have equaled putting the cart before the ox. As a matter of fact, the recognition 
of universal social rights to social protection and health care was made an essential chapter of the 
new constitutions without exception. However, advances in the direction of the effective 
materialization of those rights through public policy remained modest. Interestingly, in spite of 
the remarkable concentration of executive authority brought by some institutional reforms, 
coordination across ministries, policies and programs has remained very poor. Still, attempts at 
innovation have not been completely absent, and the analysis of frustrations and blockades is 
telling. 
8.4.2.1 Bolivia  
The most significant novelties introduced by the Morales administration came under the form of 
cash transfers and a basic health care program for pregnant mothers and children.248  
The only initiative against the established targeting paradigm, a universal, non-contributory 
old age-pension scheme (Renta Dignidad), continued in important aspects the BONOSOL introduced 
ten years before by Sánchez de Losada’s first administration.249  
                                                 
248 The Bono Madre-Niño and the Bono Juana Azurduy, administered by the Ministry of Health, were introduced in 2009, 
with the goal of reducing rates of infant and maternal mortality, and chronic malnutrition amongst children below 2 
years of age. 
249 The predominant concerns at the root of the creation of BONOSOL were not social, but political. Presented as part 
of an experiment in “popular capitalism,” the initiative was instrumental to the legitimation of pervasive privatization. 
The transfer was supposed to be funded through the “capitalization” of dividends from the privatization of public assets 
–dividends that, significantly, were put in the hands of administrators of private pension funds for their management. 
With such shaky financial foundations, the experiment lasted ten years. After abolishing it, the MAS government 
resurrected it with a new name and fresh funding, this time from the Direct Hydrocarbons Tax. The new scheme 
introduced some modifications in terms of coverage, by extending eligibility to citizens above the age of 60, and 
dropping its restriction to the elderly born before 1975; the amount of the transfer was increased by 25% (from US$ 235 
to US$ 314). The new financial formula found strong resistance from opposition parties, since it initially entailed a 
reduction of tax shares received by regions, municipalities, and universities –municipalities would finally be granted a 
compensation, and universities exempted. Strongest opposition came from regions controlled by the opposition, where 
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The constitutional reform brought more drastic changes, since public administration of 
social security was introduced as a mandate in the new constitution, approved in 2008 -the mandate 
became effective after the approval of Law 065, in 2011. The law reunifies the social protection 
system under public administration and creates a new pension pillar guaranteeing a minimum 
universal benefit, but maintains the principle of contributions-based individual capitalization. It also 
1) increases pension benefits; lowers the minimum retirement age; reinstates employers’ contribution 
(3%); 2) integrates Renta Dignidad as a basic non-contributory benefit; 3) expands the system´s 
financial base through additional contributions from general revenue; and 4) defines special 
retirement conditions for workers in the mining sector.  
Although we lack in-depth investigation on the political process through which this reform 
was designed, two aspects of the story seem remarkable. First, the opposition of the Central Obrera 
Boliviana (COB), an important component of the government´s initial support coalition, to the 
creation of a solidarity fund to subsidize the lowest pensions through part of the employers’ and 
employees’ contributions (CEDLA 2010). Second, the fact that only one of the three administrations 
considered here took a step in the direction of universalization that entailed reductions in the 
benefits of “insiders” of the existing social protection regime. In spite of rhetoric similarities and of 
the common recognition of social rights in the respective reformed constitutions, only the party that 
could rely on its own solidly organized massive constituencies apparently felt strong enough to 
challenge the organized workers of the formal sector. In fact, after more than two weeks of protests 
of salaried urban workers and road blockades, the government’s strategy was the mobilization into 
the cities of the cocaleros and other peasant organizations, in order to “defend the process of 
                                                                                                                                                             
strikes and marches took place. The pensioners’ federation, trade unions and peasant organizations supported the 
redistribution of resources, that was implemented through a law promulgated in November 2007 (Müller 2009). 
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transformation” from “bad” union leaders and “trotskyte” radicals, in the words of vice-president 
García Linera (País 2013). 
8.4.2.2 Ecuador 
The situation of the Correa administration is in that respect, pretty much the opposite. Not 
only because, as we have already seen, the president lacks anything resembling an organized 
partisan based, but also because of his consistent insistence in detaching his administration from 
any social movement or other sort of organized aggregation of interests (Conaghan 2011, Ospina 
2009). On the one hand, in spite of having picked up, during the electoral campaign, the banners 
and vindications of several social movements and left-wing organizations, once in the 
government he has successively entered into acute confrontations with many of them.250 On the 
other hand, the social extraction of the leading cadres of the government looks indeed consistent 
with what appears as an effort to build a sort of autonomous, collective “philosopher king” –a 
platonic entity in more than one sense.251 The inauguration of this administration may still be too 
close to evaluate the extent to which Rafael Correa may have overestimated the possibilities of a 
direct, highly personalized connection between government and citizenry. The new institutional 
design and distribution of functions inside the state structure reveals a clear inclination toward 
the expansion of governmental intervention in multiple aspects of social life, with a particularly 
                                                 
250 Among others, the leftist parties Patchakutik and Movimiento Popular Democrático, the Confederación de Comunidades Indígenas 
de Ecuador (CONAIE), environmentalist movements, the unions of teachers and public employees, and some students’ 
organizations (De La Torre 2013a). In a Rousseaunian vein that actually has points of contact with some  neoliberal 
technocratic litanies, the official discourse maintains that a state can represent truly national interests only the extent that 
its action is kept uncontaminated by corporations and other organizations representing sectorial interests (Ospina 2009). 
251 According to De La Torre, out of a total of thirty-seven officials filling the top positions of Correa´s government, 
twenty-nine did graduate studies, twelve did doctoral studies, and eight (including the president) own doctoral degrees –
in a country, this author observes, where the total number of university professors with doctoral degrees was 358 in 
2010 (De La Torre 2013a). 
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strong emphasis on centralized planning (Ramírez Gallegos 2010). This last aspect is especially 
apparent in the case of the assignation of jurisdictions on social policies (Naranjo Bonilla 2013). 
So far, however, the most remarkable initiatives in this realm, apart from the non-negligible 
increase in public social expenditure, include the duplication of the amounts corresponding to the 
Bono de Desarrollo Humano and the Bono de Vivienda (CCTs), the reduction of utilities tariffs 
for poor households, and the suppression of some fees charged by public hospitals.252  
8.4.2.3 Venezuela 
The Venezuelan Revolución Bolivariana is the most prolonged among the experiments here considered. 
Even if we limit our analysis to the years ranging between Hugo Chávez’s first presidential election 
and his death, it is possible to identify sub-periods in the general dynamics and self-definition of his 
political project. The main turning point defining those stages are also relevant to the analysis of the 
development of social policies.  
The initial approach to social policy (1990-2002). The first period runs until the frustrated coup 
attempt of 2002. During these initial years, social policy was framed by two documents -the 
normative definitions of the “Bolivarian” constitution, and the Plan Bolívar 2000- and perhaps the 
main aspect requiring an explanation is the gap between the ambitious ideological and programmatic 
statements of the former, and the scarcely innovative approach of the latter. It is not that innovation 
was completely absent. First, because there was increase in public spending.253 Second, because 
                                                 
252 See (Minteguiaga 2012, Nehring 2012, Ospina 2008, Ramírez Gallegos and Minteguiaga 2007).  
253 The curve of public social expenditure experienced between 1999 and 2012, important oscillations that reflect the 
extreme volatility and fragility determined by its close dependence from the ups and downs of oil prices. As a percentage 
of GDP, public social spending grew from 9% in 1999 to 11% in 2000, remaining stagnated until 2002. As a percentage 
of total public spending, it remained stable (40%) between 1999 and 2002, growing up to 41% in 2003. 2003 marks the 
beginning of a significant and steady increase, that peaks in 2007 and immediately starts a decline that lasts until 2010, 
274 
 
institutional transformations were considerable. The constitution not only expanded the list of rights 
defining the profile of social citizenship, but also introduced a new emphasis on the participatory 
dimensions of citizenship. The second aspect not only entailed diverse mechanisms of direct 
democracy, but also direct involvement in the management of social services. However, at the same 
time, and in spite of defining Venezuela as a federal republic, some aspects of the re-concentration 
of executive authority in the presidency partially reversed the progress made by decentralization 
during the previous decade.254 After the approval of the reformed constitution, additional changes 
were introduced in the organization of the executive, like the suppression of the Ministry of the 
Family –up to that point in charge of most targeted programs- to merge it in a Ministerio de Salud y 
Desarrollo Social (MSDS). The funding of the multiple focalized programs was centralized in a Fondo 
Único Social (FUS). This initial centralization of the design and coordination of social policy would be 
partially reversed in 2005, with the creation of a Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Participación y  
Protección Social, and a Ministerio para la Economía Popular, both of which took control of some of the 
programs assigned to the MSDS. 
The new strategic framework for social programs was initially provided by the Plan Bolívar 
2000, which would be followed by a Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Económico y Social 2001-2007. 
Regardless of the profusion of documents, the most important innovation was the implementation 
of the new constitutional mandate for the armed forces to participate in national development. The 
plan was presented as a “civic-military” initiative, coordinated by the Defense Ministry (Aponte 
Blank 2012). The armed forces are supposed to lend their infrastructure, organization and resources, 
                                                                                                                                                             
recovering up to a point close to the high levels of 2007 between 2011 and 2012. Even during periods of decline, 
however, the level of expenditure remained clearly high for Latin American standards. Its distribution by sub-sectors 
shows education with the biggest share, followed by social security, health care, and housing (Aponte Blank 2010, 2012).  
254 See (Contreras Natera 2003, González and Lacruz 2007). 
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to facilitate the attention of the most urgent situations of social exclusion. In concrete terms, this 
meant their involvement in the implementation of social programs. That involvement has tended to 
take place without using the established institutional channels of the public administration -
something that creates multiple problems regarding the lack of coordination, continuity and 
consistency with programs managed by civilian entities. The programs themselves, however, 
exhibited a marked continuity with the ones of the previous decades, maintaining their focalized, 
temporary, and compensatory nature.255 The dual nature of the structure of social protection as a 
whole, based on the parallel functioning of these programs and the highly fragmented social security 
system covering formally employed urban workers, was left untouched.256  
Venezuela had arrived to the 1990s with a social security system that limited its coverage to 
urban workers, was segmented in multiple “special regimes,” lacked internal coordination, and was 
inefficient and regressive. After several frustrated reformist attempts, a new Ley Orgánica del Sistema de 
Seguridad Social and a Ley del Subsistema de Salud de la Seguridad Social, were approved in 1998, close to 
the end of the Caldera administration. Both laws were basically an attempt to expand the coverage 
and restore the financial viability of the social security system by transferring the administration of 
pension funds expand and the administration of health services to the private sector.257 Both laws 
were derogated as soon as the new administration took office. Chávez accepted the proposal of 
                                                 
255 Moreover, 9 of the 14 programs initiated under the Caldera administration were ratified  and extended in 1999 
(Patruyo 2008). 
256 The narrative that follows is based on (D'Elía, Lacruz, and Maingon 2006, Díaz Polanco 2006, González and Lacruz 
2007, Gutiérrez Briceño 2008). 
257 By 1997, 76% of aggregated health expenditure was already private, in a country with two thirds of its population in 
situation of poverty. The reform included the privatization of several medical services and the suppression of 
governmental controls over the prices of several basic pharmaceutical products. There was also an important 
decentralization of public services that were transferred to regional governments with the main goal of reducing the 
financial burden and obligations of the central administration. What in the end ended being a transference of serious 
financial deficit stimulated further privatization of services (Brading 2013). 
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separation of the administration of social security and health care, and a presidential committee was 
formed and placed within the orbit of the Ministry of Finance, with the goal of defining the main 
lines for the creation of a national healthcare system. The initiative resulted in a round of 
negotiations, with participation of more than 40 actors from the sector and international experts, 
which ended with a series of recommendations. These recommendations, however, were not taken 
into consideration for the elaboration of the Ley de Salud approved in 2004. Surprisingly, this law not 
only reversed the few changes that had increased the system’s efficiency during the 1990s, but also 
ignored the constitutional mandate for decentralization.258 
The social security component experienced an important expansion of access to old-age 
pensions, climbing from 400.000 people in 1998 to 2.300.000 in October 2012, and in the amounts 
paid. Still, access remains very limited –by 2009, only 43% of the 60-years and older population 
received a pension (Aponte Blank 2012). Its significance notwithstanding, on the other hand, that 
expansion was not the result of any reorganization of the financial bases of the system, but of a 
series of ad hoc, one-time injections of funds from oil rents established by presidential decrees. 
According to Salcedo, since no financial planning was associated with those successive 
incorporations, no regular budgetary resources were assigned to their funding, creating the recurrent 
need for additional injections (Salcedo 2013). What did not suffer any modification was the extreme 
fragmentation of the social security system in multiple “special regimes.”259 
                                                 
258 According to Díaz Polanco, although the transfer of competences in healthcare administrations to the states brought 
positive results, the fact that such transformation took place in the context of a strongly market-oriented reformist wave 
has made it difficult to separate the experience of decentralization from the general perception of that framework (Díaz 
Polanco 2006); see also (Aponte Blank 2012). 
259 In 2012, the list included, apart from the Instituto Venezolano de los Seguros Sociales, the following organisms for specific 
sub-categories of public employees: Instituto de Previsión Social de las Fuerzas Armadas; Instituto de Previsión y Asistencia Social 
del Personal del Ministerio de Educación; Instituto Autónomo de Previsión Social del Cuerpo de Investigaciones Científicas, Penales y 
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By 2002, both the PB 2000 and the FUS –which had both initially received important 
financial resources- had lost visibility, to the extent of disappearing from the governments’ own 
reports of its achievements. Such a discreet dismissal can probably be at least partially explained by 
the chain of episodes of administrative corruption in which their administrators were involved 
(Aponte Blank 2012). 
The vicissitudes of social protection in those initial years of the Chávez administration 
cannot be adequately understood without taking into consideration the general context of escalation 
in the intensity of political conflict, on the one hand, and the frictions with some of the actors 
operating in the healthcare sector. The first aspect had effects at several levels. In first place, it put 
friction with the opposition and the need to engage in an almost permanent electoral campaign at 
the top of governmental priorities. Second, the oil strike initiated by state-owned PDVSA, on top of 
affecting the economic climate in general, had also a direct impact on the budget, narrowing the 
government’s fiscal space. Finally, the temporarily successful coup confirmed the importance of a 
more solid encapsulation of militants loyal to the government, and at the same time revealed the 
existence of important deficits in terms of legitimacy.  
The frictions with the medical corporation and other interests in the healthcare sector were 
going to have convergent effects. According to Brading, Chávez initially appointed his health 
ministers with the project of a reorganization of healthcare based on the paradigm known as Latin 
                                                                                                                                                             
Criminalísticas; Fondo de Inversión y Previsión Socioeconómica para el Personal, Empleados y Obreros de las Fuerzas Armadas Nacionales; 
Servicio Autónomo de Prestaciones Sociales de los Organismos de la Administración Central; Fundación para los Servicios de Salud y 
Previsión Social de la Contraloría General de la República; and the Institutos de Previsión Social de las Universidades Nacionales e 
Institutos Experimentales (Salcedo 2013). 
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American Social Medicine (LASM) in mind.260 The project, generated in a top-down fashion, met a 
frontal resistance from the Federación Médica Venezolana (FMV), and a more oblique, but not less 
effective one, from the ministerial bureaucracy.261 Resistance was not just a matter of institutional 
inertia (although that was an important factor), but also of defense of corporate interests. And it was 
part of the more general political confrontation, given that the medical infrastructure was one of the 
last areas still controlled by the opposition (Brading 2013). Besides, the appointment of military 
personnel on the top positions of the bureaucracy not only introduced the problem of the 
integration in a civilian administration, but also created additional sources of friction resulting from 
cases of corruption and the manipulation of programs for political purpose governmental routines, 
which frequently undermined the very same planning that the presidency aimed to implant from the 
top. 
The final resolution of the political crisis created by the oil strike and the coup gave Chávez 
the resources to by-pass the healthcare structure, opening the cycle of governmental 
experimentation with the organization of Misiones (missions) for the delivery of diverse social 
services. The organizational basis of the experiment were not completely new. From the very 
beginning, the government had encouraged and supported the formation of a network of political 
organizations, external to the rudimentary structures of the MVR, and directly committed to the 
defense of the president, ideological dissemination, and campaigning activities. It also encouraged a 
second type of organization in poor neighborhoods and rural areas, oriented to cooperation with the 
state in the identification of deficits in the provision of public services, and the administration of 
                                                 
260 This is an approach that strongly opposes the privatization of health, advocates for a strong role for the state in 
guaranteeing access to services as a social right, stresses the importance of considering the socio-economic determinants 
of disease, and emphasizes the importance of primary preventive healthcare (Briggs and Mantini-Briggs 2009). 
261 See (D'Elía, Lacruz, and Maingon 2006, Maingon 2004, 2006). 
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solutions.262 As a result, chavismo was from very early on constituted as a mosaic of “a large number 
of organizations of varying size, degrees of autonomy from the government, and trajectories of 
organization. […] Typically, the largest organizations are the newest and most dependent on the 
state for financing and leadership, although many smaller organizations (such as the Bolivarian labor 
unions and producer associations) are relatively new and vie for the attention and recognition of the 
government. At the intersection of these different organizations are the Bolivarian Circles (Hawkins 
2010).”  
After 2002: the experience of the Misiones. Kirk Hawkins has carefully reconstructed the curve of 
ascent and decay of the Circles. They were born in the late nineties, as part of the already mentioned 
effort to organize like-minded citizens in order to reach out and expand the MRB 200 among the 
civilian population. The effort was to a great extent abandoned as a result of the tactical switch to 
electoral competition, resulting in the creation of Círculos Patrióticos that would end constituting the 
embryo of the MVR apparatus. In 2001, Chávez called for a resurrection of the Bolivarian Circles as 
part of his effort to reorganize the MRB 200, and they would end playing a central role in the 
demonstrations following his temporary removal from office in early 2002.263 Although they would 
afterwards end being replaced by other forms of organization specifically focused on more concrete 
areas of action, they provided an important foundation for the subsequent development of the 
Missions. 
                                                 
(Maingon 2004). 
262 Among the first, we find círculos bolivarianos (Bolivarian circles), unidades de batalla electoral (electoral battle units), 
and batallones electorales (electoral batallions); in the second category, mesas técnicas de agua (related to the provision 
of drinkable water to communities), comités de tierra (land committees), and comités de salud (health committees) 
(Hawkins 2010, Hawkins and Hansen 2006, López Maya and Panzarelli 2009). 
263 See    (D'Elía 2006, Hawkins and Hansen 2006). 
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The development of the Missions found an initial trigger in the food and fuel shortages 
produced by the 2002 general strike, which led the government to mobilize volunteers and 
community organizations, building on the popular markets already created by the Plan Bolívar 
(Hawkins 2010). A second, direct political incentive came from the displacement, in 2003, of the 
scenarios of political conflict –now reconfigured under the form of a recall referendum aiming to 
discontinue Chávez’s presidential mandate. That being the case, they translated a certain sense of 
urgency for the production of policy results, and they fundamentally aimed at strengthening the 
connection between the president and his supporters. The main goal was the accelerated and 
massive increase in the attention of the poorest population regarding basic needs like alimentation, 
healthcare and education. That sense of urgency to a great extent explains their extra-institutional 
character –which on the other hand allowed to present them as a sort of prefiguration of a future 
type of state, free from bureaucratic inertias and more attentive at the concrete demands of its 
citizens (Patruyo 2008). They thus were, D’Elía observes, coordinated through ad hoc mechanisms. 
There was always a direct involvement of the presidency, and they were all organized and 
implemented through the participation of different public entities –including the armed forces. The 
urgency to expedite the delivery of services also resulted, however, in high levels of improvisation, 
leading to duplication of costs and deficits in the production and processing of information with 
evaluation purposes (Aponte Blank 2012). The tightening of the executive’s control over PDVSA 
after the oil strike brought a flux of extraordinary resources that made the experiment financially 
viable. At the same time, it made its financial accountability very difficult, given that its functioning 
not only by-passes established institutional policy-making channels, but also the regular budget 
(D'Elía 2006). 
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As D’Elía has noticed, missions’ substantive contents are not very different from the policies 
and programs that the Chávez administration had been developing since 1999-2000 –and, in some 
cases, neither from some of the programs initiated by previous administrations (D'Elía 2006). 
Moreover, some of their aspects accentuate the erratic nature and poor coordination already noticed. 
Part of the novelty, at least in theory, comes from the modifications introduced in patterns of 
governance. In Hawkins’s words, “from one emphasizing atomistic participation in the market to 
one relying on cooperatives, state coordination, and local know-how, a system the government calls 
‘endogenous development’ (Hawkins 2010).”264 The quantitative aspect, on the other hand, should 
not be underestimated: according to some estimations, the Missions represented in 2004-2005 
almost 2.5% of GDP and 20% of the central government’s social expenditure (Aponte Blank 
2008).265 
The case of Misión Barrio Adentro. I don´t intend to analyze here the totality of Missions, since 
most of them do not directly deal with the policy areas this dissertation concentrates on. I will 
however provide a short analysis of the development of Barrio Adentro, not only because it deals with 
health care, but also because, being one of the first set in many aspects a blueprint for the following 
ones. The first Mission was the unexpected by-product of an initiative of community-level 
organization aiming to integrate different social policy areas. Within that project, several health 
                                                 
264 The concept of “endogenous development” as an alternative to neoclassical models of development has its 
intellectual roots in neostructuralist formulations of ECLAC economists in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Antonio 
Vázquez Barquero elaborated it as a strategy more adequate to  the conditions of “late development” areas of Southern 
Spain than the model based on urban “poles” of industrial development.  It is based on the mobilization of local 
resources by communities, organized through cooperative and small-scale cooperative forms of entrepreneurial 
organization oriented to the creation of “endogenous technological nuclei”. On the model, see (Sunkel 1995, Vázquez 
Barquero 1999); on its adaptation to Venezuela (Alvarado Chacín 2013). 
265 That is, an expert notices, a fundamental difference with the social programs of the previous decade, with which they 
share a focalized design: spending on those programs between 1989 and 1998 rarely went beyond 15%, remained around 
1.5% of GDP (Aponte Blank 2008, 2010). 
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committees formed in some barrios of Caracas produced in April of 2003 a project called Casas de la 
Salud y de la Vida. The goal was the construction of 734 attention centers that could provide integral 
health care for 250,000 families of the poor neighborhoods of the municipality of Libertador. 
However, the recruitment of Venezuelan doctors willing to work in the barrios became an obstacle 
that forced the Mayor to explore other alternatives.  
Venezuela had received in 1999, after a massive disaster, the cooperation of Cuban medical 
brigades including doctors, nurses, and hygienist technicians. After the emergency, the governments 
subscribed a cooperation agreement that included the possibility of future medical assistance by 
Cuban brigades. Based on the existence of that precedent, a new agreement was signed by Cuba and 
the Municipality in order to provide the doctors for the latter’s project.266 Adopted as a model by a 
presidential commission, what had become the Plan Barrio Adentro was first extended to the states of 
Zulia, Lara, Carabobo and Apure, and then became the blueprint for a primary health care program 
to be extended to the whole country. The Misión Barrio Adentro was formally created in December 
2003 by a new presidential commission that combined the health care project with other activities to 
stimulate the transformation of the socioeconomic and environmental conditions in poor 
neighborhoods. Coordination was initially assigned to a commission integrated by a team of doctors, 
independent from the Ministry of Health and Social Development, and presided by the Minister of 
the Secretary of the Presidency. Before the end of the year, however, a new presidential commission 
of 12 members, with a more diverse composition, would be appointed267. In spite of the initial 
adoption of the original profile of a program aiming to articulate diverse social policies, this 
                                                 
266 Only in 2003, a total of 10,169 Cuban doctors were distributed across the country (Patruyo 2008). 
267 See (Brading 2013, González and Lacruz 2007, Patruyo 2008). 
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approach was very soon replaced by the idea of an alternative health plan designed to cover the 
limitations of the existing healthcare system. 
Table 22: Missions, areas of activity and dates of initiation 
Table 22: Missions, areas of activity and dates of initiation 
I. Mission II. Date of decree III. Main area of activity 
IV. Barrio Adentro V. April 2003 VI. Health Care 
VII. Robinson VIII. May 2003 IX. Remedial education (literacy) 
X. Robinson II XI. October 2003 XII. Remedial education (primary) 
XIII. Sucre XIV. July 2003 XV. Decentralized university education 
XVI. Ribas XVII. November 2003 XVIII. Remedial education (secondary) 
XIX. Guaicaipuro XX. October 2003 XXI. Communal land titles and indigenous groups’ rights 
XXII. Miranda XXIII. October 2003 XXIV. Military militias created as a military reserve 
XXV. Piar XXVI. October 2003 XXVII. Assistance to environmentally-sustainable small-scale mining 
XXVIII. Mercal XXIX. April 2003 XXX. Subsidized food 
XXXI. Identidad XXXII. February 2004 XXXIII. Distribution of new national identity cards and record keeping of 
Missions’ aid recipients XXXIV. Vuelvan Caras/Che Guevara XXXV. March 2004 XXXVI. Vocational training and cooperatives 
XXXVII. Habitat  XXXVIII. August 
2004 
XXXIX. Housing 
XL. Zamora XLI. January 2005 XLII. Land redistribution 
XLIII. Cultura XLIV. July 2005 XLV. Sponsorship and dissemination of popular culture and arts 
XLVI. Negra Hipólita XLVII. January 2006 XLVIII. Assistance for diverse marginalized groups (drug addicts, homeless) 
XLIX. Ciencia L. February 2006 LI. Collaborative networks for local scientific research 
LII. Madres del Barrio LIII. March 2006 LIV. Social assistance for indigent mothers and female household heads 
LV. Árbol LVI. May 2006 LVII. Reforestation and environmental education 
Sources: (D'Elía 2006, Hawkins 2010)  
The organization of the extended experiment met two important bottlenecks. The first one 
appeared with the modification of the general goals of the program, which led the government to 
change its strategy. The presidential commission then put the coordination in the hands of the 
Coordinación Nacional de Atención Primaria, of the MSDS. The Cuban Medical Mission was reluctant to 
sacrificing any part of its autonomy, and resisted the inclusion in the Venezuelan institutional 
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apparatus. According to some analysts, this decision created additional difficulties for the 
coordination of MBA.268  
The second bottleneck emerged as a result of the addition of three subsequent stages to the 
projected development of the Mission (named Barrio Adentro II, III, and IV).269 Although the IVSS 
had initially lent its support to the project, divergences of the union of IVSS doctors with the 
modalities used to hire personal for the Mission paralyzed the remodeling of facilities in 2005. BAII 
aimed at the addition of eventually necessary para-clinical diagnostic examinations and more 
complex procedures to the initial menu of preventive and basic curative care. The goal of BAIII was 
the modernization of 299 existing public hospitals that belonged to the MSDS, governorships, the 
Instituto Venezolano de la Seguridad Social (IVSS), and the armed forces. BA IV consisted on the 
construction of 15 new general hospitals, each with a specific area of hyper-specialization (Brading 
2013).  
Neither the IVSS, nor the governorships controlled by the opposition, showed disposition to 
allow the incorporation of installations from their respective jurisdictions to a program completely 
beyond their control.270 In the end, this last episode forms part of a repeatedly emphasized more 
general problem –namely, the government’s lack of inclination to organizational innovation (Patruyo 
2008). In a certain way, this is paradoxical, considering that institutional rigidities and bureaucratic 
inertia had been one of the motivations for the alternative organization leading to the missions. 
                                                 
268 See (Aponte Blank 2008, D'Elía 2006, Patruyo 2008). 
269 See (Patruyo 2008) for an exhaustive description and evaluation of each component. 
270 Interestingly, there is some evidence, however, that the lack of coordination and functional integration between the 
Mission and the institutionalized public healthcare network is to some extent bridged by the patients themselves. Some 
studies have found that the same patients that make MBA their preferred option to access emergency services, choose 
the established network for preventive care (Díaz Polanco 2008).  
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However, the response to the problem was, from very early on, circumvention, not a serious attempt 
to create the political conditions of viability for a reform of state structures. But perhaps even more 
significant is that, once the new, parallel structure began gaining in complexity to the extent of 
becoming unmanageable, the almost automatic reaction is in the direction of re-centralization.271 
8.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter provided a preliminary analysis of the political dynamics behind the expansion of social 
assistance in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. These are the countries where social assistance has 
recently had its most impressive expansion in terms both of spending and coverage. They are also 
the ones in which the institutional factors found to determine patterns of reform in social protection 
are weaker, less articulated, or directly absent. The respective political systems have experienced 
deep institutional crises -in Venezuela associated with a collapse of the entire party system; the other 
two cases having an extended legacy of systemic instability. Their systems of social insurance are 
among the least developed of the region. Finally, they are also among the most notorious examples 
of serial institutional replacement.  This is a convergence of factors a priori suggesting wider margins 
                                                 
271 The other dimension of the problem that has become more and more acute with the expansion of the problem, is the 
availability and management of human resources –which is also somehow surprising, considering the abundance of 
financial resources, and the ideological orientation of the government. Although the personnel initially participating in 
the mission did it as volunteers, the program quickly reached the point of demanding more permanent solutions. 
Particularly health care professionals began to demand regular contracts around mid-2004. Although a movement started 
in the direction of the replacement of volunteers with workers with fixed-term contracts, the union of healthcare 
workers (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Salud) began to demand, in 2006, the regularization under permanent contracts of 
20.000 workers that had become stable personal of the Mission. Working conditions have been precarious also for the 
first 1,024 professionals that in 2007 graduated from the graduate program in Integral General Medicine, specifically 
designed to train specialists for the MBA (Patruyo 2008). 
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for institutional innovation than found in other cases, and the possibility of a distinctive pattern of 
institutional change perhaps associated with recurrent institutional volatility. 
Since they also share the absence of party machines and significant bureaucratic capacity, 
all cases also belong to a common category in the typology built by Luna and Mardones to 
explain variation among strategies of electoral manipulation of the distribution of social 
assistance. This would predict a common pattern of massive distributive politics. The hypothesis 
I explored considered the possibility that, the commonalities observed by Luna and Mardones 
notwithstanding, significant differences among the organization of recently emerging partisan 
forces would lead to important differences in the political manipulation of social assistance. 
Although information is still incomplete and research unevenly distributed across cases, 
the available information seems to support –or at least not to disconfirm- the conclusion that 
such is indeed the case. The central finding is that the organizational structure of incumbent 
political forces previous to their access to governing positions may shape the implementation of 
social assistance for social mobilization. 
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9.0  PRELIMINARY FINDINGS ON SOCIAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE 
This chapter is fully exploratory. The in-depth analysis required to build the narratives that provide 
the core of chapter 7 revealed the persistence of certain patterns of interaction between state and 
society through public policy-making –of governance, in other words. Those patterns, I hypothesize, 
may be directly connected with the pattern of chronic institutional stability and serial replacement 
that characterizes the countries considered in that chapter. What follows are some insights suggested 
by the analysis of that evidence.  
I have divided the chapter in three sections. The first one reconsiders the processes 
analyzed in Chapter VII under a different perspective –that is, focusing on what they reveal 
about eventually emerging patterns of governance. The second expands the comparative range 
by adding a fourth case –that of Argentina- that, while sharing with the other three the “serial 
replacement syndrome,” also presents a radical difference in the presence of a robust machine 
party. The final part extracts some tentative comparative conclusions. 
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9.1 SOCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AS INDICATORS OF EMERGENT 
PATTERNS OF GOVERNANCE 
 
9.1.1 The Venezuelan pattern 
There are two aspects of the experience of Misión Barrio Adentro that I find worth commenting 
on, in the light of the problems analyzed here. The first question is about the extent to which we 
are in the presence of significant alterations in the pattern of governance. In theory, this should 
be expected to result mainly from two processes. One is the facilitation, from the state, of the 
formation of diverse associational entities that are subsequently incorporated to processes of 
implementation, evaluation and correction of some public policies. The second one is the 
subtraction from the operation of the market of an important number of goods and services.  
 
Recent evaluations suggest that the most substantial levels of effective and autonomous 
participation occurred around the formation of Water and Urban Land Committees (Mesas 
Técnicas de Agua and Comités de Tierra Urbana). However, the same very specific nature that 
in some ways made participation more tangible simultaneously limited its incidence to a very 
basic operative level, without significant strategic repercussions (Aponte Blank 2008). More 
generally, one of the main limitations is that, to the extent that it happens, genuine participation 
takes place at a micro-level of interaction, and there are no mechanisms designed to scale-up 
through the integration of those fragmented experiences. There is certainly abundant evidence 
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that not all the motivations behind these governmental initiatives are virtuous ones. The Missions 
pursue, among other goals, the cultivation of electoral support and the dissemination of the 
official ideology.272 This has produced a combination of strategic targeting of resources from the 
top, and self-selection bias at the bottom. Perhaps more consequentially, factionalism has led to 
marginalize NGOs with valuable expertise but not politically aligned with the government from 
the execution of some programs (Aponte Blank 2008).  
Those caveats notwithstanding, even analysts who are not particularly sympathetic to the 
“Bolivarian revolution” acknowledge that, regardless of governmental rhetorical magnification, 
the Missions have effectively reached the poorest sectors, among which they raised genuine 
support.273 That having been said, it is also true that, because of their very extra-institutional 
nature, their impact rests to a great extent on levels of enthusiasm that have been difficult to 
maintain.274 In the specific case of MBA, the most recent evaluations show that routinization and 
exhaustion may be taking their toll, for example, in terms of decreasing availability of doctors 
and intensity of communitarian activity (Díaz Polanco 2008). In any case, there is an undeniable 
increase in the density of community-level organization, but its unevenness seems to be directly 
related to the variation of politico-ideological commitment to the Bolivarian project.275 
                                                 
272 See (Corrales and Penfold-Becerra 2011, Hawkins 2010, López Maya 2011, Penfold-Becerra 2007). 
273 (Aponte Blank 2008, D'Elía 2006, Hawkins 2010). 
274 Paradoxically, however, the informality and organizational volatility of the Missions does not necessary equal shortage 
of institutional construction. Quite the contrary, we assist a process of institutional proliferation at the ministerial level. 
Five new ministries associated with the launching of new missions were created in 2005. The creation of a Ministry of 
Alimentation was associated with Misión Mercal; the Ministry of Popular Economy, with Misión Vuelvan Caras; the 
Ministry of Participation and Social Development, with Misión Negra Hipólita; and the Ministry of Housing and Habitat, 
with Misión Habitat. These new ministries added to the ones already existing in the areas of Education, Health, University 
Education, Labor and Social Security, Communes and Social Protection, Youth, and Woman and Gender Equity.  
275 See (Aponte Blank 2008, D'Elía 2006, Hawkins 2010). 
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The consequences of such unevenness are accentuated by two connected sorts of 
dualization, respectively affecting the dynamics of integration at the level of civil society and the 
structure of the state. Within the former sphere, the problem is that, to the extent that 
community-level organization and participation happens, and regardless of whether its dynamic 
forces operate from the top or bottom-up, the resulting networks of interactions tend to end 
encapsulated within themselves. By definition, the Missions target communities that experience 
a deficit of integration in the general social macro-dynamics. In spite of all their inefficiencies 
and limitations, their sheer number and complementarity favor a reciprocal reinforcement, 
leading to the formation of networks that are very dense, but also self-contained. To the extent 
that those networks strengthen cooperation and cohesiveness, there is a proportional perverse 
effect that accentuates the self-sufficiency and insularity with respect to extra-community social 
life.276  
The frequent intensely partisan coloration of missions’ activities cannot but reinforce 
their insularity. Needless to say that the structural conditions at the root of the phenomenon were 
by no means created by the chavista regime –spatial segregation and social exclusion were 
certainly part of the general crisis of Venezuelan society that made the irruption of chavismo 
possible (Roberts 2003).  But in any case the point is that the political response to that situation 
has the potential to accentuate the very structural foundations of the exclusion and segregation it 
                                                 
276 The situation may have some resemblance with the experience of the main working-class parties consolidated in 
Western Europe between the late 19th and early 20th centuries (see, for example, (Roth 1963). But the differences are in 
themselves revealing. In first place, because the encompassing expansion of capitalist markets was in itself a force of 
integration –integration can also happen through conflict, and the one between working classes and bourgeoisies was 
solidly anchored in structural interdependence. In early 21st century Latin America we have trends of structural change 
going precisely in the opposite direction –that of the fracture between a formal and an informal economy. In second 
place, the typical development of state structures in those decades –of which welfare regimes and national public 
education systems were essential components- was precisely in the direction of forms of integration aiming to contain 
conflict within the limits of a “democratic class struggle (Korpi 1983).”  
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intended to correct. And of course, the general confrontational tone and reciprocal denial of 
legitimacy between government and opposition cannot but consolidate their translation into a 
political cleavage. 
I have already pointed at the dual structure of the emergent system of social protection of 
which the missions form part. But the pattern goes beyond those specific policy areas. The 
general structure of the Venezuelan executive that has emerged from an extensive process of 
institutional change combining layering and serial replacement multiplies dualization at a larger 
scale. Indeed, many of the ministries of recent creation are strongly biased in their goal and 
actions towards constituencies defined by a combination of socioeconomic status and partisan 
loyalty. The result in terms of governance is a fractured state that steers a fractured society by 
connecting specific branches to specific fragments.277  
The second force behind change in patterns of governance is an important process of 
decommodification. The missions have provided an alternative to the market for the satisfaction 
of several important needs. But is not decommodification the key of the egalitarian effects of 
universalistic welfare regimes? The obvious difference is, of course, universalism. While 
citizenship-based decommodification is a powerful integrative force, residual 
decommodification produced as a remedial second-best for the poor is stigmatizing. Leaving 
issues of status, self-perception and identity-formation aside –although those are components of 
governance too- we find once again a fracture in the operation of a governance mechanism. In 
                                                 
277 Once again, this is not completely new in itself –someone could remind us, for example, that Luxembourg has a 
Ministry of the Middle Classes, Tourism and Housing. As Julian Marias once wrote, everything happens everywhere, the 
significant differences being frequently a matter of proportion: the problem with the Venezuelan state is, on the one 
hand, the pervasiveness of that structural fragmentation, and on the other the limited mechanisms of intra-governmental 
coordination. 
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this case the market, that forms part of the forces structuring the lives of middle and high classes 
to an extent that it does not for the majority involved in the informal economy. 
Would it be correct to maintain that, as a compensation, the unevenness of access runs in 
the opposite direction for political participation? Does it provide popular sectors with 
opportunities for engagement in network-based governance that are precluded to those at the top 
of social stratification? Two aspects need to be considered here. One is the extent to which the 
notion of “network” has application to the experience of the missions. Even acknowledging that 
no network including a governmental component is, strictly speaking and by definition, 
horizontal properly, the notion of governance through networks implies some important degree 
of moderation in the operation of hierarchy (Pierre and Peters 2005). As we have seen, this does 
not seem to have been the predominant case. The basic missing aspect, in this sense, is that 
element of joint exploration and definition of priorities that characterizes policy networks (Pierre 
and Peters 2005).278 
The second aspect are the consequences of the uneven distribution of access. I do not 
intend to ignore the universality of that attribute of actually-existing political systems.279 But, 
                                                 
278 Perhaps the best illustration of this point is the contradictory, back-and-forth, pattern of policy production and 
institutional transformation that has been so characteristic of the Bolivarian revolution in government. The essential 
element there is not the element of trial and error per se –which is has actually become a pretty much omnipresent 
attribute of governance in times of uncertainty and global instability, when policy-making has everywhere become more 
“messy”. The expansion of network-based governance is, among other things, a response to uncertain policy 
environments, and part of its benefits come precisely under the form of a certain buffering of the consequences of 
uncertainty through joint exploration. In the Venezuelan case, on the other hand, we have a government that, to the 
extent that it learns, does it on its own, with adjustments that show a marked preference for institutional proliferation 
and (re)centralization. As a result, we have a style of governing that not only seems to develop through chains of ad-hoc 
interventions, but also in which precisely the isolation in which those interventions are decided makes their 
precariousness more likely. 
279 Putting things in almost too-simple terms, the current bias in access to policy-making can be seen as simply a 
dramatic reversion of the biases that defined the dynamics of the previous bipartisan system –and led, by excess of 
rigidity, to its final demise. 
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once again, differences are a matter of degree, and in this case they directly affect what I have 
called the integrative capacity of the system. Any game that may be perceived as systematically 
biased against some players creates in the long term the temptation of kicking the chess-board. It 
is too soon to evaluate consequences in the Venezuelan case, but the consequences of diminished 
political integration for institutional stability constitutes a direction for further exploration in the 
future. 
9.1.2 Social policy and governance in Bolivia and Ecuador 
Do we find the same articulation of social assistance and political mobilization in the other two cases 
that in theory offer the conditions for massive distributive politics? Available in-depth research on 
social policy in those countries is considerably less developed than for Venezuela –among other 
reasons because the former are much more recent, especially in the Ecuadorean case. There seems 
to be enough evidence, however, to suggest that, despite obvious similarities among leadership 
styles, what is emerging in Bolivia and Ecuador in terms of governance does not fit the Venezuelan 
pattern very closely. Neither do they resemble each other any closer, however. As a matter of fact, 
the types of relationships that the Morales and Correa administrations are respectively developing 
seem to point in opposite directions. Would it be too Manichean to say that, while the latter’s 
project seems to be autonomy without embeddedness, the former attempts to preserve a situation of 
embeddedness with very little autonomy? The first part of the statement may be actually more 
accurate than the second one, but the dichotomy provides a good introduction for the analysis. 
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9.1.3 Ecuador: autonomy without embeddedness? 
I have already pointed to Correa’s agenda of “de-corporativization” and to his efforts not 
only to “rescue” a state historically captured by the Ecuadorean oligarchy, but also to avoid 
granting institutionalized access to any alternative interest organization or social movement. It is 
not possible to identify in the design of the social policies implemented so far, any component 
clearly aiming at the organization and mobilization of mass constituencies. Instead, the 
organization of the delivery of benefits tends to emphasize the centrality of the presidential 
figure. That is consistent with Correa´s preferred type of electoral strategy, which privileges 
carefully planned campaigns based on marketing expertise and point to the direct connection of 
the president with the individual voter. The new constitution certainly introduces new 
mechanisms to stimulate political participation, but those do not include any stimulus for the 
development of collective political mediations between citizen and state. On the other hand, 
some of the most important governmental initiatives so far are directly oriented to the 
strengthening of state autonomy. In first place because this is, so far, the only case in which a 
proposal for an ambitious re-distributional tax reform has been introduced –the initiative is still 
being discussed, as is the organization of a universal health care system. This is also the case in 
which the institutional framework for the design and implementation of social policies has been 
designed with a clear concern for coordination and planning.  
9.1.3.1 Bolivia: embeddedness without autonomy? 
In turn, the MAS administration shows three distinctive attributes that I find tempting to combine in 
hypotheses in future research. First, a governing coalition that has its core constituency in a group of 
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autonomous social movements mainly formed by outsiders to the formal labor market. Second, a 
governing political party that operates beyond mere electioneering and plays an effective role in 
governance. Third the effort to advance in the direction of universal social policy through a reform 
of the established social security system against the preferences of its insiders. 
Of the three cases under consideration, Bolivia is certainly the one with the highest degree of 
“horizontality” in its governance mechanisms. This is, of course, a direct consequence of the 
organizational robustness of the social movements and grassroots organizations that form the 
electoral core of the MAS. The phenomenon is not a mere matter of electoral mobilization: the 
incorporation of new actors has reached governmental dynamics.280 Not surprisingly, another 
consequence is that Bolivia is also the case with the most complex pattern of governance. The need 
for coordination presented by the heterogeneity of the governing coalition is only partially satisfied 
by the MAS, particularly as a space for the creation of consensus within the governing coalition and 
as a vehicle for the transmission of “inputs” to the government.281  
In this last aspect, however, the main channel is provided, for the main partners in the 
coalition, by the presence of their members in the cabinet and legislature. This contributes to the 
alluded horizontality, but also entails a serious challenge for the cohesiveness of governmental action 
                                                 
280  See (Laserna 2010, Mayorga 2007). 
281 The peculiarities of its birth, as the “political instrument” of the peasant unions, has left its mark on  the procedures 
of decision-making, which follow the assembly-like pattern that forms part of the historical memory of Bolivian unions 
of mining workers. At the same time, however, Morales’ personal directives have usually an important effect by setting 
the limits and general orientation among the member syndical organizations. The result is a curious hybrid that, 
incorporating a series of peasant traditions that had not historically been those of the urban Bolivian left, has not been 
completely immune to Michels’ “iron law”, developing some routines that resemble a familiar pattern of “democratic 
centralism.” This combination of an original legitimacy based on the permanent consulta a las bases and an ongoing 
process of institutionalization results in contradictory impulses whose collision is not easy to solve. It has an obvious 
correlate in terms of political action, in the oscillation between parliamentary work and extra-parliamentary pressure 
(Anria 2013, Madrid 2011, Mayorga 2005a). 
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–particularly considering the already mentioned fragmentation of the cabinet in “jurisdictions” 
controlled by different factions. Here the main mechanism is a fragile and, by definition, temporary 
one –Evo Morales’ arbitral authority.282 The most important aggregate result is the constitution of 
two parallel –though not independent- spheres of political accountability, perhaps best represented 
by the president’s delivery of separate annual reports to legislators in congress and to social 
movements in the public square (Mayorga 2007).  
However, the need to navigate between the heterogeneous demands and interests of its 
multiple associates has also had important costs for the effectiveness of governmental action. It has 
in first place resulted in high instability in the integration of the executive –the Morales 
administration is the one with more changes at that level (78) in Bolivia’s recent democratic history 
(Mendoza-Botelho 2013). Second, it has occasionally constituted an important obstacle for the 
development of the governmental agenda of public policy, in particular regarding the administrative 
reform of the state.283 Third, there has been an inclination to resolve conflicts by direct consultation 
with the citizenry through referenda –which, virtues of direct democracy notwithstanding, also has a 
dichotomous logic that alienates minorities.284 
                                                 
282 See (Anria 2010, Mayorga 2007). 
283 In this sense, two recent revealing episodes are, first, the reversal of an attempt to reorganize the public health sector 
that was met by the unions with an almost two months-long strike. Second, the revision of the Supreme Decree 
distributing the rights to exploit the “Rosario” tin load, in Colquiri, which led to violent confrontations between mining 
cooperatives and the miners of the Corporación Minera de Bolivia. See (Mendoza-Botelho 2013), for detailed descriptions of 
both conflicts. 
284 The most recent case was the consultation of the indigenous communities affected by the construction of a highway 
crossing the Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure, whose result has been objected by indigenous organizations 
opposing the project (Mendoza-Botelho 2013). 
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There are two aspects on which I want to comment. One has to do with the relationship 
between social policy and political mobilization. Although we have evidence, already mentioned, of 
the incorporation by the MAS of some important urban clientelist networks, I have not found any 
study reporting evidence of systematic electoral targeting of social assistance. That possibility, of 
course, is reduced in first place by the universal character of the most important program (Renta 
Dignidad). We know that rural communities participate in the implementation of the distribution of 
CCTs, but have no evidence that they discriminate based on partisanship. However, even if 
partisanship-based distribution took place, it would be through communities largely pre-existing the 
programs in their organization, rather than mobilized through the implementation of social policy. 
What we have is a study that analyzes the possible electoral targeting of aggregated transfers to 
municipalities that include some social funds. The evidence is clearly against the hypothesis of 
preferential targeting of municipalities with higher levels of support for Evo Morales. There is, 
however, one suggestive finding: increases in average total transfers show a significant relationship 
to voter turnout and to the presence of NGOs. It could be then the case that we actually had the 
inverse relationship, where higher levels of community organization and electoral participation result 
in higher transfers. In any case, further exploration is required (Nimz 2011).  
The second aspect to which I want to call attention is the integration of contentious politics 
not only as a relatively stable feature of the political system, but more specifically as an element of 
state power. It is the problem of what Javier Auyero, in his studies on the political 
instrumentalization of collective violence and the integration of contentious action and routine 
politics through patronage, has accurately called the “grey area” of state power.285 Auyero’s point of 
                                                 
285 See (Auyero 2005, 2007, 2008, Auyero, Lapegna, and Page Poma 2009). 
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departure is a critique of the conventional wisdom that has “traditionally understood political 
clientelism as separate from and antagonistic to most forms of collective action.” Instead, it is his 
contention that “routine patronage politics and nonroutine collective action should be examined not 
as opposite and conflicting political phenomena but as dynamic processes that often establish 
recursive relationships (Auyero, Lapegna, and Page Poma 2009).” The Bolivian situation presents, I 
will later show, important differences with the Argentine one, but the central theoretical problem is 
the same.  
At the root of the situation we have the disintegration of the logic of parliamentary inter-
party agreements that marked the dynamics of the Bolivian democracia pactada between 1982 and 2002 
(Mayorga 2005a). The dissolution took place during a period of three years that run between the 
Water Wars and the election of Evo Morales for the presidency, in which the political center of 
gravity was displaced from parliament to the streets. The election of an indigenous president of 
peasant extraction backed by an absolute majority closed a period of social and political 
marginalization older than the Bolivian republic itself. As is usually the case with this type of 
process, it was through contentions action taking place in the streets that the new political actors 
forced their inclusion. The crystallization of the process in the formation of a government and a 
legislative majority, however, did not fully bring politics from the streets. Instead, it consolidated, to 
use Auyero’s words, an important “grey area” in the practice of governance. This is the result, on the 
one hand, of the continuing contentious mobilization of social forces both from the opposition and 
from within the governing coalition itself; and on the other hand, and decisively, of the 
government’s decision to counteract it through the mobilization of loyal forces. The result is a 
singular situation of “mass praetorianism,” in which the government resorts to the collective 
violence of loyal social forces as a sort of substitutive form of repression. This choice is probably to 
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be explained by a combination of factors. First, the sincere reluctance to resort to the established 
repressive forces of the state by a government that legitimately sees itself as the direct representative 
of those who were suffering it until very recently. Second, a more calculated concern about the 
impact that using such a solution would have on its legitimacy and on the support of its core 
constituencies. Third, doubts about the institutional loyalty of the coercive apparatus. In any case, 
the situation is still very fluid, among other reasons because there are some indications that the 
government may at times have felt like the apprentice wizard scared by the very forces he had 
released.  
The situation is in itself by no means new –neither for Bolivia, nor for other Latin American 
countries. But it has particular theoretical relevance, to the extent that it reveals one of the blind 
spots both of institutionalism and of the mainstream of theories of governance -mainly produced 
with the Western European experience in mind. To a variable extent depending on the version, 
those theories are in first place attempts of account for forms of governmental action that cannot be 
understood from a purely weberian conceptualization of the state. Not surprisingly, however, the 
case is not that they deny the reality of the coercive dimension of governance, but that they take it 
for granted –that is, the implicit assumption is that the Hobbesian problem of the production of 
order is solved. That is not the case in many areas of contemporary Latin America, where the nude 
exercise of coercive power still takes place only too often. This does not mean, of course, that the 
“developed” concern with the eventual democratic deficits of “last generation” forms of governance 
becomes irrelevant. It just makes it more complex, to the extent that, in the “mausoleum of 
modernities,” it overlaps with interrogations about whether governance tout court happens at all, and 
about how its most developed forms may imbricate with the most primary ones. 
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It also sends us back to a basic problem that even reflections on Latin American political 
systems have recently tended to leave aside –namely, that of the relations between civilian and 
military power. We have already seen the problem emerge in Venezuela, where the armed forces 
–or at least fractions of them- have formed part of Chávez’s core constituency, and openly 
participate as semi-autonomous actor in a process that explicitly defines itself as civic-military. 
In Bolivia, with higher levels of contentious mobilization and a government that is at the same 
time organically connected to social movements and totally alien to the armed forces, the 
problem necessarily manifests itself differently. However, I find significant some recent 
initiatives of the Morales administration, aiming to incorporate the Bolivian armed forces as 
active, ideologically engaged components of the governing coalition. Declarations of intentions 
and official rhetoric aside, the initiative has had its first concrete materializations in the 
realization of strategic exercises with joint participation of the armed forces and peasant 
communities. Once again, hardly a complete novelty: the Pacto militar-campesino of the 1960s 
will immediately come to the mind of anybody minimally familiar with contemporary Bolivian 
history. But it constitutes a neglected dimension of most contemporary reflections on democratic 
governance in Latin America.  
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9.2 YET ANOTHER PATTERN: SOCIAL ASSISTANCE AND MACHINE 
POLITICS. AN EXPLORATION OF THE ARGENTINEAN CASE 
The pattern of governance has yet a different modulation where the relationship between social 
assistance and popular organization and contentious mobilization has been mediated by a party 
machine.  
The fact that the deep 2000-2002 crisis entailed, among other things, a turning point in 
the political economy of social protection in Argentina has been repeatedly acknowledged. This 
intuition drove an extensive academic production and in turn was confirmed by it. Such 
production focused on three novelties that seemed to be tightly connected. First, the irruption of 
kirchnerismo and its accelerated consolidation as the new hegemonic fraction of peronism, 
resulting in the end of the neoliberal interregnum represented by menemismo and in a “left turn” 
that would have restored the party’s fidelity to its historical sources. Second, the emergence of 
the piquetero movement. Third, the creation or drastic expansion of a set of programs of social 
assistance aiming to cope with the formidable raise in unemployment, informality, and poverty 
brought by the crisis.   
The wide consensus around the importance of those three elements, however, was wider 
than the one regarding the integrated conceptualization of their connections and their 
implications for the dynamics of Argentinean democracy. This was in part a consequence that, 
the novelty of the general situation notwithstanding, the force that quickly consolidated as its 
central actor –namely, peronism- was by no means new and certainly very controversial. The 
immediate consequence was that the debate on the new political economy of social protection 
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very often got caught and framed within the terms of more traditional debates on the “true” 
nature of peronism in particular and populism in general. Naturally concerned with institutional 
weakness and the puzzling survival of Argentinean democracy, political scientists tended to turn 
to the peculiarities of it puzzling unstable anchor. As a matter of fact, its capacity for resurrection 
and accommodation was less a revelation than a confirmation, as was the combination of 
fragility and endurance of the political equilibrium it was capable of guaranteeing.  
During the previous decade, an important academic production of high quality had 
increasingly tended to organize research and reflection on peronism around the operation of 
particularist exchanges, the targeted distribution of patronage, and the recurrent rearticulation of 
provincial clientelist machines.286  The quick decline of the piquetero movement, and the 
undisputable evidence of the co-optation of some of its components by the peronist government 
only reinforced the continuity of that perspective. 
A common emphasis on clientelism, however, does not necessarily entail convergent 
perspectives on the phenomenon itself.  An important part of the alluded literature added more 
sophisticated and nuanced images to the traditional vision of clientelism as the very mirror of 
political underdevelopment, for whose perpetuation it provided a pervasive mechanism 
guaranteeing massive obedience. If not replaced, that approach has been partially displaced by 
others that, by concentrating on the rationality of this type of exchange from the perspective of 
its clients, go beyond what has been accurately called an “almost pavlovian” (Alonso 2007) 
perspective that saw them as passive victims of political manipulation. Thus, ethnographic 
                                                 
286 See, for a sample of an extensive literature that continues growing, (Auyero 2001, 2007, Auyero, Lapegna, and Page 
Poma 2009, Calvo and Murillo 2004, 2006, Calvo and Murillo 2010, Eaton 2004, 2006, Jones and Hwang 2006, Lodola 
2005, Stokes 2005, Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004). 
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fieldwork has revealed, for example, the value as problem-solving resources that these networks 
acquire in poor people’s lives under certain circumstances, and their role in processes of 
construction and preservation of collective identities (Auyero 2001, Torres 2002). And of course, 
there is also the development of the potential this type of approach carries for a 
“romanticization” of clientelism. 
Now, if such diverse perspectives have developed, it is, among other reasons, because 
such contradictory ambiguity is, to some extent, in reality itself. What I want to explore and 
emphasize in this section, based on the abundant information accumulated on the largest program 
of social assistance developed in the context of the Argentine crisis, is the multiplicity and 
fluidity of its implications and consequences in terms of governance.  
9.2.1 Anti-poverty programs during the cycle of neoliberal reforms 
Although the expansion of a new profile of structural poverty was already apparent in the 1990s, the 
Menem administrations did not put together anything deserving the label of anti-poverty strategy. 
After discontinuing all the programs introduced by the Radical government that preceded them, it 
developed by trial and error a sequence of erratic programs with wide variation in coverage, 
resources, and administrative efficiency.287 It was only after four years, and at the threshold of a new 
campaign for the presidency, that Menem felt the need to create a Secretaría de Desarrollo Social directly 
                                                 
287 Interestingly, the one that acquired most relevance (the Bono Nacional de Emergencia), already suffering from a poor 
design and an incompetent administration, was terminated in the middle of a scandal when the clientelistic distribution 
of the bonos by officials of the ruling parte became public. Low bureaucratic capacity and erratic administration led the 
Programa Federal de Solidaridad to become a source of discretionary and inefficient distribution of subsidies to projects 
favored by municipal and provincial administrations. More efficient but with limited resources, the Programa Alimentario 
Integral y Solidario was confined to the province of Buenos Aires (Chiara 1996, Prévot-Schapira 1996, Repetto 2000).  
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dependent from the presidency. In spite of absorbing some functions of the Ministry of Health, the 
Secretaría was never capable of providing an efficient coordination for the 26 programs of social 
assistance in existence by 1996. Its relevance and visibility tended to oscillate with the president’s 
electoral priorities, and in spite of a non-negligible endowment of financial resources, it never 
stabilized bureaucratic cadres long enough to allow for any institutional learning to accumulate. As a 
result, the teams with valuable expertise occasionally hired tended to act isolated from each other, 
frequently ending duplicating activities and overlapping jurisdictions (Repetto 2000).  
Meantime, the explosive potential of the situations of marginality expanding in the 
Buenos Aires periphery had briefly revealed itself through lootings taking place at the peak of 
hyperinflation. Eduardo Duhalde was well aware of it when he accepted to resign the vice-
presidency he had obtained as Menem’s formula partner to compete for the Buenos Aires 
governorship. He then pressed for the inclusion in his agreement with Menem of massive 
transferences of federal funds for anti-poverty programs.  Those resources gave birth to the 
Fondo de Reparación Histórica del Conurbano Bonaerense (FRHCB), which Governor Duhalde 
chose to keep under direct personal control, by-passing the bureaucracy of the provincial 
Ministerio de Acción Social (Danani, Chiara, and Filc 1996). The financial transfers to the 
province of Buenos Aires were beyond comparison with any previous program of social 
assistance, and became central to the construction of Duhalde’s leadership. The main two 
avenues of distribution were an extensive program of public works –outsourced to private 
contractors-, and the activities of the Consejo Provincial de la Mujer -skillfully managed by 
Duhalde’s wife. Under her direction, not only the budget managed by the Consejo climbed to 
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180 million dollars in 1996, but also ended absorbing the Ministerio de Acción Social, and many 
functions of the Ministerio del Menor y la Familia (Danani, Chiara, and Filc 1996).  
But perhaps the most relevant part of the story for our current purpose was the 
development of the Plan Vida, its flagship program. Plan Vida was oriented to the provision of 
nutritional support for pregnant women and children of age below 5, and it operated through a 
network of Trabajadoras Vecinales por la Vida –popularly known as manzaneras.288 Each 
manzanera covered a very limited space and reported directly to Mrs. Hilda González de 
Duhalde. In practice, Repetto explains, “they operate as intermediaries between the president of 
the Consejo and Buenos Aires’ poor population. […] social participation was limited to the 
simultaneously atomized and collective practice of these women, detrimental to any form of 
community organization that could go beyond immediate demands: atomized, to the extent that 
each volunteer operated within her assigned space; collective to the extent that they all were 
subjected to the political will of the governor’s wife (Repetto 2000).” 
The formal existence of the FRHCB ended abruptly in 1995, victim of the reorganization 
of taxation policy. Competition from other governors and struggles among peronist factions 
notwithstanding, Duhalde managed to secure an important flux of funds up to the end of the 
decade.  
In 1996, however, two-digit unemployment figures finally led the second Menem 
administration to initiate Plan Trabajar. This was a program that incorporated NGOs and 
municipal governments by assigning them the task of organizing community-service, labor-
                                                 
288 The denomination refers to the fact that each of this “social workers” was assigned a jurisdiction of one block 
(manzana), within which she managed the distribution of the program’s benefits. 
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intensive infrastructure projects that were supposed to hire unemployed workers. The program 
would pay their salaries for a limited term. Community associations and municipalities would 
contribute to finance the materials and decide who to hire and the type of workfare activity to be 
assigned (Garay 2007, 2010).  
In spite –or precisely because of- its relatively modest magnitude, the Plan Trabajar  was 
relevant for the development of organizations that would participate in the future configuration 
and administration of some workfare programs. The relevance of the experience for the current 
analysis of governance has to do with the consolidation of a new collective actor as an 
unintended consequence of policy design. Based on an extensive survey, Candelaria Garay has 
concluded that three aspects of the program were directly consequential. First, the fact that 
resources were very limited (it initially covered only 8% of the total unemployed population); 
second, it did not include precise rules for the selection of beneficiaries; third, it made the 
communities responsible for the distribution of benefits within the respective projects (Garay 
2007).289 Steady worsening of the economic situation and growing unemployment increased the 
movement’s size and the frequency of protest. Coordination across neighborhoods and the 
proximity of elections made the costs of repression increasingly high, and participation in 
negotiations opened by the government further strengthened the cohesiveness of the different 
groups and the incentives for participation. The number of beneficiaries from national workfare 
programs went from 62.000 to more than 200.000 during 1997 (Garay 2007). 
                                                 
289 The availability of resources not only worked as an incentive for new members to incorporate, but also facilitated the 
collection of membership dues. The need to make choices on the distribution of very scarce benefits forced the 
communities to develop rules for the management of conflict. The dynamics of participation in these activities in turn 
favored the strengthening of a collective identity of the unemployed, which was further strengthened through the 
confrontation of the government for the continuity or increase of the flux of resources. For this purpose, groups of 
unemployed began to coordinate actions across neighborhoods. 
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9.2.2 The crisis of 2001-2002 
Although the Alianza FREPASO-País Solidario, winner of the 2009 presidential election, had 
prioritized unemployment among its concerns while campaigning, the  beginning of the De La Rúa 
administration brought  diverse measures that disrupted the flux of resources for workfare 
programs. Partly, those measures were part of an austerity policy aiming to tackle fiscal difficulties 
resulting from the worsening recession; but they also had a more directly political logic, since the 
Plan Trabajar was perceived by the new government as a resource of the Peronist apparatus. 
However, protests forced the government to negotiate, favoring further expansion and coordination 
of the network of unemployed organizations, in the more general context of growing contentious 
mobilization that would end in the fall of the government (Gradin 2009).  
Matching a pattern that we have already witnessed more than once, the new 
administration refurbished its predecessor’s Plan Trabajar, turning into the Plan de Emergencia 
Laboral. Within the predominant continuity of the general approach, the new version introduced 
a novelty: the formation of “Consejos de Emergencia,” that contributed to formalize, in theory if 
not necessarily in practice,   the participation of the movements of unemployed in the execution 
of workfare programs (Gradin 2009). 
Fears of the same nature of the ones that originated the FRHCB, but drastically 
magnified, were central for the definition of Duhalde’s priorities once he became president. The 
creation of the Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogares Desocupados (PJJDD) was a direct response to the 
state of social emergency that followed the collapse of the convertibility regime inaugurated 
under the first presidency of Carlos Menem. Although the recession was already installed by 
1998, its social consequences peaked in 2001-2002. In May 2002, unemployment had reached 
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21.5%; a year later, at the beginning of the Kirchner administration, the percentages of the 
population in situations of poverty and indigence were respectively 54 and 27.7 (Alonso and Di 
Costa 2013). The program emerged in the context of the Diálogo Argentino, a concertation 
forum created at the beginning of the Duhalde administration as part of the effort to minimally 
restore the legitimacy of the political system. The initiative got support from the hierarchy of the 
Catholic Church and from the representative of the UNDP in Argentina. Around 150 
representatives of the government, political parties, banks, unions, NGOs, universities, provincial 
and municipal governments, small and medium enterprises, associations of unemployed, and 
other social movements were invited to participate. The PJJHD was created by a presidential 
decree of February 2002 that defined the existing situation as one of “occupational emergency.” 
Consensus around the general idea of some type of cash transfer directed to those hit 
hardest by the crisis emerged relatively soon. Elites were shocked by the extension and intensity 
of the popular mobilization that had ended with the De La Rúa administration. The general idea 
existed that “something had to be done,” and a government starting with a serious handicap in 
terms of legitimacy was quick to promise that something would be done. Low legitimacy 
dovetailed with an even more serious deficit of sheer governability, and this constituted the 
government’s absolute priority.290 However, agreement around more concrete decisions on how 
to organize and implement the solution was not so straightforward. In that context, better 
expertise and familiarity with the organizational technicalities of the process gave some sections 
of the government the upper hand. According to the most detailed reconstructions, the discussion 
and definition of the architecture of the program was almost completely circumscribed to the 
                                                 
290 See (Golbert 2004, Gradin 2009). 
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technical and political teams working for the Ministry of Labor and the cabinet chief.291 With 
very limited experience and led by someone with very limited political leverage and visibility, 
the Ministry of Social Development could only play a very modest role.  
The combined result was a somewhat paradoxical situation. A problem reached the top of 
the public agenda out of a situation of emergency that imposed the definition of lines of for 
governmental action with information that was insufficient in quantity and quality. As a result, 
the initiative fell in the hands of those actors already involved in the field, who turned to their 
own established routines and repertoires for solutions. The “national tradition” concerning anti-
poverty interventions was not remarkable for its emphasis on transparency, and privileged 
formulas that could easily be captured by diverse political actors for their own electoral purpose. 
However, tolerance by Argentine society had diminished considerably, and immediate demands 
from the DA forced the government to at least partially break with that tradition –in its rhetoric if 
not necessarily in practice. The demands included an active participation of civil society through 
clearly defined institutional channels, and funding with public resources, not contingent upon 
loans from international agencies (Repetto 2003). 
The program established cash transfers for households whose head (male or female) were 
unemployed and had children of age below 18 or persons with special needs any age; households 
where the head or his spouse were pregnant and unemployed qualified too. Associated with the 
transfers were some controls aiming to secure that the beneficiaries’ children kept attending 
school and receiving periodical health controls. There were also a series of incentives for heads 
of households receiving benefits to continue their formal education or participate on training 
                                                 
291 See (FLACSO 2003, Repetto 2003, Repetto, Potenza Dal Masetto, and Vilas 2006). 
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programs to increase their employability. Payments would extend for three months, but could be 
renewed. The amounts varied across provinces, according to specific agreements between the 
federal government and provincial administrations based on estimations of variations in the cost 
of life and size of the population in situation of poverty.292 
Following diverse criticisms the initial architecture from the church, business 
associations, media and international agencies, who found it allowing for too much political 
discretion in its implementation, the sectorial committees of the Diálogo Argentino proposed a 
series of changes. The essential ones pushed in the direction of a universal transference 
conceived as a social inclusion salary.  In May 2002l, a new presidential decree replaced it with a 
(Repetto 2003)second plan, named Derecho de Inclusión Social, but commonly known as Plan 
de Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados II (PJHD II). Changes in the legitimizing rhetoric were 
immediately apparent in the decree itself, that pointed to the existence of a universal “right to 
work” (Gradin 2009). This implied important ruptures with preceding experiences, which had to 
do with the clear definition of the obligations of the beneficiaries and the securing of budgetary 
viability and continuity. The new decree suppressed budgetary quotas and defined a universal 
transfer (Repetto 2003). Funding came mainly from three sources: 1) funds reassigned from 
other similar programs involving cash transfers; 2) extraordinary revenue obtained through 
detractions applied to exports from the agrarian sector; 3) loans from the World Bank and the 
IADB. The second was by far the most important source; funding from international agencies 
experienced important oscillations determined by the Argentine default. 
                                                 
292 See (Acuña and Repetto 2006, Alonso and Di Costa 2013, Patroni and Felder 2012, Repetto 2003, Repetto and 
Chudnovsky 2009). 
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The most important challenges resulted from limited information and administrative 
capacity. At the moment of launching the program, the government had a raw estimate of how 
many the poor were, but very limited elements to identify who and where they were. The choice 
was for a strategy of self-focalization. Two million beneficiaries was the figure once registration 
closed and registers were minimally depurated. The implementation of distribution used the 
network already in place for the administration of the social security system. According to most 
evaluations, implementation was satisfactory in terms of timely reaching the beneficiaries, but 
controls of fulfilment of the obligations associated with the transfer were not.293   
The composition of the CCs, with important participation of representatives of diverse 
civil society organizations (business, labor unions, NGOs, Catholic Church) was literally 
imposed by the Diálogo Argentino. It expressed the almost absolute loss of legitimacy of the 
political elite. Representatives of civil society in the DA on the one hand distrusted government 
and parties too much to allow for an uncontrolled administration of the program, and on the other 
hand perceived that its success required an injection of legitimacy that could only come from the 
outside. Governmental representatives were only too aware of the weakness of their situation to 
resist the demand. However, they saw the opening to participation and control more as a strategic 
concession than as having a value in itself. This would create frictions between the CCs and the 
Labor Ministry. The difficulties of the CCs were in first place due from the vagueness of the 
normative that created them in the definition of their functions and activities –partly a result of 
                                                 
293 Such failure was in first place due to the very unequal distribution of municipal administrative capacities, and 
determined a growing emphasis on the incorporation of civil society to the implementation through the formation of 
Consejos Consultivos (CCs). A national CC, formed by representatives of the associations of the unemployed (piqueteros) and 
of the corporations making the largest contributions, constituted the tip of the emerging pyramidal hierarchy. Below, a 
second level included 22 CCs controlling subnational jurisdictions, and 1873 formed the base at the municipal level, 
covering 89% of municipal administrations all over the country (Acuña and Repetto 2006). 
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improvisation, partly a result of governmental reluctance to tie its own hands too tight. That 
imprecision had serious consequences, since the CCs completely depended on the Ministry of 
Labor to access the information needed to control the execution of the program.294 According to 
the reports of the Consejo Nacional de Administración, Ejecución y Control (CONAEyC) and to 
the points of view of several experts, the activities of the CCs –both at a provincial and 
municipal levels- varied widely. The frequent lack of expertise among members added to the 
effects of the Ministry of Labor´s negatives to provide information. However, local politicians 
and officials from municipal and provincial administrations shared their resistance to the opening 
of spaces for participation. This had particularly important consequences, because 
representatives from organizations were supposed to receive training from those very same 
cadres. Last but not least, the quality and intensity of participation were also very variable 
themselves. So with the passing of time, the gap tended to expand between the initially projected 
design of the program and its realities (CONAEyC (Consejo Nacional de Admistración 2002-03, 
Repetto, Potenza Dal Masetto, and Vilas 2006).  
Three were the most serious deficits in implementation. First, the practical restriction of 
the space for an effective participation of society in the execution and, especially, the control of 
results. Second, erratic, incomplete and poorly coordinated control of the effective fulfillment of 
the responsibilities defined for beneficiaries. Third, equality of opportunity of access.295 Seen in 
                                                 
294 See the multiple interviews collected an quoted by (Repetto, Potenza Dal Masetto, and Vilas 2006), which provide a 
particularly rich and revealing picture of the conflict from the perspective of diverse actors. 
295 In this last sense, the early closure of registration was critical. It was originally associated with the government’s fear 
that an explosion of demand could overflow the program’s budget, but it put the authorities of the Ministry of Labor in 
a privileged situation as gatekeepers of participation in the program, that the minister used in accord with the priorities 
of his political agenda (Repetto, Potenza Dal Masetto, and Vilas 2006). 
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perspective, the most striking aspect of the whole process is the government’s capacity to 
recover initiative and whole control of the program in surprisingly short time, considering the 
magnitude of the crisis of governability in which the latter had emerged. The more general point 
is the slippery nature of the integration of civil society in policy networks as a substitute or a 
corrective for limitations of hierarchical governance. In first place, of course, because it is clearly 
contingent on the autonomous political capacity of the actors involved. But not least, because it 
is also strongly dependent on the solidity of the administrative channels that can secure that 
participation… which in turn are to a great extent provided by the state itself. 
9.2.3 The Kirchner-Fernández cycle 
In spite of the significant normalization and stabilization of the political situation achieved by 
Duhalde’s brief interim period, the situation that Néstor Kirchner faced at the beginning of his 
administration was not a promising one. Not only the legitimacy of the political elite remained 
extremely precarious, but the meagre 22 % of votes that had made him president added to the 
picture. Besides, the road leading to his candidacy had put him in high dependency with respect to 
Duhalde and the network of Peronist governors. Kirchner was thus in urgent need to expand the 
very limited steering capacity of the Argentine state, on the one hand, and his own base of political 
support, on the other.  
Things being like that, the president and the piquetero movement became central 
elements of each other’s structure of political opportunities. Presidential decree 15/05 thus 
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created the Consejo Consultivo Nacional de Políticas Sociales. A Ministry of Social 
Development endowed with more political leverage than it had been granted by Duhalde started 
to play a more active role in the development of spaces for association. There has thus been a 
simultaneous and parallel movement in at least three different directions. First, a continuation of 
the process of recentralization of control of resources and program design in the hands of the 
national government. Second, an effort to consolidate community organizations by way of 
integrating them in diverse forms of governmental activity.  Finally, repression, if carefully 
administered, has not completely been absent from the picture (Svampa and Pereira 2003). The 
combination sounds hardly innovative to anybody familiar with the best Peronist tradition.  
Is it accurate then to describe the result as one of “co-optation and disciplining (Svampa 
and Pereira 2003)?” The description is less inaccurate than incomplete. That is partially a 
consequence of the dynamics of change and diversification of the piquetero movement itself. 
Already in 2007, Garay could distinguish three very different components. First, a myriad of 
groups with community-based leadership, in some cases integrated in networks of extensive 
coverage and impressive mobilizational capacity.296 Second, unemployed federations led by 
social militants. Independent from parties and unions, these groups tend to be small, local in 
scope (mainly confined to metropolitan Buenos Aires), and well connected. Third, top-down 
mobilized federations responding to partisan leaderships (Garay 2007). In this realm, 
kirchnerismo has successfully competed with small left-wing parties, with significant gains in 
terms of governability resulting from the abandonment of contentious tactics by the federations 
                                                 
296 The FTV, for example, by 2004 included approximately 3,600 soup kitchens, cooperatives, micro-enterprises, and 
day-care centers as well as 75,000 workfare beneficiaries (Garay 2007). 
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involved in the exchange. In return, they have obtained access to significant public funding for 
their programs of support for micro-enterprises and housing-cooperatives, and some of their 
leaders have got appointments for public office (Garay 2007). Co-optation has no doubt taken 
place, but it is important to keep in mind that it does not exhaust the interactions between the 
movements of the unemployed and the Peronist machine, which have been complex. Not the 
least because many of the manzaneras that became part of the scene with the Plan Vida, dropped 
the Peronist organization to join the movement of the unemployed, thus affecting the mobilizing 
capacity of the former in those districts of Buenos Aires where the latter have a strong presence 
(Garay 2007). The fragmentation between Peronist and non-Peronist unions brings additional 
complexity to the picture, since some unions that are not part of the CGT have attempted to 
differentiate themselves through the development of linkages with unemployed and community 
organizations like soup-kitchens. Besides, the overlapping between Peronist machine and 
Peronist national government is far from perfect, in first place because of the party’s internal 
fragmentation. Thus, many of the very same changes from which Kirchner’s Frente por la 
Victoria has profited have at the same time been detrimental for the traditional machine built by 
Duhalde in Buenos Aires.  
Some organizations have managed to form stable linkages with the state without partisan 
mediation. The formal incorporation of the organizations of the unemployed to the operation of 
the Ministry of Social Development has been particularly important in this regard, with 
consequences in both directions. Formal incorporation not only in the policy-making process, but 
also to some extent in the formal structure of the ministry has certainly enriched the 
organizational technology available for social movements and the penetration of the ministerial 
apparatus. However, it has also entailed the challenge of managing the eventually emerging 
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friction between the new managerial know how and the imperatives of bureaucratic efficiency, 
on the one hand, and the logic of militancy on the other. 
And then we have, of course, the grey zone. With respect to it, I am just going to call the 
attention on one aspect. We have already seen this phenomenon of “continuation of (domestic) 
politics by other means.” In this case too, we find in its origin a crisis of representation that leads 
popular sectors to resort to contentious forms of political action, and a state that, reluctant for 
different reasons to exercise a purely repressive response, adds an element of negotiation and 
cooptation to the mix. The main difference here with, for example, the Bolivian case, is the 
degree of territorial cohesiveness, on the one hand, and the centrality of a partisan machine, on 
the other one. First, the internal topography of uneven development matches the distribution of 
power between center and periphery much closer than in Bolivia. Second, Argentina has a long 
consolidated combination of formal and informal mechanisms for the management of the 
tensions between the metropolitan center and the provinces, combining networks that run inside 
the state administration and the parties –especially the Peronist party.297 As a result, the 
instrumentalization of contentious mobilization from the top may play an important role in 
confrontations between different factions of the governing party. Complexity is also fed by the 
extent to which partisan networks mediate, as we have seen, access to social assistance, and by 
the pervasive corruption affecting a structure of public coercion that is split between federal and 
provincial organizations. The aggregate result is a network –or, more accurately, a competition 
among partially independent networks- that articulate routine and contentious politics, formal 
                                                 
297 See (Devoto and Fausto 2008, Novaro 2006, Sidicaro 2003, 2010). 
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and informal structures, with a degree of complexity and subtlety that resemble the ones put 
together in other areas of the world for more virtuous purposes.298 
Complex as it is, that is, of course, only part of the story. The social security system, and 
the mechanisms of corporatist intermediation associated with it have in Argentina an extension 
and density that finds nothing comparable in the other cases analyzed in this chapter. Regarding 
this point, I will only point to the fact that an important component of Kirchner’s political 
strategy was the re-composition of the alliance with some sectors of the union movement that 
had been postponed by the policies of menemismo. This resulted in the strengthening of the 
traditional vertical and centralist model of Peronist unionism, and in the restoration of traditional 
modalities of institutionalized distributive conflict. Indeed, the years 2006-2007 “witnessed a 
genera round of peak-level centralized bargaining in most industrial and service sectors. In a 
neocorporatist fashion, national union leaders, business associations, and the government 
concluded agreements on sectorwide wage increases and on the minimum wage. […] formal 
sector workers have generally regained the offensive, not just trying to retain past gains or 
defending themselves against downsizing, unemployment, and labor flexibilization but seeking 
gains in wages, contract coverage, union membership, and profit distribution (Etchemendy and 
Collier 2007).”299 As Etchemendy and Collier notice, the process has not entailed a mere 
restoration, since the new mainstream of the labor movement, although reliant on a privileged 
relationship with the Kirchner government, has been far from controlled from above in its 
decisions of mobilization. The aspect I want to underscore, is what those authors call the 
                                                 
298 See (Auyero 2005, 2007, 2008, Auyero, Lapegna, and Page Poma 2009).  
299 On this point, see also (Rossi 2009, Senen González 2011). 
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“segmented” nature of this modality of neo-corporatism, that I would rather define as 
“truncated.”300 Regardless of semantic disagreement, the essential aspect is that the new 
arrangements cover 40 % of the economically-active population -60% of wage earners.  
9.3 SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS 
The exploration could be (actually, should be) continued up to the top of the Argentine social 
structure –I have repeatedly insisted on the idea that the stability of any formula of political 
incorporation depends decisively on the incorporation of dominant groups. That clearly goes 
beyond the limits set for this dissertation.301 However, I think that the mosaic presented in this 
chapter is diverse and detailed enough to convincingly show the extreme fragmentation of 
governance mechanisms in those Latin American countries showing also the most unstable 
institutional configurations of welfare regimes. 
There is, in first place, important cross-national diversity, and I have tried to suggest 
some ways in which institutional legacies involving state structures, party systems (or non-
                                                 
300 Arrangements are, indeed, segmented, but because of their diversity and fragmentation; but what they are pointing at, 
and I am interested in, is the limited coverage of this form of interest intermediation. The magnitude of this 
“quantitative” limitation entails qualitative difference (that they acknowledge), with what based on the Western 
European experience, is usually termed neocorporatism. Etchemendy and Collier also observe a second difference, in 
contents of the negotiations and eventual agreements themselves. “[U]nlike traditional European neocorporatism, the 
bargain is not built around the typical exchange of wage moderation for social policy that brings about the 
decommodification of formal-sector labor. Rather than social policy, in the labor political exchange in postliberal 
Argentina, mainstream unions administer the distributive struggle in the context of a friendly government, while they 
obtain real wage gains (compatible with the inflation targets of the government) and what can be called organizational 
and more particularistic gains.” 
301 In spite of an excessively dense dose of neo-Gramscian theoretical jargon, Tsolakis (Tsolakis 2010) provides an 
interesting exercise in this type of exploration for the Bolivian case. 
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systems), and welfare regimes, help to explain that diversity. However, there is also, regardless 
of its specific manifestations, the general phenomenon of internal governance fragmentation. 
This fragmentation is of a very different nature from the one that the increasing complexity of 
both societies and governments produces in the developed world. It is not the diversity 
determined by the heterogeneity of networks across policy areas that involve different actors, 
contexts, technical expertise –although that may also be present. Much more serious is that, 
depending on the segment of interaction -on the points in the boundaries between them where we 
look- state and civil society present each other very different faces. This creates differences in 
terms both of governability and of instruments of governance -and as a result in the tangible 
contents of democratic citizenship.  
Interestingly, the problem has in first place an obvious, elementary expression at the level 
of the most basic dimensions of governance –namely, those of territory and coercion. The new 
generation of social assistance programs frequently operate through forms of territorial targeting. 
That has two types of implications. The first one, that I will only mention, is that in societies that 
already suffer from spatial segregation –that is one of the forces leading the spatial focalization 
of social policies-, this pattern of intervention can only accentuate segregation. The second one is 
the uneven spatial distribution of governmental capacity. I have shown multiple attempts to 
remediate this through the inclusion of a participatory component in the design of social 
assistance and the incorporation of civil society organizations to policy monitoring and 
execution.  However, we have also had the opportunity to observe how, precisely because this 
occurs where state and civil society show each other their respective poorest faces, effective 
participation depends in those areas on administrative frames and expertise that can only be 
provided by the state. We have also seen that, even when successful, the challenge of scaling-up 
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and integrating those experiences is rarely met –and when it is, as we saw in the Chapter 7, the 
state plays a decisive role. 
A cartography of the intensity of repression would probably confirm that those are often 
the area where the state choses to show its ugliest face. However, it may not be able do to so, or 
find it too costly. The out-sourcing of repression has become in some cases the chosen 
alternative, and that should put the coercive dimension of hierarchical governance under a 
complete different perspective. Moreover, situations of acute political crisis have brought the 
issue of civilian-military relationships and the institutional forms of the coercive arm of the state 
back on the table.302 The basic problem is that the state-civil society equation is not necessarily a 
zero-sum game, so the abdication of the former can only have disastrous consequences if the 
distribution of resources and power within the latter is strongly biased.  
                                                 
302 This has yet another dimension that can only be mentioned here. Some Latin American states have high percentages 
of incarcerated population. This is, as we well know, exclusive problem of the underdeveloped world. The problem is 
accentuated, however, by the fact that some of the states have found repeated difficulties to solve the Hobbesian 
problem inside prisons themselves.  
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10.0  GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
10.1 A RELEVANT PUZZLE 
What the reader has had the kindness to go through is an effort to understand the dynamics of “the 
new politics of the welfare state” as it has developed in Latin America during the last three decades. 
The central intuition underlying my approach was that this “new politics” was neither unlikely to 
resemble the old one; nor was it likely to mirror the “new politics” found in industrial democracies. 
With respect to the past, two new factors could not but introduce radically different conditions: the 
existence of an institutional legacy of welfare regimes, and extended continuity of democratic rule. 
With respect with the developed world, the main difference is the essentially incomplete nature of 
Latin America’s “first wave” of incorporation. 
In Latin America, the construction of citizenship has been discontinuous and frequently 
at odds with the Marshallian sequence. The accumulation of layers of civil, political, and social 
rights has often been contradictory, unstable, and prone to setbacks. If we adopt a long-term 
perspective, the current crisis of incorporation appears as a window for what may be a “second 
experiment” in the construction of social citizenship –this time under predominant conditions of 
sustained  
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democratic rule. That being the case, understanding the mechanisms eventually leading to 
the expansion –or shrinkage- of social rights acquires immediate political relevance.303 
The theoretical relevance of the inquiry results from the same factors that make it 
politically relevant. The frequently turbulent political environments that surround conflicts on 
social protection allow for the expansion of comparison beyond what is frequently taken for 
granted in leading research on welfare states. Neither the robustness of political institutions, nor 
the pervasiveness of market dynamics, nor certain minimum levels of public social spending, can 
be assumed. Institutions and policies of social protection often show in Latin America levels of 
resilience comparable to the ones that their equivalents within the OECD exhibit. But they may 
be also fully displaced, sometimes in opposite directions within the space of a decade. They also 
show the marks of a time of “permanent austerity,” but have also occasionally expanded their 
coverage in spite of those constraints.  
Conceptualizing the changes I aimed to explain in terms of welfare regimes allowed for a 
comprehensive perspective, provides a straightforward connection with notions of social 
citizenship, and frames the results within the terms of the most lively and productive debates in 
the field. 
                                                 
303 Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos famously coined the expression cidadania regulada (“regulated citizenship”) to 
underscore the authoritarian conditions of development of social citizenship in most of the region (Santos 1979). 
Fernando Filgueira has shown the absence of any linear correlation between years of continued democratic rule and 
sustained growth of social spending among the countries of the region, and has suggested a plausible alternative 
hypothesis. The key observation is that “In countries where democracy took hold or survived for relatively long periods 
between the 1950s and 1970s, social spending 30 years later is higher than would be expected given the GDPs of those 
countries.” His hypothesis is that “[T]he relationship between democracy and welfare expansion is strongly path 
dependent. When major developmental surges under a given developmental model … are combined with stable 
democratic rule, a long-term social policy effort above the mean expected social effort, given a country’s GDP, should 
be expected (Filgueira 2007b).”  
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10.2 THE ARGUMENT SUMMARIZED 
My central, most general hypothesis was that the mechanisms predominantly determining cross-
national variation of the processes and outcomes of reforms of the institutions of social 
protection operated under the sign of path-dependence. As a result, diverse modalities of gradual 
institutional change have tended to prevail over institutional displacement. However, this 
outcome has been present too –four processes of structural reform of pension systems resulted in 
the closure and replacement of existing institutions. I hypothesized that radical structural reform, 
entailing institutional displacement, necessarily requires the impact of exogenous factors to break 
the lock-in effects of existing institutions. My suggestion was that the simultaneous presence of a 
deep financial crisis and an authoritarian concentration of executive power constituted a joint 
necessary condition for institutional displacement. 
In the absence of such a combination of exogenous impacts, I contended, gradual 
institutional change was the outcome to expect. Some exogenous impacts, I argued, played a role 
in these cases too, but only as triggers of reform. I expected to always find some degree of 
dysfunctionality, a mismatch between a changing socioeconomic environment and the 
institutions of social protection, to be at the root of a reformist initiative. However, the final 
result would be determined by endogenous institutional factors. 
I thus suggested a set of hypothesis explaining different patterns of gradual structural 
reform as the result of interactions between the specific architecture of the welfare regime to be 
reformed and the institutional legacies left by the respective conjunctures of mass political 
incorporation. Within those legacies, I pointed to the articulation of interest groups, political 
parties, and sectorial bureaucracies as the decisive explanatory variable. I worked on the 
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assumption of conjunctural causation by multi-causal configurations, and hypothesized the 
connection between configurations and outcomes in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
Four types of outcomes needed explanation –namely, aborted structural reforms, partial 
structural reforms installing mixed systems, structural expansion, and serial institutional 
replacement. I expected coalitions of insiders –defined as the clienteles getting the main benefits 
from the institutions already in place- to constitute the most powerful obstacle to any effort of 
reform potentially threatening their interests.  The crucial differences, then, would result from 
political parties’ variable capacity to neutralize, moderate, or counterbalance the veto powers of 
those coalitions. The dynamics of the processes having marked the transition of the respective 
political systems into massively expanded political participation imposed, I contended, path-
dependent constraints of parties’ repertoires of viable strategies. 
Only those parties counting insiders as their core constituencies were capable of 
removing anti-reformist blockades imposed by insiders to existing systems of social protection. 
In those systems with a legacy of corporatist incorporation, I predicted, the presence in the 
opposition of the main party representing the interests of insiders would constitute a sufficient 
condition to guarantee the failure of structural reform. In systems with that type of legacy, only 
insiders-based parties in government could articulate a structural reform of social protection. My 
next prediction was that such articulation could only take place at the cost of some formula that 
segmented the effects of reform in order to preserve the interests of insiders.  
In those cases having experienced a pluralist process of incorporation, I anticipated the 
outcome to be the same, but as a result of the operation of a different type of political dynamics. 
With this type of legacy, the insiders-based constituencies would be shared by the parties having 
co-participated in the incorporation process. We then should not expect any of them to be willing 
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to choose to individually carry the blame for a structural reform. The critical point, then, was 
under which circumstances those parties would switch from non-cooperative strategies of blame-
avoidance to a cooperative strategy of blame-sharing and joint credit-claiming. My hypothesis 
was that the switch was necessarily contingent upon the emergence of a third party posing a 
credible threat to the historical electoral duopoly of traditional parties.  
This type of second-generation challenger was also expected to play a central role in 
structural reforms leading to the expansion of social protection. The critical point for this type of 
reform, the argument goes, is the possibility of finding a territory of compatibility between the 
interests of the insiders benefitting from the existing system and those of the outsiders the reform 
intends to include. Given the advantages insiders usually enjoy regarding organizational 
resources for interest articulation, political parties and teams of experts are expected to play a 
central role as brokers for the aggregation if this type of reformist coalition. My hypothesis was 
that this type of reform necessarily required, besides the “right” kind of party, an autonomously 
embedded bureaucracy and institutionalized channels providing effective access to the policy-
making process for all the interests involved.  
Finally, we have the pattern of recurrent cycles of structural reform alternatively going in 
opposite directions and taking place within short periods of time. I attempted to explain this 
pattern of chronic institutional instability as the result of exclusionary policy-making processes. 
Under democratic regimes, I hypothesized, inclusionary policy-making was a necessary 
condition for the institutional consolidation and endurance of structural reforms. This type of 
process was understood as involving both comprehensive consultations with interest groups and 
wide parliamentary coalitions.  
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10.3 THE EMPIRICAL ENQUIRY AND ITS MAIN FINDINGS 
Research design combined the construction of typologies, qualitative comparative analysis based 
on Boolean algebra, and process-tracing. Typology-building was the strategy to measure 
variation in the dependent variable. I inductively constructed typologies of welfare regimes 
around 1980 and 2010, and used them to measure both each case’s diachronic transformation and 
synchronic cross-national variation. I used truth tables to test the different propositions that 
operationalized my hypotheses on necessary and sufficient conditions. Process-tracing was 
meant to explore the mechanisms through which the hypothesized causal relations effectively 
operated. My research included a sample of eleven Latin American countries that covered most 
of the range of variation of all the variables involved in my hypotheses. 
Empirical analysis runs through Chapters 4 to 8. Chapter 4 is formed by brief historical 
narratives that reconstruct the main lines of the processes of incorporation of the three countries 
in my sample that did not form part of David and Ruth Collier’s typology –that is, Bolivia, Costa 
Rica, and Ecuador. Classifying the new countries required the addition of a fifth type –that of 
incomplete processes of incorporation-, in which I placed Bolivia and Ecuador. Costa Rica was 
added to Colombia and Uruguay as a case of incorporation through the expansion of the electoral 
basis of oligarchic parties.  
Chapter 5 focused on the measurement of welfare regime change. Accounting for the 
diversity of Latin American welfare regimes required the introduction of new categories. I 
identified four different types around 1985, and five around 2010. Obviously, there was an 
important degree of mismatch between countries distribution in the respective typologies –that 
is, only a few of the countries that were part of the same category in 1985 ended together in 
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2010. Neither did membership in each of those typologies individually considered match the 
classification based on types of incorporation process. Those partial mismatches suggested that 
both initial regime type and incorporation process might be connected with the paths leading to 
the situation in 2010, but also confirmed that none of those factors could separately explain those 
paths. Diachronic comparison also revealed a pervasive multiplication and accentuation of the 
internal fractures of welfare regimes in the region. With the partial exceptions of Brazil and 
Costa Rica, systems of social protection became more internally fragmented and lacking in 
coordination.  
Fragmentation of welfare regimes occurred along four lines of discrimination potentially 
translatable into political cleavages –namely, truncation, dualization, segmentation and 
marketization. Truncation defines the limits of the effective coverage of the system of social 
protection as a whole, and creates a potential line of cleavage between insiders and outsiders. 
Dualization is present, to variable degrees, in all cases. It is the result of the expansion of social 
protection by means of social assistance, that creates two main categories of insiders –those 
covered by social insurance on contributory basis, and those covered by social assistance, usually 
based on some combination of categorical definitions and means-testing. Understood in a strict 
sense, segmentation is used here to refer to the existence of multiple sub-regimes, usually 
corresponding to occupational and professional categories, which produce differential 
distributions of benefits and contributory burdens among the insured. Finally, marketization is 
the result of the expansion of the participation of the market in the welfare mix, and expresses 
itself in the differential access, based on levels of income, to services offered by private 
providers for individual purchase. Universalization –the reversal of fragmentation through 
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inclusive expansion and a more even, rights-based distribution of benefits- has been far less 
frequent.  
Chapter 6 tests the hypotheses through qualitative comparative analysis. The results 
confirmed some of the hypotheses and showed the need to discard, or at least reformulate, others. 
First, evidence did not confirm the necessity of authoritarianism and financial crisis for the 
occurrence of structural retrenchment with institutional displacement, since the outcome could 
occur in the absence of both factors. The most solid, certainly not most exciting, conclusion 
seems to be that any more solid advance in this direction is contingent upon the accumulation of 
more detailed knowledge of the concrete processes connecting crisis and reform. Second, the 
hypothesis about the sufficiency of insider-based parties in the opposition to block initiatives for 
structural reform was confirmed. Third, so was the one about the need for those parties to water-
down their projects in order to neutralize the opposition of their core constituencies. The latter 
appears as a central explanatory factor for the resilience of established systems of social 
protection, resulting in processes of institutional layering that fed the hybridization of welfare 
regimes. Fourth, further, more finely tuned elaboration, is required around the conditions making 
structural reforms in the direction of a more egalitarian and inclusive expansion of social 
protection possible. I suggest some ideas in that direction later in these conclusions. Finally, I 
explored the conditions determining the reversibility of a significant fraction of structural 
reforms. The results led me to discard the hypothesis explaining such an outcome based on the 
attributes of specific political processes leading to the reform in each case, and suggested the 
need to reconsider the determinants of governability and state capacity. 
Chapter 7 is the explanatory core of the empirical exploration. It had two goals. First, the 
unpacking of the causal mechanisms underlying the associations that resulted from the QCA 
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practiced in chapter V. Second, the identification of clues to improve the formulation of those 
hypotheses that were only weakly or not fully supported by the Boolean analysis. Third, the 
exploration of explanatory factors that might have been disregarded in the initial hypotheses. The 
main findings are the following.  
First, abundant evidence showed the endurance of policy constituencies, and the multiple 
ways in which they may act to preserve it, depending on institutional and conjunctural 
configurations. They may be joined by co-participants in the development of social security, 
predominantly benefiting parties that emerged after incorporation junctures, or be mainly 
controlled by “old” hegemonic parties benefitting from corporatist forms of interest 
intermediation. In any case, they represent the main obstacle for any reform entailing some 
homogenization of benefits and burdens, either between insiders and outsiders, or across 
categories of insiders. Whatever the case, the partisan actors benefitting from privileged 
connections with them, if in the opposition, will never risk future electoral growth by detaching 
themselves from the protection of their interests. However, the exhaustion of the financial 
sustainability of existing social protection schemes may force those same parties, once in 
government, to push for reforms similar to the ones they opposed before.  
Second, some aspects of the configuration of party systems may alter both the timing of 
those hard choices, and the competitive strategies through which they are implemented.  
Third, there is a significant gap between the feasibility of protective coalitions of 
potential losers with tangible immediate losses, and prospective winners from diffuse future 
gains. The “political convertibility” of pressure from below, from a reactive defensive force, into 
a proactive, constructive one, is very limited. This cannot but reinforce the importance of 
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existing policies for the articulation of collective action and as a consequence the asymmetry 
between coalitions of outsiders and insiders. 
Fourth, there is nothing automatic in the process of conversion of benefits from public 
policies into effective capacity for political agency. Fifth, most cases considered in this chapter 
have confirmed the relevance that, under those circumstances, teams of experts are likely go 
gain. Technical cadres placed in power positions in sectorial bureaucratic structures have been 
key actors in the articulation of every process of structural expansion, and, perhaps more 
important, no project of systemic expansion has made significant progress by either working 
against established bureaucracies or bypassing them. Sixth, in cases that were still necessary, we 
repeatedly confirm the importance of a contingent element of political craftsmanship that seems 
very resistant to theoretical modeling.  
Chapter 8 focuses on the countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela) where social 
assistance has experienced the most abrupt and expansive growth and explores the political 
dynamics associated with that growth. These countries also have in common a set of factors a 
priori suggesting wider margins for institutional innovation than found in other cases, and the 
possibility of a distinctive pattern of institutional change perhaps associated with recurrent 
institutional volatility. The hypothesis I explored considered the possibility that, their 
commonalities notwithstanding, significant differences among the organization of recently 
emerging partisan forces would lead to important differences in the political manipulation of 
social assistance. The central finding is that the organizational structure of incumbent political 
forces previous to their access to governing positions may shape the implementation of social 
assistance for social mobilization.  
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Chapter 9 is fully exploratory, and a partially unexpected secondary product of Chapter 8. 
The in-depth analysis required to build the narratives that provide the latter’s core brought to the 
surface the striking recurrence of some patterns of interaction between state and society through 
public policy-making. Those patterns, I hypothesize, were directly connected with chronic 
institutional stability and serial replacement. The main result was confirmation of a general 
syndrome of fragmented governance. Crucially, such fragmentation differs from the one that the 
increasing complexity of both societies and governments produce in the developed world. 
Depending on which segment of the boundaries between state and society we examine, we find 
them presenting each other very different faces. This creates differences in terms both of 
governability and of instruments of governance -and as a result in the tangible contents of 
democratic citizenship. We have, in the end, returned to the initial idea of the emergence of 
“multiple citizenships” within the same political system. 
Interestingly, the problem has in first place an obvious, elementary expression at the level 
of the most basic dimensions of governance –namely, those of territory and coercion. The new 
generation of social assistance programs frequently operate through forms of territorial targeting. 
That has two types of implications. The first one is that in societies that already suffer from 
spatial segregation –that is one of the forces leading the spatial focalization of social policies-, 
this pattern of intervention can only accentuate segregation. The second one is the uneven spatial 
distribution of governmental capacity. I have shown multiple attempts to remediate this through 
the inclusion of a participatory component in the design of social assistance and the 
incorporation of civil society organizations to policy monitoring and execution.  However, we 
have also had the opportunity to observe how, precisely because this occurs where state and civil 
society show each other their respective poorest faces, effective participation depends in those 
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areas on administrative frames and expertise that can only be provided by the state. We have also 
seen that, even when successful, the challenge of scaling-up and integrating those experiences is 
rarely met –and when it is, as we saw in the Chapter 7, the state plays a decisive role. 
A cartography of the intensity of repression would probably confirm that those are often 
the areas where the state chooses to show its ugliest face. However, it may not be able do to so, 
or find it too costly. The out-sourcing of repression has become in some cases the chosen 
alternative, and that should put the coercive dimension of hierarchical governance under a 
complete different perspective. Moreover, situations of acute political crisis have brought the 
issue of civilian-military relationships and the institutional forms of the coercive arm of the state 
back on the table.304 The basic problem is that the state-civil society equation is not necessarily a 
zero-sum game, so the abdication of the former can only have disastrous consequences if the 
distribution of resources and power within the latter is a strongly biased one.  
10.4 A SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
10.4.1 The politics of structural welfare regime reform 
The metaphor of institutional “freezing” does not apply to Latin American welfare regimes. 
Changes affecting their coverage, welfare mix, levels of benefits, financial viability, institutional 
                                                 
304 This has yet another dimension that can only be mentioned here. Some Latin American states have high percentages 
of incarcerated population. This is, as we well know, exclusive problem of the underdeveloped world. The problem is 
accentuated, however, by the fact that some of the states have found repeated difficulties to solve the Hobbesian 
problem inside prisons themselves.  
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structure and stratification effects, have been pervasive and covered the whole region. Those 
changes, however, have only exceptionally suppressed or moderated the main limitations that 
social insurance schemes showed by 1980 –namely, truncation of their coverage at the limits of 
the formal economy, and extreme segmentation. 
This pattern of segmented expansion, that produces hybrid structures combining different 
principles in the determination of access to transfers and services for different risk categories, is 
rich in political consequences. Segmentation, on the one hand, increases the number of possible 
coalitions of interests, thus somehow contributing to overcoming political blockades leading to 
policy immobility. At the same time, however, those coalitions tend to form on ad-hoc basis, and 
are likely to be unstable and ephemeral. That complicates the political viability of reforms 
aiming to a more egalitarian, universal distribution of benefits effectively based on social rights. 
This situation is not original in itself. Silja Häusemann has recently observed an 
analogous process of multiplication of interests and emergence of less cohesive, short-lived 
distributional coalitions, in the most recent wave of reforms affecting continental European 
states. In Latin America, however, the incompleteness of the original development of welfare 
regimes makes things even more complicated, by adding pending business to the emerging ones.  
The cases analyzed here seem to support the hypothesis of the exceptionality of structural 
reforms entailing marked institutional discontinuities. The original hypothesis suggesting 
authoritarianism and economic crisis as necessary conditions for structural reform proved to be a 
weak one. Still, the fact remains that drastic retrenchment has in all cases required, if not 
necessarily an authoritarian regime, at least degrees of concentration of executive authority that 
are barely compatible with effective horizontal accountability. On the other hand, the eclipse of 
the recipes of the Washington consensus, and in general the failure of the project of conservative 
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modernization that they supported, seem to have put retrenchment through radical privatization 
at least temporarily out of the agenda. 
The politics of political blockade –total or partial- seem to be pretty solid, and to operate 
robustly across a wide variety of welfare regimes and political scenarios. Apart from the 
expansion of social assistance, the preservation of the original corporatist schemes of social 
security is probably the most extended trend.  
Thus, what looks as carrying more potential future relevance are the dynamics of gradual 
structural expansion, on the one hand; and the politics of social assistance, on the other. 
Regarding the former, both the results of Boolean analysis and the policy processes studied in 
depth suggest that the category may actually be too general, and that further conceptual 
discrimination is needed in order to account for the diversity of mechanisms operating across the 
diverse cases.  
Perhaps the safest generalization with respect to the processes of structural expansion so 
far analyzed, is that effective autonomous pressure from below was not at the origin of any of 
them. In other words, the set of three basic processes hypothesized to constitute necessary 
conditions for the reform may be the first aspect in need of revision. While evidence supports the 
idea that structural expansion decisively depends on the neutralization of insiders potentially 
opposing the reform and the brokerage of ideas are necessary, the existence of channels for 
outsiders to directly influence the policy process has been missing in some cases. 
Second, those necessary processes –that is, neutralization of insiders and brokerage of 
ideas- should not be conflated with the institutional conditions that facilitate them in specific 
circumstances, which seem to be more contingent. Moreover, the same type of actor may play, 
depending on configurations specific to the policy domain, very different roles. Thus, for 
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example, while the bureaucracy of the CCSS was the central engine behind the expansion of the 
Costa Rican health care system, it was against the initiatives of that very same bureaucracy that a 
more radical privatization of the Costa Rican pension system was avoided. The example entails 
an important warning against the risk of assuming necessary affinities between certain 
preferences or interests and certain types of actor. The established sectorial bureaucracy played a 
dynamic role in the universalization of health care because, as a result of the previous 
development of the system, the expansion of the public sector was in its best interest. In Brazil, 
however, the sectorial bureaucracy was a persistent advocate of the preservation of the 
fragmented insurance-based structure, and the move towards universalization required the 
penetration of the administrative structure by a sort of “counter-bureaucracy.” 
More generally, process-tracing showed at least three situations whose respective 
dynamics may require further analytic discrimination. In Costa Rica we observe the expansion of 
a system that already presented an initial development favorable to universalization, and in the 
absence of any solid coalition of private interests –precisely as a consequence of such a pattern 
of early development. In Brazil and Uruguay, on the other hand, universalization had to work 
against consolidated tripartite structures involving notoriously stronger private interests. That 
commonality notwithstanding, the constitutional reform to a great extent displaced the arena of 
the political struggle in Brazil, while in Uruguay reformist teams were forced to fully operate 
within the established channels.305 And yet the Brazilian and Uruguayan situations seem to have 
more in common with each other than with respect to the scenario faced in Chile by the Lagos 
and Bachelet administrations’ initiatives of universalization of health care. Although also 
                                                 
305 Consideration of the Colombian case –where the embryo of a structural reform was introduced through the window 
of opportunity provided by a constitutional reform too- could contribute to a better understanding of those differences.  
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tripartite, the Chilean system had emerged from a process of radical retrenchment that tipped the 
balance in favor of private agents to an extent that we could not find in any other regional case. 
Consideration of the Chilean case brings to the table a more general question –namely, to 
what extent initiatives of structural expansion following structural retrenchment are forced into a 
qualitatively different type of dynamics. The successful lobby of Chilean private health care 
providers against some of the most progressive aspects of the project initially favored by the 
socialist governments recommend that hypothesis. Answering to that question would require the 
systematic consideration of business interests and their aggregation by conservative parties –an 
acknowledged limitation of this preliminary theoretical model. However, the effects of radical 
structural retrenchment may not exclusively operate against the likelihood of developments 
towards universalism. In fact, corporatist segmentation was also among the victims of radical 
privatization, and its disappearance may in the long run facilitate the articulation of more 
homogeneous reformist coalitions.  
A final aspect has to do with the possible consequences of the mutations that the  more or 
less prolonged exercise of power are likely to introduce in the organizational structures and 
internal life of mass leftist parties. Unfortunately, we lack for the Chilean Socialist party and for 
the Frente Amplio anything comparable to the work that Steven Levitsky and Wendy Hunter 
have done for Peronism and the Brazilian PT. However, several authors converge in emphasizing 
the increasingly professional-electoral orientation that governing has stimulated both in 
Socialists and PT. Such and evolution should bring important consequences in terms of the 
repertoire of feasible strategies of expansion. 
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10.4.2 The politics of massive social assistance 
The expansion of social assistance –particularly under the modality of conditional cash transfers- has 
taken place everywhere, regardless of policy legacies, institutional environments, or governments’ 
ideological orientation. However, the use of anti-poverty programs for purpose of political 
mobilization shows important variation depending the combinations of bureaucratic capacities and 
the organizational structure of governing parties. 
The institutional framing of social assistance is particularly relevant for the future 
development of social protection in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. What crucially 
distinguishes these experiences from other massive expansions of conditional cash transfers is 
the combination of poorly developed systems of social insurance, and generalized fragility 
affecting the institutional frames of political competition and policy-making. A deep crisis of 
established political structures, resulting in systemic collapses and the ascendance of anti-
establishment forces with massive political support is common to Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Venezuela. We could expect such a point of departure to provide more room for maneuvering is 
the redesign of social protection, but also to create more serious governability problems and 
higher likelihood of recurrent serial replacement of institutions. 
The most relevant finding in this regard, is the absence of a common pattern shared by 
the three cases of “populist left.” Among them, only in Bolivia we find a governing party that 
rests on a powerful organized coalition with organizational structures consolidated before 
winning the presidency. Significantly, Bolivia is also the only case having taken concrete steps 
beyond the necessarily short-termed reliance of social assistance, and moved in the direction of 
universalizing social protection on more permanent institutional basis. We should keep in mind 
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the fact that the Ecuadorian experience is still very recent, and its future development looks 
extremely uncertain. The creation of an integrated system of social protection under public 
administration is in theory in Rafael Correa’s agenda. So far, we can only notice that, absent any 
structure aiming to mobilize support beyond the strict limits of electoral campaigning, Correa 
opted for a technocratic, exclusionary approach to policy-making, detaching himself from the 
forces that put him in the presidency –his is probably, strictly speaking, the more purely 
plebiscitarian leadership. 
Venezuela somehow lies in between, with a governing force that never consolidated 
organizational structures likely to limit the exercise of personal power from the top. However, 
Hugo Chávez had to take two types of constraints into account. First, the involvement of the 
military corporation in the process of political mobilization. Second, an inherited system of 
social protection that, its limitations notwithstanding, was considerably more developed than the 
ones forming part of Morales’ and Correa’s respective legacies. The Venezuelan process has thus 
so far been the most respectful of inherited corporatist structures of social protection. It has also 
presented the most persistent, if also erratic, attempt of political encapsulation and mobilization 
of civil society from the top.  
It is still too early, and in-depth research on Bolivia and Ecuador is too scanty, to make 
detailed predictions not only about the future anatomy of the respective systems of social 
protection, but also on their governability and possibilities of stabilization under enduring 
institutional forms.  
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10.4.3 Emerging patterns of governance? 
The deficit of governability is, in fact, a necessarily central component for any analysis of public 
policy in the countries mentioned in the previous section. Strictly speaking, any form of public 
policy is an exercise in statecraft, contingent on the possibility of simultaneously producing, beyond 
the specific content of each policy, conditions for governments to be actually able to govern. 
Analyzed under this light, processes of social policy-making provide interesting clues on 
the direction in which relations between state and society may be moving in these countries. 
What I found basically is a pervasive exasperation of the fragmentation of state structures and 
patterns of interaction with society. Such a background cannot but multiply and magnify any 
specific effect of the segmented structure of social protection. It is not just that such type of 
social protection creates “multiple social citizenships;” citizenship tout court experiences 
dramatic variations across space, social groups, and policy domains.  
10.5 A TENTATIVE RESEARCH AGENDA 
I have repeatedly acknowledged that this was a study essentially aiming for theory development, 
more guided by the logic of discovery than by the logic of validation sensu stricto. The obvious 
corollary is its incomplete nature, and the multiple directions in which further research can be 
developed. I will only briefly mention four directions that I find more immediately necessary.  
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10.5.1 Improvement of the model and theory-testing 
Since the object is a particularly dynamic one, and many of the processes here considered are still 
developing or only very recently concluded, follow-up of the evolution of their results in the near 
future is a first requirement. Second, is would be interesting to see how well the main theoretical 
conclusions resist the proof of an expansion of the cases under consideration –particularly 
considering the internal diversity of the set of excluded cases. That would also provide an 
opportunity to advance in the transition towards what we could strictly call theory-testing. Third, we 
have the need to consider the politics of implementation. We know that deliberate inaction, 
abstention to intervene, is a consequential form of political intervention, and that aspects like the 
effective translation of many of the observed changes into policy outcomes is contingent upon the 
sustained availability of resources and capacities that are notoriously scarce, precarious, and fragile. 
Fourth, theoretical refinement is necessary. Three important issues seem to require revision and 
more discriminant conceptual categories. One, the conceptualization of diverse modalities of 
structural expansion. Two, a more detailed exploration of variation across policy domains. Three, 
incorporation in the model of the role played by business interests and the diverse modalities of 
their articulation with parties and political aggregation. The fifth direction of expansion involves 
consideration of some other crucial components of welfare regimes –regulation of the labor market 
in first place. 
10.5.2 Exploration of connections with other regimes 
There are two public policy areas that, if brought under consideration, might shed new light on the 
understanding of welfare regimes and the challenges they face. First, tax reform. The future 
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possibilities of social protection are contingent upon the reformulation if its fiscal bases, and 
political immobility in that regard constitutes for many countries the most pressing bottleneck. 
Second, policies of crime repression and penal punishment. As we have known for a long time, 
welfare regimes have been, among other things, useful devices to “regulate the poor;” their 
interactions, points of friction and areas of synergy, with other forms of “regulation” are important 
for a comprehensive evaluation of their aggregate outcomes. A growing body of research has shown 
some important functional affinities between projects aiming to reorient social policy paradigms 
from emphasis on welfare to a focus on workfare, on the one hand; and recent changes in the 
paradigms guiding the accentuation of the punitive components of penal policy. 
10.5.3 Patterns of governance 
3. Patterns of governance 
I have repeatedly emphasized the unusual richness of social protection considered as a vantage point 
providing a window for the observation of a kaleidoscope of political dimensions. One of them is 
the identification of more general patterns of interaction between state and society –particularly, of 
what it is exactly that governments do when they govern.  
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APPENDIX A 
TABLES ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF WELFARE REGIMES 
Table 23: Social security programs, 1980-1990 
 
 Sickness Maternity Old 
Age 
Invalidity Survivors Family 
Allowance 
Employm. 
Injury 
Unemp. 
Argentina X X X X X Xa Xa X 
Boliviab X X X X X X X Limited 
Brazil X X X X X X X X 
Chile X X X X X X X X 
Colombia X X X X X X Xd X 
Costa 
Rica 
X X X X X X X Limited 
Ecuador X X X X X None X X 
Mexico X X X X X X X Limited 
Peru X X X X X None X Limited 
Uruguay X X X X X X X X 
Venezuela X X X X X None X X 
Source: (Mesa-Lago 1991b). 
Notes: 
a Domestic servants excluded. 
b Agricultural and domestic workers, self-employed, artisans, drivers, tradesmen, and occasional workers, excluded. 
d Domestic, temporary, casual, and family workers; public employees, and agricultural workers not using power 
machines, excluded. 
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Table 24: Social insurance coverage and social expenditure, 1980 
COUNTRY SOCIAL INSURANCE COVERAGE SOCIAL SECURITY 
SPENDING as % of 
GDP 
 % of EAP % of Total population 
Argentina 52.0 68.0 9.4 
Chile 64.0 67.3 10.6 
Uruguay 83 68.5 17.2 
Costa Rica 49.0 68.3 7.0 
Brazil 49.0 47.0 6.2b 
Mexico 34.0 53.4 3.4 
Venezuela 32 49.8 1.3 
Bolivia 18 9.0 52.7 
Colombia 21.0 22.4 2.8 
Ecuador 14.8 9.4 3.0 
Peru 29.0a 17.0 n.d. 
Source: (Isuani 1985a, Mesa-Lago 1989) 
Notes: 
a 1975. 
b 1977 
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Table 25: Special social security regimes, 1980, 2011 
 (The numbers in second and third column refer to special regimes for particular professional 
categories.) 
 1989 Coverage included: 2011 Coverage included: 
Argentina   9 Military, police and security 
personnel; some provincial and 
municipal public employees; 
university professors; foreign 
service; judiciary; researchers 
Bolivia 2 Banking, military. 17 
complementary pension funds 
supplement the general social 
security regime for particular 
categories of workers. 
----  
Brazil 3 Students, public employees, 
military 
2 Public employees; armed forces 
Chile 39  5 Railway employees; seamen and 
port workers; armed forces; 
police; public employees 
Colombia 5 Public employees, teachers, 
railway workers, military, 
national police 
4 Employees of state oil company 
having joined before 1/30/2003; 
national police; military; teachers 
Costa Rica 2  2 Teachers, employees of justice 
department 
Ecuador 3  3 Small scale fishermen; 
agricultural workers; armed 
forces 
Mexico 3 Oil workers, public employees, 
military 
3 Oil workers, public employees, 
military 
Peru 3 Fishermen, teachers, diplomatic 
service 
3 Fishermen, teachers, diplomatic 
service 
Uruguay 5 Bank employees, notaries, 
university employees, armed 
forces, police 
5 Bank employees, notaries, 
university employees, armed 
forces, police 
Venezuela 3 Armed forces, public employees, 
teachers 
1 Armed forces 
Sources: (Mesa-Lago 1991b, United States Social Security Administration 2011). 
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Table 26: Inequalities among average pensions of various special regimes, selected 
countries, 1980-1987 
(The numbers indicate the ration between the average benefit of the special regime and the 
average benefit of the respective general regime) 
 Bolivia 
(1987) 
Chile  
(1980) 
Colombia 
(1982) 
Costa Rica 
(1986) 
Mexico 
(1980) 
Uruguay 
(1982) 
General 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Armed Forces  8.0 2.5  5.5 4.9 
Police  6.9 1.6   4.1 
Civil Servants 1.2 3.2 1.7  3.8 2.0 
Teachers 1.3   3.4  2.0 
Finance, Judiciary    5.8   
Banking  5.7 3.4   3.8 
Oil 2.2      
Rural      0.8 
Domestic servants      0.7 
Source: (Mesa-Lago 1991a) 
 
Table 27: Population of difficult-coverage groups, 1980, 2001-04 
 Informal (% of total urban 
employed labor force) 
Self-employed 
(%of total 
urban 
employed 
labor force) 
Self-employed (% of total 
rural employed labor force) 
Poverty (% of 
total 
population 
 1980 2001-2004 2001-2004 19802 2001-2004 2001-2004 
Argentina 19.4 37.0 17.1 6.3 n.a. 29.41 
Bolivia 23.2 62.8 45.7 50.9 86.0 62.4 
Brazil 16.9 41.9 23.6 27.6 64.7 38.7 
Chile 20.1 28.6 15.0 8.8 32.0 18.7 
Colombia 22.3 44.4 38.5 18.7 54.8 50.61 
Costa Rica 12.4 31.4 18.1 14.8 26.4 20.3 
Ecuador 25.4 52.4 34.2 37.9 60.4 49.01 
Mexico 22.0 41.4 19.0 18.4 35.4 37.0 
Peru 23.8 60.0 43.0 32.0 80.5 54.7 
Uruguay 19.0 52.6 21.8 8.0 n.a. 15.41 
Venezuela 16.4 46.7 29.8 15.1 55.6 41.7 
Source: (Mesa-Lago 1989, 2008) 
Notes: 
1 Only urban 
2 Rural labor force employed in traditional sec tor 
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Table 28: Some indicators of changes in demography and social structure 
 Old-age dependency 
ratioa 
 (percentages) 
Female 
economic 
participation 
(percentages) 
Births to 
unmarried 
mothers 
(percentages) 
Separations and 
divorces 
(percentages) 
 2000 2010 2050 1990 2010 1970 2000-01 1994 2005 
Argentina 16.2 16.6 30.2 44.0 
(1999) 
48.0 29.8 57.6 7.1 10.7 
Bolivia 7.7 8.0 18.6 60.0 
(1997) 
62.0 
(2007) 
n.d. n.d. 9.4 9.4 
Brazil 8.4 10.2 35.9 44.0 58.0 
(2009) 
n.d. n.d. n.d n.d. 
Chile 11.2 13.5 36.0 33.0 42.0 18.8 50.5 7.7 9.4 
Colombia 7.6 8.6 27.3 44.0 
(1991) 
56.0 n.d n.d. 13.8 17.8 
Costa Rica 8.6 9.5 31.9 33.0 43.0 29.4 57.5 13.3 16.9 
Ecuador 8.5 10.6 27.2 56.0 
(2004) 
48.0 n.d. n.d.   
Mexico 8.5 10.0 35.9 30.0 43.0 27.3 39.6 n.d. 10.7 
Peru 7.9 9.3 25.7 64.0 
(1997) 
67.0 n.d. n.d. n.d. 13.1 
Uruguay 21.0 21.8 34.8 54.0 
(2007) 
55.0 21.1 55.2 10.2 14.7 
Venezuela 7.4 8.7 25.2 35.0 50.0 n.d. n.d. 6.8 13.3 
Sources: (ECLAC 2010, ILO 2011) 
Notes: 
aPercentage of the population 65 or over to the population aged 15-64. 
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Table 29: Constitutional recognition of social rights, 2013 
 Constitutional 
recognition 
Right-based 
social protection 
Explicit 
guarantees 
Argentina Yes Yes No 
Bolivia Yes Yes Yes 
Brazil Yes Yes No 
Chile No Yes Yes 
Colombia Yes Yes Yes 
Costa Rica Yes Yes No 
Ecuador Yes No No 
Mexico Yes Yes No 
Peru No No No 
Uruguay Yes Yes No 
Venezuela Yes Yes n.d. 
           Source: see Appendix B. 
 
Table 30: Social security programs, 2011 
 Sickness Maternity Old 
Age 
Invalidity Survivors Family 
Allowance 
Employm. 
Injury 
Unemploym. 
Argentina X X X X X X X X 
Bolivia X X X X X X X Limited 
Brazil X X X X X X X X 
Chile X X X X X X X X 
Colombia X X X X X X X X 
Costa 
Rica 
X X X X X X X Limited 
Ecuador X X X X X None X X 
Mexico X X X X X X X Limited 
Peru X X X X X None X Limited 
Uruguay X X X X X X X X 
Venezuela X X X X X None X X 
Source: (United States Social Security Administration 2011) 
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Table 31: Social spending as percentage of GDP, 1990-2007 
1990-1991 1996-1997 2002-2003 2006-2007 
Country PSS (as 
% of 
GDP) 
Country PSS (as 
% of 
GDP) 
Country PSS (as 
% of 
GDP) 
Country PSS (as 
% of 
GDP) 
Argentina 19.3 Uruguay 21.3 Brazil 22.1 Brazil 22.4 
Uruguay 16.8 Argentina 24.6 Uruguay 21.8 Argentina 22.1 
Brazil 16.6 Brazil  19.4 Argentina 23.9 Uruguay 21.2 
Costa 
Rica 
15.6 Costa Rica 16.8 Costa Rica  18.7 Costa Rica 17.2 
Chile 12.0 Bolivia 17.9 Bolivia 17.4 Bolivia 16.2 
Venezuela 8.8 Colombia  13.6 Chile 14.8 Venezuela 13.4 
Mexico 6.5 Chile 12.8 Venezuela 11.7 Colombia 12.3 
Colombia 5.9 Venezuela  8.6 Colombia 11.1 Chile 12.2 
Ecuador  7.4 Mexico 8.5 Mexico 10.2 Mexico 11.2 
Peru 3.9 Peru 6.9 Peru 9.5 Peru 8.2 
Bolivia  n.d. Ecuador 5.6 Ecuador 5.5 Ecuador 6.4 
LA & C1 12.2  14.3  15.7  17.3 
Source: (ECLAC 2010) 
Notes: 
1 Latin America and the Caribbean, weighted average of 21 countries 
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Table 32: Models of pension reform 
Reform model, country & date of 
beginning 
Financial regime Benefits 
calculation 
Management 
Structural reforms 
Fully funded substitutive model 
Chile 1981 
Bolivia 1997 
Mexico 1997 
Individually capitalized 
accounts 
Defined 
contribution 
Private 
Fully funded parallel model 
Peru 1993 
Colombia 1994 
PAYG Defined benefit Public 
Individually capitalized 
accounts 
Defined 
contribution 
Private 
Fully funded mixed model 
Argentina 1994 
Uruguay 1996 
Costa Rica 2001 
Ecuador 2001 
PAYG Defined benefit Public 
Individually capitalized 
accounts 
Defined 
contribution 
Private 
Parametric reforms 
Brazil (general social security regime & 
private sector workers) 1999 
PAYG Defined 
contribution 
Public 
Brazil (public sector) 2003 
Costa Rica (PAYG component) 2005 
Venezuela  
PAYG Defined benefit Public 
Sources: Adapted from (ECLAC 2010, Mesa-Lago 2008). 
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Table 33: Pension systems, circa 2010 
 Coverage Pub./
Priv. 
Mix 
Retirement 
Age 
Years of 
Cont. 
Repl. Rate Cont. Special 
regimes 
Assistential 
Pension 
 % Tot. %EAP M W   Employee Employer State 
Argentina   n.a. 65 60 30  11 12.71 Disc.  Yes 
Bolivia   n.a. 65 60 151  10.5 ---- Disc.  Yes 
Brazil   n.a. 65 60 11 - 15  9.0 20.0 Deficit  Yes 
Chile   2/98 % 65 60 10 - 20  12.55 1.3 Disc.  Yes 
Colombia   55/45 62 572 20  3.88 11.63 Disc.   
Costa Rica   4 62 60 20  2.5 4.75 0.25  Yes 
Ecuador   n.a. 60 30  6.64 3.1 5   
Mexico   0/100 65 9.5 / 253  1.13 5.15 0.25  Yes 
Peru   4/96 60 20  13.0 ---- Disc.  No 
Uruguay   49/51 60 35  15 7.5 Disc.  Yes 
Venezuela   n.a. 60 55 14.5  1.93 4.82 1.5  No 
             
Sources: World Social Security Report 2010/2011 
Notes: 
1 Only for public system; private one only requires a determined amount in the individual account. 
2 These will be the ages from 2014 on, after a process of gradual increase and convergence. 
3 Public system / Private system 
4 All the insured are simultaneously in both programs. 
5 Social insurance: 40%; social assistance: whole cost. 
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Table 34: General structure of health care systems circa 2010 
 Model Mandatory 
Coverage1 
Special 
Regimes 
Basic 
Package 
Catastrophic 
Illnesses 
Administration Decent. 
   Segment. Coord.  
Argentina Tripartite Agriculture, 
Domestic 
servants 
4 Yes Yes Very High Low High 
Bolivia Tripartite  15 Yes 
(limited) 
No Very High No High 
Brazil Dual Agriculture, 
Self-
employed, 
domestic 
servants 
3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Very 
High 
Chile Dual Agriculture, 
domestic 
servants 
2 Yes Yes Yes High High 
Colombia Cuatripart. Domestic 
servants, 
self-
employed 
3 Yes Yes Yes Yes High 
Costa Rica Dual Agriculture, 
domestic 
servants 
No Yes Yes Unified Very 
High 
Ecuador Tripartite Agriculture 2 No No Yes No Very Low 
Mexico Tripartite Agriculture 4 Yes 
(partial) 
Yes    (partial)  High No Middle 
Peru Tripartite Agriculture, 
domestic 
servants 
2 Yes 
(partial) 
No Yes No Low 
Uruguay Tripartite Agricultue, 
domestic 
servants 
5 Yes Yes Yes Yes Middle 
Venezuela Tripartite Domestic 
servants 
5 No No High No Very Low 
Source: (Mesa-Lago 2005, 2008) 
Notes: 
1 Number of groups of difficult incorporation enjoying mandatory coverage.  
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Table 35: Composition of expenditure in health care, 1998, 2008 
 Year Total public 
expenditure 
on health as% 
of GDP 
Public 
expenditure as 
% total health 
expenditure 
Private 
expenditure as 
% total health 
expenditure 
Out-of-pocket 
as % of total 
health 
expenditure 
Social 
security as % 
of total 
health 
expenditure 
Argentina 1998 4.6 57.3 44.4 32.6 60.4 
 2008 5.3 53.4 50.2 31.3 59.0 
Bolivia 1998 3.1 59.1 37.1 33.8 57.3 
 2008 2.8 66.3 36.5 31.3 59.9 
Brazil 1998 3.3 48.7 56.0 45.6  
 2008 3.7 41.6 56.0 35.9 0 
Chile 1998 2.6 49.0 63.3 48.6 76.0 
 2008 3.3 44.0 40.6 24.2 16.8 
Colombia 1998 6.7 54.5 28.1 25.9 37.5 
 2008 4.9 65.7 16.1 10.5 70.1 
Costa Rica 1998 4.8 77.1 22.1 22.3 83.8 
 2008 6.3 68.5 23.1 21.3 85.7 
Ecuador 1998 1.7 52.8 61.7 38.8 40.6 
 2008 2.2 50.3 60.5 44.6 42.8 
Mexico 1998 2.5 41.0 54.0 52.9 73.6 
 2008 2.8 45.3 53.3 49.2 55.2 
Peru 1998 2.4 39.7 47.4 50.2 55.8 
 2008 2.7 55.0 40.6 33.2 42.8 
Uruguay 1998 4.6 20.3 62.2 21.4 11.0 
 2008 4.9 46.3 27.6 8.4 38.1 
Venezuela 1998 3.1 67.4 45.3 32.6 33.4 
 2008 2.4 62.1 55.1 52.6 31.4 
Source: ILO Social Security Expenditure Database 
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Table 36: Employed persons contributing to social security, 1989-90, 2006-07 
 Year Total Men Women 
Argentina 1990 65.5 65.8 65.1 
 2006 46.0 47.6 43.8 
Bolivia 1989 28.5 29.2 27.6 
 2007 20.7 21.1 20.3 
Brazil 1990 53.3 54.5 51.0 
 2008 52.6 53.6 51.3 
Chile 1990 65.9 66.6 64.5 
 2006 66.7 69.0 62.9 
Colombia 2008 32.4 31.4 34.1 
Costa Rica 1990 69.3 71.2 64.4 
 2008 69.7 73.3 63.5 
Ecuador 1990 37.5 38.4 35.8 
 2008 36.0 35.0 37.4 
Mexico 1989 50.4 47.0 58.9 
 2006 52.1 50.6 54.6 
Peru 2001 12.9 15.0 10.1 
 2008 24.8 30.9 17.4 
Uruguay 2002 63.0 63.0 63.1 
 2008 67.4 68.1 66.5 
Venezuela 2002 61.5 58.0 67.1 
 2008 65.2 62.6 69.0 
Source: (Cecchini and Martiínez 2012) 
 
Table 37: Pension coverage of population aged 65 and above, 2000-05 
 Total Men Women 
Argentina 68.3 74.3 64.2 
Bolivia 14.7 16.1 12.7 
Brazil 85.9 80.0 76.4 
Chile    
Colombia 18.6 22.9 13.1 
Costa Rica 62.0 71.1 54.2 
Ecuador 15.2 17.3 10.8 
Mexico 19.2 17.8 18.0 
Peru 23.2 27.7 14.6 
Uruguay 87.1 76.9 78.9 
Venezuela 23.9 26.7 18.0 
Source: (Mesa-Lago 2008) 
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Table 38: Percentage of population above statutory pensional age receiving an old 
age pension, 2008-10 
 Percentage receiving a pension % receiving 
a 
contributory 
pension 
% receiving 
a non-
contributory 
pension 
 Total Men Women Total Total 
Argentina  83.0  93.3 79.1 13.8 
Bolivia  90.5  92.6  90.5 
Brazil 84.0  83.0 50.0 36.3 
Chile  70.9  73.4 29.5 45.0 
Colombia 76.0  18.4 13.9 9.1 
Costa Rica 28.2  48.8 42 13.8 
Ecuador 25.2  50.8 16 37.0 
Mexico 25.2  17.2 3.02 22.2 
Peru 25.0  18.5 21.9 1.6 
Uruguay 77.2  64.4 62.8 5.4 
Venezuela 50.1  42.5 29.9 20.2 
Source: ILO Social Security Expenditure Database 
Table 39: Pensions: mandatory systems for retirement income 
 Flat-rate Earnings- 
related 
Flat-rate 
universal 
Occupational 
retirement 
schemes 
Individual 
retirement 
schemes 
Means - 
tested 
 2000 2011 2000 2011 2000 2011 2000 2011 2000 2011 2000 2011 
Argentina  X X X      X X X 
Bolivia      X   X X  X 
Brazil   X X       X X 
Chile   X X1     X2 X2  X 
Colombia   X X     X2 X2   
Costa Rica   X X     X X X X 
Ecuador   X X      X  X 
Mexico   X1 X2     X2 X2   
Peru   X X     X4 X2   
Uruguay   X X     X X X X 
Venezuela X3 X3 X3 X3         
Source: Social Security Programs Throughout the World, 2003, 2011 
Notes: 
1 Earnings-related system is closed to new entrants and phasing-out. 
2 Governments guarantees a minimum pension. 
3 The pension formula contains both a flat-rate component and an earnings-related one. 
4 Guaranteed minimum pension not yet implemented 
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Table 40: Programs of monetary transfers, 2007-08 
 Unemp. 
insurance 
% of total 
population 
covered by 
conditional 
transfer 
programs 
(2009) 
% of poor 
covered by 
non-
contributory 
transfers 
(2007) 
EAP covered 
by pensions 
(2007) 
Population 
65 and over 
covered by 
pensions 
(2007) 
Minimum 
pension 
GROUP 1       
Chile Yes 6.8 51.7 62.7 61.7 Yes 
Costa Rica  2.9 17.4 62.7 41.3 Yes 
Uruguay Yes 10.1 54.7 60.9 85.6 Yes 
Brazil Yes 26.0 83.3 48.1 85.3 Yes 
Argentina Yes 6.7 36.0 39.2 70.5 Yes 
       
GROUP 2       
Colombia Yes 17.6 41.6 31.8 25.3 Yes 
Venezuela Yes   35.3 31.3 Yes 
Mexico Yes 23.3 71.2 35.9 23.3 Yes 
       
GROUP 3       
Ecuador Yes 37.1 83.9 26.2 17.4  
Peru  8.0 22.2 14.0 27.7  
Bolivia  18.6 35.3 12.5 18.0  
Source: ECLAC, Social Panorama 2007, 2009 
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APPENDIX B 
SOCIAL RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 
 
C OUNTRY YEAR ARTICLE 
   
Argentina 1956 14bis. […] El Estado otorgará los beneficios de la seguridad social, 
que tendrá carácter de integral e irrenunciable. En especial, la ley 
establecerá: el seguro social obligatorio, que estará a cargo de 
entidades nacionales o provinciales con autonomía financiera y 
económica, administradas por los interesados con participación del 
Estado, sin que pueda existir superposición de aportes; jubilaciones 
y pensiones móviles; la protección integral de la familia; la defensa 
del bien de familia; la compensación económica familiar y el acceso 
a una vivienda digna. 
 1994 Same article. 
Bolivia 1967 Artículo 7.- Derechos fundamentales de la persona: 
Toda persona tiene los siguientes derechos fundamentales, conforme 
a las leyes que reglamenten su ejercicio: 
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[…] 
11. A la seguridad social, en la forma determinada por esta 
Constitución y las leyes. 
Artículo 158.- Defensa del capital humano: 
El Estado tiene la obligación de defender el capital humano 
protegiendo la salud de la población; asegurara la continuidad de sus 
medios de subsistencia y rehabilitación de las personas inutilizadas; 
propenderá asimismo al mejoramiento de las condiciones de vida del 
grupo familiar. 
Los regímenes de seguridad social se inspirarán en los principios de 
universalidad, solidaridad, unidad de gestión, economía, oportunidad 
y eficacia, cubriendo las contingencias de enfermedad, maternidad, 
riesgos profesionales, invalidez, vejez, muerte, paro forzoso, 
asignaciones familiares y vivienda de interés social. 
 
Artículo 164.- Asistencia y salud pública: 
El servicio y la asistencia sociales son funciones del Estado, y sus 
condiciones serán determinadas por ley. Las normas relativas a la 
salud pública son de carácter coercitivo y obligatorio. 
 
 1994, 
1995, 
Same articles 
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2004, 
2005 
Chile 1980 Artículo 19.- La Constitución asegura a todas las personas: 
[…[ 
9. El derecho a la protección de la salud. El Estado protege el libre e 
igualitario acceso a las acciones de promoción, protección y 
recuperación de la salud y de rehabilitación del individuo. Le 
corresponderá, asimismo, la coordinación y control de las acciones 
relacionadas con la salud. Es deber preferente del Estado garantizar 
la ejecución de las acciones de salud, sea que se presten a través de 
instituciones públicas o privadas, en la forma y condiciones que 
determine la ley, la que podrá establecer cotizaciones obligatorias. 
Cada persona tendrá el derecho a elegir el sistema de salud al que 
desee acogerse, sea éste estatal o privado; 
[…] 
 
18. El derecho a la seguridad social. Las leyes que regulen el 
ejercicio de este derecho serán de quórum calificado. La acción del 
Estado estará dirigida a garantizar el acceso de todos los habitantes 
al goce de prestaciones básicas uniformes, sea que se otorguen a 
través de instituciones públicas o privadas. La ley podrá establecer 
cotizaciones obligatorias. El Estado supervigilará el adecuado 
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ejercicio del derecho a la seguridad social 
 
 1997, 
2000, 
2001 
Same articles 
 
Colombia 1991 Artículo 48.- La Seguridad Social es un servicio público de carácter 
obligatorio que se prestará bajo la dirección, coordinación y control 
del Estado, en sujeción a los principios de eficiencia, universalidad y 
solidaridad, en los términos que establezca la Ley. 
Se garantiza a todos los habitantes el derecho irrenunciable a la 
Seguridad Social. 
El Estado, con la participación de los particulares, ampliara 
progresivamente la cobertura de la Seguridad Social que 
comprenderá la prestación de los servicios en la forma que determine 
la Ley. 
La Seguridad Social podrá ser prestada por entidades públicas o 
privadas, de conformidad con la ley. 
No se podrán destinar ni utilizar los recursos de las instituciones de 
la Seguridad Social para fines diferentes a ella. 
La ley definirá los medios para que los recursos destinados a 
pensiones mantengan su poder adquisitivo constante. 
Artículo 49.- La atención de la salud y el saneamiento ambiental son 
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servicios públicos a cargo del Estado. Se garantiza a todas las 
personas el acceso a los servicios de promoción, protección y 
recuperación de la salud. 
Corresponde al Estado organizar, dirigir y reglamentar la prestación 
de servicios de salud a los habitantes y de saneamiento ambiental 
conforme a los principios de eficiencia, universalidad y solidaridad. 
También, establecer las políticas para la prestación de servicios de 
salud por entidades privadas, y ejercer su vigilancia y control. Así 
mismo, establecer las competencias de la Nación, las entidades 
territoriales y los particulares y determinar los aportes a su cargo en 
los términos y condiciones señalados en la ley. 
Los servicios de salud se organizarán en forma descentralizada, por 
niveles de atención y con participación de la comunidad. 
La ley señalará los términos en los cuales la atención básica para 
todos los habitantes será gratuita y obligatoria. 
Toda persona tiene el deber de procurar el cuidado integral de su 
salud y la de su comunidad. 
 
 1997, 
2001 
Same articles 
Costa Rica 1961, 
2001 
Artículo 72.- El Estado mantendrá, mientras no exista seguro de 
desocupación, un sistema técnico y permanente de protección a los 
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desocupados involuntarios, y procurará la reintegración de los 
mismos al trabajo. 
Artículo 73.- Se establecen los seguros sociales en beneficio de los 
trabajadores manuales e intelectuales, regulados por el sistema de 
contribución forzosa del Estado, patronos y trabajadores, a fin de 
proteger a éstos contra los riesgos de enfermedad, invalidez, 
maternidad, vejez, muerta y demás contingencias que la ley 
determine. 
La administración y el gobierno de los seguros sociales estarán a 
cargo de una institución autónoma, denominada Caja Costarricense 
de Seguro Social. 
No podrán ser transferidos ni empleados en finalidades distintas a las 
que motivaron su creación, los fondos y las reservas de los seguros 
sociales. 
Los seguros contra riesgos profesionales serán de exclusiva cuenta 
de los patronos y se regirán por disposiciones especiales. 
(Así reformado por ley Nº. 2737 de 12 de mayor de 1961). 
 
Ecuador 1978 Artículo 29.- Todos los ecuatorianos tienen derecho a la seguridad 
social, que comprende: 
1. El seguro social que tiene como objetivo proteger al asegurado y a 
su familia en los casos de enfermedad, maternidad, desocupación, 
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invalidez, vejez y muerte. Se financiará con el aporte equitativo del 
Estado, de los empleadores y asegurados. 
Se procurará extenderlo a toda la población. 
El seguro social es un derecho irrenunciable de los trabajadores. Se 
aplicará mediante una institución autónoma; en sus organismos 
directivos tendrán representación igual el Estado, los empleadores y 
los asegurados. Los fondos y reservas del seguro social, que son 
propios y distintos de los del Fisco, no se destinarán a otros fines que 
a los de su creación y funciones. 
Las prestaciones del seguro social en dinero no serán susceptibles de 
cesión, embargo o retención, salvo los casos de alimentos debidos 
por ley o de obligaciones contraídas a favor de la institución 
aseguradora, y estarán exentas de impuestos fiscales y municipales. 
El Estado y el Seguro Social adoptarán las medidas para facilitar la 
afiliación voluntaria; y, para poner en vigencia la afiliación del 
trabajador agrícola; 
2. La atención a la salud de la población de las ciudades y el campo, 
por medio de la socialización de la medicina, de los diferentes 
organismos encargados de su ejecución y de la creación de la 
correspondiente infraestructura, de acuerdo con la ley; la aplicación 
de programas tendentes a eliminar el alcoholismo y otras 
toxicomanías y a disminuir la mortalidad infantil; y, 
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3. La asistencia social, establecida y regulada por el Estado, de 
acuerdo con la ley. 
 
 1993, 
1996 
New addition as #3:  
3. la aplicación de programas tendentes a eliminar el alcoholismo y 
otras toxicomanías y a disminuir la mortalidad infantil; y, 
4. La asistencia social, establecida y regulada por el Estado, de 
acuerdo con la ley. 
 
 1998 Sección cuarta. De la salud 
Artículo 42.- El Estado garantizará el derecho a la salud, su 
promoción y protección, por medio del desarrollo de la seguridad 
alimentaria, la provisión de agua potable y saneamiento básico, el 
fomento de ambientes saludables en lo familiar, laboral y 
comunitario, y la posibilidad de acceso permanente e ininterrumpido 
a servicios de salud, conforme a los principios de equidad, 
universalidad, solidaridad, calidad y eficiencia. 
Artículo 43.- Los programas y acciones de salud pública serán 
gratuitos para todos. Los servicios públicos de atención médica, lo 
serán para las personas que los necesiten. Por ningún motivo se 
negará la atención de emergencia en los establecimientos públicos o 
privados. 
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El Estado promoverá la cultura por la salud y la vida, con énfasis en 
la educación alimentaria y nutricional de madres y niños, y en la 
salud sexual y reproductiva, mediante la participación de la sociedad 
y la colaboración de los medios de comunicación social. 
Adoptará programas tendentes a eliminar el alcoholismo y otras 
toxicomanías. 
Artículo 44.- El Estado formulará la política nacional de salud y 
vigilará su aplicación; controlará el funcionamiento de las entidades 
del sector; reconocerá, respetará y promoverá el desarrollo de las 
medicinas tradicional y alternativa, cuyo ejercicio será regulado por 
la ley, e impulsará el avance científico-tecnológico en el área de la 
salud, con sujeción a principios bioéticos. 
Artículo 45.- El Estado organizará un sistema nacional de salud, que 
se integrará con las entidades públicas, autónomas, privadas y 
comunitarias del sector. Funcionará de manera descentralizada, 
desconcentrada y participativa. 
Artículo 46.- El financiamiento de las entidades públicas del sistema 
nacional de salud provendrá de aportes obligatorios, suficientes y 
oportunos del Presupuesto General del Estado, de personas que 
ocupen sus servicios y que tengan capacidad de contribución 
económica y de otras fuentes que señale la ley. 
La asignación fiscal para salud pública se incrementará anualmente 
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en el mismo porcentaje en que aumenten los ingresos corrientes 
totales del presupuesto del gobierno central. No habrá reducciones 
presupuestarias en esta materia. 
 
Sección sexta. De la Seguridad Social 
Artículo 55.- La seguridad social será deber del Estado y derecho 
irrenunciable de todos sus habitantes. Se prestará con la 
participación de los sectores público y privado, de conformidad con 
la ley. 
Artículo 56.- Se establece el sistema nacional de seguridad social. La 
seguridad social se regirá por los principios de solidaridad, 
obligatoriedad, universalidad, equidad, eficiencia, subsidiaridad y 
suficiencia, para la atención de las necesidades individuales y 
colectivas, en procura del bien común. 
Artículo 57.- El seguro general obligatorio cubrirá las contingencias 
de enfermedad, maternidad, riesgos del trabajo, cesantía, vejez, 
invalidez, discapacidad y muerte. 
La protección del seguro general obligatorio se extenderá 
progresivamente a toda la población urbana y rural, con relación de 
dependencia laboral o sin ella, conforme lo permitan las condiciones 
generales del sistema. 
El seguro general obligatorio será derecho irrenunciable e 
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imprescriptible de los trabajadores y sus familias. 
Artículo 58.- La prestación del seguro general obligatorio será 
responsabilidad del Instituto Ecuatoriano de Seguridad Social, 
entidad autónoma dirigida por un organismo técnico administrativo, 
integrado tripartita y paritariamente por representantes d e 
asegurados, empleadores y Estado, quienes serán designados de 
acuerdo con la ley. 
Su organización y gestión se regirán por los criterios de eficiencia, 
descentralización y desconcentración, y sus prestaciones serán 
oportunas, suficientes y de calidad. 
Podrá crear y promover la formación de instituciones 
administradoras de recursos para fortalecer el sistema previsional y 
mejorar la atención de la salud de los afiliados y sus familias. 
La fuerza pública podrá tener entidades de seguridad social. 
Artículo 59.- Los aportes y contribuciones del Estado para el seguro 
general obligatorio deberán constar anualmente en el presupuesto 
general del Estado, y serán transferidos oportuna y obligatoriamente 
a través del Banco Central del Ecuador. 
Las prestaciones del seguro social en dinero no serán susceptibles de 
cesión, embargo o retención, salvo los casos de alimentos debidos 
por ley o de obligaciones contraídas a favor de la institución 
aseguradora y estarán exentas del pago de impuestos. 
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No podrá crearse ninguna prestación ni mejorar las existentes a 
cargo del seguro general obligatorio, si no se encontraren 
debidamente financiadas, según estudios actuariales. 
Los fondos y reservas del seguro social serán propios y distintos de 
los del Estado, y servirán para cumplir adecuadamente los fines de 
su creación y funciones. Ninguna institución del Estado podrá 
intervenir en sus fondos y reservas ni afectar su patrimonio. 
Las inversiones del Instituto Ecuatoriano de Seguridad Social con 
recursos provenientes del seguro general obligatorio, serán 
realizadas a través del mercado financiero, con sujeción a los 
principios de eficiencia, seguridad y rentabilidad, y se harán por 
medio de una comisión técnica nombrada por el organismo técnico 
administrativo del Instituto Ecuatoriano de Seguridad Social. La 
idoneidad de sus miembros será aprobada por la superintendencia 
bajo cuya responsabilidad esté la supervisión de las actividades de 
seguros, que también regulará y controlará la calidad de esas 
inversiones. 
Las pensiones por jubilación deberán ajustarse anualmente, según las 
disponibilidades del fondo respectivo, el cual se capitalizará para 
garantizar una pensión acorde con las necesidades básicas de 
sustentación y costo de vida. 
Artículo 60.- El seguro social campesino será un régimen especial 
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del seguro general obligatorio para proteger a la población rural y al 
pescador artesanal del país. Se financiará con el aporte solidario de 
los asegurados y empleadores del sistema nacional de seguridad 
social, la aportación diferenciada de las familias protegidas y las 
asignaciones fiscales que garanticen su fortalecimiento y desarrollo. 
Ofrecerá prestaciones de salud, y protección contra las contingencias 
de invalidez, discapacidad, vejez y muerte. 
Los seguros públicos y privados que forman parte del sistema 
nacional de seguridad social, contribuirán obligatoriamente al 
financiamiento del seguro social campesino a través del Instituto 
Ecuatoriano de Seguridad Social, conforme lo determine la ley. 
Artículo 61.- Los seguros complementarios estarán orientados a 
proteger contingencias de seguridad social no cubiertas por el seguro 
general obligatorio o a mejorar sus prestaciones, y serán de carácter 
opcional. Se financiarán con el aporte de los asegurados, y los 
empleadores podrán efectuar aportes voluntarios. Serán 
administrados por entidades públicas, privadas o mixtas, reguladas 
por la ley. 
 
Mexico 1917 Título sexto. Del trabajo y de previsión social 
Artículo 123.- El Congreso de la Unión, sin contravenir a las bases 
siguientes, deberá expedir leyes sobre el trabajo, las cuales regirán: 
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[…] 
XXIX. Se considera de utilidad pública la expedición de la Ley del 
Seguro Social, y ella comprenderá seguros de invalidez, de vida, de 
cesación involuntario del trabajo, de enfermedades y accidentes y 
otros con fines análogos; 
 1998 XXIX. Es de utilidad pública la Ley del Seguro Social, y ella 
comprenderá seguros de invalidez, de vejez, de vida, de cesación 
involuntaria del trabajo, de enfermedades y accidentes, de servicios 
de guardería y cualquier otro encaminado a la protección y bienestar 
de los trabajadores, campesinos, no asalariados y otros sectores 
sociales y sus familiares; 
 
Peru 1979 Capítulo III. De la seguridad social, salud y bienestar 
Artículo 12.- El Estado garantiza el derecho de todos a la Seguridad 
Social. La ley regula el acceso progresivo a ella y su financiación. 
Artículo 13.- La Seguridad Social tiene como objeto cubrir los 
riesgos de enfermedad, maternidad, invalidez, desempleo, accidente, 
vejez, muerte, viudez, orfandad y cualquier otra contingencia 
susceptible de ser amparada conforme a ley. 
Artículo 14.- Una institución autónoma y descentralizada, con 
personería de derecho público y con fondos y reservas propios 
aportados obligatoriamente por el Estado, empleadores y asegurados, 
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tiene a su cargo la seguridad social de los trabajadores y sus 
familiares. 
Dichos fondos no pueden ser destinados a fines distintos de los de su 
creación, bajo responsabilidad. 
La institución es gobernada por representantes del Estado, de los 
empleadores y de los asegurados en igual número. La preside el 
elegido entre los representantes del Estado. 
La asistencia y las prestaciones médico-asistenciales son directas y 
libres. 
La existencia de otras entidades públicas o privadas en el campo de 
los seguros no es incompatible con la mencionada institución, 
siempre que ofrezca prestaciones mejores o adicionales y haya 
consentimiento de los asegurados. La ley regula su funcionamiento. 
El Estado regula la actividad de otras entidades que tengan a su 
cargo la Seguridad Social de los sectores de la población no 
comprendido en este Artículo. 
Artículo 15.- Todos tienen derecho a la protección de la salud 
integral y el deber de participar en la promoción y defensa de su 
salud, la de su medio familiar y de la comunidad. 
Artículo 16.- El Poder Ejecutivo señala la política nacional de salud. 
Controla y supervisa su aplicación. Fomenta las iniciativas 
destinadas a ampliar la cobertura y calidad de los servicios de salud 
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dentro de un régimen pluralista. 
Es responsable de la organización de un sistema nacional 
descentralizado y desconcentrado, que planifica y coordina la 
atención integral de la salud a través de organismos públicos y 
privados, y que facilita a todos el acceso igualitario a sus servicios, 
en calidad adecuada y con tendencia a la gratuidad. 
La ley norma su organización y funciones. 
[…] 
Artículo 20.- Las pensiones de los trabajadores públicos y privados 
que cesan temporal o definitivamente en el trabajo son reajustadas 
periódicamente teniendo en cuenta el costo de vida y las 
posibilidades de la economía nacional, de acuerdo a ley. 
 
 1993 Capítulo II. De los derechos sociales y económicos 
Artículo 4.- La comunidad y el Estado protegen especialmente al 
niño, al adolescente, a la madre y al anciano en situación de 
abandono. También protegen a la familia y promueven el 
matrimonio. Reconocen a estos últimos como institutos naturales y 
fundamentales de la sociedad. 
La forma de matrimonio y las causas de separación y de disolución 
son regulados por la ley. 
Artículo 5.- La unión establece de un varón y una mujer, libres de 
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impedimento matrimonial, que forman un hogar de hecho, da lugar a 
una comunidad de bienes sujeta al régimen de la sociedad de 
gananciales en cuanto sea aplicable. 
Artículo 6.- La política nacional de población tiene como objetivo 
difundir y promover la paternidad y maternidad responsables. 
Reconoce el derecho de las familias y de las personas a decidir. En 
tal sentido, el Estado asegura los programas de educación y la 
información adecuados y el acceso a los medios, que no afectan la 
vida o la salud. 
Es deber y derecho de los padres alimentar, educar y dar seguridad a 
sus hijos. Los hijos tienen el deber de respetar y asistir a sus padres. 
Todos los hijos tienen iguales derechos y deberes. Está prohibida 
toda mención sobre el estado civil de los padres y sobre la naturaleza 
de la filiación en los registros civiles y en cualquier otro documento 
de identidad. 
Artículo 7.- Todos tienen derecho a la protección de su salud, la del 
medio familiar y de la comunidad así como el deber de contribuir a 
su promoción y defensa. La persona incapacitada para valor por sí 
misma a causa de una deficiencia física o mental tiene derecho al 
respeto de su dignidad y a un régimen legal de protección, atención, 
readaptación y seguridad. 
Artículo 8.- El Estado combate y sanciona el tráfico ilícito de drogas. 
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Así mismo, regula el uso de los tóxicos sociales. 
Artículo 9.- El Estado determina la política nacional de salud. El 
Poder Ejecutivo norma y supervisa su aplicación. Es responsable de 
diseñarla y conducirla en forma plural y descentralizadora para 
facilitar a todos el acceso equitativo a los servicios de salud. 
Artículo 10.- El Estado reconoce el derecho universal y progresivo 
de toda persona a la seguridad social, para su protección frente a las 
contingencias que precise la ley y para la elevación de su calidad de 
vida. 
Artículo 11.- El Estado garantiza el libre acceso a prestaciones de 
salud y a pensiones, a través de entidades políticas, privadas o 
mixtas. Supervisa así mismo su eficaz funcionamiento. 
Artículo 12.- Los fondos y las reservas de la seguridad social son 
intangibles. Los recursos se aplican en la forma y bajo la 
responsabilidad que señala la ley. 
 
Uruguay 1967 Artículo 67.- Las jubilaciones generales y seguros sociales se 
organizarán en forma de garantizar a todos los trabajadores, 
patronos, empleados y obreros, retiros adecuados y subsidios para 
los casos de accidentes, enfermedad, invalidez, desocupación 
forzosa, etc.; y a sus familias, en caso de muerte, la pensión 
correspondiente. La pensión a la vejez constituye un derecho para el 
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que llegue al límite de la edad productiva después de larga 
permanencia en el país y carezca de recursos para subvenir a sus 
necesidades vitales. 
Venezuela 1961 Artículo 94.- En forma progresiva se desarrollará un sistema de 
seguridad social tendente a proteger a todos los habitantes de la 
República contra infortunios del trabajo, enfermedad, invalidez, 
vejez, muerte, desempleo, y cualesquiera otros riesgos que puedan 
ser objeto de previsión social, así como contra las cargas derivadas 
de la vida familiar. 
Quienes carezcan de medios económicos y no están en condiciones 
de procurárselos tendrán derecho a la asistencia social mientras sean 
incorporados al sistema de seguridad social. 
 
 1999 Artículo 80.- El Estado garantizará a los ancianos y ancianas el pleno 
ejercicio de sus derechos y garantías. El Estado, con la participación 
solidaria de las familias y la sociedad, está obligado a respetar su 
dignidad humana, su autonomía y les garantizará atención integral y 
los beneficios de la seguridad social que eleven y aseguren su 
calidad de vida. Las pensiones y jubilaciones otorgadas mediante el 
sistema de seguridad social no podrán ser inferiores al salario 
mínimo urbano. A los ancianos y ancianas se les garantizará el 
derecho a un trabajo acorde a aquellos y aquellas que manifiesten su 
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deseo y estén en capacidad para ello. 
Artículo 83.- La salud es un derecho social fundamental, obligación 
del Estado, que lo garantizará como parte del derecho a la vida. El 
Estado promoverá y desarrollará políticas orientadas a elevar la 
calidad de vida, el bienestar colectivo y el acceso a los servicios. 
Todas las personas tienen derecho a la protección de la salud, así 
como el deber de participar activamente en su promoción y defensa, 
y el de cumplir con las medidas sanitarias y de saneamiento que 
establezca la ley, de conformidad con los tratados y convenios 
internacionales suscritos y ratificados por la República. 
Artículo 84.- Para garantizar el derecho a la salud, el Estado creará, 
ejercerá la rectoría y gestionará un sistema público nacional de 
salud, de carácter intersectorial, descentralizado y participativo, 
integrado al sistema de seguridad social, regido por los principios de 
gratuidad, universalidad, integralidad, equidad, integración social y 
solidaridad. El sistema público de salud dará prioridad a la 
promoción de la salud y a la prevención de las enfermedades, 
garantizando tratamiento oportuno y rehabilitación de calidad. Los 
bienes y servicios públicos de salud son propiedad del Estado y no 
podrán ser privatizados. La comunidad organizada tiene el derecho y 
el deber de participar en la toma de decisiones sobre la planificación, 
ejecución y control de la política específica en las instituciones 
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públicas de salud. 
Artículo 85.- El financiamiento del sistema público de salud es 
obligación del Estado, que integrará los recursos fiscales, las 
cotizaciones obligatorias de la seguridad social y cualquier otra 
fuente de financiamiento que determine la ley. El Estado garantizará 
un presupuesto para la salud que permita cumplir con los objetivos 
de la política sanitaria. En coordinación con las universidades y los 
centros de investigación, se promoverá y desarrollará una política 
nacional de formación de profesionales, técnicos y técnicas y una 
industria nacional de producción de insumos para la salud. El Estado 
regulará las instituciones públicas y privadas de salud. 
Artículo 86.- Toda persona tiene derecho a la seguridad social como 
servicio público de carácter no lucrativo, que garantice la salud y 
asegure protección en contingencias de maternidad, paternidad, 
enfermedad, invalidez, enfermedades catastróficas, discapacidad, 
necesidades especiales, riesgos laborales, pérdida de empleo, 
desempleo, vejez, viudedad, orfandad, vivienda, cargas derivadas de 
la vida familiar y cualquier otra circunstancia de previsión social. El 
Estado tiene la obligación de asegurar la efectividad de este derecho, 
creando un sistema de seguridad social universal, integral, de 
financiamiento solidario, unitario, eficiente y participativo, de 
contribuciones directas o indirectas. La ausencia de capacidad 
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contributiva no será motivo para excluir a las personas de su 
protección. Los recursos financieros de la seguridad social no podrán 
ser destinados a otros fines. Las cotizaciones obligatorias que 
realicen los trabajadores y las trabajadoras para cubrir los servicios 
médicos y asistenciales y demás beneficios de la seguridad social 
podrán ser administrados sólo con fines sociales bajo la rectoría del 
Estado. Los remanentes netos del capital destinado a la salud, la 
educación y la seguridad social se acumularán a los fines de su 
distribución y contribución en esos servicios. El sistema de 
seguridad social será regulado por una ley orgánica especial. 
[…] 
Artículo 92.- Todos los trabajadores y trabajadoras tienen derecho a 
prestaciones sociales que les recompensen la antigüedad en el 
servicio y los amparen en caso de cesantía. El salario y las 
prestaciones sociales son créditos laborales de exigibilidad 
inmediata. Toda mora en su pago genera intereses, los cuales 
constituyen deudas de valor y gozarán de los mismos privilegios y 
garantías de la deuda principal. 
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APPENDIX C 
CHRONOLOGY OF REFORMS 
ARGENTINA 
1984 Structural expansion (HC, aborted). An initiative from the Alfonsín administration to 
create a National Health Insurance that would extend coverage to the whole population, 
funded partly through general revenue and partly with a share of payroll deductions 
going to obras sociales, is defeated in congress under pressures from unions and 
associations of doctors and hospitals (McGuire 2010). 
1994a Structural retrenchment (P). Structural pension reform creates a mixed system 
(Alonso 2000, Arza 2009, Brooks 2009, Madrid 2003, Etchemendy 2011). 
1994b Parametric expansion (SA). Programa de Pensiones Asistenciales (unconditional, 
means-tested cash transfer). Controlled by the Ministry of Social Development. 
Eligibility criteria: 1) person above 70 years; 2) living in towns of up to 30 thousand 
inhabitants; 3) not being a beneficiary of Desarrollo Humano Oportunidades or accept 
to be suspended from that program. Selection of beneficiaries is geographic. 75 229 
beneficiaries in 2009 . 
1995 Parametric retrenchment (SS). Government lowered business contributions to social 
security. The CGT called a general strike in 1995, and government and unions finally 
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agreed to keep the tax reductions for all the social security payments but the one 
contributing to the unions’ health system –the employers’ tax that goes to the unions’ 
account was reduced only 16%, while the  business contribution to the unemployment 
fund was lowered by 52% (Etchemendy 2004, p. 285; Cook 1998, p.330) (Etchemendy 
2011). 
1996a Parametric expansion (HC, frustrated application). Programa Médico Obligatorio. 
Created by a decree of the Ministry of Health. According to the decree, all obras 
sociales and private insurers would have to provide to each client a minimum set of 
medical services –including checkups, diagnoses, treatment, dentistry and drugs; those 
providers unwilling or unable to guarantee such benefits could be legally obliged to 
merge with other insurers, but the norm did not explicitly define any mechanism to deal 
with insurers failing to fund any of the services comprising the basic package, and, 
unlike the Chilean AUGE, the PMO only covered insured persons). By 2002 more than 
60% of insurers were noncompliant, and the Duhalde and Kirchner administrations had 
to declare “national health emergency,” raise the health insurance premiums, and 
implement new public health care programs prioritizing prevention and primary care 
(McGuire 2010). 
1996b Parametric retrenchment (SA). Introduces means tests for family allowances. 
1997a Parametric expansion (P). Law 24.347 grants housewives the option of voluntarily 
participating in the Basic Pension System.  
 Law 24. 828 allows them to contribute to an individual account, which  entitles them, 
on the basis of a modest investment, to the benefits provided by the capital 
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accumulation scheme -- ordinary retirement pensions, invalidity retirement pensions 
and survivors' pensions -- but does not include medical coverage. 
1997b Parametric expansion (SA). Plan Jefas y Jefes de Hogar Desocupados (CCT). 
Developed from a short-term safety net intervention into two social protection and 
workfare schemes since 2006. Follows a workfare model, with employment and job-
seeking criteria. The scheme is managed through a network of job centers at 
municipality level. Eligibility criteria: unemployed household heads with at least one 
dependent under 18; pregnant women, and disabled children. Recipients must be 
engaged in one of the following activities: a training program, community work for up 
to 20 hours per week , or work for a private company. Coverage fell steadily to 1.7 
million by 2004 and 1 million in 2006. In 2007 the federal government provided funds 
for the continuity of the program and the number of recipients continues to be closed to 
1,6 million households. In 2005 about 93.3% of recipients were poor, 57.3% were 
indigent. In 2009 70% of beneficiaries belonged to the poorest 25% of the population  
2000 Parametric retrenchment (P). Law No. 25.362 sets up an ordinary early retirement 
scheme for former public service employees who worked for the National Public 
Administration, centralized and non-centralized organizations, state enterprises, public 
entities and provincial bodies (implemented in January 2001). Such employees 
previously contributed to the Public Social Security Scheme (Régimen Previsional 
Público). 
2002a Parametric expansion (P). Decrees No. 1387/0, No. 1676/01 and No. 2203/2002. 
Reduction in the monthly employee contributions to the old-age insurance schemes, 
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with the goal of stimulating private consumption.  Nevertheless, as this reduction 
affected too seriously Social Security resources, one month later this decree was 
modified by another decree providing for the application of the reduction only for 
dependent workers affiliated to the individual capitalization scheme. 
2002b Parametric retrenchment (SA). Law 24.714. Changes affecting family benefits: 1) 
child benefit can no longer be granted for the child or children of the beneficiary's 
spouse, i.e. the benefit can only be granted to the parents, adopting parents or the person 
in charge of the guardianship of the child or the children; 2) extension of coverage for 
disabled children benefit; 3) makes possible to receive a single payment corresponding 
to school allowances at any time of the year for children studying in institutes that 
provide remedial courses or special education. 
2002c Parametric expansion (SA). Programa Jefes y Jefas de Hogares Desempleados 
(program of monetary support for the unemployed,  funded partially with a loan of the 
World Bank and partially with export taxes (Riggirozzi 2010). “Initially, the project 
sought to be a universal and temporary program, but it became permanent and did not 
achieve universal coverage, having only reached approximately seventy percent of the 
unemployed. This limitation gave rise to projects being implemented in a clientelistic 
fashion through intermediaries (approximately 15 percent going to piquetero 
organizations and the rest channeled through political brokers (Filgueira et al).” The 
Duhalde administration brought the number of beneficiaries from 700.000 to 2 million.  
In 2007, at the end of the Kirchner administration the number of beneficiaries was 2.6 
million (Svampa 2008). 
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2003 Parametric expansion (SA)Plan Remediar (distributes basic medicines to the poorest 
population).  
Parametric expansion (P). Plan Mayores relaxes eligibility for non-contributive 
pensions. 
2004a Parametric expansion (HC). Plan Nacer, initially targeting expectant and new 
mothers and children under six lacking health insurance and living in one of nine 
impoverished provinces. By signing up to the program, any person matching those 
conditions became eligible to receive free of charge a package of 80 health 
interventions oriented at the reduction of maternal and child mortality. The Funded 
jointly by the World Bank and the Health Ministry, the program was implemented by 
provincial governments through the purchase of services from public and private 
providers. The number of beneficiaries climbed from 40,000 in October 2004 to 
450,000 in June 2007 (McGuire 2010). 
2004b Parametric expansion (P). Ley de moratoria provisional (flexibilization of payment 
conditions for independent workers). (Busquets 2012). 
2004c Parametric expansion (P, one-time measure). A fixed amount of ARS 200 is paid for 
to all beneficiaries of old-age, invalidity and survivors' benefits in order to enhance the 
redistribution of national income and to supplement minimum benefits, on an 
exceptional basis, since the amount of taxes collected did not make it possible to make 
any permanent increase in benefits. 
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2004d Parametric expansion (SA). Programa de Familias para la Inclusión Social. 
Integrated, nation-wide poverty-reduction program managed by the Ministery of Social 
Development. It focuses on large urban centers. Has two components: (1) an income 
transfer to households, provided that the household income does not exceed the 
minimum wage; 2) promotion of family and community through four areas- education, 
health, occupation training and community and citizenship development. Selection of 
beneficiaries  
2007  Parametric expansion (P). Reform of the pension system allows individual to return 
from the private to the public system (Huber & Stephens 2009, 185). Although the 
structure of pillars is maintained, greater significance is given to the public pay-as-you-
go pillar. New workers are automatically enrolled into the public pay-as-you-go system, 
instead of the individual capitalization scheme. 
2008 Structural expansion (P, post-retrenchment). Law 26.425. Public reaproppriation of 
pension funds, suppression of individual capitalization, and creation of the Sistema 
Integrado Previsional Argentino. Reform is approved with the votes of Peronism, 
Socialist Party, and part of the Coalición Civica-ARI. According to Mesa-Lago, results 
from a concertation process that took place in 2001 were not taken into account. 
(Busquets 2012, Datz 2012, Mesa-Lago 2009, Datz and Dancsi 2013, Arza 2012). 
Funds transferred may only be used to pay benefits from the public pay-as-you-go 
system, and will be invested according to the same conditions that govern the individual 
capitalization scheme, with the prohibition of investing in foreign securities; the 
Argentinean state guarantees members and beneficiaries of the individual capitalization 
scheme the provision of the same or higher benefits and pensions; contribution years 
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accumulated under the individual capitalization scheme will be the same as if they had 
been accumulated under the public pay-as-you-go system.  
2009 Parametric expansion (SS). Universalization of child allowance Administered by 
Ministries of Labor and Social Protection. Upper age-limit of 18 years, but no limit 
applies to handicapped children; the child must be a member of a family group that is 
unemployed or active in the informal economy, whose income is less than the minimum 
wage (ARS 1,400 a month). The program aims at covering about 70-80% of children 
with no benefits from previously existing family allowances (Pribble 2013).. 
2011 Structural expansion (HC, frustrated implementation). Ley de Medicina Prepaga. 
(Presidential initiative, approved by Congress with 190 votes in support of the law, 
none against, and 29 abstentions). The healthcare bill gives an increased role to the 
federal government in health insurance companies' policies and creates new obligations 
for the private medical system in Argentina, to which approximately 4.5 million middle 
and upper-middle class citizens subscribe. The new rules state that health insurers must: 
1) accept clients with pre-existing conditions and/or disabilities; 2) provide full care 
from the first day of coverage; 3) cover all illnesses listed in the Plan Médico 
Obligatorio; 4) not reject older insured persons based on age; 5) freeze premiums for 
clients over age 65 who have at least ten years of insurance coverage. (Private providers 
has responded stating that companies will not be able to maintain quality services due to 
rising costs and stricter rules). 
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BOLIVIA   
1985 Parametric expansion (SA, temporary).. Fondo Social de Emergencia, created to 
alleviate the social costs of economic adjustment by creating temporary jobs to relieve 
unemployment and create income. 
1990 Parametric expansión (SA, temporary). Fondo de Inversión Social replaces the FSE.  
1993 Parametric expansion (P, discontinued). BONOSOL: non-contributory retirement 
pension scheme for all Bolivians aged 65 and over (paid with earmarked resources from 
the privatization of state enterprises). 
1996a Parametric expansion (HC). Decentralization of the Public Health System. Seguro 
Nacional de Maternidad y Niñez (SNMN), covers pregnant women and children under 
5, with emphasis in rural areas and poor populations. 
1996b Parametric expansion (HC, limited implementation). Program of Support and 
Protection for Senior Citizens (65 and over), provides for treatment in National Health 
Fund Establishments. 
1997 Structural retrenchment (P). Pension reform: transforms the solidarity-based system 
in one of privately administered individual accounts. New systems is based in two 
schemes: the one individually funded with workers’ compulsory monthly contributions; 
and the collectively funded scheme, sustained with the dividends of the shares of 
privatized state enterprises, allocated to all Bolivians aged 21 and over. “Three key 
features are unique to the Bolivian pension reform: the link between pension reform and 
capitalization of state-owned enterprises, the introduction of a universal basic pension 
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benefit financed from the dividends from capitalization, and monopoly in private 
provision (Barrientos 2004).” 
1998a Parametric expansion (SA). Seguro Básico de Salud (SBN) replaces the SNMN. 
1998b Parametric expansion (P). Parametric pension reform gives pensioners two options for 
payment of their pension from the private pension fund administrators (AFPs). An 
individual will be able to elect either to invest her AFP account balance in an AFP-
managed account with pension payments to depend upon the performance of the fund, 
or to use their AFP account balance to purchase a life annuity from an approved 
insurance company. This annuity would be a fixed amount. BONOSOL is extended to 
all citizens aged over 21 on 31 December 1995.  
1998c Parametric expansion (P). Pensioners aged over 65 will receive BOLIVIDA 
(payments of around USD 90 a year).  
2001 Parametric expansión (SA). Plan Nacional para el Adulto Mayor (PNAM). 
2002 Parametric expansion (HC). Seguro Universal Materno Infantil (SUMI). (All these 
reforms to healthcare system will be evaluated as ineffectual). 
2003 Parametric expansion (P). BONOSOL is raised back to its original value. 
2006 Parametric expansion (SA). Bono Juancito Pinto (CCT). Aims at the promotion of 
accumulation of human capital as a way of breaking the intergenerational cycle of 
poverty, especially by encouraging the retention and completion of primary school 
children in public schools. Supports households to cover costs of study materials, 
transportation and food, and t incurred by sending children to school and to lower 
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school dropout rates. All households receive 200 Bolivianos per child and per year as 
vouchers. In 2009, 1.8 million children in public schools received a voucher to purchase 
school supplies and other materials . In 2008: it was reported that about 660,165 
children in rural areas and more than one million in urban areas received the grant.  
2007 Parametric expansion (SA). Law 3791. Institutes Renta Dignidad (CCT), to be 
implemented in 2008. Lifetime benefit for old people who do not qualify for a 
retirement pension. Financed by direct oil tax. Distributes to citizens reaching 60 years 
of age, an income transfer from the proceeds of the privatisation of utilities. Preserves 
the non-contributory nature of the Bonosol scheme. From 2007, annual payment 
increased from US$258 to US$344. Selection of beneficiaries is categorical 
2008 Structural expansion (SS). The new constitution mandates the public administration of 
social security. 
2009a Parametric expansion (P). Minimum retirement age is lowered from 65 to 60. 
2009b Parametric expansion (SA). Bono Madre Nino and Bono Juana Azurduy. 
Administered by the Ministry of Health. Aims to reduce the rate of infant and maternal 
mortality and the rate of chronic malnutrition amongst children aged 0-2 years. By the 
end of 2009, the government intended to reach 250,000 mothers and spend up to USD 
25 millions.  
2010 Structural expansion (P, reversal of retrenchment). Law 065 (to be implemented in 
2011). Re-unifies the system under public administration; creates new pillar 
guaranteeing a minimum benefit; increases pension benefits; lowers the minimum 
388 
 
retirement age (60 to 58); reinstates employers’ contribution (3%); integrates Renta 
Dignidad as basic universal non-contributive pension; expands financial base through 
additional contributions by employers and general revenue; special conditions for 
mining workers. Voted by the MAS, after obtaining the support of the COB. Business 
organizations criticized the reform arguing that it is not financially sustainable 
(Busquets 2012).  
 
BRAZIL 
1966 Structural expansion (SS). The creation of FUNRURAL extends health and retirement 
insurance to rural workers. “Funded by taxes on agricultural wholesalers and on the 
payrolls of urban firms, [the fund] … was the first Brazilian social insurance program to 
break with the principle that benefits should depend on contributions (McGuire 2010, 
160-161).” 
1972 Parametric expansion (SS). Health and retirement insurance for self-employed and 
domestic workers. 
1974 Institutional reorganization. The Instituto Nacional da Previdéncia Social is placed 
within the orbit of a new Ministry of Social Security and Social Assistance (MPAS). 
1976 Parametric expansion (HC). Program to Expand Health and Sanitation Activities in 
the Interior (PIASS). Funded by the national Ministry of Health, the INAMPS, and state 
health secretaries. Based on teams of health workers that distributed food, provided 
basic curative care, immunized children, and referred clients to health centers in cases 
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needing inpatient care. Initially focused on the Northeast, in 1979 it began to expand to 
other areas, but do to several organizational limitations, it never covered more than 25 
percent of its target population.306 
1977 Institutional reorganization (SS). The health insurance branch of the MPAS splits off 
and becomes the National Security Medical Assistance Institute (INAMPS).307 
1987 Parametric expansion (HC).The state of Ceará introduces the Community Health 
Agents Program, that the Primary Care Movement will persuade the Ministry of Health 
to scale up to the national level  in 1991. 
1988 Structural expansion (P, HC). The new federal Constitution stipulates a universal 
right to health (Art. 6) and requires the state to substantiate that right through the 
creation of a Sistema Unificado de Saúde (Arts. 196-202). It also creates a unified 
budget for pensions, social assistance benefits, and health care. 
1990 Structural expansion (HC, implements constitutional reform). Creation of the 
Sistema Unificado de Saúde mandated by the 1988 constitution. The unified system is 
financed both by payroll deductions and by general tax funds, “ending the formal 
distinction in health services provision between those eligible for usually higher-quality 
health care funded by contributory health insurance, and those eligible only for the 
                                                 
306 PIASS built a large number of health centers and health posts in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but their patronage 
hiring, poor service quality, and underutilization attenuated their benefits for the poor (McGuire 2010: 166).” 
 
307 “The INAMPS had some health care facilities of  its own, but for the most part, like the Argentine obras sociales, it 
signed contracts with private providers, first on the basis of fee-for –service arrangements and then, after 1991, 
according to a prospective payment system like that of Medicare in the United States. […] By 1978, 81 percent of public 
health care spending passed through the contributory system, and only 19 percent through the Ministry of Health 
(McGuire 2010: 161-163).”  
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usually lower-quality health care funded by general tax revenue (McGuire 2010: 162-
163).” Although the new system transferred administrative control of service provision 
to state and municipal governments, the funding for services came mostly through the 
federal Ministry of Health, which also kept strategic decision-making centralized and 
maintained oversight of decentralized administrations.308  
1991a Structural retrenchment (P, aborted). The Economy Ministry elaborated a project of 
constitutional amendment aiming to scale back privileged benefits and privatized social 
insurance above an income level of three to five times the minimum wage. The project 
faced strong opposition in Congress –including parliamentarians aligned with the 
government, and the executive finally eliminated this component from the package of 
constitutional amendments finally submitted to Congress in October 1991 (Weyland 
1995a). 
1991b Parametric expansion (HC). Programa de Agentes Comunitarios da Saúde 
(PACS).Initially created as a response to a cholera epidemic in the Amazon, it 
replicated the model developed in Ceará, based on proactive outreach instead of 
passive, facility-based care. In 1992 it was extended to the Northeast, to deal with 
another cholera epidemic. 
1991c Parametric expansion (SA). Previdéncia Rural. Inconditional cash transfer (social 
pension) targeting informal rural workers. Mandated by 1988 constitutional reform, 
                                                 
308 Health providers from the private sector and civil servants with a stake in the old system, formed a coalition with 
some clientelist politicians, that delayed the completion of the transition toward the unified system; however, the process 
was finally consolidated in 1993 with the complete absorption of the INAMPS by the Ministry of health (Fleury, 
Belmartino, and Baris 2000, McGuire 2010, Weyland 1996a). 
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replaces and upgrades programs from the 70s like FUNRURAL. The transfer is 
equivalent to the minimum wage in Brazil, regardless of their previous salary, , and is 
tax financed. The value of transfers cannot be less than the minimum wage (R$415,00 
in 2008), or higher than the maximum contribution salary limit (R$3,038.99 in 2008). A 
critical feature is the combination of social insurance and social assistance for the 
elderly under a single regime. The Informal workers in agriculture, mining, and fishing 
are entitled to a transfer from age 55 for women and 60 for men without a documented 
work/contribution history. 7.5 million beneficiaries (2008) Selection of beneficiaries is 
categorical –age and informality 
1992 Structural retrenchment (P, aborted). New officials placed by Collor in the direction 
of the social security administration who had worked for private insurance companies 
elaborate a new project to partially privatize pension insurance. The initiative found 
fierce resistance at all levels –civil society, parliament, and the state apparatus 
(especially from bureaucrats at the MPAS). The government never even submitted it to 
congress (Weyland 1995a). 
1993a Parametric retrenchment (P, aborted). In occasion of the constitutional revision, 
Finance Minister FHC sends a package combining progressive (restrictions on length-
of-service pensions; reduction of entitlements of privileged sectors, like military and 
public employees) and regressive (redefinition of social insurance as social welfare) 
elements. The initiative found strong opposition from unions, left-leaning parties, and 
even centrist and conservative legislators concerned about a reduction of patronage 
shortly before a congressional election. The executive did not push too hard either. 
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1993b Parametric expansion (SA). Beneficio de Prestacao Continuada. Means-tested 
monthly cash transfer for individuals 65 and over in situation of poverty (replaced and 
upgraded the Renda Mensual Vitalicia). Large non- means-tested transfer to the elderly 
and people with disabilities. The transfer is made on a regular basis income The 
eligibility age was reduced from 70 to 67 in 1998 and to 65 in 2004. People with 
disabilities and a family per capita income of less than one quarter of the minimum 
wage are eligible.  At the end of 2005, about 2.1 million people were receiving BPC 
payments. Selection of beneficiaries is means-tested and categorical.  
1994 Parametric expansion (HC). The PACS is subsumed by the Programa de Saúde 
Familiar(PSF), which was not conceived as an add-on program, but as a universal one, 
designed to constitute the main port of entry to the Unified Health System for the entire 
population.309 
1998a Parametric expansion (HC). Creation of Agencia Nacional de Saúde Suplementar 
(ANSS) -up to this moment, private health insurance had remained almost entirely 
unregulated. The new agency was placed under the authority of the Ministry of Health, 
a decision fiercely disputed by the minister of finance (Arretche 2004).  
1998b Parametric retrenchment (P). Constitutional amendment No. 20 establishes 
parametric adjustments in the pension scheme for private sector workers (increase in 
contribution ceiling, phasing-out of early retirement and removal of the benefit formula 
from the Constitution. In the pension scheme for public employees, phasing-in to age 
limits (60 and 55 years old). The dominant perspective behind the changes was fiscal. 
                                                 
309 See McGuire (2010: 169). 
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1999 Parametric retrenchment (P). Law 9.876. Due to consideration of the political costs 
that a second constitutional amendment in less than a year would have, changes focused 
on the only relevant subject that was removed from the constitution –the benefit 
formula for pensions of private sector. There was, however, some elements of 
equalization, resulting from the introduction of the social security factor (Caetano 
2009). No changes affecting scheme for public employees. 
2000 Parametric expansion (HC). Constitutional amendment obliges all government levels 
to spend specified proportions of their budgets in health care. The initiative came from a 
legislator of the Workers’ Party, who got the support of the health policy community 
and built a broad alliance in the legislature (Arretche 2004). 
2001 Parametric expansion (SA). Bolsa Escola (scales up to the national level conditional 
cash transfer programs implemented at the municipal since 1995 in order to pay 
mothers a subsidy to keep their children in school). 
2003a Parametric expansion (SA). Bolsa Familia (consolidates in a single program Bolsa 
Escola and cash transfer programs designed to help poor families buy food and cooking 
gas). Two main objectives: (1) to reduce hunger, poverty and inequality through an 
income transfers linked with educational, health and nutrition services; (2) to reduce 
social exclusion by facilitating the empowerment of poor and vulnerable households. 
Targeting through means test, using a database of vulnerable households applying for 
support  Municipalities are allocated with beneficiary quotas, based on poverty 
estimates using the annual national household income survey.  
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2003b Parametric expansion (P, reduces stratification). Constitutional amendment 41. This 
round had more clear distributive goals than the two previous one (harmonization of 
regimes for private and public workers310; introduction of contribution rates for those 
pensioners in the public sector scheme with higher benefits; and a series of transitional 
rules that concentrated the burden of the reform on the younger generations . 
2005 Parametric retrenchment (P). Constitutional amendment 47 introduces several 
parametric adjustments in the pension scheme for public employees (reduction in 
replacement rate for some benefits, change in benefit formula and pension indexation, 
stricter transitional rules).  
 
CHILE 
1981a Structural retrenchment (P). Privatization of pension system (Antía and Provasi 
Lanzara 2011, Borzutzky 2002). 
1981b Structural retrenchment (HC). Health care reform creates dual system (Borzutzky 
2002, Mesa-Lago 2005). 
2004 Parametric expansion (SA). Chile Solidario Provides transfers, services and psycho-
social assistance to vulnerable households. Implemented by municipalities, includes 
access to social services in areas of healthcare, education, employment, housing and 
justice. The second component consists of income transfers. Explicitly designed as a 
                                                 
310 The possibility of a unification of the system was completely out of the question, since it would have triggered a 
strong resistance from local and state governments, as a result of the drainage of fiscal resources that it would represent 
for them.  
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bridge to facilitate access to other social programs. The underlying principle emphasizes 
both individual and public responsibility. Households in extreme poverty, for which the 
program provides preferential access to the national, regional and local network of 
social transfers and services, depending on the specific characteristics and needs. 221 
thousand beneficiary households (1.1 million individuals) in 2008. 47% of beneficiaries 
were poor. Beneficiaries are selected by a proxy means test(Huber and Stephens 2012, 
Pribble 2013). 
2005 Structural expansion (HC). Plan AUGE (Acceso Universal con Garantías Explícitas), 
offering all Chileans protection for fifty-six major illnesses, with equal quality of care 
and financial protection, regardless of income (McGuire 2010, Pribble 2006). 
2006 Parametric expansion (SA). Government launches an initiative of reform that includes 
the creation of a Solidarity Pensions System (Antía and Provasi Lanzara 2011) Provides 
old-age and disability benefits that are integrated with other benefits included in an 
individual account system. Any individual belonging to the poorest 60% of the 
population and meeting the age and residence criteria is eligible for to receive benefits. 
The scheme aims at minimizing the risk of poverty in old-age or in the event of 
disability. Categorical transfer targeted at people aged 65 and over, or disabled aged 18 
and over, with household income below US$60 a month. Over 700,000 people are 
beneficiaries Reached in 2009 an estimated 40% of the most vulnerable groups. 
Selection of beneficiaries through a proxy means test. 
2008 Parametric expansion (P, post-retrenchment). Law 20.255. A “re-reform” of the 
pension system with four main components: a) creation of new solidarity pillar and 
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strengthening of the contributive one by making contributions mandatory to self-
employed and incentives for low-income workers; b) reduction of gender inequities; c) 
incentives to competition resulting in a decrease of commissions; d) flexibilization of 
regulation of investment by funds administrators. The project, however, was watered-
down in the Senate –the initial one approved by the Chamber included the creation of a 
state-run AFP. However, the final version was approved with support from the whole 
political spectrum, after extensive negotiations in both legislative chambers (Busquets 
2012, Huber and Stephens 2012, Pribble 2013). 
2010 Parametric expansion (HC). Extension of illnesses covered by AUGE (Pribble 2013). 
 
COLOMBIA 
1970s Institutional reorganization (HC). Creation of a National Health System, “with a 
highly centralized structure and a powerful Ministry of Health at its apex (Yepes 
2000).” The system included three subsectors: 1) private subsector mainly serving the 
wealthy groups; 2) social security program, funded by contributions from workers (one 
third) and employers (two thirds)concentrated in the main urban areas, and whose 
coverage was never above 25 percent; 3) public sector, basically serving the poor and 
uninsured.311 
1983-93 Institutional reorganization (HC). Series of decrees and laws aiming to decentralize 
the system, “paved the way for a comprehensive decentralization process with political, 
                                                 
311 Yepes (2000: 164-167) provides a good description of the pre-reform configuration of the health system. 
 
397 
 
administrative and fiscal components, incorporated as a constitutional mandate in the 
new Constitution of 1991 (Ramírez 2004, Yepes 2000).” 
1993 Structural expansion (HC, constitutional reform). Law 100/93, following the 
mandates of the 1991 Constitution, created an integrated social security system 
including health care and pensions. The reform is based on the generalization of social 
insurance as the basic principle for the reorganization of healthcare and pensions 
through the creation of two subsystems –contributory and subsidized respectively [see 
description in Fleury (1998)]. 
 In the area of health care, it creates the Sistema General de Seguridad Social en Salud 
(SGSSS). Based on a model of “structured pluralism”312, the reform created “a health 
insurance system based on demand subsidies that provides universal coverage through a 
market of multiple insurers and providers competing within a regulatory framework 
defined by and under the stewardship of the government (Uribe 2004, Mesa-Lago 
2005).”  
 Actually, the discussion of the law began in 1991, within the context of the process of 
constitutional reform. Although the executive initially intended to limit itself to 
introduce a proposal for pension reform, diverse pressures from the legislative branch 
led to the inclusion of health care as a component of an integrated social security 
system.  Accoring to (Uribe 2004), four main positions could be identified at that early 
point: 
                                                 
312 On the concept of “structured pluralism” see Londono & Frenk (2000). 
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1. The Instituto del Seguro Social (ISS) accepted the opening of competition 
among providers, favored the preservation of governmental  monopoly on the 
collection of contributions and the pooling of mandatory payroll taxes. 
2. Labor unions and professional associations proposed an arrangement 
resembling the British model, concentrating all the resources in a single 
healthcare system based on the public hospital network. 
3. Health Ministry was in favor of strict state regulation and fiscal centralization, 
but combined with the decentralization of insurance and service providers. 
4. The Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP) introduced a proposal 
close to the Chilean model, including a dual system that separated the public 
and private sub-sectors; however, it would switch to a model of universal 
insurance with regulated competition among private and public insurers and 
providers. Both the resignation of the president of the ISS and the 
reassignment of the deputy director of the DNP contributed to unify the 
executive around the latter position, facilitating legislative consensus. 
1994 Structural retrenchment (P). Law 100. Structural pension reform creates a parallel 
system. The initial proposal eliminated the defined benefits system, leveled the benefits 
of all systems by 2004, and excluded only the military from the standard regime. The 
final product of legislative discussion, made the defined contribution regime not 
mandatory for  new entrants and offered it only as an alternative to the defined benefits 
one. Workers can either choose to remain in a reformed defined benefit PAYG scheme 
or move to the privately-managed system. Participation in individual retirement 
accounts is voluntary for new workers, who are allowed to switch between both 
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systems. Separate systems are maintained for civil servants and other groups of 
workers. High-income workers have an additional contribution that finances a 
Solidarity Pension Fund –used to pay social assistance benefits and to finance a subsidy 
to match contributions of low-income workers in the contributory defined benefit 
scheme. The new scheme is supervised by the Superintendence of Banks and the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Bertranou, Calvo, and Bertranou 2009).  
2000 Parametric expansion (SA). Familias en Acción (CCT). It complements the income of 
poor households with small children, in order to promote human capital formation. The 
government has expanded the program to cover the entire country as part of the 
National Development Plan (2006- 2010). Geographic targeting used only in about 10 
large urban areas (e.g. in Bogota); means tests are used for household targeting in 
smaller urban areas. 
2001 Parametric expansion (HC, one-time decision). Exceptional measures are decreed by 
the Health Secretary and the President of the National Council for Social Security in 
Health in order to guarantee health insurance benefits in case of revocation of the 
license of a pension scheme administrator (Administradora del Régimen Subsidiado) for 
lack of compliance.  
2002 Parametric retrenchment (P, aborted by constitutional court). Parametric reform: 
contributions went from 13.5 to 15.5 % of wages; the minimum required number of 
weeks of contribution was increased and the replacement ratio reduced gradually; new 
public workers are forced to remain in the public pension system for at least 3 initial 
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years. The change of the minimum number of weeks of contribution was rejected by the 
constitutional court (Cárdenas, Junguito, and Pachón 2008).  
2003 Parametric expansion (P, rejected in referendum). Referendum on the proposal of 
elimination of all exempt and special public sector pensions regime and enrollment of 
all new entrants in the general pension regime as of 2008. The proposal was rejected  
(Cárdenas, Junguito, and Pachón 2008). 
2005 Parametric expansion (P). Constitutional reform defines the specific responsibility of 
the State to guarantee the social security rights of present and future generations and to 
ensure the financial sustainability of the social security system in a framework of full 
respect for acquired rights. Among the most important aspects of the reform: no pension 
may be lower than the minimum wage; special pension schemes are abolished as from 
31 July 2010, with the exception of those employed in the public service, teachers and 
the President of the Republic; sets monthly ceiling for pensions paid out of public 
resources shall be 25 times the minimum monthly wage 
2007 Parametric expansion (SA). Juntos. Integrated poverty reduction program. Aims at 
incorporating poor households into relevant social services, providing counseling and 
establishing a framework of co-responsibility to meet a set of minimum standards. 
Benefits households beneficiaries of “Familias en Acción” as well as displaced people 
that are registered in the Information System for Displaced Population “RUPD”. There 
is a set of minimum standards (or goals) that guide inter-institutional efforts.  
2009 Parametric expansion (P). Law 1328. Modifies the country's system of individual 
retirement accounts broadening  the system's investment rules and providing coverage 
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for workers who do not meet the requirements for a minimum benefit under the public 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system or the individual account system. 
 
COSTA RICA 
1995 Structural expansion (HC). Organizational reform of the entire health care system 
transfers all primary health care centers from the health ministry to the Social Security 
Fund. Creation of EBAIS. 
2000 Structural retrenchment (P). Ley de Protección del Trabajador, established a mixed 
pension system that began to operate in 2001 (Huber & Stephens 2009, 185). Coverage 
is made mandatory for the self-employed. 
2001 Parametric expansion (SA). Superémonos (CCT). 
2003 Parametric expansion (SA). Reform of non-contributory income-tested pensions 
setting this benefit at no less than half of the minimum pension of the contributory 
system. 
2005 Parametric retrenchment (P). Parametric reform of pension system. Aiming to 
guarantee the long-term solvency of the system, introduces changes to the first pillar of 
the national old-age, disability and survivors program, mainly in contribution rates and 
in the benefit formula. Workers over age 55 were not affected. Transition rules defined 
for workers between 45 and 55. The combined contribution rate of workers, employers 
and the State will gradually increase from 7.5 per cent of earnings up to 10.5 per cent by 
2035, and some more restrictive rules are introduced for the calculation of benefits. A 
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new scheme to define the percentage of the basic pension will be favorable to those 
with low incomes. Some conditions for early retirement are made more flexible. A 
separate disability benefit (50% of the full disability benefit) was setup for workers 
aged 48 and over with at least five years of contributions. For all other workers, the 
requirement of 10 years of contributions remains. The formula was worked out with a 
vast participation of other State bodies and representatives from trade unions, 
employers, cooperatives, General Superintendence of Pensions, National Institute of 
Women, and the International Labour Organization. (Bertranou, Calvo, and Bertranou 
2009) 
2006 Parametric expansion (SA). Avancemos. Income transfer plus program controlled by 
the Ministry of Education. Includes a system of scholarships and an income transfer 
aimed to reduce poverty. Supports poor households with young members, on the 
condition that youngsters attend school. Aims to reduce poverty in the short run while 
fostering long-term poverty alleviation through increased educational attainment. 
Children aged 0–14, including street children, and pregnant women in extreme poverty 
are eligible.  
 
ECUADOR 
1994 Parametric expansion (HC, implementation long delayed & still incomplete). Ley 
de Maternidad Gratuita y Atención a la Infancia, providing free healthcare to any 
woman during pregnancy, labor and delivery, and postpartum. Funding only began to 
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be provided in 1999. After 6 amendments, it was mandated in 2002 with 90 days to 
comply (Ruiz Chiriboga 2009). 
1998 Parametric expansion (SA). Bono Solidario (UCT; becomes CCT in 2003, as the Bono 
de Desarrollo Humano). 
2001 Structural retrenchment (P, reversed by constitutional court). Creation of a mixed 
pension system. Pensions would be drawn from a scheme based on solidarity between 
generations and a compulsory individual savings scheme. All insured persons aged 
under 40 when the law comes into force will be required to join the new scheme. New 
entrants to the labor market who are required to sign up with the Instituto Ecuatoriano 
de Seguridad Social (IESS) will also be obliged to join the mixed scheme irrespective 
of their age, with the exception of those covered by the insurance scheme for 
agricultural workers (Seguro Social Campesino).Initially programmed to become 
operative in 2003, then postponed to 2004, finally declared unconstitutional in 2005 
(Mesa-Lago 2004). 
2002 Structural expansion (HC, not implemented). Ley Orgánica del Sistema Nacional de 
Salud.  
2003 Parametric expansion (SA). Bono de Desarrollo Humano (CCT, replaces Bono 
Solidario). Pays monthly means-tested benefits to poor households with children, 
elderly and the disabled.  The main goal is the reduction of levels of chronic 
malnutrition and preventable diseases in children up to 5 years of age, and to maintain 
school enrollment for beneficiary children ages 6-16. 246 thousand beneficiary 
households in 2009.  
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2005 Structural expansion (P, reversal of pension reform). The Constitutional Tribunal of 
Ecuador declares the 2001 legislation unconstitutional. This decision is based on the 
fact that the mechanisms described in the constitution clearly indicate that actuarial 
studies must be carried out and the financial statements and balance sheets of the 
Ecuadorian Social Security Institutions updated, before a regulation of this kind can be 
introduced.  
2009 Parametric expansion (P). Multiple adjustments in pensions regime: 1) annual 
adjustments of benefits according to the increase in inflation over the prior 12 months; 
2) sets up a monthly minimum pension equal to the national minimum wage for workers 
with 40 years of contributions; 3) for workers with fewer years of contributions, the 
benefit is a percentage of the full monthly minimum pension, ranging from 50 percent 
of this minimum for workers with up to 10 years to 90 percent for those with between 
36 and 39 years; 4) establishes an income test for workers who collect a pension and 
remain in the labor force.  
2011 Structural expansion (SS, not implemented). Programa de Protección Social 
(Nehring 2012). 
 
MEXICO 
1984 Institutional reorganization (HC, incompletely implemented; then reversed). Ley 
General de Salud. Creation of a National Health System as an institutional framework 
for the formulation of a coordinated health care policy. Facilities of the Ministry of 
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Health were decentralized and merged at the state level with those belonging to the 
IMSS’s Programa Solidaridad, to create autonomous state-level health systems. The 
Ministry of Health was given responsibility for the formulation and coordination of that 
policy –this implied an important change in the balance of power between the ministry 
and the IMSS. Creation of a health cabinet at the national level. Although it did not 
directly opposed a reform personally backed by the president, the IMSS formed a 
powerful coalition including governors reluctant to take new fiscal responsibilities and 
IMSS employees resisting their transference to the Ministry of Health. After two years, 
and in a context of economic crisis and political unrest, president de la Madrid 
interrupted the decentralization process when 14 out of 32 states had implemented it. 
 Without amending the decentralization law, the Salinas administration reversed the 
process in practical terms by going back to the previous centralized management of the 
budget without making distinctions between reformed and not-reformed state-level 
health administrations (Brachet-Márquez 2007a, González Rossetti 2004). 
1986 Parametric retrenchment (P). Reduction of state contribution to the IMSS (from 
12.5% to 5%), compensated by an equivalent increase in employers’ contribution 
(Brachet-Márquez 2007a). 
1991 Parametric expansion (SA). Programa de Apoyo a los Servicios de Salud para la 
Población no Asegurada, that distributed 250 million dollars from international loans 
among the four poorest states, in an effort to compensate the gap among poor and rich 
states in terms of financial capacity to contribute to the decentralized health care 
system. 
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1992 a Structural retrenchment (P). Congress reformed the Law of Social Security, creating 
the Sistema de Ahorros para el Retiro, based on supplementary individual accounts. It 
was a partial reform, resulting from the rejection by unions of the initial governmental 
proposal, that included the full privatization of the system (including ISSSTE). In spite 
of initial opposition, CTM legislators ended voting for the modified bill (Brachet-
Márquez 2007a, Murillo 2001). 
1992b Parametric expansion (SA). PRONASOL (Cornelius et al. 1994, Bertranou 1993). See 
PROGRESA. 
1995 Structural retrenchment (P). Ley del Seguro Social (to be implemented in 1997). 
Includes reforms affecting both health insurance and pensions managed by the IMSS, 
but prioritizes and has more serious consequences for the latter. Changes in the pensions 
system affects private sector workers enrolled after 1997. There is an extension of the 
period of contribution necessary to have the right to a pension. Insurance against 
disability and death (the two subsystems most severely affected by deficit) are 
maintained within the orbit of the IMSS, with its previous. Unemployment and old-age 
insurance (the financially solvent components) are transformed from a PAYG, defined-
benefits one, into one based on individual savings accounts administered by private 
banks and insurance companies. The state increases its participation (from 5% to 
13.85%, and guarantees a minimum pension equal to the minimum wage (Bertranou 
1998, Brooks 2009, Madrid 2003). 
Due to successful lobbying by unions among PRI legislators during the process of 
parliamentary discussion, both the scope and depth of the health care components of the 
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law were considerably limited. The main aspects of the original proposal from the 
executive that were approved were the creation of the Seguro de Salud para la Familia, 
and  the modification of the quotas of tripartite funding of the IMSS by increasing 
governmental contribution (from 5% to 41.5% of the total contribution per worker; 
employers contribute in the same proportion as the state, and workers cover the 
remaining 17%). The IMSS union was able to exert further influence during the process 
of implementation, when the reform gravitated back into the IMSS arena. There, the 
union focused on opposing the new opt-out option, that allowed employers to provide 
health services directly to their employees through providers other than the IMSS –the 
secondary law needed for the actual implementation of the option was never submitted 
for approval. The development of other aspects related to service provision -like 
decentralization, family doctor eligibility, use of performance incentives, and 
contracting out- was kept in pilot phase (Brachet-Márquez 2007a, González Rossetti 
2004). Although the Seguro de Salud para la Familia also intended to open the access 
to the system for informal workers, the contribution required was too high for most 
workers in the sector and the expansion of coverage in this direction was negligible. 
1997 Parametric expansion (SA, reformulates existing program). PROGRESA –a 
program to support poor households with small children in rural areas- replaces 
PRONASOL (Borges Sugiyama 2011). Provides income transfers to poor households 
on the condition that they send their children to school and attend regular health 
checkups. Began operations in rural areas but it was extended to urban areas in 2003. 
An extension to additional urban areas in 2009 has been made with some additional 
training and microenterprise support components. Currently reaches 5 million 
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households (3.5 million of which live in rural areas), representing 25% of Mexico’s 
population or about 25 million beneficiaries. 72% of beneficiaries are regarded as 
extremely poor. Three-stage selection procedure: (1) localities are identified through a 
poverty map; (2) extensive household surveys are conducted in the selected localities to 
gather data on a number of welfare indicators; and (3) data is then used to identify the 
beneficiaries according to a wealth index that determines who is in a state of extreme 
poverty. President Zedillo “initially avoided World Bank funding fro the program to 
ensure the program was perceived as domestic initiative rather than a ‘directive’ of the 
international financial institutions (Borges Sugiyama 2011, Dion 2010). 
1998 Institutional reorganization (HC). Parallel to the reform of the IMSS, there was a 
reactivation of the process initiated in the mid-1980s aiming to decentralize the services 
of the Ministry of Health for the uninsured  
2000a Parametric expansion (SA). PROGRESA is expanded to cover semi-urban and a few 
urban families. 
2000b Parametric expansion (SS, restricted to privileged regimes). The act defining 
conditions of the  the Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores 
del Estado (ISSSTE) is reformed to increase coverage for sickness and maternity 
insurance. 
2001 Parametric expansion (SA, recycles existing program). The Fox administration 
transforms PROGRESA into Oportunidades, accelerating its expansion in order to 
cover urban populations. “Oportunidades includes a cash transfer with three 
components: a household nutrition component, a school subsidy for each school-age 
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child rising by grade (at the secondary school level there is a higher subsidy for girls) 
and an annual transfer to cover school costs. […] Since its expansion, distribution of 
Oportunidades resources has continued to favor rural communities (71 percent), but 
now includes semi-urban (11.4 percent) and urban (17.6 percent) residents (Borges 
Sugiyama 2011).” 
2002 Parametric expansion (P). Amendment of the law of the Retirement Savings System 
(SAR) -the SAR consists of private defined contribution retirement schemes 
implemented through private pension fund administrators (Administradoras de Fondos 
para el Retiro, AFOREs) that establish and manage Investment Funds Specialized in 
Retirement Savings (Sociedades de Inversión Especializadas de Fondos para el Retiro, 
SIEFOREs). The main reform elements are related to coverage, investment of assets 
and commissions. The reform opens the system to self-employed persons, federal 
workers and, subject to certain conditions, to the employees of states, municipalities and 
public entities. It also introduces greater investment flexibility and potential for asset 
diversification. 
2003 Parametric expansion (HC). Creation of Seguro Popular de Salud, which intends to 
extend coverage to the population lacking pre-payment capacity. Provides a basic 
package of health care services and medicines for the uninsured population. A system of 
pre-payment with categories defined according to levels of income –access is free for 
some sections of the poor lacking formal employment.  
2004 Parametric expansion (P, reduces stratification through retrenchment). Law by the 
Congress establishes that new employees of the IMSS will be enrolled into a mandatory 
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contributive private pension plan –the preservation of the IMSS’s workers special 
retirement program had been part of the compensations agreed to by the government in 
1995 in order to appease unions opposing privatization (Meyer and Marier 2005). 
 Pension funds are allowed to partially diversify their investments –until then, only 
investment in government instruments was allowed. 
 
2005 Parametric expansion (P). To expand pension coverage, the self-employed were 
allowed to set up individual retirement accounts. Authorization for two new pension 
fund-management companies, which allowed millions of low-income workers not 
covered by social security to set up individual retirement accounts with one of them. 
 Parametric expansion (P). To stimulate competition among private fund managers, 
workers are allowed to switch to a company charging lower administrative fees at any 
time, rather than just once a year (Bertranou, Calvo, and Bertranou 2009). 
2006 Parametric expansion (SA). Non-contributory pension program for elderly over 70. 
2008 Parametric retrenchment (P). All new public sector employees are required to join 
the funded scheme. Those already working in the public sector and under age 46 had the 
option to join a new pension fund manager or to remain in the PAYG scheme and 
receive a recognition bond for the value of their accrued rights.  
 Pension fund managers are no longer allowed to charge account holders a fee on their 
monthly contributions; they can only charge a fee on the IRA balances (Bertranou, 
Calvo, and Bertranou 2009). 
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2009 Parametric expansion (SA). Programa de Apoyo Alimentario. Managed by the 
Secretary of Social Development. The goal is improvement in the nutritional status of 
deprived households which are no recipients of Oportunidades. Eligibility: households 
living in targeted localities of up to 2,500 inhabitants across the country. Rural areas 
with medium level of marginality can be included. Operates across the 32 states of 
Mexico. In 2009 covered almost 26 million households.  
2012 Parametric adjustment (P). Reorganizes the regulation of the different types of 
pension funds. 
2013 Parametric expansion (SA). New non-contributory pension program that covers adults 
aged 65 or older who are residents of Mexico and receive no other public pension 
replaces and expands upon the 70 and According to the Social Development Secretariat 
or the Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (SEDESOL), the agency that administers these 
programs, some 2.5 million new beneficiaries will be added in 2013 for a total of 5.6 
million –the majority of which, having spent most of their working lives in the informal 
sector, have made few or no contributions to any pension system.  
  
PERU 
1991a Structural retrenchment (HC, aborted). A legislative decree creates Organizaciones 
de Servicios de Salud, intended to compete with the public sector in the provision of 
health care services. The project, however, was never implemented, due to the 
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opposition of organized labor, retired persons, and health care professionals (Ewig 
2004). 
1991b Parametric expansion (SA). Fondo Nacional de Compensación y Desarrollo Social 
(FONCODES). Created for the unified administration of poverty-relief programs, it 
lacked human resources and administrative capacity to distribute the funds it was 
allocated (Schady 2000, Segura-Ubiergo 2007).  
1993 Structural retrenchment (P). Structural pension reform creates a parallel private 
system (Cruz-Saco 1998, Mesa-Lago 2004, Segura-Ubiergo 2007, Weyland 2006, Arce 
2001). 
1994 Parametric retrenchment (HC). Simultaneous launching of Programa de Salud 
Básica para Todos (centralized, targeted a basic package of primary health care services 
to the poorest communities), and the Programa de Administracion Compartida (aiming 
to decentralize through the transference of the administration of local health posts to 
community representatives). Both programs had in common the integration of 
neoliberal principles and strategies, like the targeting of resources and the use of 
incentives to achieve greater efficiency, and both emphasized access to primary care for 
poor communities. However, “[a]lthough linked financially and later administratively 
within the ministry, the PSBT and CLAS programs, due to their opposing centralized 
and decentralized approaches and thus political implications, became competing and 
conflicting reforms within the overall public health system. Despite their contradictions 
[they]… were the backbone of the reconstruction and modernization of Peru’s public 
health system (Ewig 2004).” 
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1996 Structural retrenchment (HC). Law 26.790, de Modernización de la Seguridad Social 
en Salud (actually, protracted result of a project originally presented in 1991, to be 
implemented in 1997). Reforms the health system and divides it in three sectors, 
allowing private health care providers to compete with the public health social security 
system. 1) the Social Health Scheme (Seguro Social de Salud (SSS) is to be managed by 
the Instituto Peruano de Seguridad Social (IPSS) covers two classes of members. 
Ordinary members, for whom coverage will be compulsory, will be active workers in a 
dependent working relationship or associates of workers' cooperatives. People who are 
not eligible as ordinary members will be able to be covered as voluntary members. In 
addition, spouses, partners and dependent children are also covered; 2) complementary 
plans and programs will be provided by public or private organisations. Employers will 
be able to use their own infrastructure, where available, or to contract licensed 
Entidades Prestadoras de Salud (EPS) to provide services the extent of the services 
provided by employers is to be independent of the income level of workers, must 
include the treatment of employment injuries and cannot exclude the treatment of pre-
existing diseases; 3) the State Health Service will be an integrated service for people on 
low incomes who do not have access to other schemes. It will be administered by the 
Minister of Health. 
1997 Parametric expansion (SA). Seguro Escolar Gratuito, providing free health care 
coverage through the public health system to all chilcreen between preschool age and 
seventeen attending the public school system. Ewig characterizes it as “a presidential 
initiative motivated by populist presidential politics.” She also observes that, to the 
extent that the public school system is predominantly attended by poor people and the 
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lower classes, it constituted a targeted program. Its main objective, however, was 
related to education –it intended to provide an incentive for parents to send and keep 
their children in school. 
1998 Parametric expansion (HC, limited implementation). Seguro Materno Infantil. 
2000 Parametric expansion (HC). Fishermen and self-employed workers in the small-scale 
fisheries processing sector are allowed to become regular members of the health social 
security scheme (Seguro Social de Salud). 
2003 Parametric expansion (P). Creates a fund (Fondo para la Asistencia Previsional) in 
order to help to finance the payment of pensions under the public-sector scheme. This 
Fund is financed by solidarity contributions due by upper-income pensioners. 
2004a Parametric retrenchment (P). Constitutional reform law on pensions, aimed to close 
definitely for new entrants the special pension system for public employees and to limit 
the level of the pensions paid by the special system. The public employees covered 
under the special pension system, who do not qualify for a pension at the time of the 
implementation of the law, are transferred to the general pension system by choosing to 
contribute either to the social insurance scheme or to the individual accounts scheme.  
2004b Parametric expansion (P). The Social Security Commission of the Congress approves 
a reform allowing members of the privately managed pension system to switch to the 
publicly managed pension system. 
2005 Parametric expansion (SA). Juntos (CCT), a program of income transfers for poor 
rural households. Provide beneficiary households with nutritional support, health care, 
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education, and identification documents in order to improve maternal and child health 
status; decrease school dropouts; and promote registration and identification. US$ 30 
monthly grants to poor households on the condition to attend health checkups school 
and register personal identification.  
2006 Parametric mixed (P). Law No. 28971 modifies No. 26790 on the Modernization of 
the Social Health Insurance. The minimum monthly contribution base cannot be less 
than the minimum wage at the time of contribution; introduces stricter contribution 
requirements for employers; provides an allowance equal to average daily earnings over 
the 12 calendar months immediately prior to the month of the onset of disability instead 
of the previous 4 months as before. 
2007a Parametric expansion (P). Urgent presidential decree creates a complementary 
pension for insured persons under the Sistema Privado de Pensiones (SPP) whose 
pension income is less than the monthly minimum pension (the decree will benefit the 
pensioners who joined the SPP at an advanced age and were therefore unable to 
accumulate a comparable pension to the one they would have received under the 
Sistema Nacional de Pensiones. It targets a group of pensioners who ended up with 
pension income insufficient to their needs.  
2007b Parametric expansion (P). Law 28.991. Allows those who were not well-informed 
when they joined the private pensions system (SPP) created in 1992, or who have 
realized that it does not meet their needs or is inappropriate to their situation, to cancel 
their membership and return to the national pensions system (SNP) to which they 
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previously belonged and which would provide them with a minimum pension -those 
most directly concerned are older workers on low incomes.  
2010 Parametric expansion (SA). Monthly non-contributory pension for people over age 75 
living in extreme poverty who do not already have a pension. (According to Help Age 
International, about 42 per cent of people over age 75 are poor; only 7.8 per cent of 
those over age 60 receive any type of pension, thus making it necessary for older people 
to continue working. 
2011 Parametric expansion (SA). New means-tested, old-age program called Pensión 65 to 
be introduced in stages beginning in late 2011, starting with five of the country's poorest 
regions, extended gradually to the rest of the country by 2013. It provides PEN 
250 (USD 90) per month to individuals aged 65 or older in extreme poverty who do not 
receive any other government benefits. The Ministry of Social Inclusion and 
Development, a new government agency (to be established), will oversee the program. 
  
URUGUAY 
1985 Structural expansion (HC, aborted). Frustrated progressive health care reform 
negotiated at the CONAPRO (Busquets 1995, Moraes and Filgueira 1999). 
1986 Parametric expansion (SA). Programa de Pensiones No-Contributivas. Social pension 
targeting older (70 and above) or disabled poor excluded from social insurance (updates 
programs existing since the 1960s). Around 64,000 beneficiaries in 2009.  
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1987 Parametric retrenchment (P). Parametric reform of pension systems lowers the 
retirement salary, introduced incentives for later retirement were, changed the 
indexation system, and suppressed some privileged pensions (Papadópulos 1992). 
1989 Parametric expansion (P). Constitutional amendment approved by referendum 
changes the indexation system, establishing that pensions should be adjusted every four 
months according to changes in the average nominal salary (Papadópulos 1992). 
1990-92 Structural retrenchment (P, 3 aborted attempts). Three different projects aiming to 
introduce parametric reforms in order to improve the financial situation of the pension 
system were rejected by parliament (Papadópulos 2001). 
1995a Structural retrenchment (P). Law 16.713. Reform and partial privatization of the 
pension system. Introduces a mixed public and private system partially based on the 
Chilean model, with three levels of coverage (pay-as-you-go, defined benefit, funded by 
contributions from employees, their employers and the State; 
for those earning more than UYU 5,000 per month, compulsory savings held in 
individual accounts operated by private pension; voluntary level of private savings for 
those earning more than UYU 15,000 per month. The new system is obligatory for 
everyone under the age of 40. Those above that age will be able to choose between the 
old and the new systems. Pension rights acquired under the old system will not be 
affected. Benefits are payable at age 60 after 30 years of contribution. The package also 
gradually extends the age of retirement for men to 65 and for women to 60. Previously 
women could retire at age 55 and men at 60 (Papadópulos 2001). 
1995b Structural expansion (HC, aborted).  
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2004a Parametric expansion (P). Presidential decrees 281 & 291. Those covered by Pension 
Savings Fund Administrators (AFAPs) who were over 40 years of age on 1 April 1996 
may apply to leave their individual capital accumulation scheme and return to the public 
insurance scheme financed on the pay-as-you-go basis. This measure only applies to 
workers who, due to their income level, have been in the first level of the mixed 
retirement insurance system and who, without being subject to compulsory coverage, 
voluntarily opted for the individual capital accumulation scheme. Applications to leave 
the scheme will only be taken into consideration if errors are substantiated in the 
financial evaluation when opting for the scheme.  
2004b Parametric retrenchment (P). Law 17.738. Reforms the special pension system for 
university graduates with the introduction of a second voluntary pillar, in line with the 
provisions of the pension reform law voted in 1995 , which was first applied to the 
social insurance system for employees and self-employed persons run by the Social 
Insurance Bank. (The special pension system for university graduates, created in 1954 
was a defined benefit scheme with contributions paid at a flat rate according to 10 wage 
categories, that mainly provides old-age, disability and survivors benefits (sickness 
benefits can also be provided).  
2005 Structural expansion (HC). Law 17.930. Establishes bases for a Sistema Nacional 
Integrado de Salud and defines sources of financial resources. 
2006a Parametric expansion (P). Law 17.963. Introduces a series of incentives aiming to 
strengthen the financial viability of the system (Busquets 2012). 
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2006b Parametric expansión (SA). Plan de Asistencia Nacional a la Emergencia Social 
(PANES, CCT). Transfers aiming to complement the incomes of poor families with 
small children are distributed bi-monthly. Includes a household transfer (Ingreso 
ciudadano), food transfers, public works, and micro-enterprise development. Around 
140 thousand beneficiary households received Ingreso Ciudadano until 2007, when 
they were transferred to the reformed Asignación Familiar. 
2007a Parametric expansion (SA). Plan Equidad. Replaced PANES, but keeps some of it 
short-term assistentialism, combined with an attempt to reformulate the social state on 
universalist basis. Intended to cover all children in the country, its main beneficiaries 
are women living alone or who are household heads. It includes a non-contributory cash 
transfer extended to encompass ninety-five percent of families living below the poverty 
line, the extension of retirement benefits, and diverse actions with the goal of improving 
educational results (Filgueira et al). In 2005 there were 522 thousand beneficiaries.  
2007b Structural expansion (HC, part of process started in 2005). Law 18.131. Creates the 
Fondo Nacional de Salud (FONASA). 
2007c Institutional reorganization (HC). Law 18.161. Decentralization of the 
Administración de Servicios de Salud del Estado (ASSE). 
2007d Structural expansion (HC, part of process started in 2005). Law 18.211. Creates the 
Sistema Nacional Integrado de Salud (SNIS). 
2008a Parametric expansion (P). Law 18.395 relaxes conditions of eligibility for retirement 
pensions, with legislative support from all parties (Busquets 2012, Pribble 2013). 200?  
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2008b Structural expansion (SS). Unification of family allowances among formal and 
informal sector workers (Pribble 2013). 
 
VENEZUELA 
1989 Parametric expansion (SA). Plan de Enfrentamiento a la Pobreza. Designed by a 
presidential committee for the Perez administration to compensate the main recessive 
effects of the economic adjustment on the poorest sectors of society. It was focalized, 
de-centralized, temporary and compensatory. Included alimentary for children at public 
schools, basic preventive health care, rural housing, etc. (Gutiérrez Briceño 2008). 
1994 Parametric expansion (SA, recycles established program). Programa de Solidaridad 
Social. Basically extends the design of the Plan de Enfrentamiento a la Pobreza under 
the Caldera administration (Gutiérrez Briceño 2008). 
1999 Structural retrenchment (P, reversed before implementation). Creates a mixed 
pension system –never applied in practice (Mesa-Lago 2004). The new program 
structure includes five areas to be run by separate agencies with the Labor and Social 
Security Ministries retaining overall management responsibility. In addition, an 
advisory body, the Social Security National Council, is established, to integrate 
representatives from government ministers, union and employer organizations, 
recipients and professional associations. The social security system continues to be 
financed by employers, employees and the government, but the bulk of the financial 
resources is to be managed under the concept of individual capitalization. No cross-
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subsidies between programs will be permitted. Coverage will be mandatory for all 
private and public employees (except the armed forces), self-employed people, retirees, 
surviving spouses and eligible dependents. The existing Instituto Venezolano de 
Seguridad Social) is to be abolished by 31 December 1999, at which time the new 
system and related structures are expected to be operational. 
2000a Reversal of structural retrenchment (P, restores system privatized on previous 
year). The Council of Ministers approves a budget of VEB 1,490,000 million for the 
year 2000 to help sustain and restore the Venezuelan Social Security Institute going in 
the opposite direction of plans made in the late 1990s which would have privatized the 
country's social security system (The 1998 framework law was not implemented. The 
law would have abolished the IVSS by 31 December 1999, introduced a system of 
pension schemes based on individual accounts, private saving funds in the area of 
housing and voluntary private coverage for supplementary health benefits (see entry no. 
1982 on these and other changes proposed at the time). The private sector is essentially 
eliminated from the provision of social benefits. 
2000b Parametric expansion (SA). Plan Bolivar 2000. Focused on assistance for the most 
vulnerable, it was oriented to “conjunctural  and localized social problems demanding 
an immediate response (Gutiérrez Briceño 2008).“ However, it also included some 
institutional re-engineering –suppression of the Ministry of the Family and creation of a 
Ministry of Health and Social Development (MSDS). 
2002 Parametric retrenchment (P, not implemented yet). Ley Orgánica de Seguridad 
Social. Maintains a public system of defined benefits and partial collective 
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capitalization;  allows an optional second pillar of individual capitalization (Mesa-Lago 
2004). The new system was supposed to begin to operate in 2007, but that has not 
occurred yet. 
2003 Parametric expansion (SA). Presidential decree creates mission Barrio Adentro, with 
an emphasis on basic and preventive health care for poor populations (Hawkins 2010). 
2006a Parametric expansion (P, one-time measure). Presidential decree 4.269. Creates an 
exceptional and temporary program to guarantee old age pensions to elders having 
contributed to the old system. Benefited 103.039 new pensioners (Fernández Salas 
2010). 
2006b Parametric expansion (SA). Presidential decree creates mission Madres de Barrio, to 
provide targeted social assistance to indigent mothers and female heads of household 
(Hawkins 2010). 
2007 Parametric expansion (P, one-time measure). Presidential decree 5.370. Creates a 
new exceptional and temporary program for the identification and access to old age 
pensions for 50.000  women over 65 years old. The decree also mandates the 
elaboration of a program allowing housewifes and domestic workers to contribute to the 
social security system, but that has not occurred yet (Fernández Salas 2010). 
2010 Parametric expansion (P, one-time measure). Presidential decree 4701. Creates a 
new exceptional and temporary program, similar to the one established in 2006 
(Fernández Salas 2010). 
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APPENDIX D 
TABLES SUMMARIZING CONTENTS OF REFORMS 
Table 41: Coding of variables 
AUTH Authoritarian interregnum with strong institutional discontinuity. 
CONS Consensual process of structural reform 
CORP Legacy of corporatist labor incorporation 
DEM Democratic regime during structural reform process 
DHYP Balance of payments crisis with hyperinflation 
EBA Embedded Bureaucratic Autonomy 
GIOP Governing party articulating a coalition of insiders and outsiders 
ICM Institutionalized concertation mechanism 
IUP Independent unions with organic connection to party 
LBPI Legacy of bi-partisan incorporation 
MSR Mixed structural reform 
NRPI Negotiated reform by coalition of agents of pluralist incorporation 
PPG Populist party in government 
PPO Populist party in opppositiongovernment 
RRSR Radical reversal of structural reform 
SEXP Structural expansion 
SHCE Structural healthcare expansion 
SHCR Structural healthcare retrenchment 
SPR Structural pension retrenchment 
SRD Structural retrenchment with institutional displacement 
TPC Third-party challenge 
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Table 42: Summary of reforms, by type 
 PARAMETRIC STRUCTURAL 
EXPANSION RETRENCHM. EXP. RET. 
HC P SA HC P SA HC P HC P 
ARGENTINA           
1984       X    
1994a          X 
1994b   X        
1995    X X      
1996a X          
1996b     X      
1997a  X         
1997b   X        
2000     X      
2002a  X         
2002b      X     
2002c   X        
2003   X        
2004a X          
2004b  X         
2004c  X2         
2004d   X        
2007  X         
2008        X   
2009 X X         
2011       X1    
           
BOLIVIA           
1985   X2        
1990   X3        
1993  X         
1996a X          
1996b X1          
1997          X 
1998a   X        
1998b  X         
1998c  X         
2001   X        
2002 X          
2003  X         
2006           
2007   X        
2008       X X   
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 PARAMETRIC STRUCTURAL 
EXPANSION RETRENCHM. EXP. RET. 
HC P SA HC P SA HC P HC P 
BOLIVIA (cont.)           
2009a  X         
2009b   X        
2010        X   
           
BRASIL           
1987 X          
1988       X X   
1990          
1991b X          
1991c   X        
1992     X3      
1993a     X3      
1993b   X        
1994 X          
1998a X          
1998b     X      
1999     X      
2000 X          
2001   X        
2003a   X        
2003b  X         
2005     X      
           
CHILE           
1981a          X 
1981b         X  
2004   X        
2005       X    
2006   X        
2008  X         
2010 X          
           
COLOMBIA           
1993       X    
1994          X 
2000   X        
2001 X2          
2003     X      
2005  X         
2007   X        
20090  X         
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 PARAMETRIC STRUCTURAL 
EXPANSION RETRENCHM. EXP. RET. 
HC P SA HC P SA HC P HC P 
COSTA RICA           
1995       X    
2000          X 
2001   X        
2003   X        
2005     X      
2006   X        
           
ECUADOR           
1994 X2          
1998   X        
2001          X 
2002       X4    
2003   X        
2005       X    
2009  X         
2011       X4 X4   
           
MEXICO           
1984       X    
1986     X      
1991   X        
1992a          X 
1992b   X        
1995          X 
1997   X        
1998 X          
2000a   X        
2000b  X         
2001   X        
2002  X         
2003 X          
2004           
2005  X         
2006   X        
2008     X      
2009   X        
2012     X      
2013   X        
           
PERU           
1991a         X1  
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 PARAMETRIC STRUCTURAL 
 EXPANSION RETRENCHM. EXP. RET. 
 HC P SA HC P SA HC P HC 
PERU (cont.)           
1991b           
1993          X 
1994    X       
1996         X  
1997 X          
1998 X2          
2000 X          
2003  X         
2004a     X      
2004b  X         
2005   X        
2006  X   X      
2007a  X3         
2007b  X         
2010   X        
2011   X        
           
URUGUAY           
1985   X    X1    
1986           
1987     X      
1989  X         
1990-92     X     X1 
1995a          X 
1995b       X1    
2004a  X         
2004b  X         
2005-07       X    
2006a  X         
2006b   X        
2007a   X        
2008a  X         
2008b          X5 
           
VENEZUELA           
1989   X        
1994   X        
1999          X6 
2000a  X         
2000b   X        
2002     X4      
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 EXPANSION RETRENCHM. EXP. RET. 
 HC P SA HC P SA HC P HC P 
VENEZUELA 
(cont.) 
          
2003   X        
2006a  X3         
2006b   X        
2007  X3         
2010  X3         
           
EXP.: Expansion; HC: Healthcare; P: Pensions; RET.: Retrenchment; SA: Social Assistance 
Notes: 
1 Aborted reform. 
2 Incomplete implementation/reversed through implementation 
3 One-time measure. 
4 Not implemented. 
5 Universal family allowance. 
6 Reversed before implementation. 
 
429 
 
Table 43: Number of reforms, by country 
  PARAMETRIC STRUCTURAL 
 EXPANSION RETRENCHMENT EXPANSION RETRENCH. 
N HC P SA HC P SA HC P HC P 
ARGENTINA 
Total 
Aborted 
Not implemented 
 
21 
 
3 
 
6 
 
5 
 
1 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
  
1 
BOLIVIA 
Total 
Aborted 
Not implemented 
 
17 
 
3 
 
5 
 
7 
 
 
   
1 
  
1 
BRAZIL 
Total 
Aborted 
 
17 
 
5 
 
1 
 
4 
 
0 
 
5 
2 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
  
CHILE 
Total 
 
7 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
    
1 
  
1 
 
1 
COLOMBIA 
Total 
Aborted 
 
8 
1 
 
1 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
COSTA RICA 
Total 
 
6 
 
0 
 
0 
 
3 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
ECUADOR 
Total 
Not implemented 
Reversed 
 
8 
3 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
3 
3 
 
1 
  
1 
 
1 
MEXICO 
Total 
Reversed 
 
 
20 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
8 
 
0 
 
4 
 
0 
 
1 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
2 
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  PARAMETRIC STRUCTURAL 
 EXPANSION RETRENCHMENT EXPANSION RETRENCH. 
N HC P SA HC P SA HC P HC P 
PERU 
Total 
Aborted 
Not implemented 
 
17 
1 
1 
 
3 
 
1 
 
5 
 
4 
 
1 
 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
1 
 
1 
URUGUAY 
Total 
Aborted 
 
17 
5 
 
0 
 
5 
 
3 
 
0 
 
2 
 
0 
 
3 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
4 
3 
VENEZUELA 
Total 
Reversed 
 
12 
1 
 
0 
 
4 
 
6 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
1 
1 
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Table 44: Scores for causal conditions 
 AUTH CORP DHYP EBA DEM GIOP ICM IUP LBPI PPG PPO TPC 
Argentina 
1984-99 
Pre-2003 
After 2003 
0 1 1 0 1  
0 
1 
0 0 0 1 
0 
 
1 
0 
Bolivia 
Pre-2005 
Post-2005 
2010 
0 0 1 0 1  
0 
1 
0 
 
 
1 
0 0 0 0 0 
Brazil 
1988 
Pre-2005 
Post-2005 
1 0 1 1 1  
0 
1 
 
1 
 
 
0 
1 
0 0 0 0 
Chile 
Previous 1990 
Post 1990 
1 0 1 1  
0 
1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Colombia 
1993 
0 0 0 0 1 0  
1 
0 1 0 0 1 
Costa Rica 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Ecuador 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mexico 
Pre-2000 
Post-2000 
0 1 0 0 0  
1 
0 
0 0 0  
1 
0 
 
0 
1 
0 
Peru 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Uruguay 
1995-2004 
Previous 2004 
Post-2004 
0 0 0  
0 
1 
1  
0 
1 
0 1 1 0 0 0 
1 
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Table 45: Classification of processes of structural reform according to inclusiveness 
REFORM 
INTEREST 
INCLUSIVENESS 
SUPRA-PARTISAN 
SUPPORT 
TYPE OF PROCESS 
Argentina 1994 Inclusive Yes Consensual 
Bolivia 1997 Exclusive No Factionalist 
Brazil 1988 Inclusive Yes Consensual 
Chile 1981 Exclusive No Factionalist 
Colombia 1993 Inclusive Yes Consensual 
Colombia 1995 Inclusive Yes Consensual 
Costa Rica Inclusive Yes Consensual 
Mexico 1992 Exclusive No Factionalist 
Mexico 1995 Exclusive No Factionalist 
Peru Exclusive No Factionalist 
Uruguay 1995 Exclusive Yes Elitist 
Uruguay 2005-07 Inclusive No Hegemonic 
Venezuela 1999 Exclusive Yes Elitist 
 
 433 
Table 46: Paradigmatic "waves" in the design of social assistance 
 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-13 
Non-
contributory 
pensions 
Chile 1981 Uruguay 1986 
Argentina 1994 
Brazil 1991, 1993 
  
Argentina 
2009 
Chile 2006 
Mexico 2006 
Peru 2010, 
2011 
Safety nets  
Bolivia 1985 
Venezuela 1989 
Bolivia 1990 
Mexico 1992 
Peru 1991, 1997 
Venezuela 1994 
Argentina 
1997 
Argentina 
2002 
 
CCTs    
Ecuador 1998 
Mexico 1997 
Argentina 
2003, 2004 
Brazil 2001, 
2003 
Chile 2004 
Colombia 
2000 
Costa Rica 
2001 
Ecuador 2003 
Mexico 2000, 
2001 
Venezuela 
2003 
Bolivia 2006, 
2009 
Colombia 
2007 
Costa Rica 
2006 
Peru 2007 
Uruguay 2006 
Venezuela 
2006 
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